Candida Phoenix philosophica

Lexicon

A companion to the original text
and English translation
155 entries with notes and indexes

Diotimos Editions
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How to use this lexicon

This companion to Candida Phoenix philosophica offers 155 substantial entries on the vocabulary, arguments, images, operations and named voices of the anonymous work. It is designed for reading alongside the Diotimos edition of the 1680 text. Each entry follows the term through particular passages rather than assigning one modern equivalent to every occurrence.

Entries are grouped into ten thematic parts and arranged alphabetically within each part. The contents lead to every entry. The alphabetical headword index brings the whole lexicon into one sequence; the original term index leads from selected attested German, Latin and other forms to the relevant discussions. Cross-references join entries that illuminate one another. The indexes are finding aids, not an exhaustive concordance.

Selected original forms appear beneath each headword. At a Glance identifies the word, its role in the book, the translation decision and a starting passage. Meaning establishes the local concept. Use in the book follows the argument. Places to read supplies exact passage identifiers and the printed pagination of the source. Connections relate other arguments or sources where the evidence supports them. Translation in this edition explains an English rendering; Attested forms records actual source wording. Cautions mark consequential limits. See also gives related headwords.

The locators I. and II. refer to the First and Second Parts of the original work. Thus II.077.2 is the second comparison unit beginning on printed p. 77. A locator may cover more than one printed page; its page span is stated beside it. PRE. locators refer to preliminary material and REG. locators to the registers. These identifiers are shared with the reading edition. The page numbers in entry references are those of the historical source, never the newly typeset book or lexicon.

Begin with Rainwater, Subject of the art and Universal and particular for the central causal argument. For the religious account, read Genesis, Blessing and command, the two Logos entries, Spirit and Providence. Body soul and spirit, the three philosophical principles and Separation explain the operative vocabulary. Knowledge and practice, Charity and Secrecy and publication clarify why the author teaches as he does.

Historical claims remain attributed to their speakers. A report of a cure, transmutation or natural event is not automatically the anonymous author's own experience, and his experience is not automatically a result independently verified for this edition. The entries identify conjecture, borrowed testimony and practical observation where the text allows that distinction. They explain historical medicine and operations without supplying present treatment advice or invented procedures.

The language of the work

The book joins Christian exegesis to a material natural philosophy. Its waters, seeds, spirits and principles belong to that joined account. Spiritual does not automatically mean immaterial. The created spirit over the waters is expressly distinguished from God the Holy Spirit. The Mercury, Sulphur and Salt of philosophical discourse must be distinguished from common substances and from the principles of particular bodies.

Rainwater is described as having received no particular blessing or command. This negative clause supports the argument for universality and must be preserved. Close kinship between rainwater and the Hermetic subject does not make the materials unrestricted substitutes: the text reports failed attempts to mix or fix them together. Likewise, a philosophical metal name can point toward universal matter without giving a complete modern identification of that matter.

The author is anonymous. Names cited in the text identify voices he invokes, not necessarily verified biographies or the final authorship of every pseudonymous alchemical work. The two Latin correspondents on light defend different positions. Entries preserve those differences rather than constructing a single doctrine out of contradictory passages.

The lexicon keeps the source's physical claims visible while explaining its theological and ethical purposes. It does not reduce the work to an exclusively psychological allegory, modern chemistry or a sequence of secret recipes. Where the author withholds practical handling, the entries describe the resulting boundary instead of filling it with conjecture.

Text and editorial method

The primary basis is the 1680 Wellcome witness of Candida Phoenix philosophica, represented by the checked original and English comparison corpus of the Diotimos reading edition. That witness contains the two numbered Parts, printed pp. 1–245, preliminary matter and the concluding registers. The Internet Archive derivative of the same witness supplies pages obscured by placeholders in the Wellcome download. It is a recovery of the same copy, not an independent textual witness.

Headwords include source vocabulary, English concept headings and named authorities. Original term lists record attested forms, including inflected forms; they do not pretend that every English headword occurs verbatim as an original lemma. Apparent synonyms receive separate entries only when the source supports a useful distinction. The volume exceeds one hundred entries because the text supports the wider coverage, not because a numerical target requires padding.

Passage identifiers, original forms, note markers and cross-references have been checked against the comparison corpus. Entries have also received an independent editorial reading for consequential attribution and conceptual distinctions. This is a reading companion based on one printed witness, not a critical collation of all editions or a claim to have independently collated every authority quoted by the anonymous author.

Prepared for Diotimos Editions with AI-assisted drafting, textual comparison, editorial review and format production. Translation choices and remaining uncertainties are stated in the relevant entries. No editor's personal identity, professional credentials or previously published English translation are implied.

Creation scripture and the Word

Blessing and command

Seegen und Befehl · particular Leben · τὸ operari

A particular charge within the universal creative Word

At a Glance

The word. The paired expression names God's effective assignment of a particular generative task.

In the Candida. Its absence from rainwater is a positive condition of that water's universality, not a sign that rainwater is outside divine creation.

In this edition. Blessing and command retains the pairing and the decisive adjective particular.

A place to read. Read the definition on p. 17, I.017.2, beside its explanation on pp. 20-21, I.020.1.

Meaning

Blessing and command belongs to the author's account of how one created nature becomes fitted to a determinate work. A blessing supplies more than approval, and a command does more than state an external rule. God gives water and earth the capacity and activity by which particular creatures are brought forth. The expression therefore joins divine speech, material capacity and an enduring order of generation.

The qualification particular is indispensable. The author does not say that rainwater has received no divine word, power or goodness. He says that it has received no particular blessing and command. Its existence and efficacy remain grounded in the universal Word, while its freedom from a more restricted charge makes it available for the universal work he proposes.

Use in the book

The definition of rainwater introduces the expression through a negation: rainwater is an element and throne that has received no particular blessing or command from almighty God (p. 17, I.017.2). The negation can look surprising in a book that celebrates creation everywhere. Its purpose becomes clear when the definition is unfolded. The question is not whether God made rainwater, but what kind of task God assigned it after the original waters had been distinguished.

On pp. 20-21 the author contrasts rainwater with the waters gathered below the firmament and with earth (I.020.1). Water receives the charge to teem with living creatures; earth receives the charge to bring forth plants. He then invokes the statement that God had not yet caused rain upon the earth.

This supplies his textual reason for excluding rainwater from those particular commissions. His inference depends on his way of reading the creation sequence, rather than on an observation that rainwater is chemically pure.[1]

The distinction returns with greater precision in the answer to the objection that alchemists cannot create a fly or plant. Water and earth initially possess animal and vegetable nature potentially. The commands spoken in creation give them the operation by which those capacities become the particular living kinds, and give those creatures their own life, law and reproductive order (pp. 129-131, II.129.2, II.130.1, II.130.2). Blessing and command is consequently a bridge between capacity and the established activity of a kind.

This also limits the practitioner. Human beings cannot speak the same creative agency into the elements, alter the Most High's order or create elements from nothing (p. 131, II.131.1). Their inability to originate living kinds does not, however, settle what art can prepare within an existing natural order. The next paragraph distinguishes creating from preparing and tincturing (pp. 131-132, II.131.2). The paired expression thus defines a boundary of art while helping the author defend its legitimate scope.

Chapter Seven applies that boundary to the selection of waters. The appropriate elements are those which have not received the particular blessing and command (pp. 158-159, II.158.2). Waters that have received it remain universal in themselves, yet their properties have become particular in the relevant order. Their density is an additional difficulty. The argument does not rest on one isolated test: divine assignment, property, location and material condition work together to exclude ordinary terrestrial waters from the universal medicine.

By p. 176 the negation has become an identifying formula for the philosophical subject: this is the true element that received no particular blessing and command (II.176.1). It stands beside the golden chain, the earth above our heads and several Hermetic material names. The formula helps unify that catalogue, but it does not erase the earlier distinction between ordinary rainwater and the precise subject of the art. Both can be considered without the particular commission; resemblance on that point is not identity in every respect.

[1] The rain statement is identifiable as Genesis 2:5, although I.020.1 prints Gen. 2:2. The edition preserves the printed reference in its original text and identifies the passage in annotation. Identifying that verse is separate from accepting the inference that rainwater received no particular command.

Places to read

I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.020.1 (source pp. 20–21). The negative clause in the definition and the author's explanation of its purpose.

II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131); II.131.1 (source p. 131); II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132). The generative charge and the limit of human preparation.

II.158.2 (source pp. 158–159); II.176.1 (source p. 176). The criterion applied to waters and to the named subject.

Connections

Genesis matters here as the author's account of differentiated agency. He reads the commands concerning plants and living creatures together with the absence of a prior rain. The later discussion of the universal and uttered Logos supplies the causal vocabulary for the same distinction: the universal Word sustains all natures, while particular utterances establish particular works. The entry Logos uttered develops that side of the argument.

The expression also connects the theological opening with the practical exclusions in the middle of the book. A reader who begins with Chapter Seven's rejection of terrestrial waters can return to the definition and discover that the author planted his criterion there from the outset. The change is one of application and elaboration, rather than a sudden abandonment of the early water theory.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps blessing and command together where the original pairs them. Separating the words into unrelated modern categories would make the first a devotional ornament and the second a physical law. In the argument they jointly name God's effective particular determination. At II.130.2 the mixed Greek and Latin τὸ operari makes the operative sense explicit.

Particular should remain visible even when an English sentence is compressed. No blessing would be too broad; no command could suggest that the waters possess an independent agency outside the Word. The precise contrast is between a universal creative dependence and a more limited charge within that dependence.

Attested forms

Seegen und Befehl — Attested source wording; spelling retained. I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.020.1 (source pp. 20–21).

particular Leben — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131).

τὸ operari — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131).

Cautions

The source's appeal to the absence of a rain command is an interpretive inference. It should not be presented as the only possible reading of Genesis, nor converted into a demonstrated account of rainwater's composition.

A shared lack of a particular command does not authorize mixing rainwater, dew and the Hermetic subject indiscriminately. The failed mixtures on pp. 77-79 remain relevant. The criterion narrows a class of suitable natures; it is not a complete laboratory instruction.

See also

Rainwater; Logos uttered; Universal and particular; Subject of the art; Creation and imitation

Chaos and first waters

Gewässer · tohu va bohu · confusum chaos

Uniform origin, potential life and the limits of reversal

At a Glance

The word. The book distinguishes an original water from a confused mixture of already contrary constituents.

In the Candida. Its first waters are uniform although raw; animal and vegetable life are initially potential.

In this edition. Chaos is retained when the author rejects the expression, rather than made a convenient name for his own matter.

A place to read. Read pp. 165-166, II.165.1-II.165.2, after pp. 129-131, II.129.2-II.130.2.

Meaning

The first waters are the author's proposed common material beginning of visible creation. He argues that earth and the remaining elements came from water, and that differentiated waters retain a common nature. This is not the same claim as saying that creation began from a disorderly assortment of the familiar finished elements. On p. 165 he expressly denies that the original water was a confused chaos or jumble.

Rawness nevertheless remains. Uniform water need not be a perfected philosophical medicine, and the presence of powers need not mean that every living creature already exists in actuality. The vocabulary allows a beginning that is materially continuous and richly capable, yet still awaiting both particular creative determination and the later work of perfection.

Use in the book

The first theorem makes the order of creation depend on a disputed reading of Schamaym (pp. 4-5, I.004.1). In the author's account, God first creates the waters, then earth from them, and only afterward the firmament and the distinction between upper and lower waters. The sequence is a foundation for his later assertion that the elements are themselves water. It is not introduced as a poetic image that may be freely detached from his theory of matter.

The following passage argues that even readers who take heaven and earth to mean the four elements cannot escape this watery beginning (pp. 5-6, I.005.1). The reason is that the elements are nothing other than water and arise from it. Notice the direction of explanation. The author is not beginning with four independent constituents and then combining them

into water. He is using water to account for their common origin and continuing unity.

The apparently contrary phrase tohu va bohu appears in the answer to an objection about making living things (pp. 129-130, II.129.2). Here the author explains it through potentiality: earth and water possess animal and vegetable nature only potentially. The term is therefore recruited into a distinction between capacity and formed life. It does not, in this passage, license the claim that water was a chemically confused mixture or a mass wholly without ordered possibilities.

The ensuing creation commands establish living kinds in their perfection and give them an order of propagation through their own seed (pp. 130-131, II.130.1-II.130.2). The first waters contain the possibility of these natures, but potential possession is distinguished from the power to create them by human art. This is why the author can deny that an operator makes animals from elements while still maintaining that elements are the source from which such creatures were created.

At p. 165 the argument moves backward from the proposed result of art to the beginning (II.165.1). Water can undergo what the edition provisionally calls equal balancing; therefore its original nature must have been uniform, even though raw. Art improves nature but does not change it. A beginning genuinely alien to the perfected result would break the continuity that the author requires between the two. The denial of confused chaos serves that continuity.

The next paragraph anticipates the obvious difficulty. The separated elements are now contrary to one another and to water. Why does their present opposition not disprove their common beginning? The answer confines disproportion to qualities and accidents rather than essence (pp. 165-166, II.165.2). Removing superfluities can therefore perfect the magistery without adding a new essential substance. Present conflict and original unity coexist because they belong to different levels of description.[2]

That answer does not imply that every change can be reversed. The perfected magistery cannot be returned to its former rawness any more than flour can become grain again (p. 166, II.166.1). The text thus resists a simple cycle in which all products are endlessly restored to a primordial chaos. Continuity of essence, correction of qualities and irreversibility of certain transformations are all parts of the author's account.

The first Latin correspondent offers a genuinely opposed description: earth and water begin as an unformed, unordered mass and light is added as an inhering luminous quality (pp. 207-208, II.207.3-II.208.1). The Second

[2] Accidental and substantial are the source's explicit alternatives at II.165.2. The explanation through removing superfluities supports a qualitative reading of anatisation; it does not independently establish the technical word's full dictionary sense.

Letter rejects that description when it restates the priority of water and the separate creation of light (pp. 213-214, II.213.2-II.214.1). The contrast shows why chaos cannot be assigned indiscriminately to every voice in the book.

Places to read

I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6). The priority of waters and their relation to the elements.

II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130); II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131). Potential animal and vegetable nature interpreted through creation.

II.165.1 (source p. 165); II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166); II.166.1 (source p. 166). The explicit denial of confused chaos and the restriction of reversal.

II.207.3 (source pp. 207–208); II.213.2 (source pp. 213–214). Opposed accounts of the first mass in the two Latin letters.

Connections

The strongest connections are internal. Anatisation explains why the author reasons from perfected water back to uniform beginning. Accident and Substance explain why present opposition is not allowed to destroy the identity of that beginning. Creation and imitation explains why the first waters' capacities do not give human practitioners the whole creative activity ascribed to God.

The final discussion of cosmic renewal also distinguishes enduring substance from removable accidents. That later analogy should be approached through the local argument of its chapter, however, rather than treated as proof that the original waters and the renewed world are described in exactly the same terms. The book repeatedly returns to unity, but it does not place every stage in a single undifferentiated state.

Translation in this edition

Gewässer is usually rendered waters rather than one ordinary sample of water. The collective expression can name the initial body of waters before its spatial distinction. When the source says a uniform water, the singular preserves the claim of common nature without importing the modern concept of a chemically homogeneous pure substance.

Confusum chaos and Mischmasch are polemical expressions in II.165.1. Calling the author's starting matter chaos without qualification reverses the force of the sentence. Tohu va bohu is kept as the source's transliteration; the relevant entry Genesis can locate the scriptural argument without pretending that this philosophical explanation exhausts the Hebrew expression.

Attested forms

Gewässer — Attested source wording; spelling retained. I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5).

tohu va bohu — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130).

confusum chaos — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.165.1 (source p. 165).

gleichförmiges — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.165.1 (source p. 165).

Cautions

The entries' words potential, uniform and essence describe the book's argument. They do not identify a measured physical state of the early universe. Neither a modern cosmological model nor a modern definition of a chemical mixture should silently supply the missing explanation.

The theory is also more discriminating than a slogan that everything is water. The text distinguishes raw and perfected water, particular and universal natures, present qualities and enduring essence, and created powers from divine creative agency. Those distinctions do the argumentative work.

See also

Schamaym; Genesis; Anatisation; Accident; Substance; Elements; Matter prime

Creation and imitation

creiren / und erschaffen · præpariren / und tingiren · agens und operari

What art may prepare within an order it cannot originate

At a Glance

The word. The contrast separates originating a nature from preparing an existing nature in accordance with its order.

In the Candida. The author rejects making living kinds from elements while defending the preparation of a metallic tincture.

In this edition. Create, prepare and tincture keep the decisive verbs distinct; imitation also renders the source's own paired Imitatio und Nachahmung.

A place to read. Read the connected answer on pp. 129-133, II.129.2-II.132.1.

Meaning

Creation and imitation is a thematic headword for a boundary that the book repeatedly draws. Divine creation gives existence and establishes the particular activities of living kinds. Human art works with natures and capacities already given. The operator can prepare, separate, perfect or tincture, but cannot make divine creative speech his own activity or simply alter the order that speech establishes.

Imitation must therefore be understood carefully. It does not mean copying the outward appearance of gold or staging a counterfeit miracle. The author's legitimate art follows the nature of its subject and advances what that nature can become. His defense depends on a difference between two kinds of activity, not on a declaration that human beings can repeat every act described in Genesis.

Use in the book

Part I explicitly calls the Hermetic art an Imitatio und Nachahmung of the great work of creation (pp. 34-35, I.034.1). The immediate example concerns separation: God distinguishes the elements by higher and lower position without severing their mutual presence. Imitation therefore begins from an interpretation of what creation actually did. It is not permission to substitute any familiar laboratory separation for the divine model, since the very passage insists on a distinction between positional ordering and complete material division.[3]

[3] The opening I.003.1 names Gerlandus, otherwise called Hortulanus, together with Sendivogius. That identification is the source's own attribution. The present lexicon does not establish that all writings circulating under those first two names have one historical author.

The immediate issue arises among objections to a medicine prepared from rainwater. One objection says that possessing remote matter would allow the practitioner to create animals, trees and plants; another argues that people unable to make even a fly or little plant are still less able to make gold (pp. 126-127, II.126.2-II.127.1). These objections make creation a test of alchemical competence. The answer refuses that test rather than claiming that such creatures can in fact be manufactured.

The first step distinguishes the potential capacities of earth and water from the actual living kinds established by a particular command (pp. 129-131, II.129.2-II.130.2). In the author's reading, God brings plants and animals forth in perfection, gives them a particular life and establishes reproduction by their own seed. The operator encounters the resulting order; he does not possess the power by which that order was first instituted.

On p. 131 the limit is stated without ambiguity (II.131.1). Human beings cannot create these creatures from water or earth, cannot alter the Most High's holy order, cannot impart the same agency and operation to the elements, and cannot create those elements from nothing. The series is important. The argument excludes more than the making of a particular animal. It excludes treating art as a new source of the very constitutive powers that make the creatures possible.

The next paragraph rejects the inference that this defeats metallic tincture (pp. 131-132, II.131.2). Creating, or presuming to change nature and God's order, is one thing; preparing, tincturing and proceeding according to nature is another. The answer therefore does not concede the opposition between art and nature assumed by the objection. It places a rightly conducted art within nature and distinguishes it from the mistaken activity of ordinary alchemists and sophists.

Mineral generation supplies the necessary difference between the cases (pp. 132-133, II.132.1). The author says that Scripture does not assign minerals a separate creative word, a particular life or a seed like those of animals and plants. Water and the elements consequently possess mineral nature actually as well as potentially. This is his explanation of why inability to originate a living kind does not prevent preparing a tincture that improves metals. The conclusion depends on his particular theory of minerals, not simply on the general possibility of human craftsmanship.

A corresponding restraint appears when the author discusses metal generation in mines. He calls its exact manner conjectural and distinguishes it from the operation of the art (pp. 107-114, II.107.1, II.112.2). Laboratory changes can suggest an account of generation, yet he refuses to turn colour sequences into a literal succession of natural metals. Imitating or assisting nature does not entitle the observer to treat every resemblance between vessel and mine as identity.

The closing warning against uninformed practice sharpens the point (pp. 234-235, II.234.1). Those who lack knowledge of nature, the philosophical principles, the origin and root of metals, and the matter of the Stone cannot reach the right process. Following nature is therefore a demanding intellectual condition, not a consoling phrase added after an arbitrary manipulation. The practitioner must know what he is acting upon and what sort of perfection that subject admits.

Places to read

II.126.2 (source pp. 126–127); II.127.1 (source p. 127). The objections that make animal creation a test of the art.

II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130); II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131); II.131.1 (source p. 131); II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133). The full distinction between creation and preparation.

II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108); II.112.2 (source pp. 112–113); II.234.1 (source pp. 234–235). Limits on analogy and the knowledge required for practice.

Connections

This distinction helps keep the book's theological and practical claims connected. The universal Word supplies the beginning of natures; particular commands establish the order of living kinds; art works within that created field. The language of Nature and Efficient cause shows why the author can give God the primary agency without treating all created capacities as inert or irrelevant.

The headword also belongs beside Homunculus, but the argument here should be read before using the later rejection of artificial human generation as a general key. The present passage gives its own reasons concerning particular life and seed. A lexicon should allow those reasons to remain visible instead of replacing them with a broad claim that the book is either wholly hostile to experiment or wholly committed to unlimited human transformation.

Translation in this edition

The edition uses create for creiren and erschaffen in this contrast, and prepare and tincture for præpariren and tingiren. Replacing all four with make would remove the author's answer. In other contexts make may be perfectly idiomatic, but here the difference among the verbs is the point being argued.

Art follows nature is a useful summary when its qualifications remain in view. The source does not offer a freestanding definition of imitation at this point. The headword names the relationship developed through these passages, while the source terms above give the actual attested forms.

Attested forms

creiren / und erschaffen — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132).

præpariren / und tingiren — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132).

agens und operari — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.131.1 (source p. 131).

der Natur gemäß — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132).

Imitatio und Nachahmung — The source itself pairs the Latin and German terms. I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35).

Cautions

The book's assertion that tincturing is natural remains a historical claim within its account of matter and generation. Explaining its logical role does not certify the reported production of gold or medicine.

Nor should the operator's inability to create living kinds be softened into a temporary technical difficulty. The author places it within the enduring boundary between human preparation and divine establishment of nature. Conversely, that boundary should not be expanded into a rejection of every laboratory operation, which the same answer expressly defends.

See also

Blessing and command; Nature; Generation of metals; Homunculus; Knowledge and practice; Subject of the art

Elohim

Elohim · Eloha · pluralis

The Creator's name in a disputed reading of Genesis

At a Glance

The word. The source uses Elohim in a theological argument about the identity of the Creator.

In the Candida. The name includes the Holy Spirit as Creator and thereby helps exclude the hovering created spirit from that identity.

In this edition. The author's transliteration is retained, with his grammatical and doctrinal claims attributed to him.

A place to read. Read pp. 41-46, I.041.1-I.045.1, as an exchange of objections and answers.

Meaning

Elohim has two closely connected roles in the discussion. It names the Creator at the beginning of Genesis, and it occurs within the expression spirit of God that opponents take to mean God the Holy Spirit. The author accepts the first role while contesting the inference drawn from the second. His treatment is therefore not a rejection of the Trinity; he makes Trinitarian creation a premise of his answer.

Use in the book

The opponents' first ground is Ruah and especially the accompanying Elohim (pp. 41-42, I.041.1). Their reading identifies the spirit hovering above the waters with the divine Holy Spirit. The author first sets out that ground rather than letting his own conclusion stand as if uncontested. Remembering which voice is speaking prevents a reader from treating the early objection as the book's final lexical definition.

In his reply, the author says that Elohim names Father, Son and Holy Spirit together (pp. 42-43, I.042.1). He appeals to its being plural rather than merely dual, and says that Christendom understands it in this way. He then reads Psalm 33's Lord, Word and spirit of the mouth as distinguishing the three divine persons (p. 43, I.043.1). These are the book's connected theological and grammatical claims, not conclusions independently established by the lexicon.[4]

[4] The claim that Christendom understands the plural in this way belongs to the author's polemic. It has not been verified as a comprehensive historical consensus. I.044.1 also records his admission that he knows little Hebrew and relies in part on informants.

The next move separates who created from what was created. Elohim belongs on the first side; the waters, earth, deep, darkness and hovering spirit belong on the second (I.043.1-I.044.1). Since the Holy Spirit is already included in the Creator's name, the author argues that the subsequently specified spirit is a creature. The absence of any stated creating or perfecting activity on that creature's part strengthens his interpretation.

The name's occurrence in spirit of God receives a second answer on pp. 45-46 (I.045.1). The author invokes expressions such as mountain of God and city of God as intensifying idioms, and proposes exceedingly great spirit. He also recalls that Elijah can be a man of God without being God. These analogies aim to show that the phrase's grammatical association with God does not alone determine divine identity.

Places to read

I.041.1 (source pp. 41–42). The opponent's use of the accompanying divine name.

I.042.1 (source pp. 42–43); I.043.1 (source p. 43); I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45). Elohim as Creator and the separation of Creator from creature.

I.045.1 (source pp. 45–46). The proposed intensifying interpretation of spirit of God.

Connections

Elohim and Ruah should be studied together but kept distinct. The first carries the argument about the Creator's name; the second carries the argument that the hovering spirit can be wind or air. Trinity develops the doctrinal structure that Elohim supports, while Spirit explains the created agent the author wishes to protect from confusion with God.

Translation in this edition

Elohim and Eloha are attested as printed transliterations. The entry does not replace them with a standardized modern Hebrew form, nor manufacture an original-script spelling absent from the cited paragraph. God in the English argument can conceal the original's special appeal to the name; the headword restores that focus.

Pluralis is the author's own grammatical term. His assertion about the plural and dual should remain distinguishable from the scriptural wording he quotes and from the theological conclusion he builds upon it. Keeping these steps separate makes the polemic assessable.

Attested forms

Elohim — Attested source wording; not an independently supplied Hebrew lemma. I.042.1 (source pp. 42–43); I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45).

Eloha — Attested source wording; not an independently supplied Hebrew lemma. I.042.1 (source pp. 42–43).

pluralis — Attested source wording; not an independently supplied Hebrew lemma. I.042.1 (source pp. 42–43).

Cautions

The author expressly admits limited knowledge of Hebrew in the adjoining argument (pp. 44-45, I.044.1). His appeal to learned informants supplies testimony, not a warrant to treat every linguistic assertion as settled.

Do not use the entry to prove a doctrine from the form alone or to imply that the book denies the divinity of the Holy Spirit. The disputed identity is that of this particular hovering spirit.

See also

Trinity; Spirit; Genesis; Logos subsistent; Schamaym

Firmament

Feste · Gewölb des Himmels · durch die Feste des Himmels

The distinction and passage of the waters

At a Glance

The word. The firmament is the created division associated with upper and lower waters.

In the Candida. It orders the cosmos without cancelling the common watery nature, and later raises the problem of descending heavenly water.

In this edition. Firmament retains the source's scriptural and cosmological term.

A place to read. Read pp. 173-179, II.173.2-II.178.2, with the opening theorem on pp. 4-6.

Meaning

The firmament is not simply an ornamental name for open sky. In the author's account it is created on the second day and establishes the distinction between waters above and below. The term thus belongs simultaneously to his reading of Genesis, his account of spatial order and his explanation of how a beneficial water reaches the human world.

Use in the book

The first theorem places the firmament after the initial waters and earth (pp. 4-5, I.004.1). Its creation distinguishes and locates portions of the waters. The author then acknowledges that the common German translation calls this firmament heaven, while arguing that Schamaym in the opening verse means waters (pp. 5-6, I.005.1). A single English word heaven can therefore conceal the distinction on which his chronological argument depends.

The spatial distinction does not mean that God wholly isolated the elements. Part I later says that each remains within the others and that their separation is by higher and lower situation (pp. 34-35, I.034.1). This provides an important qualification to the image of a barrier. The cosmos is ordered through differences of location, yet its natures remain connected and mutually present.

Chapter Eight asks what purpose upper water serves if none of it comes down. The structural answer compares heaven to an arch or enclosed sphere whose load maintains its stability (pp. 173-174, II.173.2-II.174.1). The waters' weight supports the circular and spherical structure, while all together remain sustained in God's Word. The architectural comparison is a

stated cosmological explanation, not a modern calculation supplied by the editor.

The next answer makes the upper waters medicinally relevant. Water above and beside the firmament descends spiritually, filling the air and supplying the proposed true balsam (pp. 175-176, II.175.1). An objection remains: a cast-mirror heaven sounds too firm to admit that passage. The author answers by comparing a sweating winter window with air passing through glass (pp. 178-179, II.178.2). The analogy is part of his reasoning even though it is not a modern account of condensation.[5]

Places to read

I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6). Creation of the division and the different uses of heaven.

II.173.2 (source pp. 173–174); II.174.1 (source p. 174). The supporting weight and architectural analogy.

II.175.1 (source pp. 175–176); II.178.2 (source pp. 178–179). Descent of water and the window comparison.

Connections

Firmament is a useful meeting point for Heavenly water, Schamaym and Golden chain. The first follows the water's proposed descent, the second examines the opening interpretive word, and the third develops the linkage between earth and heaven. None of these connections makes spatial order irrelevant: location remains one of the author's grounds for distinguishing waters.

Translation in this edition

Feste is rendered firmament rather than translated each time as an ordinary solid or a modern atmospheric layer. Vault of heaven preserves the separate architectural image when the author uses Gewölb. The two expressions should illuminate each other without becoming interchangeable technical specifications.

Spiritual passage through the firmament does not by itself make the water immaterial. The chapter connects it to the air, a philosophical earth and a medicine that can be prepared. Material subtleness and cosmic placement matter more here than a simple opposition between matter and spirit.

Attested forms

Feste — Attested source wording; spelling retained. I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6).

[5] The cast-mirror objection is introduced through the Latin citation of Job 37:18 in II.178.1. The following window example is the author's proposed answer, rather than an observation that the biblical verse itself supplies.

Gewölb des Himmels — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.174.1 (source p. 174).

durch die Feste des Himmels — Attested source wording; spelling retained. II.178.2 (source pp. 178–179).

Cautions

Do not equate this firmament without argument with a modern named region of the atmosphere. The work offers its own arrangement of upper waters, vault, air and earth.

Nor should the sweating-window analogy be silently corrected in translation. Its historical error or limitation is precisely what helps a reader understand the claimed passage through a firm heaven.

See also

Heavenly water; Schamaym; Air and wind; Golden chain; Separation

Genesis

ersten Capitel des ersten Buchs Moysis · Gen. · Und GOTT sprach

The creation narrative as a rule of natural inquiry

At a Glance

The word. Genesis is usually named through the First Book of Moses or a shortened chapter reference.

In the Candida. Its sequence, wording and silences organize the book's account of matter and divine agency.

In this edition. The author's readings are preserved as arguments, with printed reference errors distinguished from identifiable passages.

A place to read. Begin with p. 3, I.003.1, then compare pp. 61-68, II.061.1-II.068.1.

Meaning

Genesis functions as more than a store of illustrative images. The author makes its creation narrative a governing account of the beginning, distinction and activity of natures. What exists first, which command is pronounced, and what activity is explicitly predicated of a spirit can each become a premise in a physical or theological argument.

The resulting inquiry is interpretive throughout. The book does not simply quote an uncontested creation theory. It proposes meanings, answers rival readings, appeals to original-language terms through transliteration and connects scriptural claims with reported experience. A lexicon must therefore distinguish the narrative being invoked from the particular conclusions the author derives from it.

Use in the book

The proem says, on the authority of Gerlandus or Hortulanus and Sendivogius, that Hermetic art imitates the great work of creation described in the first chapter of Moses (p. 3, I.003.1). This gives the opening theorems a purpose. Their account of the waters is not introductory decoration before the practical art; it establishes the model by which that art is to understand its subject and its operations.[6]

The first important interpretive decision concerns Schamaym. The author argues that it means waters in the first creation statement, although the common translation gives heaven and the later firmament is also called

[6] The book identifies Hermetic art with imitation of creation by appeal to named alchemical authorities. Their full works have not been collated for this lexicon; the account here rests on the independently translated quotation in the 1680 witness.

heaven (pp. 4-6, I.004.1-I.005.1). The priority of waters follows from this reading together with the creation sequence. The matter theory therefore begins with a contested verbal premise, whose place should remain visible even when the subsequent conclusions are summarized.

The definition of rainwater draws another inference from the creation account. Waters and earth receive particular generative commands, whereas God had not yet caused rain upon the earth (pp. 17, 20-21, I.017.2, I.020.1). The author concludes that rainwater has received no particular blessing and command. That absence is made a positive qualification for a universal subject. The source prints a chapter-and-verse reference that the edition notes as inconsistent with the identifiable rain passage; preserving the distinction between printed reference and quoted wording is part of responsible reading.

At the end of Part I, Genesis becomes the setting of a dispute over the spirit hovering above the waters. The author distinguishes the triune Creator named by Elohim from the created things subsequently specified, including the hovering spirit (pp. 41-46, I.041.1-I.045.1). The question turns both on names and on predicates: hovering is stated, while creating or perfecting the first matter is not. He resists the interpretation that divine workmanship begins inadequately and needs correction by the Holy Spirit.

Chapter One of Part II repeats the sequence in a more systematic vocabulary. Light, firmament, heavenly bodies, animals and plants are particular natures established through the repeated And God said (pp. 60-62, II.060.1-II.061.1). The author connects these commands with the uttered Logos, while the universal and substantial Word acts as first cause in both universal and particular natures (pp. 63-67, II.063.2-II.067.2). Genesis supplies the differentiation; John's account of the Word supplies the universal causal framework.

Even an apparent silence becomes evidence. The author finds no particular Fiat in the opening verse corresponding to the later commands. He concludes that the universal waters were created immediately through the universal Word (pp. 66-67, II.066.1). Immediately here concerns the absence of an intervening cause, not a measurement of elapsed time. His distinction is consequently causal as well as sequential.

The same narrative returns in the objection that a person unable to make a plant or animal cannot make gold. Particular commands establish living kinds and their reproductive order; minerals are not given a corresponding separate command or seed in the author's reading (pp. 129-133, II.129.2-II.132.1). This allows him to distinguish divine creation of life from human preparation of a metallic tincture. Genesis thus remains active in the middle practical argument, not merely at the book's beginning.

The method has an explicit self-limitation. The author declares philosophy without Scripture folly, yet refuses to approve incongruous scriptural citations used merely to support a philosophical opinion (p. 73, II.073.1). He thereby claims that scriptural authority does not excuse careless application. Whether his own readings persuade is a further question, but the warning identifies the standard to which he wishes the reader to hold them.

Places to read

I.003.1 (source p. 3); I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6). The proposed imitation of creation and the priority of waters.

I.020.1 (source pp. 20–21); I.041.1 (source pp. 41–42); I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45). Particular commands and the hovering-spirit dispute.

II.061.1 (source pp. 61–62); II.066.1 (source pp. 66–67); II.067.2 (source pp. 67–68); II.073.1 (source p. 73). Creation commands, causal interpretation and the warning against misuse.

II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133). The difference between living kinds and mineral generation.

Connections

The book's scriptural reasoning is cumulative rather than confined to Genesis. John supplies the Word through whom everything is made; Pauline passages support the continuing divine agency; Psalms support the life and response of elements and the government of weather. Those later passages are used to interpret the creation account as an enduring order, not simply a finished event in the past.

This makes Genesis a useful starting point for several thematic routes. Blessing and command follows the differentiation of capacities. Firmament follows the ordering of waters. Trinity follows the Creator-creature distinction. Creation and imitation follows the limit imposed on the practitioner. Each route should retain its own immediate argument rather than turn every scriptural image into a single secret recipe.

Translation in this edition

First Book of Moses renders the source's ordinary designation; Genesis identifies the same book in editorial explanation. The source's own paraphrases should not be replaced automatically with familiar wording from another English Bible, especially where its disputed rendering is consequential.

Original printed pages and stable unit identifiers are preferable locators here. A new edition page could move with formatting, while a passage such as I.020.1 consistently identifies the author's explanation and its reference

problem. The distinction is particularly helpful when a scriptural chapter number in the original is inaccurate.

Attested forms

ersten Capitel des ersten Buchs Moysis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.003.1 (source p. 3).

Gen. — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.020.1 (source pp. 20–21).

Und GOTT sprach — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.061.1 (source pp. 61–62).

Cautions

The lexicon explains a historical interpretation of Scripture and nature. It does not certify its Hebrew analysis, its account of the formation of minerals or its universal medicinal conclusions.

Avoid treating Genesis as either a dispensable metaphor or a mechanically complete set of laboratory directions. The author gives it real explanatory authority, while repeatedly withholding the exact manipulations that an operator would need.

See also

Schamaym; Elohim; Blessing and command; Firmament; Logos subsistent; Logos uttered; Creation and imitation

Image of God

Imaginem DEI · Imaginem DEI imitationis

Co-created accident or the human being defined by imitation

At a Glance

The word. The image of God names humanity's relation to its Creator and becomes a test of the distinction between substance and accident.

In the Candida. The first letter treats the image as co-created and lost; the reply disputes both the separation and the alleged loss.

In this edition. The speakers and their different readings remain explicit. Image is not assigned one unchanging classification across the exchange.

A place to read. II.204.1–II.205.2, pp. 204–205, and II.225.2–II.227.L, pp. 225–227.

Meaning

The image of God enters a controversy that begins with light. The first correspondent is answering a syllogism: whatever God creates is substance; God created light; therefore light is substance. He rejects the major premise by arguing that God also creates innocent accidents, including qualities such as heat and colour. The divine image becomes his example of something created together with the human being that does not constitute the human essence.

The reply gives the image a different position. The second correspondent does not recognize a distinction between the image itself and the human being created in it. He appeals to the wording of Luther's translation and to scriptural descriptions of humanity as God's image. The question is consequently more exact than whether the image is important. The correspondents disagree about how it belongs to the person and how that relation bears upon the substance-and-accident dispute.

The Fall makes the classification consequential. The first correspondent warns that confusing image and substance opens a route to treating sin as substance and then making God the author of sin. The second agrees that sin cannot be substance, but seeks to establish this through his own definition of pure substance and accidental residues. Agreement on rejecting the theological conclusion does not erase disagreement about the image.

Use in the book

At II.204.1, the first correspondent says the co-created image enters neither the matter nor the form of the human being. Nor can it supply a third intrinsic cause, since his classification admits no such cause. He therefore treats it as an accident. His example is supposed to show that

something created through God's Word can fail to be substance, defeating the universality of the original syllogism's major premise.[7]

The next paragraph uses the image's alleged replacement by sin as a warning. If the image were made substance, the first correspondent argues, what succeeds it after the Fall might likewise be made substance. The displayed Flacian syllogism is presented as an error to be avoided, not a conclusion he endorses. In his account, the image example has therefore remained relevant to the controversy about light: both test the overbroad assertion that everything God creates is substance (II.205.2).

The second letter returns to the image after developing a physical definition of substance, treating corruption and salvation, and comparing the Stone with resurrection. At II.225.2, the correspondent disputes the distinction between the image and what is created in the image. He frames the issue through the German scriptural wording: God makes the human being an image like himself. The direct object of creation is humanity under this description, rather than a person accompanied by a separately co-created image.

At II.226.1, dominion helps specify the relation. The human being is to rule over fish, birds, beasts and the earth. The correspondent then invokes Paul's unqualified statement that man is God's image. He is not merely repeating the first letter in a different vocabulary. He is replacing its account of a co-created adjunct with a reading of what the human being is said to be.

The continuation after the Fall is equally explicit. At II.226.2, the correspondent says he can find no scriptural statement of the image's loss. Genesis 9 repeats the language after the Fall, renews dominion and grounds the prohibition of killing in the fact that humanity was made in God's image. The argument combines a reading of scriptural chronology with an ethical consequence: human blood remains protected by the stated relation to God.

The reply concludes with Seibold, with whom Felden is said to agree, that the human being is God's image by imitation (II.227.L). The imitation includes dominion but is not exhausted by it. Holiness, righteousness and other Christian virtues belong to the closing account. The speaker also distinguishes the earthly and heavenly aspects of humanity: the dominion already described pertains especially to the earthly human being. The final formulation brings the physical analysis back toward Christian conduct.

This provides a significant connection with the treatise's own conclusion. There the author asks the person made in God's image to imitate divine generosity by serving the neighbour (II.237.2). That ethical use does not

[7] II.227.L closes the Second Letter and dates it 1669. The text then begins Chapter Fourteen at II.227.1. Keeping those same-page units distinct prevents the reply's conclusion from being assigned to the narrator's next chapter.

settle every classification debated in the letters, but it shows why image and imitation matter beyond an abstract logical example. The relation to God supplies a pattern for human action, including the choice to communicate useful knowledge.

Places to read

II.203.1 (source p. 203); II.203.2 (source pp. 203–204); II.204.1 (source p. 204); II.204.2 (source pp. 204–205); II.205.2 (source p. 205). The first letter's syllogism, innocent accidents and the co-created image.

II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.220.2 (source pp. 220–221); II.222.1 (source p. 222). The reply's alternative definition of substance and rejection of sin as substance.

II.225.2 (source pp. 225–226); II.226.1 (source p. 226); II.226.2 (source pp. 226–227); II.227.L (source p. 227). The image identified with the human being, retained after the Fall and explained by imitation.

II.237.2 (source pp. 237–238). Imitating divine beneficence through neighbourly service.

Translation in this edition

Imago Dei is image of God; the attested forms record its Latin inflections. Co-created preserves the first correspondent's concreatam and its argumentative force. By imitation renders imitationis in the reply's conclusion. The English retains the changing speaker so that readers do not mistake an objection, its answer and a later ethical application for a single uniform definition.

The reply's claims about Luther's wording are represented as its interpretation of the German text. An English translator should not silently replace that argument with wording from another Bible version, since the precise relation between image and what is made in the image is what the correspondent is debating.

Attested forms

Imaginem DEI — image of God in an inflected Latin form. II.204.1 (source p. 204).

Imaginem DEI imitationis — image of God by imitation. II.227.L (source p. 227).

Cautions

The exchange does not supply a neutral survey of all Christian doctrines of the image. Its propositions belong to two particular voices. The closing epistle locator is II.227.L, not II.227.1, which begins the next chapter.

See also

Light; Accident; Substance; Original sin and its polemics; Hypostasis; Creation and imitation; Charity

Logos subsistent

λόγος ὑποστατικὸς · verbum Dei universale · causa prima

The universal Word as first cause and sustaining agency

At a Glance

The word. The Greek expression names the Word as subsistent divine reality rather than merely an uttered command.

In the Candida. It is the first cause of universal and particular natures, inseparable from the particular Word acting secondarily.

In this edition. Substantial Logos in the translation and subsistent Word in explanation refer to the same distinction here.

A place to read. Read pp. 63-65, II.063.2-II.065.1, and its application at p. 74, II.074.1.

Meaning

The subsistent Logos is the universal divine Word through which all things are created and sustained. The distinction from an uttered Logos is not between a real cause and an unreal phrase, or between two unrelated divine beings. It distinguishes the universal first cause from particular creative commands while insisting that the two are inseparable.

The term also gives the author a way to distinguish divine operation from created capacity. Nature is the subject in which God acts; it does not independently explain its own motion and efficacy. The Word therefore supplies what the author thinks ordinary natural philosophers fail to identify when they speak of a principle of motion or an efficient cause.

Use in the book

The argument begins before the Greek terminology appears. Nature is defined as the substance and essence of each visible creature (p. 59, II.059.1), but that definition does not make created nature an autonomous mover. Pauline passages are invoked to say that Christ fills all in all and that one God works all things (pp. 62-63, II.062.2). From them the author concludes that nature possesses capacity and is the subject in which God works through his Word (p. 63, II.063.1).

John's opening supplies the decisive formulation. All things are made through the Word, and nothing that is made exists apart from it (pp. 63-64, II.063.2). The author then names the subsistent Logos God's universal Word. Through this Word both universal and particular natures are created primarily; through the uttered Logos particular natures are created secondarily. Universality therefore concerns the scope of causal dependence, not simply the greater size of one created material.

The following paragraph defines the relation through first and second cause (pp. 64-65, II.064.1). There is no first cause other than the subsistent Logos. The particular utterance is the true subordinate second cause. The author nevertheless says that the two are one in this respect, with the stated distinction. He reinforces the point at p. 65 by expressly forbidding their separation (II.065.1). The hierarchy must be read together with that warning.

A hypothetical example teaches the difference. Heaven made through the Lord's Word is referred to the subsistent Logos. Heaven made through the particular command Let there be a firmament would be referred to the uttered Logos (II.064.1). The contrast concerns how the agency is specified in an explanation. It does not imply that a particular command can operate after the universal Word has withdrawn, nor that the first cause acts only at an earlier moment.[8]

The universal waters are assigned a distinctive relation to this Word. Because the author finds no particular Fiat in the initial creation statement, he says that the waters and universal natures were created immediately through the universal Word (pp. 66-67, II.066.1). Immediate means without the intervening particular command being identified there. This relation helps explain why their powers are not restricted to one animal, plant or mineral kind.

At p. 74 the causal distinction supports a medicinal conclusion (II.074.1). Waters created through God's universal and substantial Word possess the powers of the whole of nature; the author therefore reaffirms that a universal medicine can be prepared from rainwater. The conclusion is his historical claim, but its logical route is important: the scope of a material's power is inferred from the scope of its creative cause.

The opposite route excludes remedies assembled from particular natures (pp. 75-76, II.075.1-II.076.1). Each particular has its own created power, so neither one nor all together can supply the universal effect. This makes the Logos distinction consequential for the selection of matter. It is not a theological appendix whose removal would leave the same practical argument intact.

Later the carnation example repeats the ascent to this first cause (pp. 137-139, II.137.1, II.139.1). Flower leads to plant, seed, earth and water; seed also leads to its particular creative command, while water and that command lead to the universal substantial Word. The true principle that communicates being to another is then identified with Christ. Physical and

[8] The hypothetical sentence about Fiat is deliberately presented as something David might have said, not another actual Psalm quotation. The distinction between the actual and hypothetical wordings is essential to II.064.1.

theosophical inquiry converge at the same causal source without making their intermediate questions identical.

Places to read

II.063.1 (source p. 63); II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64); II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65); II.065.1 (source p. 65). Capacity, universal Word and inseparable causal hierarchy.

II.066.1 (source pp. 66–67); II.074.1 (source p. 74); II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76). The argument from creative scope to universal and particular power.

II.137.1 (source pp. 137–138); II.139.1 (source p. 139). The ascent from a plant's material history to its first cause.

Connections

The distinction is continuous with the Part I interpretation of the Son as the Father's eternal subsistent Word in the discussion of Psalm 33 (p. 43, I.043.1). It should nevertheless be explained from the author's own development, rather than assigned without evidence to a particular philosophical school or chain of influence.

Efficient cause describes the broader causal question; Logos uttered explains the subordinate command; Capacity and potency, when consulted with these entries, prevents created receptivity from being mistaken for self-sufficient agency. The practical effect is visible in Universal and particular and Universal medicine.

Translation in this edition

The Greek ὑποστατικός is explained here through subsistence. Substantial Logos preserves the edition's existing rendering and the author's accompanying language of the substantial Word. The two English expressions should be linked, rather than treated as two different terms for two different agents.

Primarily and secondarily concern causal order. Reading them solely as first in time and later in time would make the author's insistence on continued inseparability difficult to understand. His recurring claims that all things subsist and are nourished in the Word show that causal dependence continues.

Attested forms

λόγος ὑποστατικὸς — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64); II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65).

verbum Dei universale — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64).

causa prima — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65); II.065.1 (source p. 65).

Cautions

The universal Word is not the world-spirit separated from a material subject. The former is the divine source of agency; the latter is expressly a creature in the dispute at the end of Part I.

Nor does the lexical explanation validate the universal medicine inferred from this theology. The entry distinguishes the reasoning's premise and conclusion so that neither is smuggled into a modern physical description.

See also

Logos uttered; Efficient cause; Nature; Trinity; Universal and particular; Universal medicine; Spirit of the world

Logos uttered

λόγος προφορικὸς · verbum Dei particulare · Fiat

Particular creative speech and the enduring order of kinds

At a Glance

The word. The uttered Logos is God's particular Word pronounced in creation.

In the Candida. It acts as subordinate second cause in particular natures and establishes their enduring, limited powers.

In this edition. Uttered preserves the distinction from the subsistent Word; audible is retained where the author expressly insists on it.

A place to read. Read pp. 63-68, II.063.2-II.068.1, then the application at pp. 75-77.

Meaning

The uttered Logos names the particular creative command through which a determinate nature is established. It is distinguished from the universal Word without being severed from it. The author calls it a subordinate second cause, acting in particular natures while the universal Word acts primarily in both universal and particular natures.

The adjective uttered is consequential. The source argues that God spoke a pronounced and audible word, rather than merely entertained a thought. The resulting command does not vanish after being spoken: it remains the order and operative limitation of the creature. Speech, causation and continuity are thus joined in a term that might otherwise sound merely linguistic.

Use in the book

The creation sequence first appears as a list of particular natures: light, firmament, stars, animals and plants (pp. 60-62, II.060.1-II.061.1). The repeated And God said distinguishes their establishment. Those words are not treated simply as a literary convention. They mark a particular utterance that gives a nature its determinate task and power.

On pp. 63-64 the author explicitly glosses the Greek expression as God's particular Word pronounced in the work of creation (II.063.2). Through it particular natures alone are created secondarily. Through the subsistent Logos both universal and particular natures are created primarily. The limitation alone belongs to the scope of the uttered Logos, not to a denial that the universal Word is also active in its creatures.

The author illustrates the distinction by contrasting two explanations of heaven's creation (pp. 64-65, II.064.1). The Lord's Word points to the

universal subsistent cause; the specified Fiat, Let there be a firmament, points to the particular utterance. He then forbids separating the two (p. 65, II.065.1). A subordinate cause remains dependent, but its particular specification still matters to the account of what the creature can do.

The contrast with universal waters is drawn partly from an absence. No particular Fiat is found where the opening creation of those waters is described (pp. 66-67, II.066.1). For particular natures, by contrast, the text expressly says And God said (pp. 67-68, II.067.2). The author reads the difference as a cause of the difference between unrestricted elemental capacity and limited created power. Whether that scriptural inference convinces is separate from recognizing its function in his natural philosophy.

The claim of audibility immediately produces an objection: nobody able to hear was present at that stage (p. 68, II.068.1). The answer says that waters and elements already existed and possessed life and sensation sufficient to see God and hear his voice. The following scriptural examples are meant to establish such responsiveness. The debate shows that uttered is not a loose synonym for effective. The author defends the specific character of speech against an objection directed precisely at hearing.[9]

The practical application follows on pp. 75-76 (II.075.1). Particular natures created through the uttered Logos possess only their own created particular powers. They cannot produce a universal medicine, whether one is taken alone or many are assembled. The causal rule that the effect corresponds to its cause underlies the exclusion. Combining restricted powers is not permitted to change the scope of their creative assignment.

The next paragraph links permanence of natural order to the eternity and unchangeability of God's Word (pp. 76-77, II.076.2). Day and night and the regular courses of celestial bodies exemplify an order precisely maintained. This is why the operative effects of a command are not confined to the moment it was first spoken. The word's continuing force preserves the creature's kind and the limits of its agency.

The same relation is expressed more concretely in the explanation of living kinds (pp. 130-131, II.130.2). Blessing, command and activity are implanted together; creatures receive particular life and reproduce through their own seed. The operator cannot repeat that divine establishment at will (p. 131, II.131.1). Art can prepare within the order, but it cannot give elements a new particular command equivalent to the creative utterance.

[9] The answer to the no-hearer objection continues through scriptural examples at II.069.1 and following. Living water in the red-heifer example is given an additional philosophical force by the author; the quoted phrase alone does not establish elemental sensation.

Places to read

II.061.1 (source pp. 61–62); II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64); II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65); II.065.1 (source p. 65). Particular commands and the relation of first and second cause.

II.066.1 (source pp. 66–67); II.067.2 (source pp. 67–68); II.068.1 (source p. 68). Fiat, explicit speech and the objection concerning a hearer.

II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76); II.076.2 (source pp. 76–77); II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131); II.131.1 (source p. 131). Limited powers, enduring order and the boundary of art.

Connections

The term supplies the causal explanation behind Blessing and command. That entry follows the particular generative charge in rainwater's definition and the later selection of suitable waters. Life and sensation follows the response of the elements required by the answer to the audibility objection.

The sea's ebb and flow offer another application of a continuing command: the gathering of waters is made their cause, while lunar correspondence is distinguished from that cause (pp. 104-106, II.104.2-II.105.1). A particular divine utterance can thus enter a proposed account of continuing natural motion as well as of reproduction.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders προφορικός as uttered and preserves pronounced and audible when the source elaborates the point. Particular Word names the same explanatory role in the accompanying Latin. Treating all these phrases as merely a divine idea would remove the objection and the author's answer.

Fiat is kept where the author uses the Latin formula. It does not mean that every cited scriptural command has to be replaced by this one Latin word in English. The actual imperative concerning light, firmament or living creatures gives the particular content at issue.

Attested forms

λόγος προφορικὸς — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64); II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65).

verbum Dei particulare — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64).

Fiat — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65); II.066.1 (source pp. 66–67).

vernehmlich Wort — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.067.2 (source pp. 67–68).

Cautions

The author's argument about audible speech and elemental hearing is a historical claim. It should not be silently reduced to a modern metaphor for information transfer, nor offered as a demonstrated account of acoustic events before living creatures.

Particular does not mean independent of God or independent of the universal Word. The author expressly insists on inseparability and on the continued causal priority of the subsistent Logos. Causal distinction remains even where the two are called one.

See also

Logos subsistent; Blessing and command; Genesis; Universal and particular; Living water; Sea and terrestrial waters; Creation and imitation

Ruah

Ruah · Wind und Lufft · Hebræischen Sprach

A disputed transliteration in the created-spirit argument

At a Glance

The word. Ruah is a printed Hebrew transliteration used in a dispute over the hovering spirit.

In the Candida. The author claims it always describes wind and air, while admitting limited Hebrew and reliance on learned informants.

In this edition. The form and the attribution of the lexical claim remain visible.

A place to read. Read pp. 41-47, I.041.1-I.046.1, as objection and answer.

Meaning

Ruah matters because the identity of one spirit turns on how a scriptural word is read. The opponents invoke it together with Elohim to identify the spirit above the waters as God the Holy Spirit. The author instead argues for a created wind or air. The entry follows that contested use; it does not establish a complete Hebrew dictionary entry or impose one meaning on all biblical occurrences.

Use in the book

The word first appears among the opponents' principal grounds (pp. 41-42, I.041.1). They also invoke the Bible gloss that wind did not yet exist. Their lexical and chronological claims work together: the phrase must be divine, they argue, because the natural alternative is unavailable. The author therefore has to challenge more than a single English translation.

His reply at pp. 44-45 makes the strong claim that Ruah always describes wind and air in Scripture (I.044.1). He cites good authors and instruction from learned people, including Hebrews. He then freely admits knowing little Hebrew or other Oriental languages. The combination of confidence and acknowledged dependence is part of the evidence for his method; neither half should be suppressed.[10]

The argument also relies on a Creator-creature distinction independent of that lexical assertion. Elohim already names the triune Creator, whereas the hovering spirit is listed with created things and is not said to create or perfect them (pp. 42-45, I.042.1-I.044.1). Ruah is thus one support within a

[10] I.044.1 places the strong lexical assertion and the admission of limited Hebrew in the same paragraph. The wording is preserved as a historical argument. This lexicon has not established the assertion as a general rule of Hebrew semantics.

cumulative answer, not the sole basis on which the author rests his conclusion.

The accompanying expression of God receives a further explanation (pp. 45-46, I.045.1). The author invokes intensifying divine-name idioms, proposing exceedingly great spirit. Elijah's designation as a man of God supplies another analogy against identifying every thing associated with God as divine. This argument belongs to Elohim and the phrase's construction, while Ruah concerns the spirit's proposed natural referent.

The chronology is answered at pp. 46-47 (I.046.1). Wind and air are one, according to the author and the Nuysement formula that wind is air in motion. He therefore denies the Bible gloss's assertion that wind was absent. A created spirit can also be called holy after its holy Creator without becoming God the Holy Spirit. The conclusion links lexical interpretation, natural identity and theological distinction.

The later wind chapter returns to the air-in-motion account and the watery origin of air (pp. 97-98, II.097.1). It does not offer a fresh survey of Hebrew usage. That distinction matters: repetition of the physical formula strengthens the book's internal continuity, but it is not an independent external confirmation of the earlier universal lexical claim.

Places to read

I.041.1 (source pp. 41–42). Ruah in the opponents' stated grounds.

I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45). The author's lexical assertion and confession of limited knowledge.

I.045.1 (source pp. 45–46); I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47); II.097.1 (source pp. 97–98). The associated divine-name argument and wind-air interpretation.

Connections

Elohim follows the accompanying name, Trinity follows the Creator-creature distinction, and Air and wind follows the proposed natural referent. Keeping the entries separate makes clear that lexical sense, grammatical association and physical explanation are different parts of the dispute.

Translation in this edition

Ruah is the source's form. The entry does not manufacture a standardized original-script spelling or an etymology. Wind and air records the author's proposed interpretation, with his universal word always attributed rather than silently endorsed.

Spirit remains appropriate when translating the larger dispute because that is the term whose identity is under examination. Replacing every

occurrence in advance with wind would make the author's conclusion appear already settled in his statement of the opposing position.

Attested forms

Ruah — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.041.1 (source pp. 41–42); I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45).

Wind und Lufft — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45).

Hebræischen Sprach — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45).

Cautions

The author's claim to have consulted informants is testimony about his preparation, not comprehensive verification of every scriptural use.

The argument should not be generalized into a claim that Candida rejects the divine Holy Spirit. Its stated purpose is to defend divine honour while identifying this hovering spirit as created.

See also

Elohim; Trinity; Spirit; Air and wind; Genesis; Spirit of the world

Schamaym

Schamaym · Himmel · Gewässer

A contested word at the beginning of the argument

At a Glance

The word. Schamaym is the printed transliteration on which the author builds his priority of the waters.

In the Candida. He argues that its meaning in Genesis 1:1 differs from its designation of the later firmament.

In this edition. The transliteration and the attribution of the interpretation remain visible.

A place to read. Read the connected opening argument on pp. 4-7, I.004.1-I.006.1.

Meaning

The headword concerns a word under interpretation, not an independently identified alchemical substance. The author knows that Schamaym is commonly translated heaven. He nevertheless proposes waters for the first creation statement and uses the surrounding sequence to defend that reading. The resulting interpretation becomes an initial premise of his theory that all visible things derive from water.

Use in the book

On pp. 4-5 the author sets disagreement among learned people against alleged agreement among Hermetic philosophers (I.004.1). He says that some theologians also understand the word as waters in this passage. The appeal establishes allies for the interpretation, but the cited paragraph does not identify their works. A reader should distinguish the assertion of a shared view from independently documented consensus.

The sequence supplies his principal reason. Waters and earth are already present before the second-day firmament; therefore, on his reading, the initial Schamaym cannot simply name that later firmament. God first creates the waters, then earth from them, then divides the waters through the firmament. The author argues from narrative order to meaning, rather than offering a dictionary discussion detached from the chapter.

The next paragraph allows Schamaym to designate the firmament in the later verses while retaining waters at the opening (pp. 5-6, I.005.1). His claim is therefore contextual, not merely that the term always has one watery equivalent. He adds that an interpretation of heaven and earth as the four elements still points to water, because the elements themselves are water.

This second route reinforces the physical thesis even where the initial translation is disputed.

On pp. 6-7 the author addresses the particles printed as ha and hay before Schamaym and Ærez (I.006.1). He says they do not prevent his German paraphrase in which God first creates the waters and earth. Again, this is his grammatical defense; the lexicon does not silently turn the printed transliterations into corrected Hebrew analysis. The passage immediately turns from wording to an appeal to experience.[11]

Near the end of Part I the term returns in a sharper polemic (pp. 49-50, I.049.1). Schamaym, he insists, never means a confused chaos, imperfect mass or mishmash. That denial supports his rejection of a Holy Spirit who must repair an inadequate first creation. The lexical point has now become a defense of divine truth and the created matter's adequacy.

Places to read

I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6); I.006.1 (source pp. 6–7). The opening interpretation and its narrative and grammatical grounds.

I.049.1 (source pp. 49–50). The later denial of an imperfect chaos.

Connections

The entry should be read with Chaos and first waters, which separates uniform original water from a confused jumble. Genesis places the interpretation in the book's larger scriptural method. Elohim offers a parallel case in which a transliterated term carries a major theological conclusion, although the two arguments concern different questions.

Translation in this edition

Schamaym is retained as the source's form. Waters in the translated argument records the author's proposed sense; it is not an editorial claim that the ordinary translation heaven has been disproved. The distinction matters especially when his paraphrase of Genesis is quoted outside its argumentative setting.

The same restraint applies to Ærez and the printed particle forms. Their role here is to show how the author explains his wording. Supplying additional original-script forms or an unverified etymology would make the entry appear more lexically authoritative than its evidence warrants.

[11] Ha, hay and Ærez are the printed forms in I.006.1. No reconstruction of an original Hebrew spelling, or emendation of the author's grammatical account, is implied by reproducing them here.

Attested forms

Schamaym — Attested source wording; not an independently supplied Hebrew lemma. I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6).

Himmel — Attested source wording; not an independently supplied Hebrew lemma. I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6).

Gewässer — Attested source wording; not an independently supplied Hebrew lemma. I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.006.1 (source pp. 6–7).

Cautions

The cited passages establish what this author argues. They do not independently establish a historical Hebrew lexicon or the identity of the theologians whom he invokes.

A modern reader need not accept the proposed rendering to understand its importance. Removing the contested word from the account would hide the dependence of the first theorem on an interpretive decision.

See also

Genesis; Firmament; Chaos and first waters; Elohim; Elements

Trinity

Heilige Dreyeinigkeit · Dreyeinigen Gott · Gott der H. Geist

The triune Creator and the created world-spirit

At a Glance

The word. The Trinity names Father, Son and Holy Spirit as the divine Creator.

In the Candida. The author uses Trinitarian creation to distinguish God from the spirit hovering over the waters.

In this edition. Holy Spirit remains distinct from holy air and from a created spirit that may be called holy.

A place to read. Read pp. 42-47, I.042.1-I.046.1, without detaching the conclusion from the dispute.

Meaning

The Trinity enters the work through an argument over the spirit in Genesis. The author does not place the divine persons among the elements or identify a separated laboratory principle with one of them. He treats the triune God as Creator, and uses that commitment to insist that the moving, life-supporting world-spirit is a creature.

Use in the book

The opponents take the hovering spirit to be the Holy Spirit and invoke Ruah, Elohim, a German Bible gloss and accepted religious opinion (pp. 41-43, I.041.1-I.042.1). The author replies that Elohim already identifies Father, Son and Holy Spirit as the Creator. On this interpretation, the later list of what was created must be read differently from the Creator's name.

Psalm 33 supplies his scriptural articulation of the three persons (p. 43, I.043.1). Lord names the Father; the Word is the Son as the Father's eternal subsistent Word; spirit of his mouth names the Holy Spirit. The author presents these as distinct designations within a single act of creation. His use of the psalm is therefore part of the argument, rather than a mere devotional quotation accompanying an otherwise independent physical account.[12]

The contrast on pp. 43-45 is explicit (I.043.1-I.044.1). The hovering spirit is named with the created waters, earth, deep and darkness. It is said to hover, not to create or perfect those things. The author concludes that it

[12] The passage is Psalm 33:6 as cited and interpreted in I.043.1. The distinct designations of Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the author's reading of that verse; they should be distinguished from the wording of the quotation itself.

cannot be God the Holy Spirit. The particular activity predicated of the spirit matters as much as the use of the word spirit.

The following concession prevents another confusion (pp. 46-47, I.046.1). A creature can be called holy after its holy Creator without becoming God. This explains why the earlier description holy air is not necessarily inconsistent with the later denial of divine identity. Holiness by association or designation and divine personhood are not treated as the same claim.

The argument also protects the first creation from a picture of incomplete work. On pp. 49-50 the author rejects the suggestion that God could have made adequate matter but chose not to, leaving the Holy Spirit to spread it out and perfect it (I.049.1). In his view that reading affronts divine truth. The polemic is not simply about which physical element wind resembles; it concerns the relations among Creator, created matter and the agency claimed for the hovering spirit.

Places to read

I.042.1 (source pp. 42–43); I.043.1 (source p. 43). The interpretation of Elohim and Psalm 33.

I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45); I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47). The explicit distinction between divine Holy Spirit and created holy spirit.

I.049.1 (source pp. 49–50). The theological objection to an inadequate first creation.

Connections

Logos subsistent develops the role of the Son as the universal Word through whom all things are made. Spirit of the world develops the created agency that the author places within nature. Holding these entries together is more faithful than making the whole argument either exclusively theological or exclusively material. The author requires both levels while resisting their identification.

Translation in this edition

The source's H. is expanded according to context. In Gott der H. Geist it means Holy Spirit; the earlier H. Lufft is holy air. English capitalization helps maintain the distinction, but it cannot substitute for reading the predicates and the Creator-creature contrast.

The edition retains the source's Trinitarian assertions as assertions. It does not supply a doctrinal ruling on every Christian interpretation of Genesis or convert the claimed agreement of Christendom into independently verified historical unanimity.

Attested forms

Heilige Dreyeinigkeit — Attested source wording; spelling retained. I.043.1 (source p. 43).

Dreyeinigen Gott — Attested source wording; spelling retained. I.043.1 (source p. 43).

Gott der H. Geist — Attested source wording; spelling retained. I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45); I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47).

Cautions

Three philosophical principles do not automatically provide three divine persons. The explicit equations Mercury-air, Sulphur-fire and Salt-body belong to another explanatory sequence and need their own textual treatment.

The author's rejection of one identification of the Genesis spirit must not be described as rejection of the Holy Spirit's divinity. His stated purpose is to defend that divine honour.

See also

Elohim; Logos subsistent; Spirit; Spirit of the world; Body soul and spirit

Accident

accidentalische · accidental-Schale · qualitates & accidentia

What can be removed without abolishing essential being

At a Glance

The word. Accident concerns a condition or part distinguished from essential substance.

In the Candida. It explains purification, elemental opposition, the reply's account of corruption and the world's transformation.

In this edition. Accident retains the philosophical sense; accidental does not merely mean unplanned.

A place to read. Read pp. 165-166, II.165.2, beside the shell distinction on pp. 32-34.

Meaning

An accident is understood through its contrast with substance or essence. In the book this contrast allows a material's qualities, superfluities or corruptible condition to be altered while its essential being is preserved. Accidental therefore does not mean simply trivial, imaginary or produced by chance. What is accidental can have decisive effects on visibility, disorder and the possibility of purification.

The term's reference also changes with the argument. An accidental shell in Part I, disproportionate qualities in Chapter Seven and the accidental residual part in the Latin reply are connected but not identical descriptions. The lexicon should follow those particular uses rather than reduce all of them to one universally interchangeable physical object.

Use in the book

The shell account supplies the earliest developed distinction (pp. 32-33, I.032.1). Water is said to have acquired a shell making it visible, and that shell is twofold: substantial and accidental. The distinction is immediately joined to two kinds of separation. One cuts away contrary and superfluous things that have no natural bond with the substance; the other distinguishes related parts by situation and figure.

The first operation removes the accidental shell after the relevant preliminary reduction of our subject (pp. 33-34, I.033.1). Its purpose is not to abolish every bodily condition. The substantial vehicle remains necessary for the subtle spirit to be accessible to hand and sight. Calling a shell

accidental is consequently an instruction about what may be removed, not a claim that material manifestation as a whole is to be discarded.

On pp. 165-166, accidental has a different immediate object: the present disproportion, contrariety and opposition of the elements (II.165.2). They oppose each other in qualities and accidents, not in essence. This answers the objection that contrary elements cannot have originated from one uniform water or become balanced without a forbidden essential reversal. The distinction is an argumentative answer to that difficulty, not a decorative classification.[13]

Removing superfluities can therefore perfect the magistery without adding or diminishing essential matter (II.165.2). The author's apparent paradox is that improvement must remove something while leaving the nature unchanged. Accident identifies the level at which removal is permitted. The familiar maxim against adding or diminishing is thus qualified by the accompanying permission to remove superfluities.

The Latin reply develops the contrast through lower bodies composed of substance and residues (pp. 218-219, II.218.2). Residues are accidental, substance essential. The evil of corruption is assigned to the residues, which can mingle with and contaminate substance but remain separable through art. This writer does not say that the visible mixed body is already pure in every respect. Purity belongs to substance considered in itself.

That reply then extends its material distinction into a theological account of sin (pp. 221-222, II.221.1-II.222.1). Sin attaches to the accidental residual flesh and is itself called an accident, introduced after the creation of humanity through transgression. This is the reply's particular inference. The lexical connection explains how it is made; it does not settle the theological controversy by redefining sin as an ordinary bodily waste.

The final chapter returns to the book's anonymous author and asks whether the world passes away in accidents alone or also in substance and being (pp. 227-228, II.227.1). The answer uses the operation and perfection of the magistery as a pattern. Even the elements melt in respect of their accidents; terrestrial residual matter burns and the present moving heavens pass away (pp. 228-229, II.228.1).

The substance of those things is nevertheless transformed into crystalline clarity and a supremely perfected spiritual being (pp. 229-231, II.229.1-II.230.1). Accident thus distinguishes present corruptible arrangement from enduring being. The account is not simple annihilation, but neither is it the

[13] The footnoted passage itself contrasts accidental with substantial and qualities with essence. Those explicit pairs are stronger evidence for the intended distinction than a general modern definition of accident. The later Latin reply and final chapter apply the contrast to different subjects and should remain separately attributed.

persistence of every present form and condition. What passes and what endures have different descriptions.

The final summary says that corruption frees substances and elements from residues and superfluities and brings them into a new more-than-perfect form (pp. 231-232, II.231.1). Accident belongs to a vocabulary of transformation that can explain both removal and continuity. The practical, cosmological and theological applications should be compared through that structure while preserving the different claims made in each context.

Places to read

I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34). The accidental shell and its relation to separation.

II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166). Opposition confined to qualities and accidents.

II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.221.1 (source pp. 221–222); II.222.1 (source p. 222). The reply's residual part and theological extension.

II.227.1 (source pp. 227–228); II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). The world's end and enduring transformed substance.

Connections

Substance supplies the paired term, while Residues explains what the reply calls excrementa. Contrariety follows the reason opposition must remain accidental. Annihilation and transformation follows the final distinction between passing conditions and enduring being. These related entries should not be merged: each asks a different question of the same philosophical vocabulary.

The cosmic analogy shows the author treating laboratory practice as a model for interpretation of the world's end. It does not establish an independent empirical confirmation of that future. The meaningful connection is the shared distinction of what may be removed and what must remain if perfection is a transformation rather than abolition.

Translation in this edition

Accident and accidental preserve a technical contrast with substance and substantial. A translation such as chance occurrence would be wrong in the argument about essential continuity. Conversely, merely secondary could obscure how powerfully an accidental mixture can contaminate or obstruct the subject.

The English shell, quality, residue and condition are not synonyms supplied to replace every accident with one modern material. They render the concrete objects of separate passages. The source's own argument decides which accidental feature is under discussion.

Attested forms

accidentalische — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33).

accidental-Schale — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34).

qualitates & accidentia — Attested source wording in the cited passage. II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166).

Accidentien — Attested source wording in the cited passage. II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229).

Cautions

Do not identify accidents with a single modern kind of impurity or imagine that removing them means subtracting only visibly dirty matter. The book's categories include qualities, opposition, residual parts and cosmic arrangements.

The reply's account of sin must remain attributed to that voice. Explaining its use of accidental is different from endorsing its doctrine or assuming every cited writer shares the inference.

See also

Substance; Contrariety; Residues; Separation; Anatisation; Corruption and sin; World and its end

Anatisation

anatisirt · anatisiret · anatisatio

A provisional name for equal balancing

At a Glance

The word. The printed technical word is explained through its contexts, not through an independently established dictionary definition.

In the Candida. It links the proposed universal cure, maturation of gold's essence and purification of the elements.

In this edition. Equal balancing is a deliberately provisional rendering.

A place to read. Read pp. 165-166, II.165.1-II.165.2, where the author gives his fullest local explanation.

Meaning

Anatisation is the editorial headword joining several attested verb and noun forms. The shared contexts concern a condition in which the universal subject's qualities can be perfected without changing its essential nature. Equal balancing names that contextual interpretation. It should not be mistaken for a verified etymology, an exact ratio or a modern instruction to equalize measured masses.

Use in the book

The term enters the argument for universal medicine. Rainwater, and especially the art's subject, may undergo anatisirt and be brought to a summum temperamentum (pp. 74-75, II.074.2). The author has just attributed the beneficial powers of particular herbs to their universal source. The possibility of balancing that source explains why one proposed medicine can reach a scope that the individual herbs do not possess.

The exclusion of particulars follows immediately (p. 76, II.076.1). They cannot be anatisiren or brought to the highest temperament. Each retains its restricted power, or a mixture weakens or removes that power. The term therefore distinguishes a possible perfection of universal matter from the attempted combination of already particular remedies. Its meaning is tied to the kind of subject, not just to the operator's dexterity.

At p. 134 the same term belongs to metallic perfection (II.134.1). Philosophers bring the essence of gold to highest maturity or anatisiret the elements, or water. The phrase does not introduce an unrelated pharmaceutical operation. It joins the medicinal and metallic claims through a common perfecting of elemental nature. The promised effects remain the author's claims, but the recurrent word helps show why he regards them as consequences of one art.

The most explicit explanation begins with a backward inference (p. 165, II.165.1). Because water can undergo this balancing, its original state must have been uniform although raw, rather than a confused chaos. Art can improve nature but not change it. Anatisation thus becomes evidence about the beginning as well as a description of the intended result.

The objection and answer on pp. 165-166 supply the essential qualification (II.165.2). The present disproportion and contrariety of the separated elements concern qualities and accidents, not essence. The anatisatio and perfection of the magistery occur by removing superfluities. Nothing essential is added or diminished. A reader who replaces the word with equal proportions alone may miss the qualitative and purificatory account that the author actually provides.

Places to read

II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75); II.076.1 (source p. 76). Universal medicine and the exclusion of particulars.

II.134.1 (source p. 134). The term applied to maturation and the Stone.

II.165.1 (source p. 165); II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166). Uniform beginning, accidental disproportion and removal of superfluities.

Connections

Temperament and balance develops the nearby summum temperamentum; Contrariety develops the opposition that must be confined to accidents. Those entries should clarify different parts of the same argument rather than create three competing definitions of one operation. Separation is also relevant because removal of superfluities is distinguished from severing all elements completely.

Translation in this edition

The source forms vary: anatisirt, anatisiret, anatisiren and anatisatio are all retained in the lists above. The English rendering is harmonized across the edition so that the reader can follow the recurrence. Historical dictionary confirmation has not been obtained for this project, and the term's provisional status is substantive.[14]

Anatisation itself is a convenient normalized English headword. It is not offered as a newly established historical spelling in every language. Where the author supplies a more familiar explanatory expression, such as removing superfluities, that explanation carries more evidential weight than a speculative expansion of the technical word.

[14] This project has not obtained independent historical dictionary confirmation of the technical forms. Equal balancing is a contextual editorial rendering, harmonized across the edition; it should remain explicitly provisional wherever it supports a larger inference.

Attested forms

anatisirt — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75); II.165.1 (source p. 165).

anatisiret — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.134.1 (source p. 134).

anatisatio — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166).

anatisiren — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.076.1 (source p. 76).

Cautions

No exact quantities, sequence of manipulations or equivalence to a modern chemical process follows from the term alone. The book itself withholds complete practical directions.

The author's refusal of substantial change here is also important. Equal balancing concerns improvement within a continuing nature; reading it as unrestricted recombination would contradict the local reason he gives for its possibility.

See also

Temperament and balance; Contrariety; Accident; Chaos and first waters; Universal medicine; Separation

Capacity and potency

potentiam · potentiâ tantum · actu

What can receive an operation, and what has not yet become actual

At a Glance

The word. Capacity and potentiality concern ability or receptivity, distinguished from an actual effect.

In the Candida. Several arguments depend on which capacity is meant: created receptivity, universal power or a generative ability brought into act.

In this edition. Capacity, potentiality and actuality are used according to the source's contrasting constructions.

A place to read. Read p. 63, II.063.1, beside pp. 129-133 and197-198.

Meaning

Potency does not have one uniform practical measure in this work. It may name nature's receptivity to the Word, the world-spirit's universal or specified power, a living kind not yet actual in earth and water, or a generative ability requiring particular conditions. The common issue is what can occur, in what subject and through which agency. An ability present in one respect need not already be an accomplished effect in another.

Use in the book

Nature possesses only capacity and is the subject in which God acts through his Word (p. 63, II.063.1). This does not say that its material qualities are irrelevant. The sandy-earth example makes passive capacity consequential: a general charge to bring forth plants does not produce abundant growth where receptive conditions are lacking (pp. 96-97, II.096.2). Capacity belongs to the relation between agency and a subject fitted or unfitted to receive its operation.

The world-spirit distinguishes universal and particular potentiality (pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1). It retains uniform being in one respect while being animal, vegetable or mineral in another. The distinction answers why omnipresence does not make an extract from every creature suitable for a universal medicine. A first universal capacity cannot be treated as identical with the second specified power available in that material.[15]

Earth and water possess animal and vegetable nature only potentially before the relevant creative commands (pp. 129-131, II.129.2-II.130.2). The

[15] I.036.1-I.037.1 name the distinctions themselves. Their first/second and universal/particular qualifications must remain visible; otherwise the author's answer to extraction from specified creatures loses its stated basis.

commands give particular life, operation and reproductive order. The author uses this distinction to deny that human operators can simply originate animals and plants from elements. Possession of potential living nature is not possession of the divine power to establish those kinds.

Minerals supply the contrasting case (pp. 132-133, II.132.1). The author finds no separately implanted life or seed equivalent to that of plants and animals, yet minerals are generated. He concludes that water and elements possess mineral nature actually as well as potentially. This difference is part of his defense of metallic tincture against the objection from inability to create a fly. It is not a modern definition of inorganic matter.

The soul-propagation argument gives capacity a further use (pp. 197-198, II.197.1-II.197.2). The soul is said to possess a multiplying capacity, first brought into effect by God in the taking of Adam's rib, and subsequently exercised through the union and seeds of both sexes under the appointed blessing. The writer expressly denies that the soul of one sex multiplies alone. Here capacity needs a specified conjunction and subordinated divine command in order to become effect.

These cases explain why summary phrases such as contains all powers require care. They may concern receptive range or possibility, not simultaneous active accomplishment. The rainwater account itself distinguishes potentiality from actuality and operation (pp. 25-26, I.025.1). That qualification belongs beside the celebrated universal definition rather than being lost in a list of promised effects.

Places to read

II.063.1 (source p. 63); II.096.2 (source pp. 96–97). Created receptivity and passive capacity.

I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37); I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38); I.025.1 (source pp. 25–26). Universal and specified powers, with operation distinguished.

II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133); II.197.1 (source p. 197); II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198). Potential living kinds, mineral actuality and conditional multiplication.

Connections

Nature supplies the subject of capacity, while Efficient cause asks what actualizes or operates in it. Universal and particular follows differences of scope. Soul propagation and Life and sensation follow two special applications whose meanings should not be assumed equivalent to medicinal potency.

Translation in this edition

Capacity renders potentia where receptivity is the main point; potentiality highlights its contrast with act; power can be appropriate when

virtus accompanies a multiplying ability. These English choices are contextual, not evidence of three wholly unrelated Latin concepts.

Actuality and effect preserve the result terms where the author uses them. They should not be flattened into presence, which could make the mere existence of a capacity look like proof that its promised effect has already occurred.

Attested forms

potentiam — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.063.1 (source p. 63).

potentiâ tantum — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130).

actu — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133).

potentia & virtus multiplicandi — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198).

Cautions

The source's proposed capacities are historical claims and distinctions. They do not independently verify the medicinal or generative effects inferred from them.

In particular, a material's universal capacity is not a complete instruction for its use. The book also requires the right condition, subject, order and operation.

See also

Nature; Efficient cause; Universal and particular; Life and sensation; Soul propagation; Rainwater

Catholic

Subjectum universale und catholicum · Subjecto catholico

All-embracing power rather than a denominational label

At a Glance

The word. Catholic describes the comprehensive scope of a subject's powers.

In the Candida. It is paired with universal in the argument that a universal remedy requires a universal beginning.

In this edition. The translation uses catholic where the source pairing is conspicuous and all-embracing where that makes its local sense clearer.

A place to read. Read pp. 12-13, I.012.1, beside pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1.

Meaning

Catholic is a term of extent in these passages. The subject is supposed to contain powers reaching across particular natures rather than remaining restricted to one animal, plant or mineral. The word does not here identify a church affiliation. Its immediate companion universal and the conclusions drawn from it establish the relevant sense.

Use in the book

Part I excludes a universal medicine made from plants, minerals or their combined extracts (pp. 12-13, I.012.1). Chymistry can obtain a vegetable water, oil and salt, or the Mercury, Sulphur and Salt belonging to particular metals, but cannot turn those particulars back into the universal principles. The positive requirement is a Subjectum universale und catholicum. Catholic therefore enters as the answer to a restriction, not as a general term of praise.

The causal maxim explains the restriction: as the cause is, so is the effect. An all-embracing result requires a beginning with corresponding scope. A large number of particular ingredients does not by itself supply such a beginning. The author's universal is a kind of nature and power, rather than merely the total number of materials collected by an operator.

A difficulty arises because the world-spirit is present in visible creatures generally. If it is everywhere, why not extract it from anything? The answer distinguishes universal from particular potentiality (pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1). The spirit retains uniform being in one respect, but has become animal in animals, vegetable in plants and mineral in minerals in another. The continuing uniformity does not restore unrestricted practical power to an already specified subject.

The renewed demand for a universal and catholic subject on p. 36 is thus more precise than an assertion of omnipresence (I.036.1). It concerns the state in which the spirit can serve the universal work. Presence, origin and present suitability must be held apart. This is a particularly useful passage for correcting the tempting summary that because all things derive from water, all things are equally good alchemical materials.[16]

Chapter Seven begins from rainwater as a Subjecto catholico and asks whether sea and other terrestrial waters should work as well (p. 156, II.156.1). The question exposes the practical burden of the term. Subsequent distinctions of location, density, particular blessing and the sort of metals contained in a water determine whether it is suitable. The adjective cannot be established merely by pointing to common watery origin.

Places to read

I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). Universal and catholic opposed to extracts of particular things.

I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37); I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38). Uniform being and specified power distinguished.

II.156.1 (source p. 156). The adjective tested by the question concerning other waters.

Connections

Universal and particular gives the fuller conceptual account. Subject of the art follows the selection problem, and Universal medicine follows the asserted comprehensive result. The present entry is useful because it stops one conspicuous borrowed word from importing an unrelated denominational question into those arguments.

Translation in this edition

The edition's catholic and all-embracing are contextual equivalents in these cited cases. The Latin endings in catholicum and catholico reflect their different constructions; the form lists preserve them without pretending that the ending marks a different kind of material.

All-embracing should not be expanded to all-powerful. The subject remains created, its operations depend on God and its selection is constrained. The word concerns breadth of natural powers, not divine omnipotence transferred to the operator.

[16] I.036.1 itself supplies the distinction between potentia universalis and potentia particularis. Uniform being and a universal practical effect must not be assumed equivalent merely because the same spirit is said to occur throughout creation.

Attested forms

Subjectum universale und catholicum — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37).

Subjecto catholico — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.156.1 (source p. 156).

Cautions

The source itself does discuss religious differences elsewhere. That does not turn every occurrence of catholic into a religious label. Here the pairing, referent and inference all concern the scope of matter and medicine.

The author's comprehensive claims are not a modern statement that a single preparation has clinically established efficacy for every disease. The term belongs to the proposed relation between universal matter and universal effect.

See also

Universal and particular; Subject of the art; Universal medicine; Spirit of the world; Rainwater

Concordance

concordantiam · concordanz

An ordered correspondence distinguished from an efficient cause

At a Glance

The word. Concordance is an ordered correspondence between events, distinguished here from one event producing another.

In the Candida. The relation between lunar changes and tides is acknowledged while a causal inference is refused.

In this edition. Concordance is retained because the distinction from cause carries the argument.

A place to read. II.105.1, p. 105.

Meaning

The author recognizes that ebb and flow, in most places as far as he knows, follow changes of the moon. He then invokes Arnd's distinction between cause and concordance. A correspondence can be real without giving the author grounds to assign efficient agency to the moon. He traces the ordered relation itself to God's command that the heavenly lights provide signs and seasons.

This is not a denial that events correspond. The concessive opening matters: the author acknowledges the observed relation before explaining what he thinks it warrants. The dispute concerns the inference from correspondence to cause within his theology of divine government. The word concordance gives the acknowledged relation a positive place in that account.

Use in the book

The passage follows the account of the divine Word remaining as the life of creatures. The author appeals to the command concerning the lights in the firmament to explain why celestial and terrestrial events can be ordered together. The relation is not random in his account, even though it does not make one correlated phenomenon the ultimate productive cause of the other.[17]

The qualification concerning most places and the limit of the author's knowledge should be preserved. He is not claiming an exhaustive global measurement of tides. His local observation supplies an objection he

[17] The statement at II.105.1 is qualified by meines wissens and an den meisten Orten: to the author's knowledge and in most places. These limits should remain alongside the distinction between cause and concordance.

considers worth answering. The reply moves from that observation to a distinction among kinds of explanatory relation.

Nearby, the author expressly refuses to deprive the elements of motions and operations received through the universal Word or the stars of influence and concordance with them (II.103.1). The tides argument therefore should not be expanded into a rejection of every stellar operation. Chapter Eight later assigns an affirmative role to the action of the stars, especially the sun, upon the water in the account of concentrated Mercury (II.177.1). Each claim has its stated object and context.

The distinction also bears on the polemic about weather. A title of rule in the air does not by itself establish that the Devil can produce true wind. There too, an association is insufficient to identify a productive agent. The author's account is theological, but it contains a definite demand concerning inference: the relation asserted in a premise must be adequate to the causal conclusion drawn from it.

Places to read

II.103.1 (source p. 103); II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106). Received natural operations and the explicit distinction between lunar concordance and cause.

II.100.2 (source pp. 100–101); II.101.1 (source p. 101). The separate refusal to infer weather-making power from association with the air.

II.177.1 (source pp. 177–178). A different passage affirming a particular stellar action upon the subject.

Translation in this edition

Concordantia and concordanz are rendered concordance. Correspondence can explain the term in ordinary prose, but replacing it by causation would destroy the distinction. The historical account is not silently translated into a modern gravitational explanation, which would answer the question in a different framework.

Attested forms

concordantiam — concordance in an inflected Latin form. II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106).

concordanz — concordance in German spelling. II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106).

Cautions

The passage gives the author's explanation of an acknowledged relation. It is neither a modern account of tides nor a general statement that correlation can never coexist with causation. Its scope is the inference and divine order under discussion.

See also

Efficient cause; Solar and lunar parents; Sea and terrestrial waters; Providence; Weather and witchcraft; Definition and demonstration

Contrariety

per contraria · contrarietät · nullam contrarietatem

Real opposition in motion, qualities and removable superfluities

At a Glance

The word. Contrariety names opposition, but the text assigns it to different levels.

In the Candida. The world moves through contraries; the elements oppose in qualities; essential substance admits no contrariety.

In this edition. The term is not replaced everywhere by conflict, impurity or a psychological opposite.

A place to read. Read pp. 14-15, I.014.1, together with pp. 165-166 and218-220.

Meaning

Contrariety is not simply an evil to be abolished wherever it appears. The author says that the created world is ordained to continual action and motion through contraries. He also distinguishes contrary superfluities removable from a subject, contrary elemental qualities, and the absence of contrariety within essential substance. The differences are necessary to understanding how opposition can be both real and compatible with a common nature.

Use in the book

In the account of the first watery distinction, God intends a world in continual action and motion per contraria (pp. 14-15, I.014.1). The heavier part moves toward the centre and the subtler upward. The passage places contrary relations within the ordered beauty of creation. It does not treat their mere existence as evidence that God first made a defective or useless mass.

The shell discussion uses opposition more selectively (pp. 32-33, I.032.1). Contrary and superfluous things lacking a natural bond with substance are cut away. Their removal is distinguished from the positional distinction of parts related in substance and power. The criterion is therefore not that all difference must disappear, but that what obstructs or lies outside the proper natural bond can be removed.[18]

[18] II.165.2 explicitly locates the elements' disproportion quoad qualitates & accidentia and denies it quoad essentiam. Those clauses establish the relevant restriction; the entry does not infer it merely from a general doctrine of elemental harmony.

Anatisation poses the philosophical difficulty directly (pp. 165-166, II.165.2). The elements separated from water oppose one another and water. The author replies that this disproportion is accidental, concerning qualities rather than essence. Their common being remains uniform enough to admit purification and balancing. The operation improves the condition of one nature rather than manufacturing unity out of essentially alien substances.

The Second Letter defines substance as admitting no contrariety (p. 218, II.218.1). Its later explanation says that otherwise art could not render substance pure and free from corruption (pp. 219-220, II.219.2). Our Mercury is said to receive only what is homogeneous with its essence. This makes absence of essential opposition an operative condition, not merely a formal adjective attached to a definition.

The same reply acknowledges residues mingling with substance and contaminating the encountered body (pp. 218-219, II.218.2). Substance's exclusion of contrariety therefore does not mean that the mixed body already lacks every obstruction. The distinction between essential constitution and accidental mixture is precisely what makes separation intelligible in the writer's account.

Taken together, the passages prevent two opposite simplifications. One would make the elements essentially incompatible and deny any basis for their universal perfection. The other would make every present opposition unreal and leave nothing substantive for the art to correct. The author's explanation depends on real differences that do not abolish essential unity.

Places to read

I.014.1 (source pp. 14–15); I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33). Created motion through contraries and the removal of contrary superfluities.

II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166). Accidental opposition distinguished from essence.

II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). The reply's definition and its operative explanation.

Connections

Accident and Substance supply the level distinction, while Homogeneity follows the positive relation required of what Mercury receives. Anatisation concerns the balancing of qualities. The present entry focuses on the problem they answer: what kind of opposition exists and where it is allowed.

Translation in this edition

Contrariety retains the technical contrast in the Latin and mixed German argument. Contrary can describe a relation without naming a separate ingredient, so it should not always be translated as a harmful substance.

Through contraries is left broad at I.014.1 because the source does not there provide a fixed exhaustive list. Supplying a standard set of paired qualities as if enumerated in that sentence would exceed its wording.

Attested forms

per contraria — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. I.014.1 (source pp. 14–15).

contrarietät — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166).

nullam contrarietatem — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220).

Cautions

No universal psychological drama of opposites is asserted by these passages. The immediate subjects are created motion, elemental qualities and the material work.

The definitions belong to particular arguments and voices. The Second Letter's rule should not be attributed to the opposed first correspondent without checking what that writer actually grants.

See also

Accident; Substance; Homogeneity; Anatisation; Separation; Chaos and first waters

Efficient cause

causa efficiens · suo modo & secundum quid · Abstractivè

Primary agency, subordinate operation and a qualified familiar term

At a Glance

The word. The term asks what brings an effect about, but the author carefully qualifies its application to a created spirit.

In the Candida. God's Word is first cause; a spirit can be called efficient cause in a restricted mineral and operative respect.

In this edition. Efficient cause preserves the familiar term and the author's explanation of why he uses it.

A place to read. Read pp. 29-31, I.029.1-I.031.1, before pp. 63-65.

Meaning

Efficient cause has to be read through a question the author himself raises: how can the world-spirit be the efficient cause of the medicine if no created nature acts of itself? The answer distinguishes unqualified primary agency from a restricted description of the spirit's operation. The qualification is not optional; it is the means by which the author holds his theological and practical claims together.

The term also changes with the standpoint from which the subject is considered. Abstractly, the spirit can name an operative cause within the mineral kingdom. Concretely, with the other principles included, the same complex is universal matter. The book does not therefore require cause and matter to be two independently collected ingredients.

Use in the book

The initial objection gathers several difficulties (pp. 29-30, I.029.1). The spirit is called efficient cause, universal matter and something enclosed in visible creatures, yet the art requires a universal rather than particular subject. The author states these tensions openly. A lexicon should not conceal them by assigning the spirit a single easy equivalent such as energy or ordinary air.

The answer first retains the denial of self-sufficient nature (p. 30, I.030.1). Speaking properly and without qualification, no nature acts. The spirit can nevertheless be called efficient cause in its own manner and in a qualified respect, specifically with regard to mineral nature. The same passage allows the name supernatural spiritual Mercury in that restricted philosophical usage. The argument is about the level and scope at which a predicate is allowed.

On p. 31 the author explains his choice of vocabulary (I.031.1). Efficient cause is common and familiar in ordinary philosophy, and he uses it so that his meaning may be better understood. Through the spirit the body is opened; the spirit is also the copulator or uniting agent through which soul rejoins body. These are the operative activities supporting the qualified designation. They are narrower than making the spirit an independent creator of all being.[19]

The abstract-concrete distinction immediately follows (I.031.1). Speaking abstractly, the spirit can be called efficient cause here in the mineral kingdom. Speaking concretely, when the other principles and elements are included, it is universal matter. No element is without another. The distinction explains how one subject may be described under an operative aspect and under a material aspect without a simple contradiction between the two names.

Part II places the account of agency within the doctrine of the Word. Nature possesses capacity and is the subject in which God acts (p. 63, II.063.1). The subsistent Logos is first cause, acting primarily in universal and particular natures; the uttered Logos is the subordinate second cause acting in particular natures (pp. 63-65, II.063.2-II.065.1). The two are inseparable. This gives the earlier qualification a fuller causal framework.

The criticism of ordinary philosophers returns in the three-principle account (pp. 87-88, II.087.1). Their efficient cause, form and matter are said to be definitions whose true referents they do not understand. The author interprets the world's spirit, soul and body through air, fire and Salt, yet says the true efficient cause remains unknown to those philosophers. Familiar terminology is useful for communication but does not, in his view, guarantee correct explanation.

The earthquake discussion tests the issue against rival natural explanations (pp. 95-97, II.095.1-II.096.2). Dense, hot and dry exhalations are proposed by ordinary philosophers; the author invokes divine anger and action as a different efficient cause. He nevertheless adds that God works with nature according to its qualities and properties. Different seasons and receptive soils still affect what occurs. Primary agency and materially conditioned effect are kept in relation.

Tides introduce a related distinction between cause and concordance (pp. 104-106, II.104.2-II.105.1). The gathering command is said to cause the sea's ebb and flow; their lunar correspondence does not defeat that claim because correspondence is not identical with cause. The example shows the

[19] The qualifiers suo modo and secundum quid occur in the author's answer itself. They are not editorial safeguards added to soften an otherwise unqualified identification. Omitting them would remove the solution that I.030.1 offers to the preceding objection.

author resisting an inference from regular association to a complete causal explanation. It is not a modern tide theory hidden in theological language.

The ascent from carnation to seed, earth, water and the Word finally identifies the true principle communicating being with Christ (pp. 137-139, II.137.1, II.139.1). A material ancestry is not enough for the philosopher. The efficient-cause question demands an account of the agency sustaining that ancestry and its continuing operations. The author's answer remains theological even where it is reached through close attention to particular materials.

Places to read

I.029.1 (source pp. 29–30); I.030.1 (source p. 30); I.031.1 (source p. 31). The author's own problem, qualified answer and abstract/concrete distinction.

II.063.1 (source p. 63); II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65); II.065.1 (source p. 65); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). The Word's causal priority and the criticism of ordinary definitions.

II.095.1 (source pp. 95–96); II.096.2 (source pp. 96–97); II.104.2 (source pp. 104–105); II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106). Material conditions and the distinction between causation and correspondence.

Connections

Nature and Logos subsistent develop the divine primary agency; Spirit of the world develops the created operative subject. Body soul and spirit explains the opening and reunion mentioned in the practical paragraph. Reading the entries together prevents efficient cause from becoming a free-floating label with no connection to the material and theological distinctions that qualify it.

Ends and purposes concerns another causal question: what the work or renewed world is for. It should not be substituted for efficient cause. The glory of God as an end and the Word as primary agency can belong to the same account while answering different questions.

Translation in this edition

Efficient cause retains causa efficiens because the source explicitly discusses that term. A paraphrase such as active ingredient would narrow it prematurely and obscure the distinction between the abstract operative aspect and the concrete universal matter.

Copulator in I.031.1 is explained through uniting agent. The term concerns the reunion of soul and body within the work. It is not evidence, by itself, of a sexual procedure or a separate ordinary substance identified by the translator.

Attested forms

causa efficiens — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.029.1 (source pp. 29–30); I.031.1 (source p. 31); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

suo modo & secundum quid — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.030.1 (source p. 30).

Abstractivè — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.031.1 (source p. 31).

Concretè — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.031.1 (source p. 31).

Cautions

The qualified causal status of a created spirit should not be turned into equality with the divine Word. The author repeatedly retains their difference.

The critique of secondary explanations is also more specific than a refusal of every material condition. The source's own qualifications concerning properties, seasons and receptive capacity must remain beside its polemical claims about the true cause.

See also

Nature; Logos subsistent; Logos uttered; Spirit of the world; Body soul and spirit; Ends and purposes; Weather and witchcraft

Elementated things

Elementata · Elementa · vegetabilisch Wasser

Why a watery extract need not be elemental water

At a Glance

The word. Elementata distinguishes bodies already formed from elements from the elements themselves.

In the Candida. It excludes the water found in a plant seed from the universal medicine's matter.

In this edition. Things constituted from elements makes the contrast readable without silently treating an extract as a universal element.

A place to read. Read the carnation sequence on pp. 139-140, II.139.2-II.140.1.

Meaning

Elementated things is an editorial English headword for the distinction expressed by Elementata. A material can contain water or yield something watery when opened and yet remain an already particularized body. The appearance or recoverability of water does not establish that the material has the unrestricted power of the universal elements.

Use in the book

The immediate example is the carnation. The author follows flower to plant and seed, then says that opening the little seed reveals only a little water and earth (pp. 139-140, II.139.2). This observation is used to support the seed's elemental origin. It is not yet a declaration that the seed's water is the correct beginning of the philosophical work.

The next paragraph sharply forbids that inference (p. 140, II.140.1). Such waters are not Elementa but Elementata; a universal medicine cannot be prepared from them. The argument's movement is therefore from composition to a restriction on practical selection. Discovering the elements in a thing and possessing a suitable universal subject are different achievements.

Part I had already prepared this distinction through the products of chymical analysis (pp. 12-13, I.012.1). Vegetable materials yield vegetable water, oil and salt; minerals yield principles belonging to their particular metals. The process does not by itself carry those products back to universal prime matter. The names Mercury, Sulphur and Salt can recur without

guaranteeing that each named fraction has the same scope as the philosophical principles in their universal state.[20]

The distinction also clarifies the earlier theoretical regress from a human being through seed, blood, chyle and bread, and from bread through grain and earth to water (pp. 11-12, I.011.1). Reason can trace dependence upon a common source. The author nevertheless denies that practical resolution of any given particular restores that common source in a universally usable condition. Elementata gives a compact name to the obstacle that this difference creates.

Nor does the author solve the difficulty by rejecting all particular properties as unreal. He continually treats plant kinds, mineral conditions and their powers as consequential. The problem is their restriction. Once a subject is specified, its watery components belong to that determinate nature and cannot simply be relabeled universal because their ultimate origin is shared.

This makes the entry a useful check on casual reading of the phrase everything is water. In the book that claim coexists with severe exclusions of aqueous materials. A plant extract may illustrate elemental origin while failing to meet the proposed art's requirements. The same evidence can support one conclusion and fail to support another without the author intending a contradiction.

Places to read

II.139.2 (source pp. 139–140); II.140.1 (source p. 140). Carnation seed and the explicit Elementa/Elementata distinction.

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). Theoretical return to origin distinguished from practical recovery.

Connections

Matter prime examines why the meaning of reduction also varies with the subject and with philosophical usage. Universal and particular explains the restricted power of what has already been specified. Together these entries distinguish origin, present constitution and operative suitability, three questions that should not be collapsed into one.

Translation in this edition

Elementata is translated as things constituted from elements rather than simply compounds. Compounds could invite an unexamined modern account of chemical bonding that the passage does not provide. Constituted

[20] II.140.1 refers back to Part I generally. The connection with I.011.1-I.012.1 is an editorial reading correlation, not a page number or exact quotation supplied by that backward reference.

emphasizes the author's contrast with the common principles without assigning a present-day molecular identity.

Elementated things is correspondingly a reading label, not an assertion that the author uses an exact German noun of that form. The attested Latin plural supplies the lexical evidence.

Attested forms

Elementata — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.140.1 (source p. 140).

Elementa — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.140.1 (source p. 140).

vegetabilisch Wasser — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13).

Cautions

Do not infer that Elementata are merely false appearances or that their components are chemically unreal. They are excluded because their nature and power are already particularized in the author's account.

The distinction is about the selection of a universal subject. It does not forbid every use of a particular remedy, which the book elsewhere acknowledges under particular preparations and the orders of medicine.

See also

Elements; Matter prime; Universal and particular; Subject of the art; Hermetic names

Elements

Elementa · Mercurius · Sulphur

Four names, three principles and one watery origin

At a Glance

The word. The elements are water, earth, air and fire understood through a common watery nature.

In the Candida. The three philosophical principles are explicitly equated with them, and their separation does not abolish mutual presence.

In this edition. Elements keeps the historical category distinct from modern chemical elements.

A place to read. Read pp. 85-88, II.085.1-II.087.1, with pp. 34-36, I.034.1-I.035.1.

Meaning

Elements names the common constituents from which the author explains visible things. Their familiar plurality is held together by the thesis that they derive from water and are themselves water in different respects. The book then interprets the three philosophical principles through that elemental scheme: Mercury is air, Sulphur fire, and Salt water, earth and the body of the others.

The account is not a simple table in which each term can be isolated and substituted for another ordinary substance. Salt's relation to both water and earth already crosses the apparent four-versus-three arrangement. The author also insists that each separated principle retains the others. Their distinction concerns roles, presentation and qualities within a continuing essential unity.

Use in the book

Part I argues from the priority of waters and the resolution of visible things to water and elements (pp. 4-9, I.004.1, I.005.1, I.009.1). Fire is said to be concealed in water, and water is called the mother and origin of the remaining elements. The common resolution maxim supports a conclusion about origin. The elements therefore function as causes and common beginnings, not merely as four observable appearances.

The universal medicine follows from this common constitution. What nourishes and preserves creatures must be related to that of which they consist; since creatures consist of elements, perfected or balanced elements are proposed as a comprehensive remedy (p. 24, I.024.1). This is a historical therapeutic inference. Its role is to connect composition with the breadth of a medicine's claimed power.

The account of separation prevents a misleading mechanical picture. In creation God distinguishes the elements by higher and lower position while leaving each within the others (pp. 34-35, I.034.1). Their connectedness is invoked through Arndt and the golden-chain image. Separation into wholly independent elemental substances would destroy the relationship that the author says creation preserves.

The art's own three-principle separation is explained in the same way (pp. 35-36, I.035.1). Mercury is not without Sulphur and Salt, and the reciprocal statements also hold. Philosophical dry water is a shell and vehicle making the threefold spirit accessible to hand and sight in distinct forms. The operator presents and handles differences without achieving absolute essential division. Boasting of a complete severing of the elements is expressly criticized.

Chapter Two of Part II supplies the direct equations (p. 85, II.085.1). They are introduced as knowledge from the author's own experience, against natural philosophers who allegedly define principles they have never seen. The force of the claim is operative as well as theoretical. The reader should preserve his first-person evidential posture while distinguishing it from an independent modern verification of the substances involved.[21]

The following page explains Salt's corporeal role (pp. 86-87, II.086.1). Through this body the threefold spirit becomes visible and tangible and can be treated in three hypostases or principles. The accompanying image of originally invisible water acquiring a shell reprises Part I. Elemental constitution is therefore tied to accessibility: the art must work with a body through which otherwise subtle powers can be encountered.

The world's spirit, soul and body are then interpreted as air, fire and Salt (pp. 87-88, II.087.1). The author uses this interpretation while criticizing ordinary efficient-cause, form and matter terminology. His three principles are not introduced as three independent ultimate substances competing with the four elements. They are his way of explaining the inner constitution and operative differentiation of the same elemental nature.

Later anatisation faces the difficulty of elemental opposition (pp. 165-166, II.165.2). Elements separated from water are contrary to one another, yet their disproportion concerns qualities and accidents rather than essence. Removing superfluities may correct that opposition without replacing their common being. The distinction explains why the book can affirm both elemental unity and materially consequential differences.

The difference between elements and elementated things is equally important (p. 140, II.140.1). A watery extract from a carnation seed may

[21] The one or two new natural philosophers criticized in II.085.1 are not named in that paragraph. No identification of those opponents is supplied here. The source's claim to experience is retained without turning it into an independent verification.

reveal an elemental origin but still belong to a specified plant nature. It is not therefore the universally suitable water. The elements' presence in everything does not make everything an equally eligible beginning of the art.

Places to read

I.009.1 (source p. 9); I.024.1 (source p. 24). Common watery origin and the argument for universal nourishment and medicine.

I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Creation's distinction and the art's non-absolute separation.

II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). The explicit equations and corporeal vehicle.

II.140.1 (source p. 140); II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166). Elementata and accidental opposition.

Connections

The strongest reading route runs from Elements to the separate philosophical-principle entries, then to Separation and Anatisation. It begins with the common scheme, examines the distinctive role of each principle, and returns to the operations that the author allows upon their unity. Reading the principle names first as ordinary materials would reverse that route and make the later exclusions harder to understand.

Water primordial develops the common beginning, while Body soul and spirit develops the threefold interpretation. These connections do not establish that every author cited by Candida uses the same equations. The present entry describes this book's explicit arrangement.

Translation in this edition

Elements is a historical translation. The entry avoids replacing the term with molecules, atoms or modern chemical elements, none of which is supplied by the cited argument. Mercury, Sulphur and Salt are retained as the names being explained, with ordinary substances distinguished in their separate entries.

Hypostases here concerns differentiated subsistent forms or constituents made accessible to operations. It should not be read automatically as the persons of the Trinity merely because the author elsewhere uses Christian theological language. Context, not the number three alone, determines the referent.

Attested forms

Elementa — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87).

Mercurius — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.085.1 (source p. 85).

Sulphur — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.085.1 (source p. 85).

Saltz — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.085.1 (source p. 85).

Cautions

The statement that the elements are one water is not a modern finding about elemental composition. It is the author's common-origin and common-essence claim, qualified by distinct powers, locations and qualities.

Nor should the claim of three separable principles be converted into a recipe for mixing three common ingredients. The book repeatedly requires one subject and denies that its essential principles are wholly divided.

See also

Water primordial; Mercury philosophical; Sulphur philosophical; Salt philosophical; Body soul and spirit; Separation; Elementated things; Anatisation

Ends and purposes

finis principalis · Haupt-Zweck · gloria DEI

What study, practice and the renewed world are for

At a Glance

The word. End can mean a purpose as well as the point at which something ceases.

In the Candida. The principal purpose of study is knowledge and praise of the Creator; the world's final transformation likewise has God's glory as its end.

In this edition. Purpose is explained where the English word end could otherwise suggest only termination.

A place to read. Read pp. 39-40, I.039.1, beside pp. 231-232, II.231.1.

Meaning

The book distinguishes success in a process from the principal purpose that makes pursuit of the art worthy. A practitioner may seek knowledge, wealth, cure or a finished product, but the author identifies contemplation of divine wonders and praise of the Creator as the study's governing end. The word end also becomes deliberately significant when the book turns to the world's end.

Use in the book

Part I introduces purpose while insisting on the distinction between Creator and creature (pp. 39-40, I.039.1). The author would rather lose the art than be a mere laboratory worker without sound understanding. The principal end is to contemplate and know God's works, attain knowledge of their Creator and advance divine praise. Knowledge and worship are therefore related purposes, not interchangeable labels for financial success.

The same paragraph connects the wrong principal purpose with unworthiness and concealment. Those who set another governing end are the people from whom philosophers hide the art. This is an ethical claim about who should possess knowledge, not merely an explanation of why an author wishes to protect proprietary information. It belongs beside the book's later warnings about greed and pride.[22]

The chapter on metal generation recalls the principal purpose before discussing an uncertain natural process (pp. 106-108, II.106.1-II.107.1).

[22] The Latin close at II.231.1 states finis ... gloria DEI and answers those who say an end is lacking. The interpretation of finis as purpose follows the nearby argument for enduring transformed substance, rather than an external philosophical system supplied to the text.

Metals are divine wonders worthy of contemplation, yet the exact mode of their generation remains conjectural. A worthy purpose therefore does not excuse turning conjecture into certain knowledge. The author's purpose and the evidential limits of his account coexist.

The end of the world provides a different but connected use (pp. 231-232, II.231.1). After describing transformed substance and a new heaven and earth, the author says that its end is God's glory and that it consequently does not lack an end. End here cannot mean only annihilation, since the surrounding argument denies that universal being simply ceases. Purpose completes the account of transformation.

The same passage limits what can be known in mortality from Scripture and knowledge of nature. Final purpose is not presented as a reason to describe every detail of the future. The author's brief answer combines a claimed natural analogy, theological expectation and a limit of inquiry. Its point is to make perfection intelligible as meaningful transformation rather than pointless survival or sheer abolition.

These uses differ from the rule that every beginning testifies to its end and every end to its beginning (pp. 12-13, I.012.1; p. 165, II.165.1). There end identifies the result relevant to a material beginning and its capacities. The ethical purpose of study, the result of an operation and the glory of God as final purpose can be related without becoming the same question.

Places to read

I.039.1 (source pp. 39–40). Study's governing purpose and the unworthy alternative.

II.106.1 (source pp. 106–107); II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108). Contemplation of metals with conjectural limits.

II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). The renewed world's end as divine glory.

I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); II.165.1 (source p. 165). A distinct beginning-result relation.

Connections

Charity and Secrecy and publication follow the ethical consequences of the principal purpose. World and its end follows the cosmic application. Efficient cause asks what brings an effect about, whereas the present entry asks what it is for; neither question should replace the other.

Translation in this edition

Finis can be rendered end, with purpose supplied in explanation where the source's argument requires it. Principal end and principal purpose render the Latin and German pairing at I.039.1 without assuming that principal means the only conceivable subsidiary aim.

At II.231.1 the brief Latin turn plays upon the question of the world's end. Preserving the purpose sense avoids the false impression that the author suddenly reverses his account and makes divine glory a synonym for annihilation.

Attested forms

finis principalis — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. I.039.1 (source pp. 39–40); II.106.1 (source pp. 106–107).

Haupt-Zweck — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. I.039.1 (source pp. 39–40).

gloria DEI — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232).

Cautions

The stated purpose does not independently validate the medicinal or metallic claims. A pious end and an accurate natural account are distinct matters.

Nor does identifying a principal end justify inventing an otherwise unattested complete hierarchy of final causes. The entry follows the purposes actually named in the work.

See also

Efficient cause; Charity; Secrecy and publication; Knowledge and practice; World and its end; Nobility and perfection

Form

forma · formam sive animam · in situ & figurâ

Appearance, constitution and the limits of a change

At a Glance

The word. Form can concern a material's constitution, a visible configuration or the condition from which it has changed.

In the Candida. The author distinguishes form from accidental appearance and criticizes inherited accounts of form while assigning fire the role of soul or form.

In this edition. The context determines whether form, figure or appearance is appropriate.

A place to read. Read pp. 87-88, II.087.1, beside the irreversibility example at p. 166, II.166.1.

Meaning

Form is not a single unchanging synonym for visible outline throughout the book. At one point it is paired with soul in an account of the three principles; elsewhere it helps distinguish parts by figure or describes a subject's former raw condition. The relevant question is what a change of form is being allowed to change, and what continuity the author requires underneath it.

Use in the book

The two separations of Part I supply an initial distinction (pp. 32-34, I.032.1-I.033.1). Removing the accidental shell is different from distinguishing parts that differ in position and figure but are related in substance and powers. Visible or positional differentiation does not entail a division into essentially unrelated materials. The account therefore resists reading every distinct form shown in the vessel as an entirely new substance.

The philosophical dry water makes the threefold spirit accessible in three different forms while each principle retains the others (pp. 35-36, I.035.1). Presentation to hand and sight is an achievement of the art, but it does not mean that Mercury, Sulphur and Salt have been purified into wholly isolated elemental beings. Form belongs here to the manifestation through which the operator encounters their differentiated roles.

Chapter Two of Part II criticizes ordinary philosophers' efficient cause, form and matter (pp. 87-88, II.087.1). The author says that they lack the true cause and do not know what their definitions teach. He then interprets the world's spirit, soul and body as air, fire and Salt. Form or soul is assigned to fire. The paragraph's polemic and its proposed material interpretation

must both be retained: it is not simply an unexplained endorsement of every inherited theory bearing the word form.[23]

The discussion of anatisation distinguishes improvement of qualities from alteration of essence (pp. 165-166, II.165.2). The perfected magistery nevertheless cannot return to its former form and rawness, any more than flour can become grain again (p. 166, II.166.1). Continuity of essential nature consequently does not make all forms reversible. Form can identify a real stage of the subject's history without being synonymous with its enduring essence.

The final cosmic discussion extends the distinction in another direction. Particular natures are resolved into universal principles and these are transformed into a supremely perfected spiritual being (pp. 229-231, II.229.1-II.230.1). Substance endures through transformation; the later summary speaks of a new more-than-perfect form (pp. 231-232, II.231.1). Here transformation is neither simple persistence of every present appearance nor annihilation of all being.

Places to read

I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Figure, related parts and the threefold spirit made visible.

II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). Form or soul interpreted as fire amid a polemic about natural philosophy.

II.166.1 (source p. 166); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). Former raw form and the new perfected form.

II.211.2 (source p. 211). The reply's account of the Word as form giving existence.

Connections

Body soul and spirit follows the explicit equation of form or soul with fire. Accident and Substance examine what may alter while essential being is preserved. The entries should remain distinct because the book's different uses of form cannot be explained merely by replacing every occurrence with one member of that contrast.

The Second Letter also calls God's Word the proper form that gives and continues to give things their existence (p. 211, II.211.2). This supplies a causal-theological use alongside the elemental interpretation of form or soul as fire. The two should not be collapsed into the assertion that the divine Word is ordinary fire.

[23] The clause formam sive animam ignem is the author's express interpretation at II.087.1. It concerns the spirit-soul-body account of the world and does not, by itself, define the constitution of a human rational soul.

Translation in this edition

Forma is rendered form when the philosophical relation is at issue. Figurâ at I.033.1 points more directly to figure or configuration. The edition's different choices are meant to preserve distinctions already carried by the source rather than impose a universal technical vocabulary on every ordinary mention of appearance.

Form or soul translates the author's own pairing in II.087.1. It should not be expanded into an identification of the human rational soul with elemental fire; the cited passage interprets the world's threefold constitution.

Attested forms

forma — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

formam sive animam — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

in situ & figurâ — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34).

vorige Form — Actual source form; related forms are discussed without manufacturing a lemma. II.166.1 (source p. 166).

Cautions

The local criticism of ordinary philosophers does not establish a simple history in which this book completely abandons all earlier accounts of form. It continues to use causal and formal vocabulary, while contesting the explanation of its referents.

No single modern physical equivalent should be assigned to form across these contexts. A visible colour, a generative condition and an essential principle play different argumentative roles.

See also

Accident; Substance; Body soul and spirit; Sulphur philosophical; Annihilation and transformation

Homogeneity

homogeneum · unius solius Naturæ · suæ sit essentiæ homogeneum

A shared nature required for fixation and reception

At a Glance

The word. Homogeneity concerns sameness of nature or essence in a specified relation.

In the Candida. It limits fixation and what philosophical Mercury can receive, without declaring every related water interchangeable.

In this edition. Homogeneous keeps the source's term, explained through nature rather than modern uniform composition alone.

A place to read. Read p. 77, II.077.1, beside pp. 219-220, II.219.2.

Meaning

Homogeneity is a requirement of belonging to one nature. In the cited maxim, what is to be fixed must be homogeneous and of one nature alone. In the later reply, our Mercury receives only what is homogeneous with its essence. The relation is more exacting than superficial resemblance, shared liquidity or the mere presence of a similarly named principle.

Use in the book

At p. 77 the author says that art can transform or improve a nature only in and with its own nature and original seed (II.077.1). Nuysement's maxim about fixation follows. Fixation is not therefore represented as an external force capable of making any selected combination endure. The material relationship required for the operation precedes the operator's management of it.

The immediately following paragraph prevents a loose interpretation (pp. 77-78, II.077.2). Rainwater is very closely related to the Hermetic subject, but mixing one with the other does not enable philosophical treatment or fixation. The reader must not replace homogeneous with closely related. The two descriptions play different roles: kinship is admitted, yet the required operative unity is not thereby achieved.[24]

Failed practice gives the warning substance (pp. 78-79, II.078.1-II.078.2). A relative, a reputed philosopher and a physician labour in vain; dew is mixed with the subject, and earth is added to rainwater. Even a claimed conjunction with bodily gold and silver does not complete the second

[24] The juxtaposition of II.077.1 and II.077.2 is consequential: the second paragraph admits close kinship while denying the proposed mixture's philosophical treatment and fixation. Any paraphrase that treats kinship as sufficient has omitted the source's immediate counterexample.

operation. An apparent early union is therefore insufficient evidence that the whole work has the necessary natural relationship.

The three-principle requirement supplies the positive counterpart (pp. 88-90, II.088.1-II.089.1). The principles are to be drawn from one subject, not Mercury from one material, Sulphur from another and Salt from a third. This does not define homogeneity by a modern analytical test, but it states a practical implication of the required original unity. Matching names cannot substitute for the common subject.

The Second Letter brings the term into its definition of substance (pp. 219-220, II.219.2). Substance admits no contrariety; otherwise art could not render it pure. The writer claims knowledge from practice that our Mercury receives only what is homogeneous with its essence. The rule concerns reception within a continuing nature, not unrestricted absorption of every substance placed beside it.

These passages also explain why a universal origin does not guarantee a homogeneous operative mixture. Specified natures have particular powers and conditions. Their remote common source can be traced in theory without making their present union suitable for fixation. Homogeneity has to be assessed within the operation and level of nature at issue.

Places to read

II.077.1 (source p. 77); II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78). The maxim and immediate restriction of mere kinship.

II.078.2 (source pp. 78–79); II.089.1 (source pp. 89–90). Failed mixtures and the requirement of one subject.

II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). Essential reception in the reply's definition of substance.

Connections

Subject of the art and Separation follow the required beginning and its differentiation. Contrariety supplies the negative counterpart to homogeneous reception. Rainwater is the useful test case because its admitted kinship with the subject coexists with an explicit warning against their mixture.

Translation in this edition

Homogeneous is retained for homogeneum. Of one nature alone is not omitted as redundant: it states the author's intended dimension of sameness more clearly than the borrowed word by itself.

The entry does not substitute miscible, chemically pure or molecularly identical. Those are more specific modern claims than the source supplies, and simple physical mixing is not the achievement the argument demands.

Attested forms

homogeneum — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.077.1 (source p. 77); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220).

unius solius Naturæ — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.077.1 (source p. 77).

suæ sit essentiæ homogeneum — Attested source form; any normalized headword is editorial. II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220).

Cautions

No exact modern test of homogeneity is given in these passages. The source offers a philosophical requirement and claimed operative experience.

The maxim's attribution to Nuysement is preserved, but its complete source has not been collated for the lexicon. It should not be expanded into an independently verified account of Nuysement's entire matter theory.

See also

Contrariety; Substance; Fixation; Subject of the art; Rainwater; Separation

Hypostasis

hypostases · hypostasin

Principial distinctions and the unity of an embodied human being

At a Glance

The word. Hypostasis is used for distinguishable principles in the alchemical account and for the constituted unity of an embodied human being.

In the Candida. The three hypostases of the principial account and the one human hypostasis belong to different local explanations.

In this edition. The technical noun is retained and explained through the conjunction stated in the passage.

A place to read. II.086.1, p. 86, beside II.220.2, pp. 220–221.

Meaning

The earlier plural hypostases belongs to the account of philosophical principles. At II.086.1, Mercury is air, Sulphur fire and Salt water, earth and body. Through the body, the threefold spirit becomes visible and tangible and can be distinguished into three hypostases and principles for philosophical treatment. Here the word supports the account of principial differentiation within a material unity; it does not name three separately constituted human persons.[25]

The singular hypostasin occurs at a precise transition in the second Latin letter. The correspondent has defined substance as pure, simple being and explained lower bodies as substance mingled with accidental residues. He now applies the account to the human being. The earthly human is corruptible; the heavenly human or soul is immortal. The appropriate earthly substance and the soul constitute one hypostasis for as long as they remain joined.

The term therefore marks unity without erasing composition. The human being is not described as a loose collection whose parts have no common identity. Nor does the unity make every component substance in the correspondent's special sense. Residues remain accidental, and sin cannot be regarded as substance. Hypostasis belongs to an account that differentiates what constitutes the person from the corruption that affects the embodied creature.

[25] II.086.1 explicitly pairs hypostases with principia. This pairing supplies the local alchemical sense. It should not be replaced automatically by a definition drawn from the later anthropological sentence or from a general theological dictionary.

Use in the book

At II.220.2, the temporal qualification is essential: one hypostasis exists while the components remain conjoined. It prevents an editor from silently turning the sentence into an unrestricted claim about an unchanged bodily state before and after death. The surrounding discussion will proceed to death, putrefaction and resurrection, where the condition of the body changes radically.[26]

The immediate argumentative target is the statement that whatever is in the human being is substance. The correspondent denies it because the earthly body contains residues as well as substance. The unity named by hypostasis does not rescue the rejected statement. One person can be constituted through conjunction without everything affecting that person becoming essential being.

This also clarifies the account of sin. Sin is denied the status of substance, yet the reply says it contaminates and perverts humanity so thoroughly that salvation requires Christ. The hypostasis sentence cannot be used to make corruption irrelevant or to divide off a wholly unaffected everyday person. Classification and extent of damage answer different questions in the reply.

The account of the original soul and its propagation elsewhere asks how human life comes to be. This passage asks how the embodied human is constituted and how sin should be classified. The shared vocabulary of soul and body does not make the questions identical. Likewise, spirit, soul and body in the alchemical three-principle scheme have to be understood through their own definitions, rather than imported without qualification into this anthropological sentence.

The contrast between these passages is valuable for translation. At p. 86, the question is how a threefold spirit becomes sensible and available for treatment through body. At pp. 220–221, the question is how earthly substance and soul remain one embodied human being while corruption is classified as accidental. A shared technical noun does not make the objects or explanatory tasks identical. The plural is paired with principles in the first passage; the singular is qualified by the duration of conjunction in the second. Each construction supplies its own limits.

Places to read

II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87). The threefold spirit made sensible through body and distinguished into three hypostases and principles.

II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219). The definition of substance and the distinction from accidental residues.

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[26] II.220.2 expressly says tamdiu invicem conjunctæ sunt, for as long as they remain joined. That temporal limitation is part of the constitution of one hypostasis stated here; omitting it makes the claim broader than the source.

II.220.2 (source pp. 220–221); II.222.1 (source p. 222); II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223). One hypostasis, the denial that sin is substance and the scope of corruption.

II.223.1 (source p. 223). The ensuing account of bodily resurrection.

Translation in this edition

Hypostasin is retained as hypostasis in the English discussion, with the inflected form recorded here. In this sentence it denotes the one human being constituted during the conjunction of earthly substance and soul. The entry does not supply a Greek etymology or equate the term indiscriminately with substance, person or underlying matter wherever those words occur elsewhere.

Attested forms

hypostases — Plural term for the three distinguishable hypostases and principles. II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87).

hypostasin — hypostasis in an inflected Latin form. II.220.2 (source pp. 220–221).

Cautions

The definition belongs to the second correspondent. It is not a present anatomical or psychological model. The wording neither settles every theological use of hypostasis nor licenses an identification of the soul with an alchemical ingredient.

See also

Body soul and spirit; Soul propagation; Substance; Residues; Corruption and sin; Resurrection; Image of God

Laws of nature

Gesetz und Ordnung der Natur · unveränderlich · Verba & Decreta DEI immutabilia

Received order, regularity and the limit of human change

At a Glance

The word. Natural law here belongs to an implanted order grounded in the creative Word.

In the Candida. Regular courses, propagation by kind and the limits of art express its force; the future resolution raises a different divine context.

In this edition. Law is not made a synonym for a mathematically formulated modern law of physics.

A place to read. Read pp. 76-77, II.076.2, beside pp. 130-132 and230-231.

Meaning

The work locates natural order in the continuing force of divine creation. A creature receives a particular constitution and activity; its regular operation is not an autonomous alternative to the Word. Law and order can therefore describe the stability of a created kind while the author continues to deny that nature acts independently.

Use in the book

The most general statement connects the Word's eternity and unchangeability with nature's constancy (pp. 76-77, II.076.2). Every nature maintains its order precisely and inviolably. Day, night, sun, moon and stars offer visible examples of regular course and alternation. The passage gives regularity theological grounding; it does not supply an equation relating measurable variables.

The generative account is more specific (pp. 130-131, II.130.2). God implants a definite law and order together with particular life and the activity of bringing forth living creatures. Those creatures thereafter reproduce through their own seed. Law concerns continuity of kind and appropriate agency, not just the regular recurrence of an outward event.[27]

The immediate human limit follows (pp. 131-132, II.131.1-II.131.2). Operators cannot alter the Most High's order or speak the same creative agency into the elements. They may nevertheless prepare and tincture in accordance with nature. Natural constancy therefore allows certain

[27] II.130.2 actually pairs law with order and links both to particular life and seed. The broader editorial headword is therefore anchored in an explicit phrase, while the other cited regularities illustrate related uses rather than additional quoted definitions.

improvements while excluding a claim to originating wholly new powers at will.

The art's timing provides another aspect of order. Nature works by degrees and brings nothing before its time; the operator's diligence and management of fire affect whether a process finishes sooner, later or is spoiled (pp. 167-170, II.167.1-II.169.1). The relation is not simple mechanical inevitability. A fixed nature can have conditions of successful development that practice must respect.

The Second Letter uses immutable decrees to defend the continued distinction of primordial light from the luminaries (p. 214, II.214.1-II.214.2). The later command establishing sun and stars does not abolish the earlier light. The source's order concept supports persistence of created identities, not only regular motion. This belongs to the reply's position in the light dispute.

The world's end requires an important qualification (pp. 230-231, II.230.1). Particular decrees and the present particular natures cease through resolution, while universal natures endure and are transformed through their relation to the eternal substantial Word. This is a future divine act within the author's eschatology. It should not be used to make the earlier prohibition on human alteration of natural order disappear.

Places to read

II.076.2 (source pp. 76–77). Unchangeable Word and visible regularity.

II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131); II.131.1 (source p. 131); II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132). Implanted order of living kinds and legitimate preparation.

II.167.1 (source p. 167); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170). Gradual work and conditional timing.

II.214.1 (source p. 214); II.214.2 (source pp. 214–215); II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231). Persistent light and the distinct future cessation of particular orders.

Connections

Blessing and command identifies the implantation of a particular task. Creation and imitation explains art's limited permission. Labour and patience follows the temporal discipline, while World and its end examines the final transformation rather than treating it as an ordinary present operation.

Translation in this edition

Law and order renders the source's paired expression. Order can also translate the Latin or German vocabulary without implying that every occurrence states a separate universally quantified law.

Unchangeable must be interpreted with the allowed maturation, balancing and tincturing. In these arguments it preserves essential nature and appointed scope, rather than declaring that no qualities or material conditions can ever change.

Attested forms

Gesetz und Ordnung der Natur — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131).

unveränderlich — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.076.2 (source pp. 76–77).

Verba & Decreta DEI immutabilia — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.214.1 (source p. 214).

Cautions

Do not insert a modern division between scientific laws and religious commands as though it were the book's own organizing distinction. The author gives the Word operative natural force.

The difference between a divine final resolution and a human laboratory procedure is consequential. Shared words such as change and order do not make the agency or conditions equivalent.

See also

Blessing and command; Logos uttered; Creation and imitation; Labour and patience; Nature; World and its end

Life and sensation

Leben und Sinnligkeit · vitâ tantum vivunt essentiali · kein Leben

Different kinds of living, acting and responding

At a Glance

The word. Life may concern sensation, propagation, elemental responsiveness or a material's operative capacity.

In the Candida. The book attributes life to elements and light, distinguishes mineral essential life and denies life to ordinary gold in a particular argument.

In this edition. The qualifications are retained rather than forced into one modern biological category.

A place to read. Read pp. 68-69, pp. 132-133, pp. 144-145 and p. 211 together.

Meaning

Life in this work is a family of consequential predicates rather than a single criterion imported from modern biology. Seeing and hearing, reproducing through seed, possessing essential life and participating in tincturing do not all mean the same thing. The entry's task is to identify which contrast makes a particular statement intelligible, including places where life is affirmed in one respect and denied in another.

Use in the book

The audible-Word discussion attributes life and sensation to the already created waters and elements (p. 68, II.068.1). They can see God and hear his voice to the extent required by the argument. The supporting passages describe living water and the responses of waters and earth to divine presence (p. 69, II.069.1). Sensation is not merely an ornamental adjective here: it answers an objection that no hearer existed.

Animals and plants receive a different kind of life. Particular creative commands establish their living kinds, implanted order and reproduction through their own seed (pp. 130-131, II.130.2). The author does not claim that the operator can give elements this activity at will (p. 131, II.131.1). Elemental responsiveness and the specific life of a propagating creature therefore remain distinguishable.[28]

[28] The Nuysement statement in II.132.1 expressly denies both sensitive and vegetative faculties. It cannot by itself support the stronger claim that all minerals possess the same sensation attributed to elements in II.068.1.

Minerals supply a third formulation (pp. 132-133, II.132.1). The quotation attributed to Nuysement denies sensitive and vegetative faculties while affirming essential life. The author uses this to argue that mineral generation needs no separately implanted seed equivalent to those of plants and animals. Life is explicitly qualified; it is not treated as proof that minerals feel as animals do or reproduce by an ordinary species seed.

Ordinary gold is nevertheless called lifeless in the argument against its supposed killing and regeneration (pp. 144-145, II.144.1). Where life is absent, killing cannot occur, since deprivation presupposes possession. The operative contrast is between a dead finished metal and the living philosophical material required by the art. This should be placed beside, rather than silently equated with, the broader formula essential life of minerals.

The Second Letter gives light life through the Word (p. 211, II.211.1). If the creative Word became the life of creatures, it became the life of light; life then supports form and substance. This is the reply's argument against the first correspondent's account of light as an inhering accident. Life is functioning in a theological and constitutive inference rather than in a report of light's reproduction.

These passages show why a simple list of living things would misrepresent the work. The relevant questions are whether a thing responds, propagates, has a determinate constitutive principle or can participate in the philosophical operation. The different predicates may be connected by the continuing Word, but the source does not present one exhaustive definition that removes every local difference.

Places to read

II.068.1 (source p. 68); II.069.1 (source p. 69). Elemental response and the audibility objection.

II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131); II.131.1 (source p. 131); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133). Specific life, human limits and mineral essential life.

II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145); II.211.1 (source p. 211). Dead ordinary gold and the reply's life of light.

Connections

Living water follows the scriptural phrase, Gold living follows the operative material, and Soul propagation follows the special account of human generation. Capacity and potency helps distinguish a possessed ability from its actual exercise. These routes prevent one use of life from proving every other use.

Translation in this edition

Sensitive and vegetative faculties retain the source's categories in the Nuysement quotation. Essential life is not translated as conscious life. Conversely, sensation remains sensation where the author expressly uses it to defend elemental hearing.

Dead and living in the gold discussion should remain operative descriptions within the author's matter theory. Reducing them automatically to poisonous and wholesome or inorganic and organic would change the opposition.

Attested forms

Leben und Sinnligkeit — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.068.1 (source p. 68).

vitâ tantum vivunt essentiali — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133).

kein Leben — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145).

lucis vita — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.211.1 (source p. 211).

Cautions

The potentially difficult relation between essential mineral life and lifeless ordinary gold should remain visible. The local contrasts suggest different respects, but this entry does not invent a complete doctrine that the author never states.

These historical predicates are not modern demonstrations of consciousness in elements or light. Their argumentative roles can be explained without validating the conclusions.

See also

Living water; Gold living; Gold ordinary; Light; Capacity and potency; Soul propagation

Matter prime

primam materiam · materia secunda · materia prima

First beginnings, changing philosophical usage and restricted reduction

At a Glance

The word. Prime matter names a first material condition, but the source warns that philosophical communities may reverse first and second matter.

In the Candida. The possibility of reduction depends on the subject; theory's return to origin does not make every particular practically reducible.

In this edition. Prime matter and remote/proximate matter are kept distinguishable.

A place to read. Read pp. 32-38, I.032.1-I.037.1, after the restriction on pp. 11-13.

Meaning

Matter prime is an editorial ordering of the headword prime matter. In the work the expression can refer to a common first beginning or to the prepared condition understood as first within the Hermetic work. The author himself warns that what ordinary philosophers call secondary matter may be prime matter for Hermetic philosophers, and conversely.

The vocabulary must consequently be read together with the action and the subject under discussion. Reducing a particular plant or metal to universal principles is denied; reducing the art's own subject to prime matter is allowed in a qualified explanation. Treating the same phrase as an identical operation in every passage would turn the author's explicit distinction into an apparent contradiction.

Use in the book

The first restriction appears in a long account of dependence (pp. 11-12, I.011.1). Thought can trace a person through seed, blood and nourishment, and bread through flour, grain, earth and water. It can likewise trace metals to their named principles and these to the elements. The author nevertheless says that practical reduction of particulars into prime matter and universal principles cannot be accomplished. A genealogy of material origin does not guarantee an operable reverse route.

The next passage explains what chymistry actually obtains from plant and mineral materials (pp. 12-13, I.012.1). The products remain vegetable water, oil and salt or the principles of a particular metal. They do not become the universal first matter merely because the analyst uses familiar names for them. The restriction supports the demand for an initially

universal subject rather than a medicine manufactured from a collection of particulars.

The shell-and-separation discussion reopens the expression (pp. 32-34, I.032.1-I.033.1). The accidental shell is removed after a preliminary reduction of our subject to prime matter. The author immediately explains the difference between Hermetic and ordinary philosophical usage. First and second matter may be reversed between the two. Part of the apparent reduction must therefore be understood in that relative terminological sense.

He does not leave the matter solely verbal. The same paragraph says that reduction also has a place in itself for this subject, though not in particular things (I.033.1). The claim is restrictive but positive: the art has a subject whose starting condition allows an operation barred elsewhere. A lexicon should preserve the two parts of the explanation rather than solve the problem by saying that every reduction is merely a change of name.[29]

The following distinction of universal and particular potentiality supplies the reason (pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1). The world-spirit remains uniform in one respect but becomes specified in another. Extraction from a specified creature does not recover universal suitability. Nevertheless the matter first created by God, otherwise called remote matter, can still be obtained. The author denies the opponent's assumption that the first beginning has become altogether inaccessible.

The objection returns with rainwater on pp. 126-129. If remote matter were possessed, the opponent argues, human beings could create animals and plants. The author replies that rainwater was created within the initial great body of waters and was not altered in itself (pp. 128-129, II.128.1). It therefore supplies remote matter; its putrefaction deposits slime and earth, which he calls the supposed proximate matter. Remote and proximate concern nearness to the work as well as the account of original creation.

Removing superfluities and proceeding philosophically are then required (p. 129, II.129.1). The fact that the deposited earth has hovered above our heads matters to his identification. The passage is not a warrant to call any sediment first matter or to replace the required origin with an ordinary soil. Neither the name earth nor the name water alone establishes the material's fitness.

Ordinary gold provides a sharply different case (pp. 143-145, II.143.2-II.144.1). The author rejects its reduction to first matter and seed in order to acquire a better form. The no-return maxim remains in force, and gold is said to lack the life whose killing or putrefaction the proposed regeneration

[29] I.033.1 says reduction is to be understood partly through reversed first/second-matter terminology and partly as having a place in itself. A reading that reduces the whole passage to verbal convention omits the second qualification.

would require. Prime matter cannot be recovered from every finished product by applying a universal label to its dissolution.

At the world's end, particular natures are said to resolve into universal principles (pp. 229-231, II.229.1-II.230.1). That future divine transformation should not be inserted into the earlier human practice as a present power over every particular. The contexts differ in agency, scale and stated condition. The shared vocabulary calls for comparison, not automatic operational equivalence.

Places to read

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). Theoretical ancestry and practical restriction.

I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34). Reduction of our subject and reversed first/second terminology.

I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38); II.128.1 (source pp. 128–129); II.129.1 (source p. 129). Accessible remote matter and the proposed proximate deposit.

II.143.2 (source pp. 143–144); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). Ordinary gold and the distinct future resolution.

Connections

Elementated things explains why an aqueous analytical product can remain particular. Subject of the art develops the positive selection problem. Creation and imitation distinguishes the human preparation defended here from the divine establishment of living kinds. Together they make clear why naming a first matter is not the same as possessing unlimited creative power.

The book's explicit warning about reversed philosophical usage is sufficient reason to resist imposing one outside definition on every occurrence. It does not identify all the schools concerned or establish a complete history of first matter. The local caution has to remain more precise than an invented intellectual genealogy.

Translation in this edition

Prime matter and first matter both render materia prima as context requires. Remote and proximate retain the separate pair remota and propinqua. First is not automatically earliest in every chronological sense; it can mark the beginning relevant to a particular account or operation.

Reduction is retained rather than paraphrased universally as dissolving. The argument distinguishes return to an original condition, analytical resolution and a terminological change of status. A familiar laboratory word can conceal those differences if used indiscriminately.

Attested forms

primam materiam — Attested source expression in the cited passage. I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34).

materia secunda — Attested source expression in the cited passage. I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34).

materia prima — Attested source expression in the cited passage. I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34).

Materiæ remotæ — Attested source expression in the cited passage. I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38).

materiam propinquam — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.128.1 (source pp. 128–129).

Cautions

The source does not supply a modern chemical identity for prime matter or a reproducible sequence from every ordinary material to it. Its restrictions are part of the definition's practical significance.

The positive claims concerning rainwater and our subject remain historical assertions. Their place in the reasoning should not be erased, but neither should they be turned into verified material identifications merely because the word first sounds fundamental.

See also

Elementated things; Universal and particular; Subject of the art; Water primordial; Putrefaction; Gold ordinary; Creation and imitation

Nature

Natur · Substanz und Wesen · Natura naturata

Substance, capacity and an order sustained by the Word

At a Glance

The word. Nature names a creature's substance and essence, but also its received capacity and determinate order.

In the Candida. The author denies its independent agency while retaining elemental operations, particular powers and material differences.

In this edition. Nature is read locally; it is not silently turned into either modern physical law or an immaterial person.

A place to read. Read pp. 59-65, II.059.1-II.065.1, then the qualification at pp. 96-103.

Meaning

The author defines nature briefly as the substance and essence of each visible creature. That definition gives the inquiry a material and constitutive object. Yet it is not his complete explanation of how the creature acts. Nature also possesses capacity and is the subject in which God works through the Word. A definition of what nature is must therefore be distinguished from an account of its agency.

The work also uses particular natures for determinate created kinds and universal natures for the common principles. These expressions mark differences of scope and power within creation. Nature cannot be replaced everywhere by the total universe, nor can each particular nature be treated as an independent little world possessing the full range of universal effects.

Use in the book

Chapter One of Part II promises the account that Part I had only sketched (p. 59, II.059.1). Knowledge of nature is said to be especially necessary to this art, and the initial definition is substance and essence. Its placement matters: knowledge must precede the successful choice of matter and process, rather than follow as a speculative explanation of operations already performed at random.

The creation sequence then distinguishes the universal beginning from particular natures of light, firmament, celestial bodies, plants and animals (pp. 60-62, II.060.1-II.061.1). The author's use of nature in the plural is therefore not loose repetition. It identifies different received constitutions and activities. Their common origin does not cancel the particular creative commands that establish their order.

The denial that created nature acts of itself follows from scriptural claims about Christ's presence and God's operation in all things (pp. 62-63, II.062.2). Nature has capacity and is the subject of God's working (p. 63, II.063.1). This is the central causal restraint. The author rejects explanations that make a named nature the final answer to why anything moves or acts, when that nature's own received efficacy remains unexplained.

The distinction of the subsistent and uttered Logos prevents this restraint from becoming a merely undifferentiated appeal to God (pp. 63-65, II.063.2-II.065.1). The universal Word acts primarily in all natures; particular commands act secondarily in particular natures. The same divine dependence underlies both, but the scope of a creature's power still follows its particular constitution and charge.

Part I gives a complementary account through the world-spirit. It retains uniform being with respect to universal potentiality while becoming animal, vegetable or mineral with respect to particular potentiality (pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1). The distinction answers why the spirit's presence everywhere does not make every creature a suitable beginning for the universal medicine. Nature includes present specification, not just remote ancestry.

The eternity and immutability of the Word explain the constancy of natural order (pp. 76-77, II.076.2). Day and night and the regular celestial courses exemplify this constancy. The author then insists that art can transform or improve a nature only in and with its own nature and original seed (p. 77, II.077.1). Constancy is thus a condition of legitimate change, not a denial that any material improvement can occur.

The weather discussion supplies a necessary qualification. God acts in nature according to its qualities and properties (pp. 96-97, II.096.2). More storms arise in summer, and sandy barren places produce little despite the general creative charge given to earth. Such differences matter because receptive capacity differs. The author's primary divine cause does not erase the material condition through which a proposed effect can occur.[30]

He makes the qualification explicit at p. 103 (II.103.1): he does not seek to deprive the elements of motions and operations they possess in themselves through God's universal Word, nor the stars of influence and concordance. A reading that turns all nature into wholly inactive matter would miss this statement. The difficult relation is received operation without independent self-sufficiency, and the book asks the reader to maintain both parts.

[30] The sandy-earth example attributes poor growth to impotentia passiva germinandi. That phrase identifies a lack of receptive capacity within the author's account; the paragraph does not supply a modern agronomic analysis of the soil.

Finally, the definition is revisited from within in Chapter Two (pp. 84-88, II.084.2-II.087.1). The essence of visible creatures consists in the three principles, interpreted as the elements. The author criticizes ordinary philosophers for naming efficient cause, form and matter without knowing their referents. His alternative is not to discard material inquiry, but to join an operative account of principles to a theological account of their first cause.

Places to read

II.059.1 (source p. 59); II.062.2 (source pp. 62–63); II.063.1 (source p. 63). The definition and the denial of independent created agency.

I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37); I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38); II.076.2 (source pp. 76–77); II.077.1 (source p. 77). Specification, constant order and legitimate improvement.

II.096.2 (source pp. 96–97); II.103.1 (source p. 103); II.084.2 (source pp. 84–85); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). Material receptivity, elemental operations and the internal account.

Connections

Nature is the meeting point of several entries rather than a substitute for all of them. Substance asks what persists; Capacity and potency asks what can receive or exercise an operation; Efficient cause asks where agency originates; Universal and particular asks how far a received power extends. Following these distinctions allows the book's practical exclusions to be understood as arguments instead of arbitrary prohibitions.

The author's natural philosophy is joined to scriptural interpretation at each major transition. That does not establish a particular intellectual lineage or prove direct dependence on every authority he names. The entry follows the local definitions and qualifications, which are stronger evidence for his meaning than an imposed general history of early modern nature.

Translation in this edition

Natura naturata is rendered created nature where the author uses it to qualify the denial of self-acting nature. The phrase should not be expanded into a second divine agent. Nature, substance and essence remain distinct English words where the source places them together.

Unchangeable nature can mislead if quoted without the admitted transformations. It means, in these arguments, that art cannot give a creature a wholly alien essential order or unrestricted power. The same source describes maturation, purification and tincturing as legitimate changes proceeding according to nature.

Attested forms

Natur — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.059.1 (source p. 59); II.063.1 (source p. 63).

Substanz und Wesen — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.059.1 (source p. 59).

Natura naturata — Attested source expression in the cited passage. II.062.2 (source pp. 62–63); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

Cautions

The book's nature is neither a complete modern scientific category nor merely a personification of human experience. Its substance, powers and operations are treated as realities within a particular theological account.

Avoid resolving its tensions by deleting one side: God is the primary worker, yet material qualities, capacities and received elemental operations remain consequential. The author himself provides the qualifications by which those claims should be read together.

See also

Substance; Efficient cause; Capacity and potency; Universal and particular; Elements; Laws of nature; Creation and imitation

Providence

Gottes Fürsehung · verwaltet / geleitet / regieret · Regiment

Divine government without an independently acting nature

At a Glance

The word. Providence names God's continuing government of created effects.

In the Candida. It is invoked for mineral generation even without a particular seed or separate creative command.

In this edition. The word is explained through the local causal argument, not generalized into a doctrine of fate.

A place to read. Read pp. 132-133, II.132.1, beside pp. 73-74 and99-103.

Meaning

Providence is a narrow explicit headword with a broad causal setting. The author uses Gottes Fürsehung when saying that minerals are generated in the earth and brought forth for human necessities. The passage matters because it refuses to infer independent natural agency from the absence of a separate particular command or seed for minerals. Their generation remains within divine government.

Use in the book

Chapter Six distinguishes minerals from animals and plants (pp. 132-133, II.132.1). Scripture, on the author's reading, gives minerals no particular life or seed like those of living kinds. Experience nevertheless witnesses their generation. Providence joins these two premises: actual mineral production does not require either a separately implanted reproductive seed or a nature detached from God.

The conclusion is that water and elements possess mineral nature actually as well as potentially. Providence does not replace that material claim with an unexplained miracle. The author still asks about the elemental subject and its mode of generation. Divine government and a material field of capacity are treated as connected explanations.[31]

The wider account of the Word states the continuity explicitly (pp. 73-74, II.073.2). Everything created through the Word also subsists through it and is administered, directed, governed, preserved, nourished and multiplied. Providence is therefore not merely an initial act followed by a

[31] The explicit providence phrase occurs at II.132.1 within an inference concerning mineral actuality. The additional government passages clarify its setting; they are not presented as further verbatim occurrences of Fürsehung.

self-sustaining mechanism. The source gives present operations their continuing dependence upon the same agency.

The weather discussion applies divine government more exclusively to storms and related phenomena (pp. 99-103, II.099.1-II.102.1). God reserves their government to himself; the Devil and witches do not receive power to create them. The interpretation of Job distinguishes demonic appearance or violent action in a form from production of true elemental wind and fire. Providence here limits what agency may be assigned to rival powers.

That exclusivity does not remove every difference of material circumstance. God works with nature according to its qualities, and summer storms or barren soil remain relevant examples (pp. 96-97, II.096.2). At p. 103 the author expressly preserves elemental motions and operations received through the Word (II.103.1). The account is therefore more discriminating than the statement that because God governs, natural properties do not matter.

For the reader, the key question is how a particular passage connects divine rule with subordinate activity. Minerals, weather and living kinds receive different explanations. The one explicit word providence should not be made to flatten those differences into a single undetailed assertion that everything happens in exactly the same way.

Places to read

II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133). Providence invoked in the mineral-generation argument.

II.073.2 (source pp. 73–74). Continuing government through the Word.

II.096.2 (source pp. 96–97); II.099.1 (source pp. 99–100); II.102.1 (source pp. 102–103); II.103.1 (source p. 103). Weather's agency and material conditions distinguished.

Connections

Efficient cause asks how primary and qualified operative agency are distinguished. Capacity and potency supplies the material receptivity that providence does not abolish. Weather and witchcraft follows the special exclusions concerning demonic power, while Generation of metals follows the mineral example.

Translation in this edition

Providence renders Fürsehung in its explicit context. Government translates Regiment in the weather passage. The related expressions help explain the theme but should not be represented as one identical word repeated throughout the source.

Brought forth for human necessities preserves the practical orientation of II.132.1 without converting it into a claim that every mineral event has an immediately visible personal benefit for an individual reader.

Attested forms

Gottes Fürsehung — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133).

verwaltet / geleitet / regieret — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.073.2 (source pp. 73–74).

Regiment — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.099.1 (source pp. 99–100).

Cautions

The entry does not reconstruct an exhaustive doctrine of predestination or fate from this limited lexical evidence. Those topics would require different passages and arguments.

The author's assertion of experience with mineral generation and his account of divine government remain distinct kinds of claim. The latter is not an independent verification of every reported metallurgical effect.

See also

Efficient cause; Capacity and potency; Generation of metals; Weather and witchcraft; Logos subsistent; Nature

Simplicity

Simplex · einfaches Ding · nuda & simplici spirituali forma

Essential unity that admits operative differentiation

At a Glance

The word. Simple is compatible here with three principles that cannot be divided essentially.

In the Candida. The term qualifies raw rainwater, inaccessible bare spirit and pure substance under different descriptions.

In this edition. Simple is not silently translated chemically pure, indivisible atom or easy to perform.

A place to read. Read the explicit explanation at p. 219, II.219.1.

Meaning

Simplicity means essential unity in the reply's developed definition, not an absence of every distinction or constituent role. Every substance consists in three principles, yet no principle is absolutely first or last and each remains in its companions. A substance can therefore be simple while its principles are shown separately in the art. The author's earlier account of mutual elemental presence supplies the practical background.

Use in the book

The central explanation follows the definition of substance as pure and simple (pp. 218-219, II.218.1-II.219.1). The reply explicitly anticipates the objection from three principles. Their separability does not permit essential division. The unity being protected is not the operator's inability to see differences, but the claim that those differences do not become independent pieces of essence.

Part I describes the corresponding operation in more material language (pp. 35-36, I.035.1). Mercury is not without Sulphur and Salt, and the reciprocal statements apply. The dry philosophical water is a shell and vehicle through which the threefold spirit becomes accessible to hand and sight in distinct forms. Simplicity does not prevent differentiation of manifestation and handling.[32]

Rainwater is already called a simple thing in its definition (p. 17, I.017.2). It is still raw and not yet the perfected universal medicine. The same definition assigns it many colours, beginnings and powers. Simple therefore

[32] II.219.1 states the reason for calling substance simple in the writer's own words. The explanation expressly permits separation but denies essential division; a summary that forbids every separation would reverse the qualification.

cannot mean that it has only one effect, no capacities or no further need of preparation. A simple beginning may be rich in possibilities and still require disciplined work.

The world-spirit's bare and simple spiritual form raises another problem (pp. 28-29, I.028.1). The author says that it cannot be obtained in that form. God has enclosed it in visible and tangible creatures, and the proper subject must provide access. Simplicity is not itself an assurance that an operator can collect a naked universal spirit apart from all bodily vehicle.

The shell distinction also prevents pure and simple from becoming synonyms for visibly cleaned matter (pp. 32-34, I.032.1-I.033.1). Removing accidental superfluities differs from severing essential principles. A body can require purification while its substance, considered in itself, remains simple. These descriptions answer different questions: what is mixed with it and whether its essential nature is divided.

The reply's next property, absence of contrariety, gives simplicity an operative setting (pp. 219-220, II.219.2). Homogeneous reception and purification are possible because the essential being is not constituted by mutually alien opposites. Yet the accidental mixtures acknowledged in the preceding paragraph remain real. Simplicity protects a unity through which the work proceeds rather than declaring that no obstacle ever existed.

Places to read

II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.219.1 (source p. 219); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). Definition, explanation of three principles and operative property.

I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Mutual presence in the differentiated principles.

I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29); I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33). Raw simple water, inaccessible bare spirit and bodily access.

Connections

Substance explains the definition's whole sequence; Elements and Separation follow its material articulation. Homogeneity asks what may be received into the continuing unity. Reading those entries together makes clear why simplicity does not remove either the need for work or the possibility of showing several principles.

Translation in this edition

Simple retains simplex and einfach where the relevant claim is essential unity. The entry avoids adding atomic, which would imply a different theory not supplied by the passages.

Bare and simple spiritual form reproduces a description that the source denies is obtainable. Omitting that negation would convert a limit on access into a promised product.

Attested forms

Simplex — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. II.219.1 (source p. 219).

einfaches Ding — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. I.017.2 (source p. 17).

nuda & simplici spirituali forma — Verbatim source expression, with the normalized headword distinguished. I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29).

Cautions

The source's simplicity is not a modern chemical purity specification. No analytical composition or measurement is supplied by the adjective.

Simple also does not mean effortless. The work can be described through simplicity of nature while requiring time, skill, patience and a difficult opening of its natural bond.

See also

Substance; Elements; Homogeneity; Separation; Spirit of the world; Rainwater; Labour and patience

Substance

Substanz · Substantia · ens purum & simplex

Pure essential being through separation and transformation

At a Glance

The word. Substance names essential being, distinguished from accidental conditions and residues.

In the Candida. It remains through purification and cosmic transformation; the Latin reply defines it as pure, simple and without contrariety.

In this edition. The term is not silently converted into a modern chemically isolated substance.

A place to read. Read the reply on pp. 218-220, II.218.1-II.220.1, beside the world's-end discussion.

Meaning

Substance is the essential side of the author's distinction between what a thing is and the accidental conditions from which it may be purified. The word can identify a creature's constitution, the being underlying an accidental shell, or the enduring reality transformed at the world's end. It is not restricted to a material already isolated and certified by a modern analytical procedure.

The Latin reply supplies a particularly explicit definition: a pure and simple being admitting no contrariety. Each part is then explained. Pure distinguishes substance from residues; simple does not deny the three principles; absence of contrariety supports purification and the reception only of what is homogeneous with its essence. The definition must be read with those explanations.

Use in the book

Part I first gives substance a practical contrast through the two shells (pp. 32-33, I.032.1). Contrary superfluities lack a natural bond with substance and can be removed. A substantial shell or vehicle nevertheless remains necessary to make the threefold spirit tangible and visible (pp. 35-36, I.035.1). Purifying substance is not simply stripping away all embodiment until the art possesses an inaccessible naked spirit.

The definition of nature makes substance and essence the constitution of each visible creature (p. 59, II.059.1). Chapter Two then asks what that essence consists in and answers through the three philosophical principles (pp. 84-88, II.084.2-II.087.1). These passages tie substance to a structured

material account. The theological insistence on the Word as first cause does not eliminate the question of a creature's internal constitution.

The two Latin letters take opposed positions on light. The first correspondent argues that light inheres in a body, cannot subsist of itself and is therefore an accident rather than substance (pp. 206-208, II.206.1-II.208.2). The Second Letter begins at p. 209 and answers that position (II.209.1). It argues that light is a creature and therefore substance, that it inheres in no other body, and that it is or possesses an exceptionally subtle body (pp. 210-216, II.210.1, II.211.3, II.216.1). At p. 218 the same reply turns from this conclusion to a fuller definition of substance (II.218.1).[33]

The reply distinguishes essential substance from the accidental residual part in lower bodies (pp. 218-219, II.218.2). Considered in itself, substance is pure. Residues may exceed it, mingle with it and contaminate the visible body, yet art can separate them. The claim of purity is therefore not an assertion that every encountered material is free of corruption before work begins. It belongs to the essential nature under consideration.

Simple is explained with equal care (p. 219, II.219.1). Every substance consists in three principles, but none is first or last, highest or lowest, and they cannot be divided essentially. Each remains in its companion even when separated. Simplicity here is consistent with operative differentiation because differentiation does not turn the principles into independently existing essential fragments.

The next paragraph makes absence of contrariety a property of substance (pp. 219-220, II.219.2). Otherwise art could not render it pure and free of corruption. The writer invokes Nuysement and personal experience that our Mercury receives only what is homogeneous with its own essence. This connects definition with the claimed possibility of an operation. Contrariety is excluded essentially, while the accidental mixtures that must be removed remain acknowledged.

A related distinction had appeared in anatisation (pp. 165-166, II.165.2). The elements' disproportion and opposition concern qualities and accidents, not essence. The lexical continuity is useful, but the two contexts are not identical: one explains balancing of the magistery, the other develops the reply's definition and its implications for corruption. Each argument gives its own reason for protecting essential unity.

The final chapter poses the broadest application: will the world perish in substance as well as accidents (pp. 227-228, II.227.1)? The answer distinguishes burning and corruption of accidental conditions from transformation of substance into crystalline clarity and a supremely

[33] Altera Epistola, Second Letter, is printed at II.209.1. II.218.1 continues that reply; it is not the beginning of another letter. The first correspondent's light-as-accident position and the reply's light-as-substance position must remain distinct.

perfected spiritual being (pp. 228-231, II.228.1-II.230.1). Universal natures do not cease in their being; they are transmuted. The author thus makes substantial endurance compatible with a radical difference in the world's future state.

The concluding summary treats corruption as the means of freeing substances and elements from residues and bringing them into a new perfected form (pp. 231-232, II.231.1). Substance is not merely what remains unchanged in every observable property. It is what persists essentially through a transformation whose removal of present conditions is real and extensive.

Places to read

I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36); II.059.1 (source p. 59). Substance, shell, embodiment and nature's constitution.

II.206.1 (source p. 206); II.207.2 (source p. 207); II.209.1 (source p. 209); II.210.1 (source p. 210); II.216.1 (source p. 216); II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.219.1 (source p. 219); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). The first correspondent's position, the Second Letter's answer and its definition of substance.

II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166); II.227.1 (source pp. 227–228); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). Accidental opposition and transformed enduring being.

Connections

Simplicity and Homogeneity develop the two qualifications that the reply most carefully unpacks. Accident and Residues explain what is distinguished from essential being. Light follows the dispute that prompts the definition, while World and its end follows its largest later application. Keeping these routes separate prevents one definition from swallowing the particular questions that give it meaning.

No independent historical school attribution is required to understand the cited definition. The reply explicitly appeals to Nuysement, but this lexicon has not collated the complete cited work. Its account follows what the 1680 witness actually quotes and how the printed writer uses it.

Translation in this edition

Substance is retained for Substanz and Substantia. Pure, simple and essential are kept as distinct qualifications rather than compressed into chemically pure material. The source distinguishes substance considered in itself from a lower body mixed with residues.

Spiritual being in the final chapter does not automatically mean being without any material reality. The same account speaks of transformed universal natures, crystalline clarity and a new heaven and earth. Its

continuity should be described before a modern matter-spirit opposition is imposed.

Attested forms

Substanz — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); II.059.1 (source p. 59); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230).

Substantia — Attested source wording in the cited passage. II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219).

ens purum & simplex — Attested source wording in the cited passage. II.218.1 (source p. 218).

nullam contrarietatem — Attested source wording in the cited passage. II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220).

Cautions

The preserved substance at the world's end is not a statement of a modern quantitative conservation law. The text supplies no measurement of mass or energy and frames endurance through the eternal Word.

The reply's further application to sin is a separate theological inference. A definition of pure substance does not independently establish that conclusion for every speaker or reader.

See also

Accident; Simplicity; Homogeneity; Contrariety; Light; Residues; World and its end

Supernatural

übernatürlicher geistlicher Mercurius · supernaturalem

A qualified name for Mercury outside dependence on subordinate causes

At a Glance

The word. Supernatural is a qualified designation whose local explanation concerns dependence on causes.

In the Candida. The elements as such and philosophical Mercury are distinguished from particular natures governed through subordinate causes.

In this edition. The adjective is kept with its explicit qualification and is not treated as a synonym for immaterial.

A place to read. I.030.1, p. 30, and II.067.1, p. 67.

Meaning

The author first permits the designation supernatural spiritual Mercury in a carefully qualified answer. Properly and without qualification, he says, no nature acts of itself. Yet the uniform spirit can in its own manner and in a certain respect be called an efficient cause as regards mineral nature. With Basilius it can also be named supernatural spiritual Mercury. The limits surrounding the designation are part of its meaning.

The Second Part explains the causal reason. The elements, considered as elements, depend upon no subordinate cause. The author therefore says that our Mercury can rightly be called supernatural with Basilius. The word marks a place in his hierarchy of divine, universal and particular causation. It does not place the matter beyond creation or make it identical with God.

Use in the book

At I.030.1, the question concerns how a uniform spirit can preserve its nature while being capable of varied powers and properties. The answer requires philosophical rather than sophistical understanding. The qualified efficient-cause language allows an explanatory role in mineral nature while reserving unqualified agency to God. Removing the qualification would make the paragraph contradict its own governing claim.[34]

At II.067.1, the explanation follows the account of the universal Word and the distinction from particular subordinate causes. The powers of nature are said to be gathered in the one matter. The universal capacity, the strength of the subject and multiplication are connected in the argument.

[34] The phrases suo modo and secundum quid at I.030.1 limit the attribution of efficient causality. II.067.1 then explains supernatural through absence of dependence on a subordinate cause. These are local definitions, not evidence that every early modern writer used the adjective identically.

Supernatural is therefore not an ornamental intensifier meaning merely extremely powerful.

Another passage supplies a necessary counterweight. Gold-making by the Hermetic art is expressly called natural rather than supernatural at II.134.2. Art works within mineral nature and its established order. The adjective applied to Mercury in a specified causal respect should not be extended into a claim that every operation suspends that order or repeats creation from nothing.

The distinction also protects the created spirit from being confused with God the Holy Spirit. Spiritual Mercury remains within the book's material and created account. The author can use a religiously charged adjective, discuss received powers and affirm physical operations in the same passage. A reading that translates supernatural as simply nonphysical would lose those connections and the reason the author actually gives for the name.

Places to read

I.030.1 (source p. 30). The qualified causal role and the first designation supernatural spiritual Mercury.

II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64); II.064.1 (source pp. 64–65); II.067.1 (source p. 67). The universal Word, particular causes and the stated reason for supernatural Mercury.

II.134.2 (source pp. 134–135). Hermetic gold-making called natural within the mineral order.

Translation in this edition

Übernatürlich and supernaturalis are rendered supernatural. Spiritual is retained beside it where the source pairs the adjectives. Neither term should be replaced by miraculous without checking what is being predicated. The qualifiers our, in its own manner and in a certain respect keep the claimed designation tied to its local subject and explanatory role.

Attested forms

übernatürlicher geistlicher Mercurius — supernatural spiritual Mercury in an inflected German phrase. I.030.1 (source p. 30).

supernaturalem — supernatural in an inflected Latin form. II.067.1 (source p. 67).

Cautions

The account is the author's theology of nature and causes. It supplies no basis for treating Mercury as an uncreated divine person, identifying it with common quicksilver or describing the art as unrestricted intervention beyond natural order.

See also

Mercury philosophical; Efficient cause; Universal and particular; Spirit; Logos subsistent; Creation and imitation; Basilius Valentinus

Temperament and balance

summum temperamentum · anatisirt · qualitates & accidentia

The highest condition proposed for universal powers

At a Glance

The word. The highest temperament names a perfected balance of qualities in the universal subject.

In the Candida. It supports the claim to a comprehensive remedy and excludes arbitrary combinations of particular powers.

In this edition. Highest balance of qualities explains the contextual sense without inventing a quantitative formula.

A place to read. Read pp. 74-76, II.074.2-II.076.1, beside pp. 165-166.

Meaning

Temperament and balance focuses on the condition sought rather than the uncertain technical word for achieving it. Summum temperamentum accompanies anatisation in the medicinal argument. The author's subject is to possess powers in a perfected relation capable of comprehensive effects. A list of individually useful ingredients does not, for him, establish that relation.

Use in the book

Part I introduces the claim through elemental nourishment (p. 24, I.024.1). Creatures are nourished and preserved by what constitutes them, and they consist of elements. The author then says that elements subjected to equal balancing and the supreme temperament can cure every disease. Temperament marks the proposed perfection of a common source, rather than the initial existence of elemental components in an untreated material.

Part II spells out the powers more concretely (pp. 74-75, II.074.2). Particular herbs strengthen head, heart or stomach, cleanse lungs, open obstructions or promote excretion. The author locates those restricted beneficial operations in rainwater and especially the universal subject, then connects all-disease healing with the possibility of balancing that subject. The catalogue explains why comprehensive balance is claimed to exceed each particular effect.[35]

The next paragraph denies the same highest temperament to particulars (p. 76, II.076.1). Each retains its own limited power, or another material

[35] Anatisation remains a provisional contextual rendering without independent historical dictionary confirmation. Summum temperamentum is the adjacent attested Latin phrase; the later qualities-versus-essence explanation guides the English account of its balance.

weakens or removes it. In that case none retains its right effect. The author consequently criticizes compound apothecary remedies. The reasoning concerns his theory of combining particular powers; it is not a tested general verdict on modern combination medicines.

The fuller explanation of anatisation clarifies what kind of imbalance is at issue (pp. 165-166, II.165.2). Disproportion and opposition belong to qualities and accidents, not essence. The perfected magistery is achieved by removing superfluities. The highest balance therefore does not require replacing the essential nature with a different substance or assembling unrelated essential constituents.

The author also reasons from the possibility of balancing back to the uniform first water (p. 165, II.165.1). Art can improve but not change nature. A raw yet uniform beginning can be perfected; a confused jumble of essentially alien natures would not supply the same continuity. Temperament is thereby linked to a claim about the subject's origin, not simply to the pleasantness of its final sensory qualities.

The term should also remain distinct from moral temperament or an individual's character. The cited paragraphs concern elemental conditions, powers and a medicinal end. The book has ethical requirements for the operator elsewhere, but they are not the immediate referent of summum temperamentum in these passages.

Places to read

I.024.1 (source p. 24). Elemental constitution and supreme temperament.

II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75); II.076.1 (source p. 76). Particular benefits and the denial of highest balance to particulars.

II.165.1 (source p. 165); II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166). Uniform origin and correction of accidental qualities.

Connections

Anatisation treats the provisional technical rendering, while Universal medicine follows the intended comprehensive effect. Contrariety and Accident explain what can be corrected without changing essence. The present entry keeps the goal of balance separate from the name, sequence and evidential limits of the operation.

Translation in this edition

Summum temperamentum is retained in the source-form list and explained as highest or perfected temperament. Balance of qualities is a contextual English explanation, supported by the later contrast of qualities and essence.

Equal should not be expanded into identical weights or an exact numerical recipe. The cited passages do not state those quantities. The source's purification explanation is more secure than an invented formula for four equal constituents.

Attested forms

summum temperamentum — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.024.1 (source p. 24); II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75); II.076.1 (source p. 76).

anatisirt — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75).

qualitates & accidentia — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166).

Cautions

The universal therapeutic conclusion belongs to the historical author. Explaining its relation to balance does not establish clinical efficacy.

The entry does not reconstruct a full humoral theory from the phrase alone. It follows the qualities, particulars and removals expressly named here.

See also

Anatisation; Universal medicine; Contrariety; Accident; Elements; Universal and particular

Waters air and heaven

Air and wind

Wind und Lufft · aër commotus · H. Lufft

A created mobile spirit, with qualified operative meanings

At a Glance

The word. Wind is explained as air in motion; both belong to the created world.

In the Candida. Air supports life, is equated with philosophical Mercury and enters arguments about the Genesis spirit and weather.

In this edition. The ordinary words are retained, with each stronger philosophical identification read in its local qualification.

A place to read. Read pp. 46-48, I.046.1-I.047.1, beside pp. 97-103.

Meaning

Air and wind are paired because the author repeatedly treats them as one nature considered with or without motion. The Nuysement saying that wind is air in motion supplies a concise formula. Their relation is not merely a modern weather observation added to an alchemical text: the author uses it in a dispute about creation and the identity of the spirit hovering above the waters.

Air also bears several operative descriptions. It is the medium in which creatures move, the life-supporting spirit penetrating their members, and the philosophical Mercury of the three-principle scheme. These roles do not justify making every occurrence mean the precise prepared Hermetic subject. The later qualification that the world-spirit identification is relative must remain in view.

Use in the book

Part I calls the great spirit holy air and describes its penetration of living bodies (pp. 27-28, I.027.1). It opens channels through which radical moisture conveys nourishment, refreshes and preserves creatures, and advances them toward their ends. The other elements could not persist without it. This is a broad account of created animation and support, not a description of one isolated breath taken by an animal.

The following paragraph says that the spirit is animal in animals, vegetable in plants and mineral in minerals while retaining uniform being (pp. 28-29, I.028.1). Air's ability to take on different powers is therefore central to the problem of universality. Its presence throughout creatures

does not mean that an extract from any one specified creature will have every power of the universal source.

The dispute over the hovering Genesis spirit gives air a theological significance. A Bible gloss argues that wind did not yet exist and that the passage must therefore refer to the Holy Spirit. The author denies the first premise, saying that wind and air are one and invoking Nuysement's formula (pp. 46-47, I.046.1). He then identifies the created hovering spirit with wind, air and the world-spirit (pp. 47-48, I.047.1). This is a Creator-creature distinction, not an attempt to make ordinary air God.[36]

The adjective holy does not undo that distinction. A created spirit may be holy after its Creator without being God the Holy Spirit (I.046.1). English must preserve the source's two levels of designation. Capitalizing every holy spirit identically or silently expanding H. Lufft into divine Holy Spirit would make the author contradict his explicit answer.

The three-principle account assigns Mercury to air (p. 85, II.085.1). Salt supplies the corporeal vehicle, while Sulphur is fire. Mercury-air is consequently one role within a connected threefold constitution. The author does not say that the ordinary metallic mercury named elsewhere is simply atmospheric air; that separate material is repeatedly excluded from the work.

Chapter Three separates the origin of wind from its motion (pp. 97-98, II.097.1). Its origin is the common water from which air was created. Its movement is then explained through scriptural angels and the holding of winds in Revelation (p. 98, II.098.1). The distinction of questions matters: identifying wind with moving air does not, for this author, finish the explanation of why that movement occurs.

The rejection of witch-made weather develops the same causal restraint. The Devil and witches are not given independent power to create storms (pp. 100-103, II.100.2-II.102.1). The Job narrative is instead interpreted as demonic action in the appearance of wind or fire, distinguished from true elemental wind and fire (pp. 101-102, II.101.2). The author maintains demonic action but limits the nature of the agency allowed.

He nevertheless preserves received elemental motions and operations and celestial influence and concordance (p. 103, II.103.1). Air is not rendered a wholly inert backdrop by primary divine government. Its natural capacities remain real within that government. The entry must therefore retain both the polemic against independent causal powers and the explicit refusal to deprive the elements of their proper operations.

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[36] The source cites Nuysement's wind formula but does not give a precise work locator in these paragraphs. The claim about the wind's existence at creation belongs to the anonymous author's use of that formula against the Bible gloss; it is not itself a separately collated Nuysement quotation.

The later criticism of advertised world-spirit preparations adds a practical qualification (pp. 163-164, II.163.2). Wind and air are the philosophers' world-spirit only relatively; there are different regions of air, and both fire and water tinctures from one root are required. Simply collecting air, or naming a product after it, does not establish that the universal work has been achieved.

Places to read

I.027.1 (source pp. 27–28); I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29). Life-supporting air and its specification in different kingdoms.

I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47); I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48). Wind's existence in creation and the created hovering spirit.

II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.097.1 (source pp. 97–98); II.098.1 (source p. 98). Mercury-air, wind's origin and the cause of motion.

II.101.2 (source pp. 101–102); II.103.1 (source p. 103); II.163.2 (source pp. 163–164). Demonic appearance, received operation and the relative world-spirit identity.

Connections

Ruah develops the disputed Hebrew word through which the created-air interpretation is defended. Mercury philosophical develops the principle equation without confusing common metallic mercury. Weather and witchcraft follows the limits on demonic agency, while Spirit of the world follows the broader receptive and material role of the air.

The connection with Heavenly water is especially concrete. The air is described as full of descending water, and rainwater has its residence there. Neither statement makes air and every water identical in present property. The author repeatedly differentiates location, density and the kind of power available within the common elemental nature.

Translation in this edition

Wind and air translate the paired German words directly. Air in motion renders the cited Latin formula, retaining motion as the difference rather than inventing a separate substance called wind. Holy air expands H. Lufft according to the author's later explanation of created holiness.

Philosophical Mercury is named when the author supplies the principle equation. The entry does not replace all ordinary occurrences of air with Mercury, because the source itself distinguishes cosmological, meteorological and operative contexts.

Attested forms

Wind und Lufft — Attested source form in the cited passage. I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47); II.097.1 (source pp. 97–98).

aër commotus — Attested source form in the cited passage. II.097.1 (source pp. 97–98).

H. Lufft — Attested source form in the cited passage. I.027.1 (source pp. 27–28).

Lufft — Attested source form in the cited passage. II.085.1 (source p. 85).

Cautions

The equation of air with the created Genesis spirit is the author's contested interpretation, not a settled meaning of every scriptural occurrence of spirit.

Nor is the meteorological explanation a modern secular account disguised in old words. Angels, divine government and qualified demonic appearances belong to the stated causal reasoning and should remain visible.

See also

Spirit; Spirit of the world; Ruah; Mercury philosophical; Heavenly water; Weather and witchcraft; Providence

Circulation

circulationes · wiederumb dahin fliessende · fluxus & refluxus

Repeated operations and returning waters kept distinct

At a Glance

The word. The explicit Latin word appears in a catalogue of laboratory operations.

In the Candida. Returning terrestrial waters and tidal ebb and flow provide related movement language, but the book does not identify all these processes.

In this edition. Circulation is used cautiously as a reading theme, not as an invented complete water-cycle theory.

A place to read. Read the laboratory polemic on p. 55, II.055.1, beside the water distinction on pp. 156-157.

Meaning

Circulation has a limited explicit lexical footprint in the book. The Latin circulationes occurs among the many operations attributed to contemporary chymists. The wider thematic category also invites attention to waters that come from the sea and return to it. These uses concern repeated or returning motion, but their contexts and explanatory purposes must remain distinct.

Use in the book

The proem of Part II quotes Sendivogius imagining Hermes, Geber and Lull returned to life (p. 55, II.055.1). Modern practitioners would count them pupils because they would not know the many distillations, circulations, calcinations and other procedures now in use. The praise is ironic: the moderns still lack the one thing the old philosophers achieved, the Stone or tincture. A multiplicity of procedures is not the same as attainment of the art.

This context provides no precise description of a circulating apparatus or a fixed sequence of heating and cooling. The catalogue's function is argumentative. It warns that technical proliferation and names of operations can coexist with ignorance of the correct subject and end. The entry should not convert the one listed term into a detailed practice that the paragraph does not give.[37]

[37] The term circulationes is present in a quotation attributed to Sendivogius, not in an independent procedural definition by the anonymous author. Its exact source in Sendivogius has not been collated for this lexicon.

The other relevant movement occurs in the distinction among waters (pp. 156-157, II.156.2). Sea water and terrestrial waters are grouped as waters that come from the sea and flow back to it. Their position and predominant powers differ from rainwater and water above heaven. Return is therefore part of their placement in the author's ordered world, not evidence that their present properties and suitability are all identical.

Ebb and flow receive a separate explanation (pp. 104-106, II.104.1-II.105.1). The author assigns the motion to the continuing force of the gathering command and distinguishes lunar correspondence from cause. Although tides are recurrent, they should not simply be labeled the same circulation as the return of terrestrial waters. The text gives them their own question and causal answer.

The firmament chapter introduces yet another relation: upper water descends spiritually and fills the air (pp. 175-176, II.175.1). This downward passage is not supplied with a matching detailed upward route in that paragraph. Combining all these passages into a modern hydrological diagram would therefore add links that the text has not stated.

Places to read

II.055.1 (source p. 55). The explicit term in a polemic about multiplying operations.

II.156.2 (source pp. 156–157). Waters coming from the sea and returning to it.

II.104.1 (source p. 104); II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106); II.175.1 (source pp. 175–176). Distinct accounts of tides and descending upper water.

Connections

Distillation follows one operation listed beside circulations. Sea and terrestrial waters follows the returning waters, while Heavenly water follows the descent from above. The cross-references deliberately preserve different directions of inquiry rather than pretend that one word supplies a unified procedure for all of them.

Translation in this edition

Circulationes is translated circulations in the quotation. Returning waters is an explanatory English label for II.156.2, not an assertion that a German equivalent of circulation appears there.

Likewise, fluxus and refluxus are ebb and flow in their tidal context. Recurrent motion alone is insufficient reason to erase the specific words and causal questions of the source.

Attested forms

circulationes — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.055.1 (source p. 55).

wiederumb dahin fliessende — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.156.2 (source pp. 156–157).

fluxus & refluxus — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.104.1 (source p. 104).

Cautions

This is a comparatively narrow entry. The evidence does not warrant a reconstructed apparatus or a complete theory of circulation attributed to the anonymous author.

The laboratory catalogue's criticism falls on mistaking numerous operations for achievement. It does not by itself declare that every circulation is useless.

See also

Distillation; Sea and terrestrial waters; Heavenly water; Knowledge and practice; Regimen of fire

Comets

Cometen · Wunder- und Zornzeichen

Temporary signs under God's immediate government

At a Glance

The word. Comets are discussed as stars whose appearance and meaning require an account of divine agency.

In the Candida. The narrator connects the comet of 1664–1665 with God's temporary creation of signs and later removal of them.

In this edition. This is the author's scriptural interpretation, not a modern astronomical explanation.

A place to read. Read the opening of Chapter Three, pp. 93–94.

Meaning

Comets introduce the Candida's discussion of meteors, a historical category broader than modern shooting stars. The narrator recalls the strange judgments made about the comet appearing in 1664 and 1665, both about its origin and its significance. He uses the event to revisit an opinion expressed in his earlier rainwater tract, written in 1665. The passage gives a dated point of reference in the history the author tells about his own writings.

His explanation begins from two commitments: nature does not act independently, and Scripture says stars were created to shine upon the earth rather than remain hidden until a later time. He therefore proposes that God creates these stars when he wishes them to appear and signify something, and afterwards removes them. The argument is not merely that God originally created a comet now following an autonomous path. It gives the temporary appearance a particular divine purpose.

Use in the book

At II.094.1 the author calls comets wondrous signs and tokens of almighty God's wrath. He appeals to events experienced over recent years in various places as confirmation. The text does not specify those events sufficiently for the lexicon to produce a catalogue of fulfilled predictions. Its interpretive claim should remain at the level actually given.

The narrator then leaves the matter and proceeds to thunder, lightning, rain, earthquakes, wind, dew, and tides. The comet discussion is thus a concise opening application of a larger causal programme. Its brevity is not evidence that the author offers a complete cometary theory. The chapter's concern is understanding nature under God's government and testing explanations supplied by pagan philosophers and their imitators.

Comets also clarify the relation between sign and cause. Their proposed role is to signify something to human beings. That significance is not identical with a claim that the comet physically causes the calamity whose warning it may carry. The passage identifies divine creation and purpose without developing a mechanical influence upon earthly events.

The earlier tract mentioned here must not automatically be equated with the First Part printed in the 1680 volume. The narrator describes a writing from 1665 as an earlier stage of his account. His retrospective language belongs to the evidence for development and reuse; it does not by itself give a complete publication history.[38]

Places to read

II.093.1 (source p. 93). The comet of 1664–1665 and judgments about origin and significance.

II.093.2 (source pp. 93–94). The recollection of the 1665 rainwater tract and the proposed temporary creation.

II.094.1 (source p. 94). Comets interpreted as divine signs and the transition to other meteors.

Connections

Signs and miracles explains the distinction between an event's meaning and its agency. Weather and witchcraft and Thunder and lightning continue the discussion of God's reserved government.

Anonymous author is relevant because the dated recollection supplies one autobiographical statement without identifying the narrator's person.

Translation in this edition

Cometen is "comets." Meteora is explained as the chapter's historical category rather than translated everywhere as modern "meteors."

"Tokens of wrath" preserves the evaluative force of Zornzeichen. It should not be softened into a neutral astronomical marker.

Attested forms

Cometen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.093.1 (source p. 93).

Wunder- und Zornzeichen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.094.1 (source p. 94).

[38] II.093.2 dates the earlier rainwater tract to 1665. The lexicon treats this as the narrator's statement about an earlier writing; it does not infer a separately verified edition or equate it without qualification with the 1680 First Part.

Cautions

The chapter does not give a modern orbital explanation or establish the identity of a specific modern catalogue comet.

Do not turn the vague appeal to recent events into invented fulfilled prophecies.

See also

Signs and miracles; Weather and witchcraft; Thunder and lightning; Anonymous author

Dew

Thau · Mayenthau · Frucht der Morgenröthe

Universal kinship qualified by the author's lack of experience

At a Glance

The word. Dew is discussed as a natural water related to the proposed Hermetic subject.

In the Candida. Its possible universality is allowed, but identity with the art's subject is expressly denied and experience withheld.

In this edition. Dew and May dew retain the distinction where the source makes it.

A place to read. Read p. 162, II.162.1, beside pp. 164-165, II.164.2.

Meaning

Dew is important because it resembles the art's subject closely enough to invite identification, while the author supplies several reasons not to make that identification. It can be called universal in his theoretical account and may resemble the subject more closely than rainwater does. Neither claim supplies the personal operative experience or precise identity that a practical conclusion would require.

Use in the book

The failed-mixture account already includes dew (pp. 78-79, II.078.2). A physician reports that another practitioner used it with the Hermetic subject but did not reach a proper result. The anecdote does not establish that dew has no value; it shows that resemblance or kinship does not make the combination work. Its place beside a failed rainwater-and-earth preparation reinforces the warning about arbitrary mixture.

The meteorological discussion calls dew a fruit of dawn on Arndt's authority and through Psalm 110 (pp. 103-104, II.103.2). God remains first cause. The author opposes the account of dew as begotten by sun and moon as its father. He has just allowed celestial influence and concordance, so rejecting this parentage should not be expanded into rejection of every relation between dew and heavenly bodies.[39]

At p. 162 he allows the name universal and sees no reason to dispute certain praise transmitted from Noldius through Sperling (II.162.1). He also says that dew can be compared more closely with the Hermetic subject than

[39] II.162.1 explicitly qualifies the praise with ein oder andern theils and immediately denies comparable personal experience. The passage is therefore weaker evidence for a successful dew operation than the claims the author presents as experience with rainwater or the Hermetic subject.

rainwater. The paragraph then turns: he has no comparable experience with dew, whereas he claims experience with rainwater and especially with the subject. He therefore leaves the matter to others. The limit is an explicit part of his testimony.

The polemic against B.'s preparations follows immediately (pp. 162-164, II.162.2-II.163.2). Derivation from dew or from something advertised as world-spirit does not make a product a Hermetic medicine. Names and attractive origins remain inadequate. Both the fire and water tinctures are required and must come from one root.

The conclusion concerning May dew is unambiguous (pp. 164-165, II.164.2). It is not the repeatedly mentioned subject, even though it is closer in some respects than rainwater. The author then grants distilled May dew great help in feverish illnesses. A remedy can therefore be useful without being the universal Hermetic preparation or its precise matter.

Places to read

II.078.2 (source pp. 78–79). Dew used unsuccessfully with the art's subject.

II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104). Dawn, divine cause and rejected solar-lunar parentage.

II.162.1 (source p. 162); II.164.2 (source pp. 164–165). Universality, admitted lack of experience and explicit non-identity.

Connections

Dew belongs beside Rainwater and Subject of the art as a particularly clear case of resemblance without identity. Experience and conjecture explains the evidential restraint at p. 162. Solar and lunar parents follows the contested generation language, which must not be accepted as the author's final view merely because it is a familiar alchemical image.

Translation in this edition

Thau is translated dew; Mayenthau is May dew. The seasonal adjective should not be added when the source only says dew, nor dropped where the author specifically turns to May dew.

Compared more closely and identical are different claims. English should preserve the former's qualification and the latter's negation rather than smoothing them into a declaration that dew is simply the superior recipe ingredient.

Attested forms

Thau — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104); II.078.2 (source pp. 78–79).

Mayenthau — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.164.2 (source pp. 164–165).

Frucht der Morgenröthe — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104).

Cautions

The praise of distilled dew is the author's therapeutic assertion, not an identification of a modern medicine or a recommendation to consume a preparation.

The author's refusal to publish mere speculation should be retained alongside his theoretical praise. Removing the disclaimer makes his testimony seem stronger than the passage permits.

See also

Rainwater; Subject of the art; Spirit of the world; Solar and lunar parents; Experience and conjecture

Earthquakes

Erdbeben · exhalationibus crassis calidis & siccis · inter terræ motum naturalem & supernaturalem

Local dispositions without an autonomous natural cause

At a Glance

The word. Earthquakes test the relation between divine agency, local material conditions, and subordinate causes.

In the Candida. The author refuses an autonomous natural explanation while acknowledging differences among places and possible angelic agency.

In this edition. His rejection of a cause should not be mistaken for a denial that material dispositions matter.

A place to read. Read pp. 95–99, including the return to earthquakes after the wind discussion.

Meaning

Earthquakes follow thunder and lightning in the chapter on meteors. The narrator reports the philosophers' varied explanations, especially dense, hot, and dry exhalations. He opposes these with the Psalmist's account of the earth trembling and mountains smoking under God's action. The dispute concerns efficient cause: what truly acts and makes the event occur.

He also rejects the distinction between natural and supernatural earthquakes as a solution. Scripture, he says, does not make that distinction, and no subordinate cause can be found or demonstrated here. The philosophers' appeal to nature is inadequate if they cannot say what nature is or how it acts. His argument belongs to the book's broader resistance to treating nature as an independent agent.

The observation that some places, especially sulphurous places, suffer more earthquakes does not settle the causal dispute for him. God acts in nature according to its qualities and properties. The earth's different dispositions can explain where or how an action is received without replacing God as its efficient cause. This is a distinction between material conditions and the governing agent, not a denial of geographical variation.

Use in the book

The narrator illustrates this distinction with storms and growth. Summer has more storms than winter. Sandy barren places produce little even though earth generally received the command to bring forth plants, because they lack passive capacity for germination. Conditions can assist or impede a divinely grounded activity. The example connects earthquake locality with the broader vocabulary of capacity and potency.

After discussing wind, the author returns briefly to earthquakes through Helmont. He says Helmont's opinion should not be rejected: the earthquake in Matthew 28:2 provides an example of angelic agency. Bechmann is named as another reporter of the view. The narrator therefore permits a created minister of God's action while denying an independently acting nature. This is a specific reported opinion, not a general identification of every earthquake with one observed angel.[40]

The biblical evidence includes a textual irregularity. The first shaking-earth quotation is assigned in the original to Psalm 8, although its wording belongs to Psalm 18; Psalm 104 supplies the second image of trembling earth and smoking mountains. Retaining and explaining the mistaken number is more useful than silently correcting it and concealing the source's actual citation.[41]

The earthquake discussion shows why the chapter cannot be summarized as either wholly rejecting secondary relations or wholly accepting ordinary natural explanations. The narrator considers local conditions, passive capacity, and angelic ministry while reserving efficient government to God. The reader must track what kind of cause or condition each sentence addresses.

Places to read

II.095.1 (source pp. 95–96). Exhalation theories opposed with Psalmic descriptions of divine agency.

II.096.1 (source p. 96); II.096.2 (source pp. 96–97). The natural/supernatural distinction, sulphurous places, and passive disposition.

II.098.2 (source pp. 98–99). Helmont's reported opinion on angelic agency and Matthew 28:2.

Connections

Efficient cause and Capacity and potency explain the two causal levels. Air and wind supplies the intervening discussion of angels and elemental motion.

Weather and witchcraft shows the ethical consequence of the same governmental principle: the Devil and witches are denied the power to create true weather.

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[40] II.098.2 attributes the view to Helmont, also reported by Bechmann, and invokes Matthew 28:2. The layered attribution is more precise than saying the narrator independently proves all earthquakes angelic.

[41] The source's Psalm 8 is retained in the transcription. The shaking-earth wording corresponds to Psalm 18:7, or 18:8 in numbering that counts the superscription; the Psalm 104 passage is 104:32.

Translation in this edition

Erdbeben is “earthquakes.” Exhalationes is “exhalations,” a historical explanatory term, not a confirmed modern gas species.

Causa subalterna is “subordinate cause.” The author’s rejection of one does not erase the explicitly acknowledged differences in passive material conditions.

Attested forms

Erdbeben — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.095.1 (source pp. 95–96).

exhalationibus crassis calidis & siccis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.095.1 (source pp. 95–96).

inter terræ motum naturalem & supernaturalem — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.096.1 (source p. 96).

Cautions

The account should remain attributed to the author’s theological physics.

Helmont here must not be confused with Helvetius, whose Golden Calf is discussed in a different chapter.

See also

Efficient cause; Capacity and potency; Air and wind; Weather and witchcraft

Heavenly water

Wasser ober dem Himmel · geistlicher Weise · allerbest- und heylsambste universal-Medicin

Upper water's benefit, descent and relation to the subject

At a Glance

The word. Heavenly water here means the waters above the firmament and the descending water associated with them.

In the Candida. The author gives upper water a cosmic supporting role and a medicinal relation to the air and philosophical subject.

In this edition. Above heaven is retained as the source's location, without a modern atmospheric identification.

A place to read. Read the complete Chapter Eight argument on pp. 172-179.

Meaning

Heavenly water is a thematic designation for a located water, not a loose synonym for anything precious, celestial or devotional. The chapter begins from the assertion that waters exist above heaven and asks what benefit they give humanity. Its answers concern the stability of the world and the descent of a water from which the proposed universal medicine can be prepared.

The relation to the Hermetic subject is developed through movement, place and a catalogue of names. The author does not simply say that every drop falling from the sky is the finished tincture. The broader distinctions among waters, the presence of water in air and the need for a suitable philosophical earth remain part of the identification.

Use in the book

The question is attributed to sophists (pp. 172-173, II.172.2). If everything was made for human benefit but not a drop of upper water comes down, why was that water created? The author first limits inquiry: human beings cannot thoroughly investigate every divine wonder, as the question to Job about rain's father illustrates (p. 173, II.173.1). The limit is stated before his own proposed explanation, not after a claim of exhaustive knowledge.

An architectural comparison supplies the first positive answer (pp. 173-174, II.173.2). A wise builder secures a structure against displacement and failure; a loaded arch becomes firmer, and a sphere enclosed within another keeps its roundness. The upper waters' weight is then said to preserve the vault of heaven and the earth enclosed by air in their stable form (p. 174,

II.174.1). The water benefits human beings by maintaining the world they inhabit.

The explanation rests on mutual support within nature and ultimately in the Word. Each thing is sustained within another, while all things subsist in God's Word (II.174.1). The next paragraph argues that if heaven and earth benefit humanity, so must the water participating in their connected order (pp. 174-175, II.174.2). Benefit is therefore indirect as well as direct: useful water need not first be collected in a vessel to have a purpose.[42]

The second answer disputes the premise that no upper water descends (pp. 175-176, II.175.1). Water above and beside the firmament comes down spiritually, and the whole air is full of water. From it the true balsam and highest universal medicine may be prepared. This moves the discussion from cosmic support toward the art's material, but still within an account of subtle passage and location.

The identifying catalogue follows (p. 176, II.176.1). This is the element without a particular blessing and command, the golden chain, the earth above our heads, Echeneis, Helmont's nymph, immature mineral electrum and Basilius's spiritual Mercury and heavenly Sulphur. The names are gathered around one proposed subject. Their diversity does not license taking each as a different ordinary ingredient.

An objection from solar-lunar parentage requires another distinction (pp. 176-177, II.176.2). A particular nature created from universal nature cannot generate that universal source in return. The author therefore rejects a simple account in which sun and moon produce the original world-spirit. He nevertheless allows the action of stars, especially the sun, upon the water, from which concentrated Mercury arises (pp. 177-178, II.177.1). Generation of the source and modification or concentration within it are different claims.

The chapter finally confronts the firmness of heaven (p. 178, II.178.1). A cast-mirror heaven seems difficult to penetrate. The author appeals to sweating winter windows and concludes that air can pass through glass, making the upper water's passage intelligible (pp. 178-179, II.178.2). The comparison supplies his explanatory bridge; a modern account of condensation cannot be silently substituted without changing the argument.

This chapter also needs to be read after the exclusions of terrestrial waters. Location, density and specification determine why the upper and aerial water differs in suitability from deep mineral waters (pp. 156-161, II.156.2-II.161.1). Common watery origin does not mean equal availability

[42] The casting analogy enters through Job 37:18 in II.178.1. The statement that air penetrates glass is the author's inference in II.178.2. Keeping quotation, objection and proposed natural analogy apart makes the reasoning assessable without rewriting it.

for the universal work. The upper water's proposed benefits depend on its particular place in the author's ordered cosmos.

Places to read

II.172.2 (source pp. 172–173); II.173.1 (source p. 173). The question of benefit and the stated limit of inquiry.

II.173.2 (source pp. 173–174); II.174.1 (source p. 174); II.174.2 (source pp. 174–175). Supporting weight and connected natural order.

II.175.1 (source pp. 175–176); II.176.1 (source p. 176); II.176.2 (source pp. 176–177); II.177.1 (source pp. 177–178). Descent, Hermetic names and restricted celestial agency.

II.178.1 (source p. 178); II.178.2 (source pp. 178–179). The firm-heaven objection and window comparison.

Connections

Firmament explains the division through which upper water is located. Golden chain and Earth philosophical follow two material images in the identifying catalogue. Solar and lunar parents explains why celestial influence is allowed while origin of the universal source from particular bodies is denied.

The entry also illuminates the book's use of spiritual. The descending water is associated with air, material names and preparation of a medicine. Spiritual here cannot be assumed to exclude every bodily or operative reality. The author's argument requires a subtle mode of presence and passage, not a retreat from material inquiry altogether.

Translation in this edition

Water above heaven preserves the location claimed in the source. Heavenly water is an editorial headword collecting that argument; it should not be mistaken for one separately attested German material name applicable everywhere in the book.

The phrase in a spiritual manner describes the descent. It is not translated as metaphorically, because the source gives it a real explanatory role. Yet it is also not expanded into a modern claim about vapor pressure, atmospheric layers or a defined invisible chemical species.

Attested forms

Wasser ober dem Himmel — Attested source form in the cited passage. II.172.2 (source pp. 172–173).

geistlicher Weise — Attested source form in the cited passage. II.175.1 (source pp. 175–176).

allerbest- und heylsambste universal-Medicin — Attested source form in the cited passage. II.175.1 (source pp. 175–176).

Cautions

The architectural explanation and glass analogy belong to the author's historical cosmology. Their presence is evidence for how he reasons, not modern confirmation that upper waters support a solid heaven.

The catalogue gives philosophical names and constraints, but it does not supply the exact manipulations that would turn the named subject into the medicine. A lexicon should expose the identification's structure while retaining that limit. Its origin, condition and preparation remain separate questions throughout this account.

See also

Firmament; Rainwater; Spirit of the world; Golden chain; Earth philosophical; Solar and lunar parents; Subject of the art

Humidity

humiditas · humidität · feuchte Erde

Moisture as quality, condition and removable excess

At a Glance

The word. Moisture can name an accidental quality or a material condition, rather than the whole identity of water.

In the Candida. The water considered for tincture is distinguished from its diffused excessive humidity, while moisture remains part of generation accounts.

In this edition. Moisture is often clearer than humidity in these material contexts.

A place to read. Read pp. 142-143, II.142.2, beside the first correspondent's list at pp. 203-204.

Meaning

Humidity concerns how a material is moist, not necessarily what its essential nature is. The distinction is especially important in a book that calls the elements one water and nevertheless speaks of philosophical dry water. A thing's watery origin, its present wetness and its suitability for a work are separate questions. The source's use of moisture gives several concrete ways to keep them apart.

Use in the book

The answer to the objection about gold's nobility says that water should not be considered in its diffusion, excessive humidity and quality, but in its coagulated and fixed essence (pp. 142-143, II.142.2). The author is not asking the reader to compare ordinary free-flowing liquid with finished gold and stop there. He argues from a perfected state of water that he ranks above metallic gold. Moisture as a present quality does not exhaust that asserted essence.

The first Latin correspondent lists humiditas with colour, heat and cold among accidents that God creates without imperfection or corruption (pp. 203-204, II.203.2). The list supports his objection to the universal premise that everything created is substance. Humidity therefore has a logical role in an opposed argument, not merely an operative role in the anonymous author's account. The reply later distinguishes created from co-created things (p. 209, II.209.2).[43]

[43] II.203.2 is in the first Latin letter, whereas II.209.2 begins the answering distinction between creata and concreata. Retaining the speaker attribution is necessary because humidity helps support the premise that the reply contests.

The metal-generation account needs moisture as a condition. A subterranean vapour takes up sulphurous moisture and becomes unctuous; that material encounters pure, subtle, moist earth and fills its pores (pp. 109-110, II.109.2-II.110.1). These are attributed or conjectural explanations, not the author's claim to have directly watched every event underground. Moist is one qualification of a receptive earth, alongside purity, subtleness and place.

Precious stones are also said to congeal from mercurial moisture after condensation and sublimation, through cold (p. 117, II.117.1). This model distinguishes the sequence of states and conditions rather than treating one fixed amount of water as the entire explanation. The term mercurial belongs to the historical philosophical vocabulary; it is not silently changed into metallic mercury mixed with ordinary water.

The philosophical earth can in turn be imbibed with spirit and soul, becoming suitable for a further transformation (pp. 159-161, II.159.2-II.160.1). The source also calls that earth water which does not wet the hands. The apparent paradox becomes less misleading when moisture as an immediate sensory property is distinguished from water as a philosophical nature and origin.

Taken together, these passages prevent wet and dry from becoming a complete classification of suitable and unsuitable subjects. Excess humidity can be corrected, moist earth can be receptive, and philosophical dry water can retain a watery nature. The relevant condition depends on the stage, subject and intended operation.

Places to read

II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143). Excess humidity distinguished from fixed essence.

II.203.2 (source pp. 203–204); II.209.2 (source pp. 209–210). The first correspondent's accidental quality and the reply's distinction.

II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110); II.110.1 (source p. 110); II.117.1 (source p. 117); II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161). Moisture in conjectural generation and later imbibition.

Connections

Accident follows the quality classification; Water primordial follows common origin; Coagulation and Congelation follow the changes in condition. Earth philosophical explains why a philosophical earth may also be called dry water. The terms form a sequence of questions rather than a set of interchangeable substance names.

Translation in this edition

Moisture renders humiditas where the material sense is clearer. Humidity remains useful when the source distinguishes an excess quality from essence.

The choices should not imply that the writer is measuring modern atmospheric relative humidity.

Mercurial moisture is retained as a compound philosophical description. Its referent must be read from the generation model and its relation to the principles, not inferred solely from the modern name mercury.

Attested forms

humiditas — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. II.203.2 (source pp. 203–204).

humidität — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143).

feuchte Erde — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. II.110.1 (source p. 110).

Mercurialischen Feuchtigkeit — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

Cautions

The first correspondent's list of created accidents belongs to the position answered by the Second Letter. It is not an uncontested summary of every voice's causal classification.

The account gives no universal instruction to remove all moisture from a subject. The same text requires moist receptive conditions and controlled imbibition in other places.

See also

Accident; Water primordial; Coagulation; Congelation; Earth philosophical; Mercury philosophical

Living water

lebendig Wasser · maym, haym · Leben und Sinnligkeit

Scriptural wording made evidence for elemental responsiveness

At a Glance

The word. Living water is a quoted scriptural expression to which the author gives additional philosophical force.

In the Candida. It supports his answer that already created elements can hear God's audible command.

In this edition. The expression is retained while its argumentative extension remains attributed.

A place to read. Read pp. 68-69, II.068.1-II.069.1.

Meaning

Living water stands at the junction of a scriptural phrase and a stronger claim about the elements. The author's immediate problem is not how to distinguish potable water from polluted water. It is whether God's particular creative speech could be audible when, an opponent argues, nobody able to hear was yet present. He replies that the waters and elements already existed and could respond to God.

Use in the book

The objection follows the defense of an uttered and audible Word (pp. 67-68, II.067.2-II.068.1). The author says that the elements possess life and sensation to the extent needed to see God and hear his voice. That qualification sets the relevant capacity. He does not here supply a general anatomy of elemental organs or equate their mode of sensation with the senses of an animal.

The first supporting example is the water added to the ashes of the red heifer for purification (p. 69, II.069.1). The source calls it living water and points to the transliterated maym, haym in the original text. The phrase is offered as evidence that Scripture itself attributes life to water. The move from a quoted designation to a philosophical property is the author's inference and should remain distinguishable from the quotation.[44]

Further examples give waters and earth responses to divine presence and judgment. Waters see God and are afraid; earth hears judgment, becomes still, sees lightning and trembles (II.069.1). These passages strengthen the

[44] The print cites the fourth book of Moses, chapter9. The identifiable red-heifer water passage is Numbers 19:17, as the edition notes. That correction locates the quotation; it does not independently prove the author's interpretation of living as a capacity for sensation.

author's cumulative argument for elemental responsiveness. They also show why living is not being used simply as an approving adjective for a pleasant liquid.

This local argument should be distinguished from living philosophical gold. The latter concerns a material capable of tincturing metals and differs from ordinary bodily gold (p. 150, II.150.1; pp. 157-159, II.157.1-II.159.1). Both uses make life operative, but the immediate question, evidence and contrast are different. A reader should not assume that every mention of living water identifies the finished tincture.

The continuing activity of the Word connects the example with the larger nature theory. Created nature is the capacity in which God acts, and the creative Word becomes the life of creatures (pp. 63, 73-74, II.063.1, II.073.2). The red-heifer passage is one supporting link within that account, rather than an independent complete proof of every universal medicinal conclusion.

Places to read

II.067.2 (source pp. 67–68); II.068.1 (source p. 68). Audible speech and the objection concerning a hearer.

II.069.1 (source p. 69). Living water and responsive elements in the scriptural examples.

II.150.1 (source p. 150); II.159.1 (source p. 159). A separate use of living in the account of philosophical gold.

Connections

Logos uttered explains why hearing becomes a question. Life and sensation develops the wider distinction among life, capacity and kinds of response. Gold living follows another operative use while preserving its separate material argument. The links allow comparison without making every occurrence of life a synonym.

Translation in this edition

Living water follows the source's cited wording. The Hebrew expressions are reproduced as its transliteration rather than silently corrected into an unattested original-script form. A lexicon entry should expose how the wording is used, not make the translation appear to have proved the extension to sensation.

The book's sensory predicates are retained when the author quotes them. Replacing see or hear with merely undergo a physical effect would prejudge the dispute that the passage is designed to answer.

Attested forms

lebendig Wasser — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.069.1 (source p. 69).

maym, haym — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.069.1 (source p. 69).

Leben und Sinnligkeit — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.068.1 (source p. 68).

Cautions

A word in a scriptural quotation is not automatically a complete definition of a natural substance. The author adds a philosophical reading to it.

This passage gives no permission to equate any ordinary running water with the Hermetic subject or its medicine. Selection still depends on the separate universal-particular and blessing-command arguments.

See also

Logos uttered; Life and sensation; Rainwater; Gold living; Nature

Rainwater

Regenwasser · geistlich / einfaches Ding · Spiritus

Universal capacity, reported effects and a carefully qualified subject

At a Glance

The word. Rainwater is the book's principal named water and the subject of its detailed definition.

In the Candida. Its universal capacities are argued from creation and reported effects, but it is not simply identified with the precise Hermetic subject.

In this edition. The ordinary word remains, together with the historical philosophical qualifications attached to it.

A place to read. Read p. 17, I.017.2, beside pp. 77-79, II.077.2-II.078.2.

Meaning

Rainwater is the material around which the book joins scriptural creation, elemental theory, medicinal promise and experimental testimony. It is defined as artfully made, thin, subtle, transparent, sweet, pleasant, spiritual and simple; an element and throne without a particular blessing and command; a bearer of all colours and powers, residing in the air beneath the firmament.

These predicates are parts of an argument, not a modern specification for the contents of any collected sample. The author distinguishes original nature from particular properties, reported observation from inference and close kinship from precise identity. Those distinctions are essential if the entry is to explain his rainwater without turning it into a prematurely disclosed recipe.

Use in the book

The first ground is creation. Waters originally uniform remain universal through their division, although one is subtler or more powerful than another (pp. 14-16, I.014.1-I.016.1). Rainwater is neither an animal, plant nor mineral, so the author argues that it is a universal and catholic subject (p. 16, I.016.1). Its location and lack of a particular generative commission are meant to preserve the scope of its powers.

The definition on p. 17 brings those claims together (I.017.2). Artfully made first means made by the highest, wise Creator, through the Word and from nothing, amid the initial body of waters (pp. 17-19, I.017.3). The adjective does not mean that ordinary rainwater has already undergone the practitioner's art or become a completed elixir.

Subtle and spiritual are defended through visible and operative properties. The author says that water has a body yet only its lustre is seen, and that sight can penetrate several fathoms into it (p. 19, I.019.1). Raw rainwater standing in an open vessel evaporates entirely, which he takes as evidence of spirituality (pp. 19-20, I.019.2). Spiritual therefore does not simply mean nonmaterial or psychologically significant in this definition.[45]

The claim to all colours is supported by repeated distillation and coloured appearances on dried glass (pp. 21-22, I.021.1). The interpretation is broader than the observation: colours appearing after treatment are made evidence for rainwater's possession of all colours. Likewise, a subtle spirit, spiritual oil and salt are said to be obtainable from it (pp. 23-24, I.023.1). These products support the claim that it contains the beginnings of the other elements.

The universal medicinal power follows from common constitution. Creatures consist of elements and are nourished by what constitutes them; balanced elements are consequently proposed as able to cure all diseases (p. 24, I.024.1). The author immediately restricts the powers in the definition to potentiality, distinguishing them from independent actuality and operation (pp. 25-26, I.025.1). God works in things through the Word. Rainwater's comprehensiveness does not make it a self-sufficient divine agent.

Part II adds the causal distinction of the universal and particular Word and reaffirms the possibility of a universal medicine from rainwater (p. 74, II.074.1). The ensuing paragraph connects the many beneficial operations of herbs with that universal source and says rainwater and especially our subject can undergo equal balancing (pp. 74-75, II.074.2). The phrase especially our subject already preserves a difference that the next discussion makes explicit.

Rainwater is closely related to the subject of the Hermetic art, yet mixing one with the other does not allow philosophical treatment or fixation (pp. 77-78, II.077.2). The author supports this warning with fruitless practice and with a physician's report of dew mixed with the subject and earth added to rainwater (pp. 78-79, II.078.1-II.078.2). A shared universal character does not make materials interchangeable in the required operation.

The mineral evidence also has different levels of testimony. M.M. sends crystals judged good stones or topazes by a lapidary (p. 119, II.119.1). The author himself reports a spirit colouring a warmed silver spoon golden yellow (pp. 123-124, II.123.2). A person of rank reports oil prepared from rainwater tincturing silver into gold (p. 124, II.124.1). These are not all

[45] The spoon episode at II.123.2 reports golden-yellow colouring, not an assay proving that its silver became gold. The separate report in II.124.1 does claim tincturing into gold and is explicitly transmitted by another person. Those observations and testimonies must not be fused.

eyewitness accounts of the same event, and their descriptions should not be merged into one certified metallic transmutation.

The subsequent syllogism argues that rainwater contains animal, vegetable and mineral nature and is therefore a perfect subject, able to yield tincture as well as medicine (p. 126, II.126.1). The conclusion depends on the accumulated natural-philosophical and testimonial premises. A lexicon should explain the chain rather than either suppress the author's conclusion or present it as an independently established chemical result.

The conclusion of the book still allows a process with rainwater and says the wet way is best applied to it, while warning that its beginning is lengthy (p. 243, II.243.1). This practical mention does not supply every manipulation. It confirms that rainwater remains a real proposed material through the closing pages, even as the precise subject, its preparation and the differences among waters remain carefully qualified.

Places to read

I.016.1 (source p. 16); I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.017.3 (source pp. 17–19). Universal nature and the central definition.

I.019.1 (source p. 19); I.019.2 (source pp. 19–20); I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.023.1 (source pp. 23–24); I.024.1 (source p. 24); I.025.1 (source pp. 25–26). Properties, operations and the distinction of capacity from agency.

II.074.1 (source p. 74); II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75); II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.078.2 (source pp. 78–79). Medicinal inference and the warning against identifying or mixing subjects.

II.119.1 (source p. 119); II.123.2 (source pp. 123–124); II.124.1 (source p. 124); II.126.1 (source p. 126); II.243.1 (source p. 243). Levels of mineral testimony, conclusion and wet-way qualification.

Connections

Rainwater must be read beside Dew and Sea and terrestrial waters rather than allowed to stand for every water indiscriminately. The comparisons show how common origin coexists with differences of location, power, density and present specification. Subject of the art follows the further distinction between a broadly universal material and the exact subject required in a particular operation.

Experience and conjecture is especially useful for the mineral reports. Personal pouring of a spirit, a received object, a lapidary's judgment and another person's account of tincturing each support a different evidential claim. The author assembles them into a larger conclusion; the lexicon should preserve their individual character before assessing that assembly.

Translation in this edition

Rainwater is retained for Regenwasser. Artful, spiritual and simple are explained from the author's own elaboration rather than modernized into pure, distilled or sterile. None of those modern adjectives is established by the definition.

No particular blessing or command must keep its negation and qualifier. Rainwater is created through the universal Word; it is not outside divine creation. Wet way renders via humida at the conclusion, while the separate operational entries explain the phrase's retrospective relation to the earlier three-principle account.

Attested forms

Regenwasser — Attested source form in the cited passage. I.017.2 (source p. 17); II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78).

geistlich / einfaches Ding — Attested source form in the cited passage. I.017.2 (source p. 17).

Spiritus — Attested source form in the cited passage. I.023.1 (source pp. 23–24).

via humida — Attested source form in the cited passage. II.243.1 (source p. 243).

Cautions

The book's rainwater is not established by the text as identical with the precise Hermetic subject. The explicit failed-mixture discussion makes that restraint unavoidable.

The universal cure, metallic tincture and stone identifications remain historical claims. Describing their support in the book supplies a reading guide, not an instruction to ingest collected water or reconstruct a medicine from the definition.

See also

Blessing and command; Dew; Sea and terrestrial waters; Subject of the art; Universal medicine; Experience and conjecture; Spirit; Anatisation

Sea and terrestrial waters

Meer · auff- und in dem Erdboden · WeltGeist

Common origin does not establish equal suitability

At a Glance

The word. The group includes seawater and waters upon and within the ground.

In the Candida. They share a watery origin but are excluded from the proposed universal work through location, density and particular specification.

In this edition. Terrestrial describes location without supplying a modern chemical composition.

A place to read. Read the question and answer on pp. 156-161, II.156.1-II.161.1.

Meaning

The author's common-origin argument makes an objection unavoidable: if waters were not changed essentially at their separation, why should sea and terrestrial waters not serve as well as rainwater? Chapter Seven answers by distinguishing essential continuity from present differences of property, position and operative scope. This entry follows the exclusion rather than merely repeating the general claim that all waters are related.

Use in the book

The question at p. 156 states the difficulty plainly (II.156.1). Rainwater is an all-embracing subject from which medicine and tincture may be prepared; could the same be done with other waters upon and within the earth? The answer does not deny the earlier thesis that the waters remain unchanged in themselves. It adds that one is clearer, thinner, subtler or more powerful than another, and that different waters were assigned different places (pp. 156-157, II.156.2).

The same answer distinguishes water above heaven, rainwater, and sea and terrestrial waters. Animal, vegetable or mineral nature may predominate in different waters. These are not merely locations on a map. Place and predominant power are correlated within the author's account, so a common name water cannot establish identical practical function.[46]

[46] The Bier report is transmitted by a princely physician. II.157.1 explicitly calls the grain bodily gold; the subsequent exclusion is the author's interpretation of that report. The distinction prevents a mineral-production anecdote from being silently counted as an assay of a universal tincture.

The Bier narrative supplies an example with two uses. A court physician reports a transparent emerald-like mass from a special water, and later reports a grain of gold at the vessel's bottom (pp. 157-158, II.157.1). The author takes the grain as bodily gold. The observation is made to support mineral nature in water, yet it also marks this water as unsuitable for the art's living and spiritual metals. Evidence for mineral generation is not automatically evidence for a philosophical tincture.

At p. 158 the author explains the restriction through specification of the world-spirit (II.158.1). The deep earth is mineral, and the universal spirit immediately specifies itself there. Such waters contain dead and bodily metals rather than the living philosophical metals required by the art. The spirit's universal receptivity is therefore compatible with a presently restricted mineral condition.

The particular blessing and command supplies another reason (pp. 158-159, II.158.2). The art requires elements that have not received it. Waters associated with the generative charge may remain universal in themselves but are particular in property within the relevant order. Their density is an additional impediment. No single ground replaces all the others.

The earth above our heads sharpens the location criterion (p. 159, II.159.1). Water upon or within the ground cannot, on this account, supply that philosophical earth. The chapter's conclusion therefore excludes sea and terrestrial waters, as well as anything that has touched ordinary earth, from the universal medicine and effective tincture (p. 161, II.161.1). The exclusion concerns this proposed universal work, not a blanket denial of every medicinal use of every terrestrial substance.

Places to read

II.156.1 (source p. 156); II.156.2 (source pp. 156–157). The objection and distinction among waters.

II.157.1 (source pp. 157–158); II.158.1 (source p. 158). Bodily gold and the specified mineral world-spirit.

II.158.2 (source pp. 158–159); II.159.1 (source p. 159); II.161.1 (source p. 161). Blessing, density, location and the final exclusion.

Connections

Bier and Generation of precious stones develop the reported preparation; Gold living and Gold ordinary develop the decisive difference between kinds of gold. Rainwater and Heavenly water follow the alternative waters whose positions and properties are contrasted here. The entries preserve the double use of the report instead of forcing it into a single proof of successful alchemy.

Translation in this edition

The source distinguishes bodily from spiritual and living metals. Those expressions are retained rather than modernized into impure and pure gold. The author's issue is generative and operative nature, not merely an assay percentage.

Terrestrial waters covers the source's upon and within the earth. It does not imply that every water now classified as groundwater has been analyzed or individually tested by the author.

Attested forms

Meer — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.156.2 (source pp. 156–157).

auff- und in dem Erdboden — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.156.1 (source p. 156).

WeltGeist — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.158.1 (source p. 158).

corporalisch Gold — Attested expression; the headword groups the local uses described here. II.157.1 (source pp. 157–158).

Cautions

The reported identification of a grain or stone is not independent modern mineralogical verification. Its role in the argument is narrower: it marks what the author believes that water produces.

The common nature of waters and their unequal suitability are simultaneous claims. Dropping either one makes the chapter's question and answer harder to understand.

See also

Rainwater; Heavenly water; Bier; Gold living; Gold ordinary; Earth philosophical; Blessing and command

Spirit

Spiritus · Geist · geistlich

A contextual word across divine, cosmic and operative claims

At a Glance

The word. Spirit and spiritual have several referents that must be established from their predicates and contexts.

In the Candida. The book distinguishes God the Holy Spirit, the created world-spirit and a prepared spirit obtained from rainwater.

In this edition. The same English word is retained where useful, with its different applications explained.

A place to read. Read the explicit created-spirit distinction on pp. 44-47, then the operative spirit on pp. 23-24.

Meaning

Spirit is not a guarantee of immateriality and is not one fixed name for a single product throughout the book. The word can concern the divine Holy Spirit, a created cosmic agent, an operative principle or a subtle preparation. Spiritual can describe raw rainwater through its evaporation and the perfected condition of a transformed substance. Meaning must therefore be read from the immediate claim, not supplied by a modern opposition between physical and spiritual.

Use in the book

The rainwater definition already calls its subject spiritual (p. 17, I.017.2). The explanation appeals to raw rainwater's disappearance from an open vessel through evaporation (pp. 19-20, I.019.2). The author does not first remove water from the material world in order to apply the adjective. A visible body's subtleness and capacity to vanish from sight are made evidence for spirituality.

A spirit prepared from rainwater is described more specifically (pp. 23-24, I.023.1). It is exceedingly subtle and disappears so rapidly when poured into air that no drop can be detected. Spiritual oil and salt accompany it. The description supports the rainwater's possession of elemental beginnings. It does not identify the spirit's modern composition, nor prove that every occurrence of Spiritus names this preparation.

The world-spirit is another referent: uniform in being, receptive of all powers, and specified differently in animals, plants and minerals (pp. 28-29, I.028.1). It cannot be obtained in a bare simple spiritual form, but must be approached through a visible and tangible subject. The bodily vehicle is

necessary to the art's access, rather than a merely regrettable obstacle to be erased without remainder.[47]

The Creator-creature distinction is decisive at the end of Part I (pp. 44-47, I.044.1-I.046.1). The author argues that the spirit hovering over the waters is created and is not God the Holy Spirit. Even holy can be said of the creature after its Creator without identifying the two. A reader should distinguish divine personhood from a created agent's received designation and activity.

The three-principle account adds an operative differentiation (pp. 86-88, II.086.1-II.087.1). Salt provides the body through which the threefold spirit is visible and tangible; the world's spirit, soul and body are interpreted as air, fire and Salt. Here spirit in the spirit-soul-body triad is air, while the expression threefold spirit can gather the related principles. These are different levels of description within the same material account.

The term also appears in the mineral testimony. The author says that M.M. communicated a spirit that coloured a silver spoon golden yellow (pp. 123-124, II.123.2). That reported effect is not enough to turn the word spirit into a chemical identification or to certify an assay of transmutation. The particular operation and evidential claim remain necessary to its interpretation.

Finally, the world's substance is said to be transformed into a supremely perfected spiritual being (pp. 229-231, II.229.1-II.230.1). Enduring substance and a new heaven and earth remain part of the account. Spiritual here does not simply mean that the physical world disappears and survives only as a human mental image.

Places to read

I.019.2 (source pp. 19–20); I.023.1 (source pp. 23–24). Spiritual raw water and the separately prepared subtle spirit.

I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29); I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45); I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47). World-spirit and divine Holy Spirit distinguished.

II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88); II.123.2 (source pp. 123–124); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). Threefold embodiment, a reported preparation and perfected spiritual being.

Connections

Spirit of the world gives the fuller account of cosmic receptivity and specification. Body soul and spirit follows the explicit three-principle triad. Annihilation and transformation follows the future spiritual condition.

[47] I.028.1 initially says that the spirit can be found in visible creatures generally. I.029.1 raises the resulting selection problem, and I.036.1-I.037.1 answer through universal and particular potentiality. The first broad sentence must be read with that later restriction.

These cross-references identify the relevant question before the shared word is allowed to do explanatory work.

Translation in this edition

Spiritus and Geist are translated spirit where the source's recurrence matters. Spiritual preserves geistlich, but its explanation may concern volatility, subtle material presence, life or perfected being rather than one modern religious sense.

Holy Spirit is capitalized for the divine person; holy air and a created holy spirit remain distinguishable. Capitalization assists reading, while the source's explicit predicates provide the actual evidence for identity.

Attested forms

Spiritus — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.023.1 (source pp. 23–24); I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29).

Geist — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45); I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47).

geistlich — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.019.2 (source pp. 19–20).

triplex Spiritus — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87).

Cautions

Never infer God the Holy Spirit from the word spirit alone in this work. The author spends several pages denying that identification for the hovering spirit.

Likewise, spirit is not a substitute for a modern chemical name. The operations and reports supply limited properties, not a complete present-day analysis.

See also

Spirit of the world; Air and wind; Body soul and spirit; Rainwater; Trinity; Annihilation and transformation

Spirit of the world

Spiritus Mundi · materia universalis · gleichförmig

Uniform being, variable powers and a required material vehicle

At a Glance

The word. The world-spirit is a created, uniform and receptive nature, capable of different powers and specifications.

In the Candida. It sustains life and enters the universal work, but its presence in a particular body does not make that body universally suitable.

In this edition. World-spirit and Spiritus Mundi are linked without identifying every advertised preparation bearing the name.

A place to read. Read pp. 27-38, especially I.028.1-I.037.1, then the qualification at pp. 163-164.

Meaning

The world-spirit names the common created spirit that the author associates with wind and air. It retains uniform being while being capable of every kind of power, operation and property. In creatures it becomes animal, vegetable or mineral. The tension between uniformity and specification is not an editorial difficulty imposed on the text: the author raises it as an objection and supplies distinctions meant to resolve it.

The spirit also cannot be obtained in its naked and simple spiritual form. It is encountered through a body, shell or vehicle in which God has enclosed it. The art's problem is therefore not merely to believe that a universal spirit exists, but to choose the right material condition in which its universal capacity is available for the proposed work.

Use in the book

The description begins with holy air sustaining living and growing things (pp. 27-28, I.027.1). The spirit penetrates their parts, opens channels for radical moisture and nourishment, preserves life and advances creatures toward their appointed ends. Even fire, earth and water are said to depend on it. Its scope is cosmological and generative before the text turns to its particular laboratory role.

The name Spiritus Mundi is supplied with universal matter on pp. 28-29 (I.028.1). In itself the spirit remains uniform; in different kingdoms it is animal, vegetable or mineral. The same paragraph says that it is enclosed in visible and tangible creatures and can be found there. Read alone, this could suggest unrestricted extraction from any creature. The following objection is designed precisely to test that suggestion.

At pp. 29-30 the author asks how the spirit can be efficient cause when no created nature acts independently, and how all visible creatures can be mentioned when a universal subject is required (I.029.1). The first answer qualifies efficient cause to the mineral and operative respect (p. 30, I.030.1). The spirit is not thereby promoted to the unqualified agency of the divine Word.[48]

The abstract-concrete distinction explains its two names (p. 31, I.031.1). Under an operative aspect it can be called efficient cause: through it the body is opened and soul reunited with body. When the other principles and elements are included, it is universal matter. Cause and matter are therefore aspects of a connected subject, not necessarily separate ingredients to be found and mixed.

The shell discussion explains access (pp. 32-36, I.032.1-I.035.1). An accidental covering may be removed, but the corporeal vehicle remains necessary for the threefold spirit to be shown to hand and eye. Mercury, Sulphur and Salt remain mutually present even when individually extracted. The world-spirit's threefold manifestation is incompatible with complete essential dismemberment.

Universal and particular potentiality answer the selection problem (pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1). In respect of the first, the spirit preserves uniform being; in respect of the second, it has become specified. Its presence in an animal or plant does not restore unrestricted power to that particular. The universal medicine therefore still needs a universal and catholic subject. This is the key qualification of the earlier broad statement about visible creatures.

The end of Part I identifies the created hovering spirit with wind, air and the philosophers' world-spirit (pp. 44-48, I.044.1-I.047.1). The author denies that it is God the Holy Spirit and rejects other invented spirits as excessive subtlety without true grounds. This polemic should be read as his position, not a comprehensive report of every historical use of Spiritus Mundi.

The subterranean application demonstrates specification in action (p. 158, II.158.1). A universal spirit capable of every property enters deep mineral conditions and immediately specifies itself there. The resulting ordinary waters contain bodily and dead metals, unsuitable for the universal work. Universal receptivity can thus explain a restricted product; it does not make every mineral deposit a philosophical subject.

B.'s marketed world-spirit, Gold of the Breeze and Balsam of the World expose another risk (pp. 162-164, II.162.2-II.163.2). A name and an attractive aerial or dewy origin do not prove Hermetic medicine. The

[48] II.163.2 expressly uses respectivè to qualify the earlier wind-and-air identification. It also requires both fire and water tinctures from one root. Those clauses are textual limits, not cautions supplied from a modern chemical interpretation.

identification of wind and air with the philosophers' world-spirit must be understood relatively. Different regions of air matter, and both fire and water tinctures must be drawn from one root. The later qualification prevents the earlier formula from becoming a simplistic collection instruction.

Places to read

I.027.1 (source pp. 27–28); I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29); I.029.1 (source pp. 29–30). Cosmic support, names and the author's own selection objection.

I.030.1 (source p. 30); I.031.1 (source p. 31); I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Qualified agency, material aspect and bodily access.

I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37); I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38); II.158.1 (source p. 158). Uniform being and specified practical power.

I.044.1 (source pp. 44–45); I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48); II.162.2 (source pp. 162–163); II.163.2 (source pp. 163–164). Created identity and the later relative qualification.

Connections

The connection with Nature is reciprocal. Nature names a creature's constitution and capacity; the world-spirit describes the uniform receptive being through which different powers are understood. Neither replaces the Word as primary cause. Efficient cause and Logos subsistent keep that causal hierarchy explicit.

The practical connections are equally important. Subject of the art follows selection, Separation follows access through the shell, and Universal and particular follows the distinction of potentialities. Reading only a cosmological definition of world-spirit would miss the severe exclusions that make these other entries necessary.

Translation in this edition

Spiritus Mundi is linked to spirit of the world, while the German WeltGeist is world-spirit. The forms identify a recurring theme, but their appearance in another person's product name does not establish that product's identity with the author's accepted subject.

Uniform being is not translated as universally identical composition in the modern analytical sense. The source itself combines it with different qualities, operations and specification. Capacity for every property is a receptive claim, not proof that every effect is simultaneously active in every body.

Attested forms

Spiritus Mundi — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29); I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48).

materia universalis — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29); I.031.1 (source p. 31).

gleichförmig — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.028.1 (source pp. 28–29).

WeltGeist — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. II.158.1 (source p. 158).

Cautions

The world-spirit is expressly created. Identifying it with the divine Holy Spirit would erase the central polemic at the end of Part I.

Do not read presence in all creatures as unrestricted availability from all creatures. The question at I.029.1 and the answer at I.036.1-I.037.1 are indispensable parts of the account.

See also

Spirit; Air and wind; Nature; Efficient cause; Universal and particular; Subject of the art; Separation; Ferment and Azoth

Thunder and lightning

Donner / Blitz / und Regen · causas secundas · dem Blitz und dem Regen einen Ursprung

The authority of God's Word and the common watery origin

At a Glance

The word. Thunder and lightning belong to the weather through which the author examines divine and secondary agency.

In the Candida. Their government is reserved to God, while lightning's relation to rain also supports the account of fire and water.

In this edition. The causal and elemental arguments are connected but should not be treated as the same claim.

A place to read. Read pp. 85–86 and pp. 94–100.

Meaning

Thunder and lightning enter two arguments in the Candida. In the account of principles, lightning helps explain the relation of fire to water. In the chapter on meteors, thunder, lightning, and rain test whether learned philosophers attribute too much to secondary causes and nature. The same phenomena are considered first for their elemental origin and then for their governing agency.

At II.085.2 the narrator says all elements are nothing other than water and arose from it. He cites Nuysement and the Revelation of Divine Majesty for the claim that fire is water. Lightning that ignites something is fire, yet blessed rain comes from lightning; Müller's Spiritual Kiss of Love is said to agree by assigning lightning and rain one origin. These citations support the book's common-origin thesis. They do not identify a modern electrical mechanism.

Use in the book

The weather chapter begins from acknowledged scriptural language: God thunders, sends lightning, brings clouds, and causes rain. The author complains that the learned nevertheless assign the greater part to secondary causes and nature without being able to explain what those causes or nature actually are. The criticism concerns an inadequately defined agent and an excessive transfer of power from God.

Job 38 then supplies the imagery of allotted downpour and the path of thunder and lightning. Psalms 18 and 148 make vapour, fire, snow, hail, and storm winds acts or servants fulfilling God's Word. The author argues that Scripture gives no particular subordinate creative command placing these

events under an autonomous natural ruler. The distinction from ordinary propagation under particular commands is central.

This reserved government has an ethical consequence. If true storms and weather are God's wondrous works, they cannot be created by the Devil or witches. The thunder-and-lightning discussion therefore prepares the explicit rejection of demonic weather power that follows. It is not an isolated physical digression.

The account is qualified by the author's preservation of elemental operations through the universal Word and stellar concordance. He does not deny every process within created nature. Rather, he distinguishes an asserted efficient cause from a condition, a concordance, or an operation grounded in God's Word. The reader should not turn his polemic against excessive secondary causation into a blanket refusal of all differentiated relations.[49]

Places to read

II.085.2 (source pp. 85–86). Lightning, rain, and the common watery origin of the elements.

II.094.2 (source pp. 94–95). The criticism of excessive attribution to secondary causes.

II.099.1 (source pp. 99–100); II.100.1 (source p. 100). Job and the Psalms on divine government and the fulfilment of the Word.

II.100.2 (source pp. 100–101); II.103.1 (source p. 103). The consequence for witchcraft and the qualification preserving elemental operation.

Connections

Elements and Sulphur philosophical explain the fire-water argument. Efficient cause and Blessing and command explain the weather argument.

Weather and witchcraft develops the denial of demonic power. Comets and Earthquakes apply neighbouring causal judgments to other phenomena gathered under meteors.

Translation in this edition

Blitz is "lightning," Donner "thunder." Causæ secundæ remains "secondary causes," a technical causal category rather than a vague synonym for circumstances.

"Blessed rain" preserves the devotional adjective in the cited elemental comparison. It does not mean rainwater has received the particular blessing and command that the book elsewhere expressly denies it.

[49] The adjective seelig or blessed at II.085.2 belongs to the quoted description of rain. The technical statement about rainwater's lack of a particular Seegen und Befehl at I.017.2 concerns a different classification and should not be reversed by that adjective.

Attested forms

Donner / Blitz / und Regen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.094.2 (source pp. 94–95).

causas secundas — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.094.2 (source pp. 94–95).

dem Blitz und dem Regen einen Ursprung — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.085.2 (source pp. 85–86).

Cautions

Do not substitute a modern account of electricity for the author's claimed common elemental origin.

A devotional adjective for rain is not the technical particular blessing discussed in the creation argument.

See also

Elements; Sulphur philosophical; Efficient cause; Weather and witchcraft; Blessing and command

Universal and particular

universal-Natur · particular-Naturen · potentiam universalem

Scope of being, power, cause and practical suitability

At a Glance

The word. The pair distinguishes unrestricted common principles from already specified natures and powers.

In the Candida. It structures the selection of matter, the creative-cause hierarchy and the difference between universal medicine and particular effects.

In this edition. Universal is not merely many, and particular is not merely small.

A place to read. Read pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1, and pp. 74-79, II.074.1-II.078.2.

Meaning

Universal and particular are among the work's most important relational terms. A nature may be universal with respect to common being or capacity, yet specified and particular with respect to its operative property. The distinction can also concern a creative cause, a medicine's scope or a restricted successful effect. Each context should say what is universal or particular and in what respect.

Universal does not simply mean a heap containing every available ingredient. Particular does not simply mean a small amount or a private instance. The author repeatedly argues that combining many particular materials cannot produce the universal power that their natures individually lack. Scope follows the kind of beginning and its causal constitution, rather than quantity alone.

Use in the book

The first practical exclusion rejects a universal medicine made from animals, plants, minerals or all of them together (pp. 11-13, I.011.1-I.012.1). Analysis of particulars yields particular products, not the universal first principles. The causal maxim as the cause is, so is the effect gives the inference its structure. A universal result requires a correspondingly universal subject.

Rainwater's universal status is then defended through the difference between separating waters and creating particular natures (pp. 14-16, I.014.1-I.016.1). Waters may differ in clarity, subtleness or power while remaining unchanged in themselves. The author argues that rainwater, being neither animal, vegetable nor mineral, belongs to the universal class.

The inference depends on his classification, not merely on a visual resemblance among liquids.

The world-spirit creates an apparent counterexample. It is uniform and present in visible creatures, so why are their extracts excluded? The answer distinguishes universal from particular potentiality (pp. 36-38, I.036.1-I.037.1). Uniform being remains in the first respect; animal, vegetable or mineral specification belongs to the second. The spirit extracted from a specified body is therefore not available for a universal medicine merely because its essential origin is common.[50]

Part II gives the difference a causal framework (pp. 63-67, II.063.2-II.067.2). The subsistent Logos acts primarily in both universal and particular natures; the uttered Logos acts secondarily in particular natures. The author finds no particular Fiat for the initial waters and assigns their creation immediately to the universal Word. Different scopes of natural power are thus traced to different specifications within one inseparable divine agency.

The medicinal application follows directly (pp. 74-76, II.074.1-II.076.1). Rainwater and especially our subject possess the powers from which individual herbs' effects are understood and can undergo equal balancing. Particular herbs or other materials cannot acquire that highest balance simply by composition. Their powers may remain restricted, weaken one another or be removed. The argument distinguishes comprehensive perfection from a collection of limited effects.

The qualification especially our subject must not be lost. Rainwater is closely related to the Hermetic subject, yet mixing them fails to provide the required philosophical treatment or fixation (pp. 77-79, II.077.2-II.078.2). Belonging to a universal class does not make two materials identical in condition or interchangeable in an operation. Universality is necessary within the author's argument but does not abolish every other criterion of suitability.

Particular also describes an alleged successful effect. The objection that a rainwater oil tinctured only silver into gold is not accepted as disproving the possibility of further knowledge (pp. 126-128, II.126.2-II.127.2). A restricted permanent metallic effect can open the doors of nature according to the cited Sendivogius saying. The scope of an achieved effect and the scope ultimately claimed for the subject are therefore distinguished.

Conversely, the true philosophical particular preparations are said to flow from a universal source (pp. 90-92, II.090.2-II.092.1). Particular need not be

[50] I.036.1-I.037.1 supply the distinction between first or universal potentiality and second or particular potentiality. II.158.2 similarly says waters can be universal in themselves but particular in property. These are explicit restrictions on equivalence, not a contradiction repaired by the editor.

a term of contempt. It may name a useful differentiated work whose origin is correct. The author excludes fraudulent or unprofitable particulars that do not proceed from that source, rather than declaring every restricted preparation equally worthless.

The question concerning other waters demands another respect (pp. 156-159, II.156.1-II.158.2). Waters remain universal in themselves, but their location, density, received command and predominant nature make them particular in property within the relevant order. Common essence does not settle the practical selection. This is the same conceptual discipline that the world-spirit answer required, now applied to an explicit choice among waters.

The end-of-world account finally distinguishes the endurance of universal natures from the cessation and resolution of particulars (pp. 229-231, II.229.1-II.230.1). The universal Word is eternal; the particular created order of the present heavens can cease through resolution. This future claim should not be mistaken for a human operator's present ability to reduce every particular at will. The relational vocabulary recurs, but agency and context still matter.

Places to read

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); I.016.1 (source p. 16). Initial exclusions and the classification of rainwater.

I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37); I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38). Two potentialities and specified power.

II.063.2 (source pp. 63–64); II.074.1 (source p. 74); II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76); II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78). Creative scope, medicinal scope and non-interchangeability.

II.091.2 (source pp. 91–92); II.126.2 (source pp. 126–127); II.158.2 (source pp. 158–159); II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231). Useful particulars, restricted effects, properties of waters and future resolution.

Connections

Catholic is a companion adjective marking all-embracing scope. Capacity and potency develops the distinctions that prevent uniform essence from being confused with an active universal effect. Subject of the art follows selection, while Universal medicine and Tincture and elixir follow the intended products.

The pair also guides the reading of Hermetic names. Ordinary metallic names can designate philosophical materials drawn from the universal source, yet common mined metals remain particular. A name alone cannot establish which side of the distinction a material occupies; the account of origin and operation must supply that information.

Translation in this edition

Universal nature, particular nature and universal or particular potentiality retain the source's different grammatical objects. Collapsing them all into universal matter would erase distinctions the author expressly uses to answer objections.

A universal preparation and a particular success are likewise different descriptions. English summaries should not replace either with successful alchemy without specifying the scope and testimony of the claimed result. The source's restricted and comprehensive claims can then be compared fairly.

Attested forms

universal-Natur — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.016.1 (source p. 16).

particular-Naturen — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76).

potentiam universalem — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37).

potentiam particularem — Actual form in the cited original; the entry distinguishes its contextual senses. I.036.1 (source pp. 36–37).

Cautions

Uniform origin, universal being, universal power and universal operative suitability are not automatically equivalent in the book. Several central objections exist because a reader is tempted to identify them.

Particular should not be treated as wholly valueless. The author permits useful particular preparations from the universal source and acknowledges different orders of medicine. The exclusion is always tied to a stated end and condition.

See also

Catholic; Capacity and potency; Subject of the art; Universal medicine; Nature; Spirit of the world; Hermetic names; Medicine and its orders

Water primordial

Gewässer · anfangs gleichförmig-geschaffenen · universal Wort Gottes

Created common beginning and continuing availability

At a Glance

The word. Primordial is an editorial description of the first created waters, not a claim that water is uncreated or eternal alongside God.

In the Candida. The common watery beginning explains the elements and remains accessible in a qualified universal material.

In this edition. The entry distinguishes first waters from ordinary finished mineral waters and from a confused chaos.

A place to read. Read pp. 4-9 and14-19, then the answer about accessible remote matter on pp. 37-38.

Meaning

Water primordial names the body of waters that the author places at the common beginning of visible creation. The entry focuses on its origin and continuing relation to later materials. Chaos and first waters examines the separate question of whether that beginning was confused or uniform. Rainwater examines one water's definition, reported effects and practical qualification. These linked subjects should not be reduced to one undifferentiated substance label.

The beginning is created. The author speaks of God making water through the Word and from nothing. A common material source within creation is therefore not a rival divine first cause. The difference between the source of created materials and the source of their existence remains fundamental.

Use in the book

The priority of waters rests first on the interpretation of Schamaym and the narrative sequence (pp. 4-6, I.004.1-I.005.1). God creates the waters, then earth from them, and later the firmament distinguishes upper and lower waters. The elements are also taken to be water. The argument therefore places one common material before the differentiated order, though its opening lexical premise remains contested.

The resolution argument adds a different route (p. 9, I.009.1). Visible things can be resolved by chymistry into elements and water; the author infers that they arose from that source. Water is called the mother and origin of other elements, with fire concealed in it. This is a claim about common

constitution and generation, not simply a claim that every object contains visible liquid when encountered.[51]

The first mass is then distributed by density and situation (pp. 14-15, I.014.1). The heavier and coarser part moves toward the centre; the subtler part rises and remains above. The firmament distinguishes the waters without creating wholly new particular natures out of each portion (pp. 15-16, I.015.1-I.016.1). Their shared nature remains, although their properties and powers differ.

Rainwater's creation within that great body is used to preserve its relation to the common beginning (pp. 17-19, I.017.3). The author says that in human speech water is rightly called created from nothing, while a higher manner of speaking can identify Christ as its author or origin. This is a distinction of explanatory levels, not an admission that an uncreated material preceded God's act.

A central objection says that the matter first created can no longer be obtained (pp. 37-38, I.037.1). The author denies it: remote matter remains available. The later rainwater answer makes the claim concrete by saying rainwater was created within the first waters and was not changed in itself, and that a proximate material can be obtained from it (pp. 128-129, II.128.1). Continuing availability does not mean that every particular body can be reduced to the first water at will.

The practical restriction is indispensable (pp. 11-13, I.011.1-I.012.1). Plants and minerals can yield their particular waters and principles without becoming universally usable first matter. Origin and present condition are different. The same restraint applies to terrestrial waters whose deep mineral setting specifies the world-spirit and produces bodily metals (pp. 156-159, II.156.2-II.159.1).

The final account of cosmic transformation returns to universal natures and principles (pp. 229-231, II.229.1-II.230.1). They endure through their relation to the eternal universal Word while particular orders resolve. The author thus connects the beginning and end through common created being. This should be read as his theological-natural account, not as a modern quantitative conservation theory.

Places to read

I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.005.1 (source pp. 5–6); I.009.1 (source p. 9). Priority, common constitution and the resolution argument.

I.014.1 (source pp. 14–15); I.015.1 (source pp. 15–16); I.016.1 (source p. 16); I.017.3 (source pp. 17–19). Distribution, continued nature and created origin.

[51] I.017.3 explicitly distinguishes human speech about creation from nothing from the higher account of Christ as author or origin. The passage does not identify the material waters with the divine Word; that difference remains necessary to the Creator-creature argument.

I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38); II.128.1 (source pp. 128–129). The claim that remote matter remains obtainable.

I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); II.159.1 (source p. 159); II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231). Practical restriction and the distinct final transformation.

Connections

Matter prime follows the varying senses of first material and the difference between remote and proximate. Logos subsistent follows the common beginning's causal dependence. Universal and particular follows what later specification changes, while Chaos and first waters follows the denied description of a confused mass.

Translation in this edition

Primordial is a thematic adjective supplied by this lexicon. The attested words are waters, originally uniform water and remote matter. The headword should therefore not be mistaken for one exact Latin or German technical name recurrent in the source.

Waters preserves the collective character of Gewässer where the initial mass is meant. It does not automatically imply many already separated samples with independent essential compositions. The later plural distinctions are part of the account to be explained.

Attested forms

Gewässer — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.004.1 (source pp. 4–5); I.014.1 (source pp. 14–15).

anfangs gleichförmig-geschaffenen — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.014.1 (source pp. 14–15).

universal Wort Gottes — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.016.1 (source p. 16).

Materiæ remotæ — Attested source form; the headword is a reading reference rather than an added historical lemma. I.037.1 (source pp. 37–38).

Cautions

The author's first waters are not identified with a modern primordial ocean or a reconstructed state of the physical early universe. The source's scriptural sequence and elemental theory govern the description.

Common watery origin is not universal practical interchangeability. The book's exclusions of particular extracts, terrestrial waters and arbitrary mixtures must remain beside the origin thesis.

See also

Chaos and first waters; Schamaym; Matter prime; Logos subsistent; Rainwater; Universal and particular; World and its end

Alkaest

Alkaests · Huyle

A cautiously mentioned name in the world-spirit dispute

At a Glance

The word. Alkaest is the headword for the source's Alkaests, mentioned alongside Huyle in connection with Theophrastus.

In the Candida. The occurrence is brief and qualified by the author's own limited knowledge, within his rejection of a different invented world-spirit.

In this edition. The English uses Alkahest for the familiar name while the original spelling and grammatical form remain recorded.

A place to read. Read p. 47 in its argument about the created spirit, then compare the selective praise of Theophrastus at p. 191.

Meaning

The Alkaest occurrence has a small but important footprint. The author says that, as far as he knows, Theophrastus mentions only his Huyle or Alkahest (I.047.1). The statement should be read with its qualification and its immediate polemical setting. It is not a full description of Alkahest's composition, use or universal history, and it does not disclose a preparation.

The headword follows the spelling requested for this reference work; the actual attested form is the genitive Alkaests. Recording that difference avoids manufacturing an exact source lemma while still making the term easy to find.

Use in the book

The surrounding argument identifies the spirit hovering over the waters as created from water, wind and air, and the philosophers' Spiritus Mundi. The author rejects another supposed spirit proposed in its place as a product of excessive subtlety without true grounds (I.047.1). He then appeals to what he knows of earlier writers, including Gerlandus, Lull, Villanova and Bernard, before the brief mention of Theophrastus.[52]

This order matters. The Alkahest phrase is part of an argument limiting unsupported alternatives to the author's elemental spirit. It does not by itself equate Alkahest with ordinary air, identify it as the universal subject, or

[52] The two qualifications meines wissens and meines abermahligen wissens at I.047.1 explicitly mark the limits of the author's reading. The entry treats the named earlier writers as evidence in his argument, not as a verified exhaustive catalogue of their terminology.

prove that every other attributed Paracelsian term is spurious. “To my knowledge” marks the extent of the author’s claim.

The later assessment of Theophrastus is selective rather than uniformly dismissive. At p. 191 the author praises useful illumination concerning the second operation and especially multiplication (II.191.1). At p. 198 he rejects homunculus-making as speculative and contrary to nature’s order (II.198.2). These passages show why one should not use the Alkahest mention to infer complete acceptance or rejection of everything associated with Theophrastus.

The wider discussion of names also recommends restraint. Philosophers’ materials cannot safely be identified from a name alone, and familiar mineral names can conceal the subject’s different conditions (II.150.2). The Alkahest passage offers even less practical detail than those longer lists. Its chief value here is evidence about the author’s reading and his limits of assertion.

Places to read

I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48). The only developed local mention, with Huyle and the author’s knowledge qualification.

II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151); II.191.1 (source pp. 191–192); II.198.2 (source p. 198). Interpretive restraint and the later selective assessment of Theophrastus.

Connections

Paracelsus and Theophrastus gives the larger assessment of the named writer. Spirit of the world explains the disputed subject of the immediate paragraph. Hermetic names cautions against letting an impressive term establish a chemical identity. Authority and testimony concerns the difference between an author’s reported reading and a fully verified attribution.

Translation in this edition

The English Alkahest is a reading equivalent for Alkaests, while Huyle remains as the source gives it. “Or” preserves the author’s pairing without proving a universal identity of those names in every historical text. No speculative etymology is needed or supplied.

Attested forms

Alkaests — Alkahest; genitive source form. I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48).

Huyle — Huyle, paired with Alkahest in the source. I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48).

Cautions

The occurrence is too brief to sustain a recipe, a precise modern solvent identification or a comprehensive account of Paracelsian terminology. Its limited scope is an editorial finding, not a reason to replace missing evidence with a general history borrowed from unrelated sources.

See also

Paracelsus and Theophrastus; Spirit of the world; Hermetic names; Authority and testimony

Antimony

Antimonium · Antimonio

A mineral name that does not identify the subject

At a Glance

The word. Antimony names a mineral in ordinary discourse and also occurs among the philosophers' borrowed names.

In the Candida. The author quotes a saying identifying antimony with Mercury, then expressly denies that ordinary antimony serves the work.

In this edition. The English keeps the mineral name. Its philosophical use requires interpretation from context.

A place to read. Read pp. 150–154, where the reasons for mineral names are followed by the rejection of literal vitriol and antimony.

Meaning

Antimony is a useful test of how this book expects its reader to handle an apparently concrete material name. A named mineral can be real and useful without being the universal subject sought by Hermetic art. Conversely, a philosopher can employ that mineral's name without directing the reader to obtain the common substance. The distinction concerns the intended referent, not merely the spelling of a technical word. Antimony therefore belongs as much to the book's account of interpretation as to its inventory of materials.

Use in the book

At p. 151 the author introduces a quotation from the avicula Hermetis catholica: the philosophers say that Antimonium is Mercury and Vitriolum is Sulphur (II.151.1). The saying initially seems to disclose where the two principles are to be sought. Yet its next assertion is that reflection on nature shows neither antimony nor vitriol to be suitable for the purpose. Keeping both assertions together is essential. The quotation is not an isolated endorsement of an antimony process followed by an unrelated reservation; it stages the difference between a philosophical name and a common mineral.[53]

The preceding paragraph supplies the interpretive framework. The subject receives metallic and mineral names because it possesses mineral nature abundantly, because raw matter must be distinguished from matter freed from superfluities, because names may conceal the meaning from the ignorant, and because they can indicate changes of form and colour

[53] The avicula Hermetis catholica is introduced as a speaking authority, "the Universal Little Bird of Hermes." This entry records the title and quoted contrast as they occur at II.151.1; it does not identify an actual bird or claim a secure author attribution for the cited work.

(II.150.2). The passage does not assign one of these four reasons exclusively to antimony. A reader should therefore resist supplying an exact antimony stage that the author has not specified.

The conclusion returns to the problem at pp. 235–236. Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Moon, Sun, arsenic, vitriol, antimony and marcasite are listed as philosophers' names that common alchemists mistake for separate materials (II.235.1). The error leads them to labour with one particular substance after another or to combine several. The author says the philosophers meant their universal matter alone. This retrospective passage confirms the earlier warning and makes the misreading consequential: even a clear process will fail when its subject is misunderstood.

Places to read

II.151.1 (source p. 151). The quoted identification of antimony with Mercury immediately qualifies its apparent literal sense.

II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151); II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236). The general explanation of mineral names and the closing warning against treating them as separate starting materials.

Connections

The closest companion is Vitriol, whose rejection receives a more extended argument. Mercury philosophical supplies the positive elemental meaning: Mercury is air within the author's three-principle account, not a permission to substitute any substance called mercurial. Subject of the art explains why a particular mineral cannot be promoted to universality merely by an impressive name or reputation.

Translation in this edition

The edition translates Antimonium and the inflected Antimonio as "antimony." It does not silently replace either with Mercury, although the quoted saying links them. Such a replacement would remove the very ambiguity the author is teaching the reader to resolve. "The philosophers' antimony" is a contextual description, not an additional independently identified material.

Attested forms

Antimonium — antimony; the Latin nominative form. II.151.1 (source p. 151).

Antimonio — antimony; an inflected Latin form in a list. II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236).

Cautions

No precise modern chemical species or laboratory preparation is established by these passages. Nor does the author's rejection imply that every historical use of antimony is worthless. The claim is restricted to its suitability as the universal starting subject of this work. The book gives no warrant for turning the name into a practical recipe.

See also

Vitriol; Mercury philosophical; Hermetic names; Subject of the art; Universal and particular

Arcanum

arcanum · Summum Arcanum · arcana

A hidden excellence, knowledge and gift rather than one fixed material

At a Glance

The word. Arcanum names a secret or excellence whose nature must be determined from the local object and argument.

In the Candida. It can concern the high philosophical attainment, particular powers in rainwater, the Salt as master key or the divine mystery of soul propagation.

In this edition. The English sometimes retains arcanum and sometimes uses secret, without treating every occurrence as the name of one reagent.

A place to read. Read pp. 170–171, p. 182, p. 198 and p. 243 for its changing objects and ethical demands.

Meaning

Arcanum is not a single material identity disguised by a Latin word. The book uses it for knowledge, an attained philosophical power, a significant preparation and a divine mystery. What remains common is an excellence not available to merely superficial understanding or ordinary public handling. The term's scope must therefore be supplied by context rather than assumed from its prestige.

Use in the book

At pp. 127–128 Sendivogius is quoted saying that a genuine philosophical tincturing, enduring the required tests, opens the doors of nature to further and higher arcana (II.127.2). A successful limited effect is a beginning for inquiry, not a declaration that every secret has already been attained. The plural allows different excellences and levels of knowledge.[54]

At p. 170 possessors of the high arcanum are said to have a sign of God's love and to attract particular hostility from the devil (II.170.2). The author's account of obstruction combines practical difficulty with providential interpretation. At p. 171 the supreme arcanum is associated with the knight of the Golden Fleece, because nature's firm bond is hard to dissolve (II.171.1). The image emphasizes difficult attainment, not simply possession of a rare named ingredient.

[54] The plural arcana at II.127.2 occurs in an authority's conditional statement: the colour must endure all required tests and the work be without fraud. Omitting those conditions would turn a qualified opening for further inquiry into an unsupported certificate of success.

The Salt passage gives a more specific use. A doctor has eagerly sought the arcanum, described as a master key of Hermetic art; the warning says whoever lacks the Salt of the wise lacks their wisdom and art (II.182.1). Here the context concerns a philosophical preparation and its necessity. The difficult sentence does not justify reconstructing an entire exchange or identifying the doctor.

At p. 198 the object changes again. The human soul's origin from God and continuing propagation through both parents is called an arcanum and mighty work of God (II.198.2). This is not a name for the medicine. The same word can mark a divinely ordered mystery whose law limits human art, especially in the rejection of homunculus-making.

The final recommendation adds an ethical condition. Those attaining the arcanum should observe the seal of silence, prevent deliberate transfer to the unworthy and avoid abuse and danger (II.243.2). Knowledge is treated as a gift carrying responsibilities. This does not cancel the author's publication, but explains why his disclosure remains selective.

Places to read

II.127.2 (source pp. 127–128); II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172). Higher secrets, the high attainment and the Golden Fleece image.

II.182.1 (source p. 182); II.198.2 (source p. 198); II.242.1 (source pp. 242–243); II.243.2 (source pp. 243–244). The Salt, soul propagation, rainwater's powers and the seal of silence.

Connections

Secrecy and publication treats the ethics of disclosure, while Charity concerns the intended use of the gift. Salt philosophical supplies one concrete application. Soul propagation demonstrates that arcanum is broader than the material work. Knowledge and practice explains why mere possession of a formula would not exhaust the claimed attainment.

Translation in this edition

Arcanum is retained where its historical technical breadth is useful; secret gives a readable English equivalent elsewhere. Arcana is the plural, not another substance. Summum is translated supreme, preserving a hierarchy of attainment. The lexical entry does not back-project one fixed esoteric meaning into every occurrence.

Attested forms

arcanum — secret or arcanum. II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171); II.198.2 (source p. 198).

Summum Arcanum — supreme secret. II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172).

arcana — secrets or arcana. II.127.2 (source pp. 127–128); II.242.1 (source pp. 242–243).

Cautions

The word's presence does not authenticate a claimed preparation or establish that the author disclosed it fully. Its theological use should also not be reduced to a merely cryptographic secret. The local referent and the author's explicit limits are more reliable guides than a generalized notion of hidden wisdom.

See also

Secrecy and publication; Charity; Salt philosophical; Soul propagation; Knowledge and practice

Body soul and spirit

Corpus · Seele · Spiritum, Animam & Corpus

Three coordinated principles and the limits of their analogy

At a Glance

The word. Body, soul and spirit name a coordinated threefold constitution rather than three independent ingredients.

In the Candida. In the elemental scheme spirit is air, soul or form is fire, and body is Salt; the principles remain mutually implicated.

In this edition. The translation keeps body, soul and spirit distinct while following the author's explicit local identifications.

A place to read. Read pp. 31–35 with pp. 85–88, where practical language is joined to the elemental account.

Meaning

The triad is one of the main bridges between the book's language of living nature and its language of operations. It explains how a substance can be spoken of as opened, separated and reunited while its essential relations remain intact. Body is not simply an obstructive shell to be discarded, soul is not always the human soul, and spirit does not automatically mean something immaterial. Each word must be read at the level of discourse in which it occurs: the universal subject, a particular creature, the material work or a human theological argument.

The author gives an unusually explicit local mapping at pp. 85–87. Mercury is air, Sulphur is fire, and Salt is water, earth and body. When Nuysement says that the world possesses spirit, soul and body, the author understands spirit as air, form or soul as fire, and body as Salt (II.087.1). This explanation governs the immediate natural-philosophical discussion. It does not abolish all other senses of soul throughout the book.

Use in the book

The practical account begins before this mapping is stated. At p. 31 spirit opens the body and acts as the copulator, the uniting agent by which soul is joined to body again (I.031.1). The author then distinguishes abstract and concrete speech. In abstraction, spirit may be called an efficient cause, especially in the mineral kingdom. Concretely, when the other elements and principles are included, it is universal matter. The same named spirit therefore has a different explanatory role according to what the speaker includes in the expression.

At pp. 32–35 the body's shell is divided into substantial and accidental aspects. Contrary superfluities may be removed; parts related in substance

may be distinguished without being severed in their essential nature (I.032.1 –I.035.1). This matters for the triad because "opening the body" cannot mean throwing away every bodily condition of spirit. The dry water or shell is also the vehicle through which the threefold spirit becomes visible and tangible. A wholly naked spirit cannot be obtained for the work.

The statement that the principles can be individually extracted is immediately qualified. Mercury is not without Sulphur and Salt; Sulphur is not without Salt and Mercury; Salt is not without Mercury and Sulphur (I.035.1). Separate presentation does not establish absolute elemental isolation. The author's analogy with creation preserves each element within the others, distinguished by position rather than cut apart. A reading that makes body, soul and spirit three self-sufficient substances misses this qualification.

At p. 86 Salt is the body by which the triplex Spiritus becomes accessible to sight and touch and can be treated in three hypostases (II.086.1). The appeal to Nuysement's proposition that nothing reaches these senses without Salt supports embodiment. The visible shell is consequently part of the explanation of successful practice, not merely a negative remnant of fallen grossness. The accidental coat is removable; the substantial vehicle has a different status.[55]

The later supplement to the second operation gives the triad renewed practical force. The subject's own purified earth is imbibed and fermented with its spirit and its soul, the living gold (II.160.1). The possessives are important. This is a reintegration within one root, not an instruction to gather unrelated earth, air and a piece of ordinary gold. The paragraph claims an increase in power through the properly coordinated operation and then describes further cooking with philosophical fire.

Human soul-language requires another distinction. In the homunculus chapter, anima sive spiritus hominis means the human soul or spirit, whose propagation is argued through the participation of both parents (II.197.1–II.197.2). The author compares the need for both ferment and Azoth in art (II.198.1). The comparison concerns coordinated generation. It does not reduce the human soul to alchemical Sulphur, nor does it authorize producing a human being from the philosophical subject.

Places to read

I.031.1 (source p. 31); I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34); I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Opening, reunion and the two kinds of separation.

[55] The word hypostases at II.086.1 concerns the three accessible presentations of the created subject. The resemblance of triadic language does not make these hypostases the three divine persons. The author's practical and elemental explanation governs this occurrence.

II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88); II.088.1 (source pp. 88–89). The explicit elemental mapping and the unity of the three principles.

II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161); II.197.1 (source p. 197); II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198); II.198.1 (source p. 198). The coordinated operation and the later comparison with human propagation.

Connections

The triad connects Matter prime with Separation: operations distinguish and purify what is already related rather than fabricate unity from arbitrary materials. It also connects Spirit with Salt philosophical, because tangibility and spirituality are compatible within this account. The human application belongs with Soul propagation and Homunculus, where the author sharply limits what art may imitate.

Translation in this edition

Corpus and Leib are translated "body"; anima and Seele, "soul"; spiritus and Geist, "spirit," with local context determining any more specific gloss. The equation "form or soul" at p. 87 is retained because it is the author's own explanation. It should not be generalized into an assertion that every occurrence of form means soul. Likewise, "threefold spirit" preserves the tension between unity and differentiated presentation instead of simplifying it into three spirits.

The vocabulary of joining and opening describes material relations within a historical system of nature. Translating spiritual as "immaterial" throughout would make the substantial vehicle and the assertion of tangibility incoherent. The English therefore allows spiritual bodies and embodied spirit wherever the source does.

Attested forms

Corpus — body; Latin form. I.031.1 (source p. 31); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

Seele — soul. I.031.1 (source p. 31).

Spiritum, Animam & Corpus — spirit, soul and body in Nuysement's proposition. II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

Cautions

These passages explain the author's framework; they do not verify the claimed medical or transmutational powers. Christian triadic comparisons should also remain comparisons. The created elemental triad is not the divine Trinity. Most importantly, the created spirit over the waters must not be confused with God the Holy Spirit, a distinction expressly defended elsewhere in Part One.

See also

Mercury philosophical; Salt philosophical; Sulphur philosophical; Separation; Spirit; Soul propagation; Homunculus; Trinity

Ferment and Azoth

fermentum · Azoth · fermento

Two required principles from one root

At a Glance

The word. Ferment and Azoth are paired names for required principles of the philosophical work.

In the Candida. Neither alone completes the magistery. Both belong to one root, and completed matter requires further mercurial water for multiplication.

In this edition. Azoth remains untranslated; ferment is kept distinct from ordinary gold used in a separate fermentation.

A place to read. Read p. 163 and p. 198 together, then compare the qualified gold fermentation at p. 145.

Meaning

The pair does more work in this book than either term can safely do in isolation. The author does not provide a self-contained dictionary definition of Azoth or a recipe identifying the ferment. He establishes their relation: both are necessary, they derive from a single root, and they must be understood within the one-subject theory. This is enough to rule out several misleading interpretations without pretending to disclose the withheld practice.

Use in the book

At p. 163 the discussion challenges B.'s Gold of the Breeze and an insufficient account of the world-spirit. Wind and air can be called that spirit only in a relative sense; the regions of air must also be distinguished. Both tinctures, of fire and water, are needed, and the author immediately names ferment and Azoth (II.163.2). One alone is insufficient, and both must be drawn from one root. The sequence associates these paired expressions, but it does not fully specify each component's preparation or authorize combining unrelated purchased materials.[56]

At p. 198 the same necessity becomes an analogy within the rejection of homunculus-making. The magistery cannot be completed by taking either principle alone, ferment or Azoth; both must be employed (II.198.1). Similarly, the author argues, human propagation requires the union of both

[56] II.163.2 pairs fire-and-water tinctures with ferment-and-Azoth language in succession. The passage does not expressly give a fully developed one-to-one definition of each member. The entry therefore uses the explicit requirements of a common root and joint necessity rather than imposing an unprovided table of equivalences.

parents. The point of comparison is the insufficiency of one contributing principle by itself. It does not identify human seed as an alchemical ingredient or turn the philosophical matter into a human being.

The paragraph then distinguishes completion from multiplication. Even a perfected magistery cannot multiply unless further mercurial water is added. Changes in flowing and coagulating under fire and air accompany this statement. Thus "both are required" is not the whole account of later growth: a completed product still has conditions for renewed increase. This distinguishes the entry from a simple binary recipe.

Gold fermentation at p. 145 supplies a further limit (II.145.2). Here the medicine is prepared first and then fermented with gold; the claimed tincturing power is large, but the resulting work can no longer be multiplied. The author treats this as legitimate and refers to Basilius's twelfth key. He does not thereby withdraw his argument that ordinary gold cannot supply the originating tincture. Starting subject, perfected medicine and final gold-fermented product occupy different places in the sequence.

Places to read

II.163.2 (source pp. 163–164). The two tinctures, ferment and Azoth, must come from one root.

II.198.1 (source p. 198). Both principles are necessary, followed by a separate condition of multiplication.

II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145); II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146). Azoth as the privileged locus of strength and the limited gold fermentation.

Connections

Body soul and spirit gives the wider account of coordinated principles. Multiplication explains why the further addition in the homunculus chapter does not contradict the removal of superfluities during purification. Gold ordinary marks the restricted role that finished gold may have after the medicine is already prepared.

Translation in this edition

Azoth is retained rather than expanded into an alleged universal chemical name or an etymological cipher. The translation also preserves the changing forms fermentum and fermento through the English "ferment." "Principle" here describes the author's functional argument; it does not assert that each named member is a separately obtainable modern element.

Attested forms

fermentum — ferment; Latin nominative form. II.163.2 (source pp. 163–164).

Azoth — the complementary named principle. II.163.2 (source pp. 163–164); II.198.1 (source p. 198).

fermento — ferment; an inflected Latin form. II.198.1 (source p. 198).

Cautions

The pairing does not justify a fixed formula equating ferment with ordinary gold and Azoth with common mercury. It also does not establish every meaning those words may bear in other alchemical books. The safest reading begins with the explicit local requirements—both principles, one root, and a further condition for multiplication—and leaves unprovided manipulations unprovided.

See also

Body soul and spirit; Gold ordinary; Multiplication; Mercury philosophical; Homunculus; Subject of the art

Gold living

Goldwesenheit · lebendigen Gold · spiritualisch gemachtes Gold

Generative gold before the metallic terminus

At a Glance

The word. Living gold names gold in a philosophical and generative condition, rather than the finished common metal.

In the Candida. It belongs to water and the universal subject and is identified with the soul employed in the coordinated operation.

In this edition. "Essence of gold," "living gold" and "gold made spiritual" remain distinct source expressions.

A place to read. Read pp. 148–150, then p. 160, where the living gold is rejoined with its own spirit and earth.

Meaning

Living gold is not merely a more attractive name for ordinary gold. The distinction resolves an apparent paradox in the book: the author defends gold-making while denying that a tincture can be prepared from common gold. The universal subject possesses a generative gold-nature which the completed metal no longer possesses in that form. Consequently the most perfect familiar metal is not, in this account, the most powerful source of further perfection.

"Living" concerns operative capacity. The material is said to possess a spirit and to be capable of communicating perfection to lesser metals. The author's claim is not that a piece of bullion has become an animal, or that living gold must be understood as a modern biological organism. His vocabulary crosses the three kingdoms by asking what can act, mature and improve other bodies under the divinely established order.

Use in the book

The argument is developed against the use of finished metals at pp. 143–150. Gold has reached its terminus and cannot be raised above that endpoint to produce the much nobler tincture. At pp. 148–149, Sendivogius is cited to distinguish dead common metals from "ours," which are living and possess a spirit (II.148.2). The seed of metals must not be sought where it is absent. The author concludes that living and spiritual metals, their root and seed, must be sought in water (II.149.1).

The following paragraph joins this claim to his rainwater argument. Gold has been shown present in water, and particularly rainwater; philosophical oil and gold are said to be one and the same (II.150.1). Water itself has been argued to possess life. Therefore the gold within it must likewise be living.

The reported power to tincture lesser metals is offered as further evidence: weak matter could not communicate an excellence it does not possess. The steps are consequential, but they remain the author's inference from his theory and reported effects.

Earlier accounts provide the narrative basis. A spirit communicated by M. M. colours a warmed silver spoon golden yellow (II.123.2); a person of rank reports silver tinctured to pure gold by an oil from rainwater (II.124.1). The author also interprets crystals as the essence of gold rather than topazes. These accounts have different evidential statuses: an event he describes performing, testimony he accepts, and his judgment of a crystal's nature. They should not be merged into one uniformly direct demonstration.[57]

The distinction from common gold is also comparative. At pp. 141–142 water is described as a nobler body than earth and as containing the root of metals and gold-essence. The relevant water is considered in its coagulated and fixed essence, not merely as diffuse moisture (II.142.2). The philosophers' stone is then ranked far above metallic gold. "Living" belongs to this larger explanation of why a cause may communicate metallic perfection without already being an ordinary piece of the resulting metal.

At p. 151 Antonius de Abbatia's list includes "our gold made spiritual" among many products of correct philosophical labour (II.151.2). The list is intentionally varied: metallic names appear beside salt, milk, vinegar, honey and a blessed drink. It supports the interpretation of mineral names as names of the one subject under different aspects and operations. It does not license identifying every named product with the same visible condition at the same moment.

At p. 160 the phrase becomes especially precise. The purified earth is imbibed and fermented with its own spirit and its soul, identified as the living gold (II.160.1). This gives living gold a place within the body-soul-spirit relation. It is not a detached ingredient introduced simply because gold is valuable; it belongs to the subject's own coordinated constitution. Subsequent treatment is said to increase power and virtue.

The criticism of B.'s Aurum Auræ further limits the expression. A product that pales and loses colour in sunlight is judged not to be Hermetic philosophical gold (II.163.1). A grand name or airborne origin therefore does not suffice. The author demands a suitable enduring nature and the right relation of principles, while leaving parts of that practical knowledge undisclosed.

[57] II.119.1 reports the lapidary's judgment that the rainwater crystals were topazes; II.124.1 reports the author's own preference for understanding them as the essence of gold. These are distinct judgments of the same narrated crystals, not a single uncontested identification.

Places to read

II.148.2 (source pp. 148–149); II.149.1 (source pp. 149–150); II.150.1 (source p. 150). The explicit contrast between dead common metals and living philosophical gold in water.

II.123.2 (source pp. 123–124); II.124.1 (source p. 124); II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143). Reports and causal arguments used to establish the gold-essence.

II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152); II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161); II.163.1 (source p. 163). Spiritual gold, living gold as soul, and the rejection of Gold of the Breeze.

Connections

The most important connections are Gold ordinary and Seeds. The contrast is between a growing, communicative root and a completed particular metal. Body soul and spirit explains living gold's role as soul in the second operation. Ferment and Azoth prevents that role from being reduced to an independently sufficient ingredient. Nobility and perfection explains why familiar market value does not determine causal rank.

Translation in this edition

Goldwesenheit is rendered "essence of gold," not automatically "gold." The longer expression preserves the distinction between a gold-bearing or gold-producing philosophical nature and the finished metal. "Living gold" follows the source where the phrase actually occurs. "Gold made spiritual" is likewise retained rather than collapsed into a modern chemical description.

The author's equations are translated as his equations. When philosophical oil and gold are declared identical, the edition does not supply a physical formula allegedly hidden behind the claim. "Living" also remains a historical natural-philosophical predicate, not an editorial certification of biological life.

Attested forms

Goldwesenheit — essence of gold. II.150.1 (source p. 150).

lebendigen Gold — living gold; inflected phrase. II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161).

spiritualisch gemachtes Gold — gold made spiritual. II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152).

Cautions

Neither rainwater's universality nor the reported projections establishes that untreated rainwater is itself the precisely identified Hermetic subject. The author repeatedly distinguishes the analogy from that subject and distinguishes raw matter from purified matter. Modern chemical identity and transmutation are not demonstrated by the historical language. The entry therefore explains why the author calls this gold living without treating his demonstrations as independently reproduced results.

See also

Gold ordinary; Seeds; Body soul and spirit; Ferment and Azoth; Nobility and perfection; Rainwater; Subject of the art

Gold ordinary

aurum vulgi · Gold · Terminum

Perfect metal, exhausted generative source

At a Glance

The word. Ordinary gold is the finished common metal, contrasted with philosophical living gold.

In the Candida. Its metallic perfection makes it a product at its limit, not the originating source of a still nobler tincture.

In this edition. The translation preserves the author's qualified rejection and his later allowance for fermenting an already prepared medicine with gold.

A place to read. Read pp. 142–146 and pp. 148–150 as one argument, rather than extracting a prohibition from a single sentence.

Meaning

The treatment of ordinary gold is deliberately counterintuitive. It is the best and most perfect common metal, yet that very perfection limits its role. Having reached the endpoint of its natural determination, it cannot be raised higher into the philosophers' stone, which the author regards as far nobler and more powerful. This separates perfection within a kind from the universal capacity to perfect other kinds.

The distinction is not a denial that ordinary gold exists, has value or can be handled by chymical art. It is a denial that finished gold supplies the living generative source of the universal medicine. The word "ordinary" therefore identifies the relevant condition and class; it does not simply disparage an inferior specimen of gold.

Use in the book

At p. 142 the author ranks the coagulated and fixed essence of water, the philosophers' stone, above gold and below only the human soul (II.142.2). The following page draws the consequence. Those who prepare the stone or natural tincture from gold err against the principles, because nature cannot be raised beyond its terminus once that terminus has been reached (II.143.1). Metallic excellence and tincturing power are different capacities. Ordinary gold cannot spare some of its perfection and pass it to another metal merely by possessing that perfection itself (II.148.1).

The rejection of a supposed reduction into gold's first matter and seed follows. Such reduction would require corruption and putrefaction, described in the philosophers' language as killing and annihilation. Yet the author says gold is subject to neither corruption nor putrefaction (II.143.2).

He invokes the rule that nature admits no return. That rule was already used in Part One against turning particular creatures back into the universal principles in practice. A theoretical tracing of origins is not the same as a successful reversal in the laboratory.

The next paragraph sharpens the argument: gold has no life, and where life is absent no killing can take place, since privation presupposes possession (II.144.1). "Dead" is consequently relational. The finished metal lacks the relevant life and generative capacity, unlike the living philosophical metals. The point is not a modern biological classification of every substance but a restriction on the proposed process.[58]

The polemic becomes economic at p. 145. Common alchemists' killing and annihilating gold means making it disappear from the patron's chest and purse (II.145.1). The joke depends on a double sense of destruction: a claimed philosophical operation is exposed as the loss of money and material. This passage belongs with the book's concern for wasted time, heavy costs and fraudulent particular processes. It is not a detailed report that every treatment physically destroys metallic gold.

Yet the author immediately distinguishes a legitimate later use. If the medicine has first been prepared in the best manner and is then fermented with gold, one part is said to tincture a thousand parts of common metals (II.145.2). Thereafter the work cannot be multiplied. The reference is to Basilius's twelfth key. The order of clauses matters: the medicine precedes the gold fermentation. Gold is not thereby reinstated as the original universal subject, and the process carries a limitation absent from the unrestricted language of the universal root.

The Mercury discussion prevents another mistaken route. Ordinary mercury is said to remain volatile even after ten years of common heating, alone or with gold or silver, because no proper inner agent is manifest within it (II.146.2). A mixture of two familiar substances does not acquire the necessary universal principle simply because both have impressive names. The author's argument concerns inward nature, not the duration or cost of unsuccessful labour.

Finally, a Sendivogian warning contrasts common metals, especially aurum vulgi, with living metals possessing spirit (II.148.2). The next pages direct the search toward water and the gold-essence contained in it. Thus the negative account of ordinary gold serves a positive purpose: it redirects the reader from the completed product to the generative root, without claiming that a root must resemble its eventual product in outward appearance.

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[58] At II.143.2–II.145.1 "killing" and "annihilation" move between philosophical vocabulary and the satire of lost patronage. The later account of enduring substance prevents their automatic interpretation as absolute reduction to non-being.

Places to read

II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143); II.143.1 (source p. 143); II.143.2 (source pp. 143–144); II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145). The causal and terminus arguments against preparing the stone from ordinary gold.

II.145.1 (source p. 145); II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146). The economic polemic followed by the qualified allowance for gold fermentation.

II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147); II.148.1 (source p. 148); II.148.2 (source pp. 148–149); II.150.1 (source p. 150). Failed common mixtures and the contrast with living gold.

Connections

Gold ordinary is a necessary companion to Gold living, not a rival topic. Universal and particular explains the difference between a finished mineral and the universal root. Ferment and Azoth and Multiplication explain why gold may appear after medicine is prepared while closing off further increase. Labour and patience concerns perseverance under right principles, which this entry shows cannot be replaced by indefinite heating of a wrong subject.

Translation in this edition

Aurum vulgi is “common” or “ordinary gold.” “Dead” and “living” are kept where the quoted authorities use them, rather than paraphrased into modern chemical inactivity and reactivity. Terminus is translated as a limit or endpoint; it marks the author’s theory of determination, not a measured laboratory threshold.

The edition also preserves the difference between ordinary gold being dissolved and its alleged radical reduction to first matter. The author can discuss dissolution while denying that a familiar metal is practically restored to a universal seed. English should not turn every loosening, dissolving or opening into the same operation.

Attested forms

aurum vulgi — ordinary or common gold. II.148.2 (source pp. 148–149).

Gold — gold. II.143.1 (source p. 143); II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146).

Terminum — limit or endpoint; inflected Latin form. II.143.1 (source p. 143).

Cautions

The author's assertions about gold's resistance to putrefaction are historical claims in his system. They should not be expanded into statements about every chemical reaction involving gold. Equally, the later fermentation is not a complete reproducible process and supplies no modern guarantee of transmutation. Its importance here is logical: a material excluded as origin can still have a limited subsequent role.

See also

Gold living; Universal and particular; Ferment and Azoth; Multiplication; Putrefaction; Mercury ordinary; Labour and patience

Magistery

Magisterium · Magisterii · Magisterium nostrum

The accomplished work and its enduring transformed condition

At a Glance

The word. Magistery names the philosophical work, especially as an accomplishment or perfected condition.

In the Candida. It may be reached through different ways, is perfected by removing superfluities, and has conditions for further multiplication.

In this edition. The English retains magistery rather than reducing the word to either a substance name or the practitioner's expertise.

A place to read. Read p. 108, pp. 165–166 and p. 198 for ways, perfection and subsequent increase.

Meaning

Magistery gathers the work as an achievement. It can refer to what is prepared and perfected rather than merely the intellectual ability of a master. The word's breadth is useful: the author can speak of accomplishing the magistery, of its perfection and of its later multiplication without making it one ordinary material named independently of operations.

The term is therefore related to the stone and tincture but should not replace their more specific names everywhere. A lexical reading must ask whether the sentence concerns the process, its successful product or the perfected state from which another operation can proceed.

Use in the book

At p. 57 the author says even some Hermetic philosophers define nature badly, though they have understood enough in other respects to accomplish the priceless Magisterium (II.057.2). Practical attainment and complete theoretical explanation can come apart. The term marks success in the work, while the author reserves the right to criticize the successful practitioner's account of nature.[59]

At p. 108 he explains differences among philosophers through the processes they have employed. There are several ways of preparing the philosophical magistery (II.108.1). This is not an admission that any starting material will do. The one-subject and universal-source restrictions remain. It is a claim that correct practice need not have only one outward route.

[59] II.057.2 explicitly allows attainment of the magistery alongside a definition of nature the author criticizes. This is a distinction between kinds of competence, not a concession that theory never matters; the proem elsewhere blames mistaken labours on mistaken theory.

At pp. 165–166 the perfection of the magistery is tied to anatisation and removal of superfluities. Contrariety among the separated elements concerns qualities and accidents, not essence (II.165.2). Once perfected, the magistery cannot return to its earlier form and rawness, just as flour cannot become grain again (II.166.1). The changed state is real and irreversible in the relevant respect, while the essential unity of the principles remains.

At p. 171 fire is necessary for completing the magistery, though violent fire is not the right interpretation of "burn our brass" (II.171.1). Both women's work and a labour of Hercules can describe the task philosophically. The terminology of accomplishment therefore does not eliminate skill, patience and difficulty.

At p. 198 the magistery cannot be completed by ferment or Azoth alone. Both must be employed; even a perfected magistery cannot be multiplied without more mercurial water (II.198.1). Perfection and subsequent multiplication are distinct. The term does not designate a state in which no further operation is possible.

Finally, the perfection of the magistery supplies a pattern for the author's argument about the world's end (II.228.1). Its ordered transformation helps him distinguish passing accidents from enduring substance. The work's significance is thus practical and theological without being reduced to a metaphor alone.

Places to read

II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58); II.108.1 (source p. 108). Attainment despite imperfect theory and the plurality of correct ways.

II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166); II.166.1 (source p. 166); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172); II.198.1 (source p. 198). Purification, irreversibility, fire and the conditions of multiplication.

II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229). The perfected work as a pattern for cosmic renewal.

Connections

Art and science concerns the relation of theory and accomplishment. Anatisation and Separation explain the mode of perfection. Multiplication prevents the word perfected from being misunderstood as an end to every possible increase. World and its end supplies the theological application of the work's pattern.

Translation in this edition

Magisterium is rendered magistery, retaining a historical word whose context can include accomplishment and product. The Latin genitive Magisterii is recorded as an inflected form, not a different technical substance. The English avoids replacing every occurrence with "mastery,"

which would shift attention from the prepared work to the operator's mental skill.

Attested forms

Magisterium — magistery. II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58); II.198.1 (source p. 198).

Magisterii — of the magistery; Latin genitive. II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166).

Magisterium nostrum — our magistery. II.198.1 (source p. 198).

Cautions

The claim to a perfected magistery is the author's claim, not independent verification by the edition. Its plurality of ways does not override the universal subject requirement, and its theological use does not make the practical account purely allegorical. The entry describes the local range without imposing one modern equivalent.

See also

Art and science; Anatisation; Separation; Multiplication; World and its end

Mercury ordinary

vulgari illo Mercurio · gemeinen Mercurium · gemeinen ☿

Quicksilver as a false starting subject

At a Glance

The word. Ordinary mercury is the familiar mineral substance from which philosophical Mercury must be distinguished.

In the Candida. Its volatility and lack of a manifest inward agent make prolonged common heating unproductive for this work.

In this edition. The English states "ordinary mercury" where the source marks that distinction, including the mercurial sign in the quoted manuscript.

A place to read. Read pp. 146–147, which follow the restriction on using ordinary gold.

Meaning

This entry concerns a failed identification, not the whole historical chemistry of mercury. The author's question is whether common mercury can be the root of the universal tincture. His answer is emphatically negative. The substance may be a mineral water in the vocabulary of the authorities he cites, yet it does not therefore have the required nature or essence. The difference between a descriptive class and a suitable universal cause governs the discussion.

Use in the book

At p. 146 the author anticipates a reader misled by a philosophical maxim that expressly mentions Mercury. He quotes the Brief Guide to the Celestial Ruby: nothing is accomplished in the art without "our Mercury," but ordinary mercury is wholly useless for the work, even if the operator continues until the last day (II.146.1). The repeated name makes a contrast; it does not establish identity. A reader who retains only the opening "without Mercury" loses the author's entire warning.

The next quotation says many learned men have been deceived by ordinary mercury. Though a mineral water, it is unlike gold in nature or essence (II.146.2). Then the Sudum Philosophicum is cited: ten years of common warmth, whether mercury is alone or mixed with gold or silver, would not remove its volatility. The reason supplied is internal. It has no proper agent manifest within it by which it might be altered from within. This explains why neither prolonged time nor the prestige of added metals can make an unsuitable subject suitable.

At p. 147 a manuscript copied from an old text found at Löwenstein uses the sign ☿. Its author explicitly denies that ordinary mercury is meant by mercurial water and instead names the philosophers' Mercury, described as a red substance drawn from the midst of the mine (II.147.1). The Candida immediately places this beside the maxim that matter touching earth is useless for the art. The tension prevents the "mine" phrase from being treated as a simple direction to obtain ordinary mined quicksilver.[60]

The wider argument helps explain the polemic's force. Ordinary metals, especially common gold, are dead; the philosophers' metals are living and possess spirit (II.148.2). The author redirects the search toward water as the root of living metals (II.149.1). Common mercury's failure belongs to the same distinction between a particular finished mineral and the universal generative subject.

Places to read

II.146.1 (source p. 146); II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147). The explicit rejection and the explanation of persistent volatility.

II.147.1 (source pp. 147–148); II.148.2 (source pp. 148–149); II.149.1 (source pp. 149–150). The manuscript's sign, philosophical mining language and the contrast between ordinary and living metals.

Connections

Mercury philosophical gives the positive elemental and collective uses of the name. Fixation explains why volatility matters, while Gold ordinary shows that common gold is not a sufficient corrective. Universal and particular supplies the broader reason that mineral water is not automatically universal matter.

Translation in this edition

The source combines Latin inflections, German adjectives and a graphic sign. The edition translates the intended common substance consistently without pretending that these are separate materials. "Our Mercury" remains a philosophical possessive whose reference must be learned from the argument; it is not a brand name or a securely identified chemical reagent.

Attested forms

vulgari illo Mercurio — that ordinary mercury; inflected Latin phrase. II.146.1 (source p. 146); II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147).

[60] The quoted manuscript uses the mercurial sign ☿ in its water expression and denial of common mercury. The sign is part of the original's graphic vocabulary. Rendering the referent in English does not establish that every occurrence of the sign throughout alchemy has the same philosophical sense.

gemeinen Mercurium — ordinary mercury; inflected German-Latin phrase. II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147).

gemeinen ☿ — ordinary mercury with the mercurial sign. II.147.1 (source pp. 147–148).

Cautions

The passage does not prove that ordinary mercury can undergo no alteration under any conditions. Its assertion concerns the described common heating and its unsuitability for the universal work. Nor does it offer a safe experimental protocol. A lexicon should preserve the restriction without converting a historical polemic into a modern general chemical law.

See also

Mercury philosophical; Fixation; Gold ordinary; Universal and particular; Hermetic names

Mercury philosophical

Mercurius · Mercurium der Philosophen · Mercurius noster

Air, universal matter and the philosophers' own Mercury

At a Glance

The word. Mercury has an elemental, a collective and a practical philosophical use, all distinct from common quicksilver.

In the Candida. The author explicitly calls Mercury air, yet can call the coordinated threefold subject Mercury as well.

In this edition. The translation preserves these shifts instead of giving Mercury one modern chemical identity.

A place to read. Read pp. 85–89 for the principles, then pp. 146–150 and p. 219 for the distinction from ordinary mercury.

Meaning

Mercury is among the book's central words precisely because it is not governed by a single material substitution. In the explicit account of the three philosophical principles, Mercury is air; Sulphur is fire; Salt is water and earth or body (II.085.1). Elsewhere Mercury can name the threefold subject, and a particular mercurial water can belong to an operation. The reader must determine whether one principle, their concrete unity, or a material condition of that unity is being discussed.

The author himself provides a rule for such shifts in his distinction between abstract and concrete speech. Considered abstractly, the spirit can be spoken of as a qualified efficient cause in mineral nature. Considered concretely, together with the other principles, it is universal matter (I.031.1). The same care is needed when "Mercury" appears. A convenient English gloss cannot replace the argument that specifies its scope.

Use in the book

Part One first calls the spirit a supernatural spiritual Mercury in a qualified mineral respect, following Basilius (I.030.1). This does not make it God or identify it with the Holy Spirit. The created spirit may bear extraordinary power because of its origin and universal capacity, while remaining dependent on the true efficient cause. The later insistence that gold-making accords with nature also prevents supernatural from being read as an unrestricted magical exemption from order.

At p. 35 all three principles can be extracted and presented separately, but none is without the other two (I.035.1). Mercury is not pure air isolated from every trace of Sulphur and Salt. The dry philosophical water is a vehicle that makes the threefold spirit available to hand and sight. To boast

of severing the elements absolutely would, the author says, deceive oneself and others. This qualification distinguishes philosophical separation from an imaginary disassembly into independent elemental units.

At pp. 85–87 the account becomes explicit. Mercury is air, and the triplex Mercurius is created nature, the elements which ordinary philosophers describe inadequately as efficient cause, form and matter (II.085.1; II.087.1). The author then explains Nuysement's spirit-soul-body formulation through air, fire and Salt. A collective use of Mercury therefore does not contradict the elemental mapping; it speaks concretely of the coordinated whole.

The insistence on a single root follows at pp. 88–89. Basilius is cited for the common origin of spiritual Mercury, philosophical Sulphur and spiritual Salt. Their different abundance can ground particular applications, but the Universal is one thing found and extracted in one thing (II.088.1–II.089.1). Obtaining Mercury from one matter, Sulphur from another and Salt from a third is explicitly rejected, however closely related those materials might appear.

The long warning at pp. 146–147 keeps common mercury out of the universal work. A cited guide says that labour with it until the last day would find nothing suitable. Another authority explains its persistent volatility by the absence of a proper inner agent. The old Löwenstein manuscript then describes mercurial water as a red substance drawn from the mine, but explicitly says ordinary mercury is not meant (II.146.1–II.147.1). The author sets this wording beside the maxim that matter touching earth is useless. The juxtaposition demands interpretation of "mine," rather than a literal mining prescription.[61]

The dissolution maxim at p. 135 also requires this distinction: Mercury is to be made through Mercury, through mercurial water (II.135.1). Its repetitions express a relation within the philosophical work. They do not permit an editor to replace every Mercury with quicksilver and so turn a deliberately compact maxim into an ordinary mineral process.

In the reply letter, the second correspondent makes Mercury evidence for the purity of substance. His own Mercury, he says, receives only what is homogeneous with its essence (II.219.2). This supports the claim that substance admits no contrariety. It is important to preserve the direction: accidental impurities can mingle with and obscure a substance, but their removal does not require substance itself to possess an essential contradiction. The statement is a reported observation and a philosophical inference, not an independently verified analytical test.

[61] The Löwenstein manuscript at II.147.1 explicitly denies ordinary mercury, but its "mine" wording is not fully decoded. The juxtaposed earth-contact maxim should remain visible rather than be silently resolved into a literal source location.

Places to read

I.030.1 (source p. 30); I.031.1 (source p. 31); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Qualified causal language, concrete unity and the mutual implication of principles.

II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88); II.088.1 (source pp. 88–89); II.089.1 (source pp. 89–90). Mercury as air and threefold subject, all from one root.

II.135.1 (source p. 135); II.146.1 (source p. 146); II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147); II.147.1 (source pp. 147–148); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). Mercurial water, exclusion of common mercury and the claim of essential homogeneity.

Connections

Mercury philosophical connects Air and wind with Body soul and spirit but does not simply equate the universal subject with any air one can collect. The criticism of B.'s Gold of the Breeze explicitly limits that inference. Salt philosophical explains the embodied vehicle; Sulphur philosophical supplies the coordinated fire principle. Hermetic names explains why a mercurial name may point toward a condition or function rather than a common material.

Translation in this edition

Mercurius is usually retained as Mercury, and aqua Mercurialis as mercurial water. The translation can use "ordinary mercury" where the source explicitly says vulgaris or gemein, but leaves the philosophical expression visible elsewhere. Capitalization is an editorial aid, never sufficient evidence by itself.

The attested mixed German-Latin expression Mercurium der Philosophen is not regularized into a new supposedly quoted Latin lemma. The lexical entry's headword is a convenient English grouping. Likewise, "threefold Mercury" preserves the collective source usage instead of silently rewriting it as the single principle air.

Attested forms

Mercurius — Mercury. II.085.1 (source p. 85); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36).

Mercurium der Philosophen — Mercury of the philosophers; inflected mixed-language phrase. II.147.1 (source pp. 147–148).

Mercurius noster — our Mercury. II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220).

Cautions

Philosophical Mercury is not securely identified here with a modern substance or formula. “Supernatural” must be qualified by the author’s created-nature framework, and “spiritual” does not warrant an immaterial interpretation. Above all, common mercury, an airborne preparation and the author’s universal subject should not be conflated merely because each can be described as mercurial.

See also

Mercury ordinary; Air and wind; Body soul and spirit; Salt philosophical; Sulphur philosophical; Hermetic names; Substance

Phlegm

Phlegma · gebrandte Wasser

What remains when a medicinal water loses its sensible virtues

At a Glance

The word. Phlegm names the insipid remainder of aged distilled waters in a critical example.

In the Candida. It follows the claim that taste, smell and colour belong to a thing's soul, life and quintessence.

In this edition. The English keeps phlegm as a historical chymical term, without restricting it to respiratory mucus.

A place to read. Read pp. 21–22, where the sensory account is tested through spoiled medicines and a decayed apple.

Meaning

Phlegm has a specific chymical sense in this passage. The author describes what remains when distilled medicinal waters grow old and lose taste, smell and colour. Rendering it only as bodily mucus would make the example incoherent. It names a depleted watery remainder as judged through the author's account of sensible virtues.

The occurrence is narrow, but it is not trivial. It clarifies why the text distinguishes a useful spirit or essence from merely having some liquid left in a vessel. Appearance as water is not sufficient proof of retained medicinal excellence.

Use in the book

At p. 21 rainwater is said to contain every colour, and Hollandus is cited for the three spirits in natural warmth: taste, smell and colour. These are called the soul, life and quintessence of things (I.021.1). The author connects this to rainwater's sweetness and pleasantness. Sensible qualities therefore bear an explanatory relation to inward power in the local argument.[62]

The next page addresses Aristotelian philosophers who, the author says, commonly maintain the contrary. He declines an extended quarrel but asks them to remember their own apothecaries' waters. When these have aged and lost the three properties, nothing remains but Phlegma (I.022.1). The

[62] The sarcastic parenthesis at I.022.1 says that the remaining phlegm must sometimes still serve poor patients as medicine. This is the author's criticism, not a recommendation by the edition to use such a remainder.

aside that this still sometimes serves poor patients as medicine adds criticism of practice to the theoretical example.

A decayed apple supplies the parallel. When it has lost smell, taste and colour through rotting, only Excrementum remains. The comparison links phlegm with waste in a functional account of lost virtue. It does not establish that the two words are strict synonyms in every passage, or that their ordinary substances are chemically identical.

The later substance-residue distinction supplies a wider reading connection. Lower bodies are said to contain essential substance and accidental residues that mingle with and distort purity but can be removed by art (II.218.2). The phlegm example is earlier and more concrete; it should not be forced into a full analysis of that later ontology. Together, however, the passages show the author's concern to distinguish useful essence from an unproductive or obscuring remainder.

Places to read

I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23). The sensory triad, spoiled distilled waters and decayed apple.

II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219). The later distinction of substance and accidental residues.

Connections

Quintessence explains the positive claim immediately preceding phlegm. Distillation concerns the operation that produces the apothecaries' waters, while Residues explains the broader waste vocabulary. Medicine and its orders is useful for distinguishing the polemic against depleted remedies from a complete judgment of every medicine available in shops.

Translation in this edition

Phlegma is translated "phlegm" with a contextual explanation. Gebrandte Wasser is rendered distilled waters in the apothecary setting. The translation does not silently insert a specific modern distillate or presume that the word denotes one chemically uniform fraction.

Attested forms

Phlegma — phlegm. I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23).

gebrandte Wasser — distilled waters. I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23).

Cautions

Loss of taste, smell and colour is the author's historical criterion in this example, not a sufficient modern test of medicinal efficacy or safety. The passage does not establish that every colourless, odourless water is useless. Its object is the aging of preparations that previously possessed the named properties.

See also

Quintessence; Distillation; Residues; Medicine and its orders

Quintessence

quinta essentia · Geschmack · Geruch

Taste, smell and colour as the life of things

At a Glance

The word. Quintessence occurs in a quoted explanation linking taste, smell and colour with soul and life.

In the Candida. It supports the argument that rainwater possesses inward excellence despite an ordinary outward appearance.

In this edition. The English uses quintessence, without importing an unmentioned fifth element or a complete extraction doctrine.

A place to read. Read p. 21 with p. 22, where loss of the same three properties explains depleted medicines and waste.

Meaning

Quintessence has a clear local definition by association. The author recalls Hollandus's statement that three spirits resting in natural warmth—taste, smell and colour—are the soul, life and quinta essentia of things (I.021.1). The relation is the important evidence. The entry does not need to import every historical meaning of quintessence to explain why the word appears here.

The passage belongs to the praise of rainwater. An apparently simple and outwardly almost white water can contain a range of colours and can be sweet and pleasant. Sensory properties are taken as signs of an inward constitution and power. This is a historical natural-philosophical argument, not a modern sensory assay.

Use in the book

The author first describes repeated rainwater distillation and the colours that appear after the alembic dries. Even glass exposed to rain and then dried in sunlight displays such colours (I.021.1). The Hollandus statement follows as an explanation of why taste, smell and colour matter. The sensory triad is not simply ornament; it supports the earlier description of rainwater as artfully constituted in respect of essence.[63]

The next page makes the negative case. Apothecaries' distilled waters that grow old and lose taste, smell and colour leave phlegm, while a decayed apple losing those qualities leaves waste (I.022.1). The parallel gives quintessence

[63] The sensory triad at I.021.1 is attributed to Hollandus by the Candida. The entry follows that local attribution; it does not claim a verified exact location in the wider Hollandus corpus or a one-to-one equation with the three elemental principles.

its practical significance: losing the manifestations is interpreted as losing useful life or virtue. The author's aside about poor patients criticizes treating an emptied remainder as an effective remedy.

This account should be distinguished from the later elemental triad. Mercury is air, Sulphur fire, Salt water or earth and body (II.085.1). Spirit, soul and body are then mapped onto those principles (II.087.1). The two triads have related explanatory ambitions, but the Candida does not state that taste equals Mercury, smell equals Sulphur and colour equals Salt. Creating such a table would add a correspondence not supplied by the text.

Likewise, the term does not by itself identify the universal subject. A particular thing can possess taste, smell and colour, yet the author still denies that particulars can yield the universal medicine by a practical return to first matter (I.012.1). Quintessence in the sensory passage therefore should not be treated as a blanket permission to extract the universal stone from any fragrant or coloured material.

Places to read

I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23). The local Hollandus attribution and the contrasting examples of lost sensible virtues.

I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). The restriction on particulars and the distinct elemental triad.

Connections

Hollandus addresses the named authority. Colours supplies the fuller discussion of colour as evidence, and Phlegm explains the depleted remainder. Body soul and spirit distinguishes the later elemental account from the sensory triad. Universal and particular prevents a local claim about a thing's life from becoming an unrestricted claim about universal medicine.

Translation in this edition

Quinta essentia is translated quintessence, preserving a recognizable historical term. The English keeps the three concrete sensory words rather than paraphrasing them into a general "subtle energy." Soul and life remain the quoted author's terms. This entry records that attribution without assigning a precise original Hollandus passage not established here.

Attested forms

quinta essentia — quintessence. I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22).

Geschmack — taste. I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23).

Geruch — smell. I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23).

Farb — colour. I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23).

Cautions

The passage does not explicitly posit a fifth modern element or provide an extraction method for quintessence. Nor does it prove that every remaining or disappearing sensory quality corresponds to a measurable medicinal power. Its limited but coherent local role is to connect sensory excellence, useful life and the author's account of water.

See also

Hollandus; Colours; Phlegm; Body soul and spirit; Universal and particular

Salt philosophical

Saltz · Sale · Sal Philosophorum

Water, earth and the body of the threefold spirit

At a Glance

The word. Salt names the embodied water-earth principle, not merely familiar seasoning or a mineral salt.

In the Candida. It makes the threefold spirit visible and tangible and is also praised as a first-order philosophical medicine.

In this edition. The translation keeps Salt's elemental role distinct from the particular products called salts.

A place to read. Read pp. 85–89 with pp. 159–160 and pp. 181–182, attending to the changing level of discussion.

Meaning

Salt is the principle that gives the book's spiritual vocabulary a bodily foothold. The author explicitly calls it water, earth and the body of the other principles (II.085.1). A reader who supposes that spirit must be immaterial, or that perfection requires the abandonment of every body, will therefore misunderstand Salt's role. The visible and tangible vehicle belongs to the positive constitution of the subject.

The headword groups related philosophical uses without asserting that every occurrence of salt denotes one identical prepared product. The elemental principle, a salt extracted from particular matter, and the philosophers' medicinal Salt occupy different positions. Their relation has to be learned from the one-subject account and the author's distinctions between universal and particular preparations.

This embodied role is especially important when reading the book's language of refinement: a purer subject can remain visible and tangible without ceasing to be spiritual in the author's sense.

Use in the book

At pp. 85–86 the author says the three philosophical principles are nothing other than the elements. Mercury is air, Sulphur fire, and Salt water. Salt is also earth; in the preceding paragraph an earth can again become water (II.085.2). These propositions are not a modern classification of chemical elements. They express the author's theory that the elements originate in and remain forms of one water.

At p. 86 Salt is the body through which the triplex Spiritus becomes visible and tangible and can be divided into three hypostases for philosophical treatment (II.086.1). Nuysement's sentence that nothing

reaches sight or touch without Salt supplies support. The author also recalls the report that originally invisible water received a shell from God. Salt's bodily character therefore explains access to the subject rather than merely indicating a gross obstacle to be destroyed.

Part One had distinguished the shell's substantial and accidental aspects (I.032.1–I.035.1). Contrary superfluities are removable; the substantial vehicle cannot simply be severed from the other elements. Salt is not without Mercury and Sulphur, just as those principles are not without Salt. This prevents the instruction to separate the principles from being mistaken for absolute purification into self-sufficient modern components.

Basilius's testimony at pp. 88–89 then unites the roots of philosophical Sulphur, spiritual Mercury and spiritual Salt within one matter (II.088.1). Their particular uses depend on their abundance, but the Universal is one thing found in one thing. Extracting a salt from one substance and joining it with Mercury and Sulphur taken from two others is rejected (II.089.1). The material may bear three names without requiring three independent starting materials.

The later discussion of philosophical earth sharpens the requirement of purity. The spirit cannot be coagulated or fixed without earth, but it must be the subject's philosophical earth, not the ground trodden underfoot, and it must be free of superfluities (II.159.2). At p. 160 its own earth is imbibed with its spirit and soul, the living gold (II.160.1). Salt's embodied function should be read alongside this coordinated operation; the shared water-earth vocabulary does not justify arbitrary substitution of common earth or common salt.

At pp. 181–182 the philosophers' Salt enters the hierarchy of medicines. It is called a medicine of the first order and praised for treating disease, while a compound of Salt and Sulphur is associated with the second order (II.181.1; II.182.2). The author distinguishes the individual principle and particular preparation from the compound and universal. Consequently medicinal praise does not eliminate the book's concern with differences of order and preparation.

The intervening account of a doctor who solicited the arcanum calls the Salt a master key of Hermetic art (II.182.1). The warning is that whoever lacks the Salt of the wise lacks their wisdom and whole art. The source sentence surrounding the doctor is syntactically difficult, and it should not be expanded into an invented accusation or a precise history of a refused transaction. The key metaphor has firmer textual support than any reconstructed personal episode.[64]

[64] The doctor sentence at II.182.1 is syntactically unfinished in the source: after his despair of gratification, no clear main predicate supplies a subsequent action. The translation and entry do not invent misconduct, retaliation or a completed transaction to fill that gap.

Places to read

II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.085.2 (source pp. 85–86); II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87); II.088.1 (source pp. 88–89); II.089.1 (source pp. 89–90). Salt as water, earth and body, rooted with the other principles in one matter.

I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36); II.159.2 (source pp. 159–160); II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161). Substantial embodiment, removable impurities and the subject's own earth.

II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182); II.182.1 (source p. 182); II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183). The medicinal orders and the master-key image.

Connections

Body soul and spirit explains the formal mapping in which body means Salt. Separation distinguishes discarding contrary residues from distinguishing related principles. Medicine and its orders clarifies the shift from an elemental principle to particular and compound remedies. Hermetic names is useful when "our vegetable salt" appears in the list of products visible through right labour (II.151.2).

Translation in this edition

Saltz and Sal are translated "Salt" or "salt" according to context. The Latin Sale is an inflected form of Sal, not a different substance. Philosophical capitalization helps reading but cannot by itself settle whether a passage concerns a principle or a prepared medicine. The source's explicit predicates —water, earth, body, first-order medicine—provide the firmer evidence.

The phrase "without Salt" is retained in the Nuysement quotation. Replacing it with "without solid matter" would import a modern account and obscure the broader water-earth principle. Conversely, translating every ordinary salt as the philosophers' Salt would erase the very distinction the book repeatedly demands.

Attested forms

Saltz — Salt. II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87).

Sale — Salt; Latin ablative form. II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87).

Sal Philosophorum — philosophers' Salt. II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182); II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183).

Cautions

The claimed cures are historical assertions, not clinical findings established by this edition. The lexicon neither identifies a modern pharmaceutical nor supplies doses. Equally, substantial embodiment should not be confused with accidental impurity: purification removes the latter while retaining the former's necessary relation to spirit and soul. No formula for obtaining the philosophers' Salt is disclosed here.

See also

Body soul and spirit; Mercury philosophical; Sulphur philosophical; Separation; Earth philosophical; Medicine and its orders; Hermetic names

Saturn and planetary names

Saturno, Jove, Marte, Venere, Luna, Sole · Saturni, Jovis, Veneris, Martis · Tinctura Solis & Lunæ

Celestial names in philosophical mineral language

At a Glance

The word. Planetary and luminary names appear as mineral and metallic names in philosophical discourse.

In the Candida. The author warns that the philosophers' named metals mean their universal matter, while common particulars cannot supply the universal work.

In this edition. The translation retains the names and distinguishes actual contextual usage from an assumed universal correspondence table.

A place to read. Read pp. 235–236 with p. 12 and pp. 91–92.

Meaning

Saturn and the other celestial names are a particular instance of the book's broader problem of Hermetic naming. They can refer to metals or tinctures in a philosophical account, but the referent cannot safely be determined by the prestige of the name alone. The author's purpose is not to teach a complete table of planetary correspondences. It is to prevent the reader from substituting a common particular where the philosophers intend a universal subject or its derivative preparation.

Use in the book

At p. 12 chymistry is said to obtain from particular plants and minerals only particular water, oil and salt, or a Mercury, Sulphur and Salt of Saturn, Jupiter, Venus, Mars and so forth (I.012.1). These products do not become the universal principles merely because they bear elemental or celestial names. The rule that no universal medicine is prepared from an animal, plant or mineral governs the passage.[65]

At p. 91 the hierarchy of tinctures includes Sun and Moon for red and white, Vitriol and Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, and Mercury itself (II.091.1). The following paragraph unites all these derivative works in one seed and matrix (II.091.2). The list is therefore not evidence that the author endorses unrelated common minerals as independent universal sources. Philosophical particulars must flow from the universal fountain.

[65] The lists in I.012.1, II.091.1 and II.235.1 have different orders and functions. This entry does not infer a complete one-to-one correspondence merely by aligning lists, or turn the concluding list into a literal ingredient sequence.

The gold-and-silver example at p. 92 clarifies the same distinction. A saying about melting them so that nobody can separate them is interpreted as philosophical gold and silver from the universal source; ordinary mineral gold and silver do not satisfy the stated condition (II.092.1). The terms retain familiar material associations while their intended philosophical reference is restricted.

The conclusion names the problem directly. Philosophers' Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Moon and Sun are listed with arsenic, vitriol, antimony and marcasite (II.235.1). Common alchemists mistake them for the ordinary particulars and labour with one after another or several together. The philosophers, the author says, meant their universal matter alone. The wrong referent spoils even an otherwise clear process.

At p. 236 the sowing analogy repeats the warning through gold: sowing gold only helps if one knows what kind of gold is required (II.236.1). Planetary names must therefore be read through the living-versus-ordinary distinction and the correct subject, not through an automatic substitution of a familiar metal.

Places to read

I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). Particular principles extracted from named minerals remain particular.

II.091.1 (source p. 91); II.091.2 (source pp. 91–92); II.092.1 (source p. 92). Named derivative tinctures and philosophical gold or silver from one source.

II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236); II.236.1 (source p. 236). The explicit warning about philosophers' planetary metals and mistaken common referents.

Connections

Hermetic names gives the four reasons for multiple names. Universal and particular explains the causal restriction. Gold living and Gold ordinary supply the most developed contrast between philosophical and finished metal. White and red tinctures clarifies the Sun-and-Moon pair without making it a complete planetary system.

Translation in this edition

Latin names change with grammar: Saturni is "of Saturn," while Saturno occurs in an inflected list. The English uses recognizable names rather than treating the cases as separate substances. "Sun" and "Moon" are retained where Sol and Luna function in philosophical naming, leaving contextual explanation visible.

Attested forms

Saturno, Jove, Marte, Venere, Luna, Sole — the listed inflected names Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Moon and Sun. II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236).

Saturni, Jovis, Veneris, Martis — of Saturn, Jupiter, Venus and Mars; inflected names. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13).

Tinctura Solis & Lunæ — tincture of Sun and Moon. II.091.1 (source p. 91).

Cautions

The local lists do not establish an exhaustive correspondence table, an astrological timing system or a planetary influence for every preparation. No apparatus, day of operation or modern mineral identity follows from a celestial name alone. The entry's restricted purpose is to explain why those names matter to the author's warning about referents.

See also

Hermetic names; Universal and particular; Gold living; Gold ordinary; White and red tinctures

Sulphur philosophical

Sulphur · Philosophischen Schwefels · album & rubrum Sulphur

Fire, soul and a principle inseparable from its companions

At a Glance

The word. Sulphur is explicitly the fire principle, also interpreted as soul or form within the threefold scheme.

In the Candida. It shares one root with Mercury and Salt and cannot exist essentially apart from them.

In this edition. The English retains both Latin Sulphur and German Schwefel as sulphur, preserving philosophical qualifications where present.

A place to read. Read pp. 85–89 for the definition and p. 155 for the warning against imagining a diamond wholly without sulphur.

Meaning

Sulphur must first be understood through the book's express equation: Mercury is air, Sulphur is fire, and Salt is water, earth and body (II.085.1). The elemental account distinguishes philosophical Sulphur from an automatically identifiable common combustible mineral. At p. 87 soul or form is interpreted as fire in the explanation of Nuysement's world-body triad (II.087.1). Sulphur consequently has an animating or formal role within this particular account, but the equation must not be generalized to every use of "soul."

The principle belongs to a coordinated whole. The author's repeated insistence that none of the principles is without the other two is more decisive than any isolated metaphor of fire. A philosophical operation may display Sulphur separately without extracting an absolutely independent fire-substance. This is the same distinction between presentation and essential division that governs the other principles.

Use in the book

Part One states the mutual implication directly: Sulphur is not without Salt and Mercury (I.035.1). The dry water or substantial shell brings the threefold spirit into hand and sight. Thus a spiritual Sulphur can have a tangible vehicle; spirituality does not automatically remove all bodily conditions. The author's account of creation similarly leaves each element in the others, distinguished by place rather than severed absolutely.

At pp. 85–86 the reduction of the principles to elements is followed by the claim that the elements are again one water. Fire's watery origin is supported through cited discussions of lightning and rain (II.085.2). This is an argument within the author's natural theology. It does not mean that

every visible flame is a sample of the prepared philosophical Sulphur, or that the operations can be reduced to mixing ordinary fire and water.

The quotation from Basilius calls the root of philosophical Sulphur a heavenly spirit and places it with the roots of spiritual Mercury and spiritual Salt in one matter (II.088.1). Separate treatment of the names concerns their abundance and useful particular preparations. The universal treasure remains a single thing. The author's next paragraph rejects taking Sulphur from one matter and the other principles from unrelated matters (II.089.1). A material's reputation for sulphurous richness therefore cannot settle its suitability as the universal source.

Mineral generation introduces another level. The author reports a theory in which mercurial vapour becomes thick water and is specified into a metal according to the pure or impure sulphur it has absorbed (II.110.2). He then reports a different author who refuses that addition of sulphurous fatness, attributing an inward digesting power to Mercury (II.111.1). These are competing descriptions, not a single composite mechanism endorsed without reservation. Their differences explain why this lexicon cannot treat every occurrence of sulphur as a fixed laboratory ingredient.

The precious-stone discussion provides the sharpest qualification. The view that diamond arises from nature's vapour without Sulphur does not overthrow the common elemental origin of stones. The author replies that diamond can no more exist without sulphur than without salt, which is said to give hardness (II.155.1). He then adds that both white and red Sulphur occur in his philosophy. The point is that an apparently colourless or special mineral cannot be declared essentially outside the three-principle account. It is not a modern analysis of diamond composition.[66]

At p. 151, the saying that vitriol is Sulphur belongs to a warning about philosophical names; ordinary vitriol is rejected as unsuitable for the work (II.151.1–II.154.1). The verbal equation should therefore not be turned into a recipe for deriving philosophical Sulphur from common vitriol. The surrounding argument distinguishes a borrowed name from a literal particular mineral.

Finally, Sulphur is treated medicinally alongside Salt. The author praises the individual principles against children's convulsive fits, and praises their compound still more highly (II.182.2). The individual and particular are distinguished from the compound and universal, associated with the second order. This passage gives Sulphur a practical role but still does not identify a modern preparation. Its medical claims remain the author's historical assertions.

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[66] II.155.1 actually includes the reported phrase absque Sulphure, "without sulphur," before the author denies that diamond can be essentially without sulphur or salt. The claim and its rebuttal must both remain, rather than silently deleting the reported opinion.

Places to read

I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36); II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.085.2 (source pp. 85–86); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88); II.088.1 (source pp. 88–89); II.089.1 (source pp. 89–90). Fire, soul or form, mutual implication and the one-root requirement.

II.110.2 (source pp. 110–111); II.111.1 (source p. 111); II.155.1 (source p. 155). Different mineral theories and the diamond qualification.

II.151.1 (source p. 151); II.154.1 (source p. 154); II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183). Philosophical naming and a later medicinal application.

Connections

Heat and fire distinguishes elemental fire, philosophical operation and uncontrolled external heat. White and red tinctures clarifies why the existence of white and red Sulphur should not be converted into an exhaustive colour chart. Salt philosophical and Mercury philosophical explain the coordinated companions. Generation of precious stones is needed for the diamond passage, whose purpose is argumentative rather than an isolated mineral definition.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps "Sulphur" rather than substituting "combustibility," "oil" or "soul" everywhere. Each of those may be related in a local passage, but no one English replacement covers the source's varied uses. Album and rubrum are translated as white and red. The two adjectives preserve an explicit distinction without inventing its unprovided preparation or assigning a modern formula.

"Sulphurous fatness" remains the vocabulary of a reported theory. A translation that silently changes it to an accepted chemical constituent would erase the author's presentation of disagreement. Likewise, "heavenly spirit" is retained as an authority's characterization, not an editorial claim of immateriality.

Attested forms

Sulphur — Sulphur. II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.155.1 (source p. 155).

Philosophischen Schwefels — philosophical Sulphur; inflected German phrase. II.088.1 (source pp. 88–89).

album & rubrum Sulphur — white and red Sulphur. II.155.1 (source p. 155).

Cautions

The three-principle scheme should not be confused with modern elements or mineral composition. The text does not establish that every material called sulphur is interchangeable, nor that philosophical Sulphur can be obtained from a particular mineral merely because its name or colour resembles it. The specific subject and correct order of treatment remain essential and partly withheld.

See also

Mercury philosophical; Salt philosophical; Body soul and spirit; Heat and fire; White and red tinctures; Generation of precious stones; Vitriol

Vitriol

Vitriolum · Vitriol · Vitriolo

Excellent particular virtues and a rejected universal subject

At a Glance

The word. Vitriol is a mineral name, sometimes ordinary and sometimes philosophical.

In the Candida. Its excellent properties are conceded, but its identification with the universal Hermetic subject is explicitly rejected.

In this edition. The translation preserves "vitriol" and the distinction between common varieties and a borrowed philosophical name.

A place to read. Read pp. 152–154: four reasons advanced for vitriol are answered in sequence.

Meaning

Vitriol receives one of the book's clearest demonstrations that resemblance and usefulness do not establish identity. A substance can look like "dry water," possess remarkable virtues, and appear in authoritative alchemical language without being the universal matter. The argument does not depend on denigrating the mineral. It depends on determining what kind of cause it is and how far its power can extend.

Use in the book

At p. 151 a borrowed saying declares that vitriol is Sulphur, while simultaneously warning that neither ordinary vitriol nor ordinary antimony serves the intended purpose (II.151.1). The following list of philosophical products includes "our vitriol" alongside gold made spiritual, vegetable salt, milk, vinegar and many other names (II.151.2). The possessive belongs to the problem: these are things encountered by one who knows how to work rightly, rather than a shopping list of common substances.

The author then sets out four plausible reasons for taking ordinary, Roman or Hungarian vitriol as the subject (II.152.1). Philosophers use its name; it resembles dry water; nature has begun but not completed it; and its powers are excellent. His replies at pp. 153–154 separate linguistic, structural and causal questions. The philosophers' names have already been explained. Dry water has a specific philosophical meaning developed in Part One. The maxim about unfinished nature must be read with the contrary

warning that matter touching the earth is useless for the work. Finally, excellent particular virtues do not entail universal power.[67]

That last reply is decisive. Vitriol cannot, in the author's judgment, be demonstrated universal either from principles or from effects. Like other minerals generated in the earth, it is a particular thing. Earth itself may be universal, but not everything generated within it inherits that universality unchanged (II.154.1). The author therefore denies that the universal medicine or tincture can be prepared from ordinary vitriol while expressly refusing to deprive it of its proper virtues.

An earlier colour comparison should be read in this light. At p. 120 vitriol exemplifies the emergence of a beautiful red from green; the maxim about the blood of the green and red lions follows (II.120.1). This visible analogy does not reverse the later exclusion of vitriol as the starting subject. It illustrates a transformation of colour, not an identity of materials.

Places to read

II.152.1 (source pp. 152–153); II.153.1 (source pp. 153–154); II.154.1 (source p. 154). The four arguments for vitriol and their ordered rebuttal.

II.120.1 (source p. 120). A colour comparison involving vitriol and the green and red lions.

II.151.1 (source p. 151); II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152); II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236). The philosophical naming convention and its concluding clarification.

Connections

Vitriol connects the distinction Universal and particular with the interpretation of Hermetic names. Green and red lions explains why a mineral's observable colour change can supply a useful image without becoming the material of the whole work. Salt philosophical and Sulphur philosophical likewise require an account of their function within one subject.

Translation in this edition

"Roman" and "Hungarian" are retained as the author's qualifications. They should not be treated here as verified modern compositional classifications. The German and Latin forms identify what the author calls vitriol; they do not resolve its changing historical manufacture. The phrase "our vitriol" is translated as written, so that its difference from ordinary vitriol remains visible.

[67] At II.152.1–II.153.1 the maxim that nature has begun but not completed the material is answered by setting it beside the warning about touching earth. The author's response constrains the literal inference; it does not supply a complete modern identification that reconciles every maxim.

Attested forms

Vitriolum — vitriol; Latin form. II.151.1 (source p. 151); II.152.1 (source pp. 152–153).

Vitriol — vitriol; German form. II.154.1 (source p. 154).

Vitriolo — vitriol; inflected form. II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236).

Cautions

The rejection belongs to the author's universal art, not to all possible particular remedies or mineral operations. Nor is a modern formula supplied for the philosophical referent. The text's positive concession and negative conclusion must both be kept: considerable virtues are compatible with unsuitability for this specific purpose.

See also

Antimony; Hermetic names; Green and red lions; Sulphur philosophical; Universal and particular; Subject of the art

Coagulation

coagulation · coagulirt · coagulare

Water becoming a fixed body

At a Glance

The word. Coagulation names a passage toward a thicker or fixed bodily condition.

In the Candida. It explains metallic hardening, the fixed water-essence and the reciprocal behaviour of perfected matter in fire and air.

In this edition. The translation retains coagulation rather than substituting a modern account of solidification.

A place to read. Read p. 117 for metals, p. 142 for fixed water and p. 198 for the reversal of flowing and coagulating.

Meaning

Coagulation belongs to the book's account of water becoming a body without leaving behind its elemental origin. It is not limited to the familiar clotting of blood, nor does the author define it through a modern physical threshold. Its explanatory force depends on the relation between an inward essence and a changing condition. Water can be considered as diffuse moisture or as a coagulated and fixed essence; confusing those conditions makes the argument about the source of gold seem more implausible than the author intends.

Use in the book

At p. 117 metallic hardening follows gradual coagulation through the continuous action of warmth hidden in the ores (II.117.1). The same paragraph contrasts precious stones, whose congelation follows condensation and sublimation and is attributed to cold. Coagulation is therefore part of a differentiated account of mineral generation, not a catch-all name that makes warm and cold operations identical.

At p. 142 the author answers the objection that water cannot be a sufficiently noble cause of gold. Water is not to be considered in its diffusion, excessive humidity and quality, but in its coagulated and fixed essence (II.142.2). Coagulation occurs in earth, and earth itself is called coagulated water. This allows water's causal rank to be judged through its concentrated essence rather than its most familiar loose appearance. The resulting philosophers' stone is ranked above gold, rather than treated as water made valuable merely by acquiring a metallic name.

The spirit's need for earth adds a relational qualification. At p. 159 it cannot be coagulated or fixed without earth, but this must be philosophical earth freed of superfluities, not common ground (II.159.2). Coagulation is consequently not a licence to mix a spirit with any dry material. The appropriate body belongs to the subject and must be suitable in nature and purity.

At p. 198, after the necessity of ferment and Azoth, further mercurial water is required for multiplication. What flows in fire is then seen to coagulate in air, whereas previously what coagulated in fire flowed in air (II.198.1). The reversal marks a changed condition of the work. It should not be flattened into a generic statement that the finished stone is simply solid.[68]

Places to read

II.117.1 (source p. 117). Gradual metallic coagulation is contrasted with precious-stone congelation.

II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143); II.159.2 (source pp. 159–160). Coagulated water-essence and the necessity of the subject's philosophical earth.

II.198.1 (source p. 198). The reciprocal flowing and coagulating behaviour associated with multiplication.

Connections

Congelation preserves the contrasting role of cold in the stone chapter. Fixation concerns the steadiness of the resulting condition, while Earth philosophical explains the appropriate bodily support. Multiplication shows that the state described as perfected can still participate in a further operation with mercurial water.

Translation in this edition

"Coagulate," "coagulated" and "coagulation" follow the source's family of forms. The Latin infinitive coagulare and the German participial coagulirt are not additional technical ingredients. The edition does not silently translate them as freezing, because the text itself distinguishes coagulation from the cold-related congelation of precious stones.

Attested forms

coagulation — coagulation. II.117.1 (source p. 117); II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143).

coagulirt — coagulated. II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143).

coagulare — to coagulate. II.198.1 (source p. 198).

[68] The final comparison at II.198.1 explicitly reverses flowing and coagulating between fire and air. It supplies no unambiguous modern phase diagram. The entry records the reversal without correcting it into the more familiar behaviour of an ordinary solid.

Cautions

The account is a historical theory of nature and art, not a verified explanation of metallic or crystalline formation. Its terms provide no temperatures, proportions or adequate experimental instructions. Coagulation should also not be confused with the absolute division or destruction of elemental substance, which the author elsewhere rejects.

See also

Congelation; Fixation; Earth philosophical; Multiplication; Generation of metals

Congelation

congelation · Kälte · angeschossene Chrystallen

Cold and the formation of precious stones

At a Glance

The word. Congelation is the cold-related formation of a firm stone from mercurial moisture.

In the Candida. The author distinguishes it from the warm, gradual coagulation associated with metallic hardening.

In this edition. The English retains congelation where the source names the operation and uses crystallization for the narrated crystal formation.

A place to read. Read pp. 117–119, where the theoretical distinction is followed by reported stones and crystals.

Meaning

Congelation has a specific local function in the chapter on precious stones. It explains how mercurial moisture can acquire a firm mineral body through cold after preceding concentration and upward movement. The description links precious stones to the common watery origin of mineral nature while distinguishing their formation from that of metals. It is therefore useful to keep the word separate from coagulation even though both concern a transition toward firmness.

Use in the book

At p. 117 the author says that precious stones congeal from mercurial moisture through cold after condensation and sublimation (II.117.1). He contrasts this with metallic hardening after gradual coagulation through persistent warmth in ores. The order matters. Cold is not presented as acting on wholly unchanged rainwater; the moisture has already undergone conditions relevant to its preparation and formation.

The same paragraph qualifies sublimation. Uncoloured matter rises more readily than coloured matter, since no fatness or sulphur ascends without force. Colour thus belongs to the explanation of different mineral conditions, not merely to the final naming of a gem. Yet the later diamond qualification prevents this from becoming an assertion that a colourless stone essentially lacks one of the three principles.

Reports follow as support. The earlier account of Bier's water includes a mass from which pieces were struck, polished and set, one judged by a Nuremberg jeweller to be a pale but otherwise good emerald (II.118.1). The assessment is testimony within a narrative, not a modern mineral analysis. At p. 119 M. M. is said to have sent the author crystals derived from rainwater

and formed in the cold; an experienced lapidary judged them good stones and topazes (II.119.1). Later the author says he took those crystals for the essence of gold rather than topazes (II.124.1). The differing judgments should remain visible.[69]

The theoretical conclusion at p. 155 reaffirms that stones share the matter of metals and arise in the first instance without a particular seed or proximate matter (II.155.1). Congelation differentiates a route of formation within that shared mineral nature. It does not establish a separate universal subject exclusively for gems.

Places to read

II.117.1 (source p. 117). The explicit account of cold, mercurial moisture, condensation and sublimation.

II.118.1 (source pp. 118–119); II.119.1 (source p. 119); II.124.1 (source p. 124). The reported emerald and rainwater crystals, with distinct judgments of their identity.

II.155.1 (source p. 155). The concluding common-origin account and the diamond qualification.

Connections

Generation of precious stones provides the full setting, while Coagulation records the paired contrast with metals. Colours concerns the relation of coloured and uncoloured moisture. Sulphur philosophical is essential for the later refusal to regard the diamond as entirely without Sulphur.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps "congelation" as a historical technical term. "Freezing" alone would suggest an ordinary phase change that does not cover the author's account of lasting stones. The German angeschossen describes crystals forming; its contextual English is "crystallized," not a supposed quotation of the Latin term congelatio.

Attested forms

congelation — congelation. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

Kälte — cold. II.117.1 (source p. 117); II.119.1 (source p. 119).

angeschossene Chrystallen — crystals that have crystallized or formed. II.119.1 (source p. 119).

[69] The emerald and topaz assessments in II.118.1–II.119.1 belong to jeweller and lapidary testimony within the narratives. Calling them assessments preserves their evidential status and avoids treating a historical trade judgment as a modern mineralogical test.

Cautions

The report does not warrant identifying the narrated stones as laboratory-produced emeralds or topazes by modern criteria. Nor does the vocabulary supply a reproducible procedure. Its value for the reader is the author's distinction of conditions and sequence, together with the clearly marked status of the supporting accounts.

See also

Generation of precious stones; Coagulation; Colours; Sulphur philosophical; Diamonds and rock crystal

Digestion

digerirende Krafft · gekocht · decoctione aquæ

An inward maturing power in a reported mineral theory

At a Glance

The word. Digestion is an English organizing headword for the inward digesting power and gradual cooking discussed in the text.

In the Candida. A cited author attributes such power to Mercury from celestial influences, in opposition to adding sulphurous fatness.

In this edition. The entry distinguishes the actual source forms from a normalized technical label.

A place to read. Read pp. 110–111 for the competing accounts, then p. 170 for slow cooking toward fixed redness.

Meaning

Digestion should be approached with lexical restraint. The most explicit local form is not a neatly isolated noun Digestio but the statement that Mercury has a digerirende Krafft und Würckung, a digesting power and operation (II.111.1). The headword collects that account with related language of cooking and maturation. It does not claim that the book supplies a complete standard doctrine under one technical heading.

Use in the book

At p. 110 the author of the True Chemical Foundations is reported as deriving metals from mercurial vapour in the earth. Fire within mountains cooks that vapour into thick water, which is then determined toward a particular metal according to the sulphur it has drawn into itself (II.110.2). The next page introduces a different explanation from the author of On the Metamorphosis of Metals. This writer refuses the addition of sulphurous fatness to Mercury, saying that Mercury possesses within itself a digesting power derived from heavenly influences (II.111.1).[70]

The contrast is important. The Candida is not simply instructing the reader to add sulphur and then digest. It places two accounts beside one another, distinguishes their mechanisms, and directs the reader to the cited works for more information. Digestion in the second account explains an inward power of maturation rather than an externally supplied ingredient.

[70] II.110.2 and II.111.1 name two different cited accounts. The refusal to add sulphurous fatness belongs specifically to the second. Combining both into one prescribed sequence would erase the disagreement the Candida explicitly presents.

The later discussion of practice gives gradual cooking a more direct role. Nature operates by degrees and not by leaps, and does not bring things forth before their time (II.167.1). The calendar analogies at p. 169 explain why even a real process cannot be assigned one fixed completion time independently of conditions and the operator's care (II.169.1). At p. 170 Rosarius is quoted urging the cooking of water little by little through putrefaction until it changes from colour to perfect colour (II.170.1). The author identifies the result as the tincture when fixed redness is reached.

These later passages do not prove that every operation called cooking is identical with the earlier inward digesting power. They do, however, show why maturation, time, heat and appropriate nature belong together in the book's practical reasoning. A patient duration matters only within a correct subject and regimen.

Places to read

II.110.2 (source pp. 110–111); II.111.1 (source p. 111). Competing explanations of metallic generation and the actual digesting-power expression.

II.167.1 (source p. 167); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170); II.170.1 (source p. 170). Gradual natural operation, variable time and cooking toward perfect colour.

Connections

Generation of metals supplies the disputed setting. Heat and fire and Regimen of fire explain why the operation is not reducible to stronger heating. Putrefaction gives the more specific transformational process named in Rosarius's advice. Labour and patience distinguishes sustained attention from indefinite work on a wrong material.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders the participial German phrase as "digesting power." It retains "cooking" for kochen and decoctio-related language where that is the source's expression. The entry does not back-translate all these words into an unattested Latin lemma or pretend they are verbally identical. Their connection is interpretive and local.

Attested forms

digerirende Krafft — digesting power; the author's mixed-language expression. II.111.1 (source p. 111).

gekocht — cooked. II.110.2 (source pp. 110–111).

decoctione aquæ — cooking of water; Latin ablative phrase. II.170.1 (source p. 170).

Cautions

No temperatures, vessels or time schedule can be reconstructed from this headword alone. Nor is the reported power from celestial influences a verified physical explanation. The modest textual footprint calls for this focused entry rather than an imported universal history of alchemical digestion.

See also

Generation of metals; Heat and fire; Regimen of fire; Putrefaction; Labour and patience

Dissolution

solves · radicaliter solvirt · Gleichwesenheit

Opening the fixed through a kindred philosophical nature

At a Glance

The word. Dissolution opens a fixed condition, while radical dissolution is attributed to one thing of the same essence as gold.

In the Candida. The author opposes the appropriate philosophical opening to mere corrosive force, haste and a supposed practical return of particulars to universal first matter.

In this edition. The English distinguishes dissolve, resolve, open and reduce according to the local argument.

A place to read. Read p. 135 with p. 172, then compare the denial of ordinary gold's reduction at pp. 143–144.

Meaning

Dissolution is a necessary operation whose force cannot be determined from the verb alone. A material can be dissolved or opened in some respect without thereby being returned to the universal first matter. The book repeatedly denies that particular creatures can undergo that practical return, even though their origins can be traced theoretically. The distinction protects the argument from a misleading equation between any successful liquefaction and the recovery of a universal seed.

The most explicit positive account concerns sameness of essence. At p. 172 the author says one thing alone dissolves gold radically, and does so not through corrosiveness, sharpness or strength but through its essential kinship with gold (II.172.1). The choice of dissolvent is therefore governed by nature and relation rather than mere attacking power.

The distinction also belongs to the author's wider demand to investigate interiors rather than judge from outward appearance. At pp. 135–136 an opponent is criticized for lacking knowledge of causes and principles. Dissolution must consequently be interpreted as a relation grounded in those interiors, rather than identified solely by the visible disappearance of a solid shape.

Use in the book

The first practical framework is the spirit opening the body and reuniting soul and body (I.031.1). The author then distinguishes two kinds of separation: contrary superfluities are removed, while related principles are distinguished without essential division (I.032.1–I.035.1). Dissolution belongs within that framework of opening and ordered transformation. It

cannot automatically mean that every bond is abolished or that the bodily vehicle disappears entirely.[71]

At p. 135 the short verse gives a reciprocal pattern: dissolve the fixed, make the dissolved fly, and fix the winged thing (II.135.1). The adjoining maxim says to make Mercury through Mercury, through mercurial water. Dissolution is not the whole work; mobility must be followed by a suitable renewed fixation. The verse states a relation and sequence compactly while leaving the actual manipulations incompletely disclosed.

Reported rainwater effects give another use of the verb. At p. 124 M. M. is said to have prepared a spirit that dissolved gold leaf in his hand (II.124.1). The author connects this with tincturing oil and crystals interpreted as gold-essence. The account is testimony about a particular effect, not a complete identification of the spirit or an adequate protocol. A lexicon should not turn the short report into a reproducible process by adding absent details.

The negative argument at pp. 143–144 must remain beside these positive passages. Ordinary gold has reached its terminus; reducing it to first matter and seed in order to create a higher form would require corruption and putrefaction, to which the author says it is not subject (II.143.1–II.144.1). This is not the same proposition as saying no substance can ever loosen or dissolve gold in any respect. The scope of "reduction" is more demanding.

At p. 171 dissolving nature's firm bond is described as difficult and laborious, explaining the knight of the Golden Fleece image (II.171.1). The next page's radical dissolution proceeds by subtle ingenuity, skill, persistent diligence and perseverance (II.172.1). Haste is rejected. The author's use of Hermes' expression subtili ingenio associates the operation with attentive discrimination, not merely an operator's ability to apply greater physical force.

The homogeneity claim in the reply supplies a close conceptual connection. Our Mercury receives only what is homogeneous with its essence (II.219.2). This reinforces the importance of kindred nature and the denial of essential contrariety. The entry should not, however, treat that later statement as a fully disclosed chemical explanation of the earlier dissolution. The author reports a relation, not a modern molecular mechanism.

The cosmic conclusion finally uses resolution at another level: particular natures are resolved into universal principles, which are transformed into perfected spiritual being (II.229.1). The author distinguishes this from all things simply melting together in one crucible. A divine eschatological

[71] II.172.1 attributes radical dissolution to one thing's essential kinship with gold, but does not identify that thing by a complete modern name or composition. The entry leaves the assertion at that level instead of supplying an unsupported solvent identification.

transformation cannot be transferred without qualification into an ordinary laboratory reduction of every particular material.

Places to read

I.031.1 (source p. 31); I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36); II.135.1 (source p. 135); II.135.2 (source pp. 135–136); II.136.1 (source p. 136). Opening, coordinated principles and the fixed-and-winged sequence.

II.124.1 (source p. 124); II.143.1 (source p. 143); II.143.2 (source pp. 143–144); II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145). The gold-leaf report and the distinct denial of reduction to first matter.

II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172); II.172.1 (source p. 172); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). Difficult radical dissolution, essential kinship and the separate cosmic resolution.

Connections

Separation explains what an opening can remove or distinguish. Fixation gives the necessary reciprocal operation. Gold ordinary and Gold living clarify why the completed common metal must not be mistaken for its generative root. Mercury philosophical concerns the related medium, while Labour and patience addresses the required human discipline.

Translation in this edition

Solvere is translated dissolve in the verse, and radicaliter solvirt as dissolves radically in the prose. Resolutio and reductio retain resolve and reduce where the author argues about first matter. The terms may overlap in a particular philosophical discussion, but an editorial rule making them always interchangeable would destroy important restrictions.

Gleichwesenheit is rendered sameness of essence, preserving the stronger relation than a loose similarity of outward appearance. Subtili ingenio is subtle ingenuity. Neither expression supplies a modern chemical formula, and the translation does not silently identify the single dissolving thing with an ordinary corrosive acid.

Attested forms

solves — you dissolve; Latin verbal form. II.135.1 (source p. 135).

radicaliter solvirt — dissolves radically. II.172.1 (source p. 172).

Gleichwesenheit — sameness of essence. II.172.1 (source p. 172).

subtili ingenio — with subtle ingenuity. II.172.1 (source p. 172).

Cautions

The passages offer no safe practical method for dissolving gold in the hand or identifying the proper substance. They report historical claims within the author's framework. Their lexical importance is the distinction of kinds and levels of dissolution, the requirement of essential kinship and the explicit rejection of haste and corrosive force as the decisive cause.

See also

Separation; Fixation; Gold ordinary; Gold living; Mercury philosophical; Labour and patience

Distillation

destillirt · destillationes · destillirte Mayenthau

A familiar operation whose abundance does not guarantee the stone

At a Glance

The word. Distillation is a familiar chymical operation used in demonstrations and particular preparations.

In the Candida. Repeated rainwater distillation supports the claim that water contains colours, but many distillations do not amount to possessing the stone.

In this edition. The translation keeps distillation distinct from evaporation and from the whole philosophical process.

A place to read. Read p. 21 alongside p. 55, where technical abundance is contrasted with the missing tincture.

Meaning

Distillation has both a modest evidential role and a critical place in the book's account of practice. It can reveal something the author believes is present in rainwater and can prepare a useful particular remedy. It does not by itself establish the universal subject or complete the philosophers' stone. This distinction is especially helpful because the book addresses readers familiar with numerous chymical manipulations.

Use in the book

At p. 21 rainwater is said to contain all colours despite its outwardly almost white appearance. Repeated distillation through an alembic, followed by drying the apparatus, is offered as a simple example: many colours appear within it (I.021.1). The author adds the less elaborate observation of glass that has lain in rain and then dried in the sun. Distillation here belongs to an argument about what water contains. The passage does not identify each colour with a distinct prepared tincture or insist that this demonstration completes the art.

Part One also distinguishes undistilled water's evaporation. Rainwater left in an open vessel is said to disappear entirely, and this is offered as evidence of its spiritual nature (I.019.2). Evaporation in an open vessel is not the same operation as repeated passage through an alembic. The distinction should survive translation, even though both observations support the author's wider claims about water.

The opening of Part Two supplies a pointed contrast. Sendivogius is quoted imagining Hermes, Geber and Raymond Lull returning to a world with innumerable distillations, circulations, calcinations and other

operations. Modern practitioners might treat them as pupils, yet still lack the one thing those earlier masters accomplished: the stone or natural tincture (II.055.1). Multiplying procedures is not equivalent to understanding principles. The quotation establishes the proem's concern with wrong theory producing wrong labours.[72]

At p. 164 the author says even simply distilled May dew can help in feverish illnesses (II.164.2). The concession follows an explicit denial that May dew is the precise subject of the Hermetic art. A useful distillate therefore need not be the universal medicine. This is a concrete instance of the distinction between particular benefit and identity with the central subject.

Places to read

I.019.2 (source pp. 19–20); I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22). Undistilled evaporation and the separate alembic demonstration of colours.

II.055.1 (source p. 55). Many operations contrasted with the absent philosophers' stone.

II.164.2 (source pp. 164–165). A particular medicinal claim for distilled dew after the subject has been distinguished.

Connections

Colours explains the inference made from the dried alembic. Dew and Universal and particular clarify the limited concession concerning May dew. Knowledge and practice supplies the wider point of Sendivogius's comparison: procedural sophistication can coexist with ignorance of the proper subject.

Translation in this edition

The forms destillirt and destillirte belong to ordinary distillation vocabulary. Destillationes is the Latin plural in the quoted proem. "Distilled" is not silently added when the source merely speaks of rainwater or a spirit prepared from it. Likewise, "evaporate" is kept for the open-vessel observation instead of making every departure of moisture a distillation.

Attested forms

destillirt — distilled. I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22).

destillationes — distillations. II.055.1 (source p. 55).

destillirte Mayenthau — distilled May dew; inflected phrase. II.164.2 (source pp. 164–165).

[72] The contrast at II.055.1 is a quotation introduced under Sendivogius's name. This entry follows the attribution within the Candida and does not claim to have established an exact original location for every operation in the quoted list.

Cautions

The observations are not modern analytical proofs that all possible colours or medicinal powers reside in water. The medical statement is the author's assertion. Neither the alembic example nor the dew concession supplies an adequate practical protocol for the universal work, and no hidden sequence of distillations should be invented to fill that absence.

See also

Colours; Dew; Universal and particular; Knowledge and practice; Rainwater

Fixation

fixationem perseverantem · figes · fixe röthe

Enduring power rather than mere loss of movement

At a Glance

The word. Fixation concerns an enduring condition opposed to the flight or instability of unperfected matter.

In the Candida. It appears in the hierarchy of tinctures, the fixed-and-winged maxim, and the endpoint of fixed redness.

In this edition. The English keeps fixation distinct from coagulation, while preserving passages where the author joins them.

A place to read. Read p. 135 with pp. 159–160 and p. 170; compare ordinary mercury's persistent volatility at p. 146.

Meaning

Fixation is more than making something motionless. The author connects it with a condition in which the appropriate matter retains and communicates its power. Its meaning emerges through oppositions: fixed and winged, enduring and volatile, stable redness and a colour that fades. These contrasts concern the proper philosophical subject, not an arbitrary material made firm by whatever means are available.

Use in the book

A quoted hierarchy of tinctures at p. 91 says that certain tinctures contain the tincture of the Sun if brought to enduring fixation (II.091.1). The statement belongs to the account of particular works flowing from one seed and matrix. It does not retract the one-root requirement by inviting readers to treat every common metal as an independent universal source.

The compact verse at p. 135 gives a reciprocal sequence: dissolve the fixed, make the dissolved fly, then fix the winged thing (II.135.1). Fixation is one movement within a transformation, not a command to begin by making common matter immobile. The adjoining maxim says to make Mercury through Mercury and mercurial water. Together they imply coordination between release, mobility and renewed stability, while withholding the full manipulations.[73]

The contrast with ordinary mercury is explicit. Even ten years of common warmth, alone or with gold or silver, would not remove its

[73] The source labels the two-line fixed-and-winged verse old, but does not securely assign its authorship at II.135.1. The entry therefore cites the local verse without adding an unsupported author's name.

volatility, according to the quoted Sudum Philosophicum (II.146.2). The absence of a manifest proper inward agent explains the failure. More time and familiar noble metals cannot substitute for the required nature. Fixation is therefore not merely a technical obstacle that external heat automatically overcomes.

At p. 159 the spirit cannot be coagulated or fixed without earth. The author immediately specifies philosophical earth, the subject's own earth freed from all superfluities (II.159.2). The bodily support is necessary, but inappropriate common ground will not do. The next paragraph describes reintegration with spirit and living gold, followed by philosophical cooking (II.160.1).

At p. 170 the tincture is possessed when water has moved through colours to the highest colour and fixed redness (II.170.1). A useful comparison is B.'s Gold of the Breeze, which loses colour in sunlight and is therefore rejected as Hermetic philosophical gold (II.163.1). Stable colour matters, but the book does not state that any red substance surviving light is the stone. The sign operates within the larger account of subject, principles and operation.

Places to read

II.091.1 (source p. 91); II.135.1 (source p. 135). Enduring fixation and the reciprocal fixed-and-winged sequence.

II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147); II.159.2 (source pp. 159–160); II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161). Volatility, appropriate earth and coordinated reintegration.

II.163.1 (source p. 163); II.170.1 (source p. 170). Fading false gold and the positive endpoint of fixed redness.

Connections

Coagulation concerns the bodily change often joined with fixation. Mercury ordinary supplies the failed counterexample. Colours and White and red tinctures clarify why stable redness is a meaningful endpoint without being a complete assay. Earth philosophical explains the required support.

Translation in this edition

Figere and its inflected form figes are translated as "fix." "Fixed redness" follows fixe röthe rather than replacing it with "red colour." The adjective matters because the endpoint combines colour with an enduring condition. Conversely, the edition does not turn every hardening or congealing into fixation; the source can distinguish these operations.

Attested forms

fixationem perseverantem — enduring fixation; inflected Latin phrase. II.091.1 (source p. 91).

figes — you will fix; Latin verbal form. II.135.1 (source p. 135).

fixe röthe — fixed redness. II.170.1 (source p. 170).

Cautions

The account does not establish a modern test for the stone, a safe way to alter mercury or an identification of the resulting body. Neither simple rigidity nor stable colour alone exhausts the author's requirements. The entry records how fixation functions in the argument and preserves the limits of the disclosed practice.

See also

Coagulation; Mercury ordinary; Colours; White and red tinctures; Earth philosophical

Heat and fire

Feuer · wässerigen Feuer und feurigem Wasser · Wärme

Elemental principle, natural warmth and the restraint of practice

At a Glance

The word. Fire may mean the elemental Sulphur principle, natural warmth, philosophical fire or an external working condition.

In the Candida. The work requires fire, but violent uniform maximum heat is explicitly rejected as a route from raw matter to the stone.

In this edition. The English preserves these local distinctions instead of giving all occurrences one apparatus-based meaning.

A place to read. Read pp. 166–171, where open-fire language is interpreted and the necessity of gentle graduated operation is defended.

Meaning

Heat and fire cannot be treated as one unvarying instruction in this work. The elemental definition identifies Sulphur with fire (II.085.1). Accounts of mineral generation invoke warmth in ores or fire in mountains. Practical passages refer to philosophical fire, watery fire and fiery water, and to the governance of external fire. The author can relate these expressions without making them interchangeable. Determining which level a sentence concerns is part of reading it accurately.

The clearest general rule is that nature acts by degrees, not by leaps, gently rather than violently, and in time rather than before its time (II.167.1). This rule governs the polemic against a literal four-day operation under the strongest uniform heat. It is a claim about proportionate operation, not an instruction that heat is unnecessary.

The lexical problem is therefore practical as well as theoretical: a reader who treats every metaphor of burning as a demand for stronger external flame can reverse the author's advice.

Use in the book

The principle scheme at pp. 85–87 makes fire one aspect of the elemental whole. Sulphur is fire; soul or form is also interpreted as fire within Nuysement's spirit-soul-body account (II.087.1). The next argument traces fire back to water, supported by comparisons involving lightning and rain (II.085.2). This is the author's natural-theological reasoning. It should not be rewritten as a modern account of the physical identity of flame and liquid water.

The mineral chapters use warmth differently. Mercurial vapour is reported as cooked into thick water by fire within mountains in one cited

theory (II.110.2). At p. 117 metals harden after gradual coagulation through the continuous hidden warmth of ores, whereas precious stones congeal through cold after condensation and sublimation (II.117.1). These distinctions prevent the blanket inference that every mineral is simply produced by increasing external heat.

A personal episode gives practical weight to moderation. While working according to Artephius, the author says careless governance of fire broke one or more vessels (II.112.1). He names regimen of fire and weight as the two foremost practical concerns. The coloured flowers found afterward did not make him accept a proposed sequence of metallic transformations. The account thus combines a warning about operation with caution about interpreting its visible results.

The supplement to the second operation uses the language of bathing with watery fire and fiery water. The subject's purified earth is rejoined with its spirit and soul, made wax-flowing, and then cooked with philosophical fire once gummy (II.160.1). This complex expression belongs to a coordinated transformation of the subject. The lexical entry can explain its relation to the principles without pretending to identify an unmentioned fuel, furnace or solution.

The Helvetius discussion then distinguishes truth from literal interpretation. The reported claim that the entire work occurs in four days, in open fire and a crucible, has misled readers (II.166.2). The author does not call Helvetius and the artist liars. Instead, the four days designate principal colours; his own claim of three days refers to three principal colours (II.168.2). A figurative timetable cannot be translated into a maximum heating schedule.

At p. 169 the comparison with fruit and grapes develops the positive account. Nature keeps its season, but differing sunshine affects the speed of ripening. Likewise diligence and right or wrong governance of fire affect the completion of the work; careless practice may spoil it (II.169.1). This permits variability without licensing arbitrary haste. Time matters through conditions rather than as a guaranteed fixed number of days.

The conclusion is explicit: the command "burn our brass" is to be accomplished differently from the violence of fire, although the magistery cannot be completed without fire (II.171.1). Operation in open fire is restricted to the previously discussed manner of fermentation associated with Basilius's twelfth key. The author also juxtaposes women's work and a labour of Hercules. Both descriptions are said to be philosophically true,

showing again that simple surface opposites do not settle the practical meaning.[74]

Places to read

II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.085.2 (source pp. 85–86); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). Elemental fire, watery origin and the soul-form mapping.

II.110.2 (source pp. 110–111); II.112.1 (source p. 112); II.117.1 (source p. 117); II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161). Mineral warmth, broken vessels and watery or philosophical fire.

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167); II.167.1 (source p. 167); II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172). The rejection of violent haste and the qualified necessity of fire.

Connections

Regimen of fire addresses the practical management of conditions; Sulphur philosophical explains the elemental principle. Colours is indispensable for the figurative four-day claim. Labour and patience concerns the human discipline required, while Allegory and analogy explains why the literal wording of a process can mislead.

Translation in this edition

Warmth and heat are used where Wärme and related expressions describe a condition; fire follows Feuer or ignis. The translation does not collapse the compound "watery fire and fiery water" into either ordinary fire or ordinary water. "Open fire" is retained where the author discusses that phrase, together with his limitation of its application.

"Cook" and "burn" remain distinguishable. The latter occurs in a quoted imperative whose proper sense the author explicitly qualifies. Replacing both with a generic "heat" would erase the interpretive problem. Conversely, the elemental equation Sulphur = fire is left as a historical assertion rather than converted into a description of a furnace setting.

Attested forms

Feuer — fire. II.085.1 (source p. 85); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172).

wässerigen Feuer und feurigem Wasser — watery fire and fiery water; inflected phrase. II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161).

Wärme — warmth. II.117.1 (source p. 117); II.146.2 (source pp. 146–147).

[74] The open-fire qualification at II.171.1 refers back to the fermentation of Basilius's twelfth key discussed at II.145.2. This is a limitation to a particular operation, not an unrestricted rule that all prior work occurs in an open crucible.

Cautions

The lexicon explains the stated relations and restrictions; it supplies no practical temperatures or complete operation. The author's conditional and figurative phrases should not be turned into a recipe by borrowing details from unrelated alchemical works. His claim of fire's necessity and his rejection of violent heat are compatible, because necessity does not mean indiscriminate intensity.

See also

Regimen of fire; Sulphur philosophical; Colours; Labour and patience; Allegory and analogy; Fixation

Multiplication

multiplicandi in infinitum · multipliciren · multiplicari

Increase after perfection and its necessary conditions

At a Glance

The word. Multiplication names an increase of the work's power or efficacy, distinguished from merely producing more common metal.

In the Candida. The universal root is praised as inexhaustibly powerful, yet completed matter still needs appropriate mercurial water, and gold fermentation can end further multiplication.

In this edition. The English preserves the difference between the universal claim and the conditions of particular operations.

A place to read. Read p. 67 with p. 145 and p. 198, where the strongest claim is bounded by practical distinctions.

Meaning

Multiplication is a way the book distinguishes a universal generative principle from a completed particular product. It concerns the continuation or increase of philosophical power, not simply the accumulation of monetary wealth. The author can describe the root as possessing a power of multiplication without limit while also naming conditions without which a perfected magistery will not multiply. Those statements concern different levels: capacity, preparation and the subsequent state of the work.

The term must also be distinguished from human or plant propagation. The book compares processes across kingdoms, but it does not claim that they operate through an identical practical manipulation. A shared requirement of coordinated principles can support an analogy while the particular law of each kind remains intact.

Use in the book

At p. 67 the strength strongest of all strengths is linked to the power of multiplying in infinitum (II.067.1). The surrounding argument says the elements as such do not depend on a subordinate cause, and our Mercury may therefore be called supernatural with Basilius. The matter contains the powers of all nature. This is the author's explanation of universal capacity, founded in the elemental origin and God's Word, not an assertion that any particular product carries limitless power merely because it has been called Mercury.

The one-root account at pp. 88–91 provides the next condition. Mercury, Sulphur and Salt derive from one matter; the particular tinctures and stones flow from one seed and one matrix (II.089.1; II.091.2). The rule

that no profitable particular work exists unless it proceeds from the universal source distinguishes legitimate derivative power from disconnected recipes. Multiplication belongs to that connected account of origin.

At p. 145 the author explicitly limits one successful operation. A medicine first prepared in the best manner and then fermented with gold is said to tincture a thousand parts of common metals with one part, but afterwards the work cannot be multiplied (II.145.2). The claim of a large projection ratio is not the same as continued generative increase. Fermentation with gold gives one kind of useful outcome while changing the possibilities of the resulting work.

The distinction also prevents a misreading of ordinary gold. Finished gold has reached its terminus and cannot supply a still nobler tincture; it is called dead in contrast with living philosophical metals (II.143.1; II.148.2). The positive role of gold in the later fermentation therefore does not make common gold the universal starting source. Sequence is essential: the medicine precedes the gold fermentation.

At p. 198 the author makes the required cooperation especially clear. Neither ferment alone nor Azoth alone completes the magistery; both are necessary. Even when it is perfected, however, it cannot be multiplied without the addition of further mercurial water (II.198.1). Perfection here is not a state beyond every possible further operation. The paragraph describes a reversal in what flows in fire or coagulates in air, signalling an altered condition rather than a simple repetition of the original state.

This is introduced as an analogy to human propagation in the rejection of homunculus-making. Neither a man's nor a woman's soul can multiply alone; the author requires the union of both through their seed, under the divinely appointed blessing (II.197.2). The alchemical comparison concerns coordinated contributions and the passage from capacity to effect. It does not permit readers to transfer human seed into the philosophical recipe or to manufacture a human soul.

The praise of Paracelsus at p. 191 also has a restricted evidential role. The author says he found useful illumination concerning the second operation and especially multiplication in Theophrastus's writings (II.191.1). He does not identify a particular passage or disclose all of its practical content here. The statement supports the author's selective assessment of an authority whose homunculus claim he nonetheless rejects.

Places to read

II.067.1 (source p. 67); II.089.1 (source pp. 89–90); II.091.2 (source pp. 91–92). Universal capacity and the common source of derivative works.

II.143.1 (source p. 143); II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146); II.148.2 (source pp. 148–149). Completed gold, a large projection and the end of further multiplication.

II.191.1 (source pp. 191–192); II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198); II.198.1 (source p. 198). Selective praise of Theophrastus and the explicit conditions of multiplication.

Connections

Ferment and Azoth explains the necessary pair; Mercury philosophical explains why "more mercurial water" is not automatically more common quicksilver. Gold ordinary addresses the restricted fermentation. Anatisation concerns purification by removing superfluities. That process and subsequent multiplication should not be forced into one undifferentiated instruction to add or remove matter.

Homunculus and Soul propagation supply the human analogy's setting. The analogy preserves differences between kinds of life and is used to limit art's powers. It does not erase the author's distinction between preparing a tincture and creating living creatures.

Translation in this edition

Multiplicare and the German multipliciren are translated "multiply," with the context explaining whether power, work or propagation is at issue. "Without limit" follows in infinitum as the author's claim, rather than as a numerical promise endorsed by the edition. A stated tincturing ratio is retained as a historical assertion and not converted into a projected modern yield.

The additional mercurial water at p. 198 is translated as an addition. It should not be silently suppressed to reconcile it with "nothing is to be added" in the purification discussion. The stages and purposes differ, and translation should preserve the apparent tension for interpretation.[75]

Attested forms

multiplicandi in infinitum — of multiplying without limit. II.067.1 (source p. 67).

multipliciren — to multiply. II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146).

multiplicari — to be multiplied. II.198.1 (source p. 198).

[75] The purification maxim at II.165.2 and the additional mercurial water at II.198.1 concern different purposes. Retaining both passages is preferable to harmonizing them by deleting an addition or reading "remove superfluities" as an absolute ban on every subsequent operation.

Cautions

The book provides no verified unlimited-production method. Its positive claims are conditional on a suitable universal root, correct preparation and the state of the resulting work. The lexical task is to explain those conditions and the distinction between projection and continued increase, without supplying omitted proportions or an invented repetitive cycle.

See also

Ferment and Azoth; Mercury philosophical; Gold ordinary; Anatisation; Homunculus; Soul propagation; Paracelsus and Theophrastus

Putrefaction

putreficiren · putrefactionem · putrefaciendo

Corruption as preparation for a new form

At a Glance

The word. Putrefaction is a preparatory corruption through which matter can be opened and made ready for separation or regeneration.

In the Candida. Water depositing earth, philosophical cooking and the resurrection analogy give it connected but distinct roles.

In this edition. The translation retains putrefaction instead of reducing every occurrence to ordinary spoilage.

A place to read. Read p. 128 with pp. 222–223: the operation precedes removal of residues and supports the analogy of regeneration.

Meaning

Putrefaction belongs to the book's account of a new form arising through the corruption of an earlier condition. It is not merely the destruction of everything worth preserving. The author explicitly argues that substance can be freed from superfluities through corruption and brought into a more perfect form. That claim gives putrefaction a constructive place in a theory where essential substance is not simply annihilated.

The term nevertheless varies with its object. An apple losing its taste, smell and colour becomes waste in the argument of Part One, while properly treated water deposits a useful earth. Ordinary gold, by contrast, is said not to undergo the kind of putrefaction required for reduction and regeneration. A single dictionary gloss cannot replace those distinctions.

Its constructive use depends on ordered purification, rather than on the mere fact that some material has become foul or disintegrated.

Use in the book

The first demonstration occurs at pp. 7–8. Water allowed to putrefy properly is said always to deposit earth, and the author infers that earth originally arose from water (I.007.1). Nature preserves the order implanted at creation. The observation is thus made to support a claim about origins, not merely a claim that standing water changes appearance. Its inferential strength is the author's own, and should not be presented as a modern proof.

At p. 128 the same kind of operation answers an objection about remote and proximate matter. Rainwater, retained in its original universal condition, supplies the remote matter; when left to putrefy for its proper

time, it deposits slime and earth (II.128.1). Further procedure removes superfluities and follows the philosophical account already given (II.129.1). The sequence matters: obtaining a deposit is not itself completion of the stone, and not every deposited earth is thereby a suitable universal subject.

The account of ordinary gold supplies the negative case. Reducing gold into first matter and seed would require corruption and putrefaction, described in the philosophers' language as killing and annihilation (II.143.2). Yet gold has reached its terminus and is said to resist corruption and putrefaction. Since it lacks the relevant life, it cannot be killed in the required sense (II.144.1). The author mocks practitioners whose alleged annihilation merely removes gold from a patron's purse. The criticism preserves the difference between an authentic preparatory corruption and a false claim about the wrong subject.

Rosarius's advice at p. 170 joins putrefaction to gradual cooking. The reader's intention should remain on water, cooking it little by little through putrefaction until it moves from colour to perfect colour (II.170.1). The author connects the endpoint with fixed redness. Putrefaction therefore belongs to a governed transformation over time. It is not a warrant for indiscriminately abandoning material to decay or for forcing the strongest heat.

The reply letter gives the most explicit order of operations. Residues mingle with substance and distort its purity; the Art must separate them with great diligence after putrefaction, which should precede every operation, especially in this Art (II.222.2). The Latin describes the residue as threatening to choke the substance. The relation between pure substance and accidental impurity makes separation intelligible, while putrefaction prepares the intervention.

The next pages connect this to human resurrection. Bodies pass through death and putrefaction and rise free from stain and corruption (II.223.1). In art, the subject is regenerated through putrefaction and separation, freed of grossness and impurity and brought into a nobler spiritual form (II.223.2). The author calls the operation a type and living image. The comparison supports hope and interpretation; it does not claim that an alchemist causes the resurrection by performing a material process.[76]

The conclusion extends the pattern to the world's end. Substance persists through the passing away of accidents and is transformed into crystalline clarity and perfected spiritual being (II.229.1–II.231.1). Corruption is explicitly called the means by which substances, especially the elements, are

[76] The resurrection comparison at II.223.1 invokes 1 Corinthians 15. The edition's "natural body" renders corpus animale in that scriptural setting; it should not be misunderstood as an assertion that the resurrected human body was previously a non-human animal.

freed from wastes and superfluities. Putrefaction belongs to this larger logic of renewal through transformation rather than absolute disappearance.

Places to read

I.007.1 (source pp. 7–8); II.128.1 (source pp. 128–129); II.129.1 (source p. 129). Water depositing earth and the relation of remote to proximate matter.

II.143.2 (source pp. 143–144); II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145); II.170.1 (source p. 170). The ordinary-gold exception and gradual cooking through putrefaction.

II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223); II.223.1 (source p. 223); II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). Separation after putrefaction and the analogies of resurrection and cosmic renewal.

Connections

Separation explains the operation for which putrefaction prepares the subject. Residues identifies what is removed; Substance distinguishes what remains essentially pure. Gold ordinary gives the failed attempt to impose the process on a completed metal. Resurrection and World and its end explain the theological analogies without turning them into merely psychological symbolism.

Translation in this edition

Putrefy and putrefaction retain the historical technical vocabulary. The source also speaks of corruption, killing and annihilation and can treat them as equivalent in a particular philosophical context. The edition preserves those words rather than assuming that all imply absolute non-being. “Through putrefaction” in Rosarius’s advice describes the gradual process, not a separate modern chemical reagent.

The verb in the early water account is translated consistently with the later noun. The author’s requirement that it occur “properly” or for its appropriate time is retained, because it limits the inference that any accidental decay is the philosophical operation.

Attested forms

putreficiren — to putrefy. I.007.1 (source pp. 7–8); II.128.1 (source pp. 128–129).

putrefactionem — putrefaction; inflected Latin form. II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223).

putrefaciendo — through putrefying; Latin verbal form. II.170.1 (source p. 170).

Cautions

The claimed origins, cures and transformations are historical assertions. The entry supplies no timings, apparatus or handling instructions. It should also not be read as saying that every corrupting process improves its object: the author distinguishes useful preparation, spoiled medicine and inappropriate attempts on ordinary gold. Regeneration depends on the suitable subject and subsequent ordered separation.

See also

Separation; Residues; Substance; Gold ordinary; Resurrection; World and its end; Regimen of fire

Regimen of fire

Regimen Ignis · Regiment des Feuers · Regierung des Feuers

Governance of conditions and the work's variable time

At a Glance

The word. Regimen means the managed order of fire, rather than a single fixed intensity.

In the Candida. Alongside weight it is a foremost practical concern; right or wrong governance affects speed and can spoil the work.

In this edition. The English uses regimen, management or governance according to the sentence, preserving the shared concern with conduct.

A place to read. Read p. 112 for the broken vessels and p. 169 for the analogy with varying sunshine and ripening fruit.

Meaning

Regimen of fire is the practical counterpart of the book's insistence that nature works by degrees. It concerns the operator's conduct of conditions over time. The noun should not suggest a universally disclosed schedule: the author gives general principles and consequences while expressly withholding an extensive process. Its importance lies in the claim that handling matters, even when the subject and theory are otherwise right.

Use in the book

At p. 112 the author recalls working according to Artephius. Careless management of the fire caused one or more glass vessels to break (II.112.1). He interrupts the narrative to identify regimen of fire and weight as the two foremost points to observe in practice. The experience is not simply decorative autobiography. It explains why visible material and learned reading are insufficient without judgment in operation.[77]

The coloured flowers found on the remaining glass did not persuade him to accept a particular proposed sequence of metallic transformations. This qualification also matters for regimen. A striking outcome after a failed operation cannot automatically be promoted into proof that the theory used to interpret it is correct. The author separates what he saw from the stronger inference he declines to draw.

At pp. 166–168 he rejects a literal understanding of completing the whole work in four days in open fire and a crucible, especially from entirely

[77] II.112.1 is a reported personal episode, including the failure of glass vessels. The author makes a practical lesson from it but declines a stronger inference about a succession of common metals. That separation of observation and theory is part of the passage's evidence.

raw matter under a uniform maximum degree of heat (II.166.2; II.168.1). Nature acts gently and by degrees, not by violent leaps (II.167.1). Regimen therefore involves proportion and sequence rather than the operator's ability to force the strongest fire.

The positive explanation at p. 169 uses fruit and grapes. Nature has its season, yet more or less sunshine changes the speed of ripening. Likewise diligence or negligence, and right or wrong governance of fire, make the work finish earlier or later or become entirely spoiled (II.169.1). The comparison answers why no precise universal completion time can be stated. Variable time is not permission to disregard natural order; it reflects the conditions within that order.

Places to read

II.112.1 (source p. 112). The practical importance of fire and weight in an account of broken glass.

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167); II.167.1 (source p. 167); II.168.1 (source p. 168); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170). The criticism of a fixed short timetable and the positive ripening analogy.

Connections

Heat and fire supplies the different meanings of fire and the restriction against violence. Labour and patience explains the sustained care required of the practitioner. Colours clarifies why four days may signify principal colours, rather than four calendar days. Experience and conjecture is useful for the author's restraint in interpreting the fragments after his failed operation.

Translation in this edition

The Latin regimen and the German Regierung or Regiment belong to governance vocabulary. The edition does not force a single English noun into every occurrence; what remains constant is managed conduct. "Regimen of fire" is an organizing headword supported by the explicit Latin phrase, not the title of a complete recipe provided by this book.

Attested forms

Regimen Ignis — management or regimen of fire. II.112.1 (source p. 112).

Regiment des Feuers — governance of fire. II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170).

Regierung des Feuers — management of fire. II.112.1 (source p. 112).

Cautions

No exact furnace design, temperature progression or fixed duration is disclosed in the cited passages. The author's two principal concerns should not be turned into a modern checklist that guarantees success. Their purpose is to show where practical judgment matters and why mere haste, force or persistence under wrong conditions can fail.

See also

Heat and fire; Labour and patience; Colours; Experience and conjecture; Knowledge and practice

Separation

zweyerley Arten der Scheidung · distinctio · superflua removendo

Removing contraries and distinguishing related parts

At a Glance

The word. Separation has two expressly distinguished kinds: removal of unrelated contraries, and distinction of parts related in substance and powers.

In the Candida. The first removes an accidental shell; the second presents coordinated principles without severing their essential unity.

In this edition. The translation preserves separation, distinction, division and removal as related but not automatically identical.

A place to read. Read pp. 32–35, then pp. 165–166 and pp. 218–219 for the later restatement.

Meaning

Separation is the book's most important safeguard against reading purification as absolute disassembly. The author explicitly distinguishes two kinds. One cuts away contrary and superfluous things with no natural bond to the substance. The other distinguishes parts unequal in position and form but related in substance and powers (I.032.1–I.033.1). A statement that the principles are separated can therefore mean something different from a statement that residues are removed.

This distinction explains how the work can alter its subject without changing nature's essential order. Accidental contrariety may be removed; related principles can be differently presented while retaining their mutual implication. The reader should ask what is being separated, what relation it has to the subject, and whether the operation is removal or distinction.

Use in the book

Part One introduces the problem through the spirit that cannot be obtained in a bare simple spiritual form. God has clothed originally invisible water with a visible shell. The shell is substantial and accidental, and the two separations correspond to that difference (I.032.1). The accidental shell comprises contrary superfluities and elemental wastes. Its removal opens the work. The substantial vehicle, however, makes the threefold spirit visible and tangible; eliminating it absolutely would defeat the author's account of practical access.

The first kind is described through several expressions: opening and resolving, dividing and cutting away contrary things, separating the subtle from the gross, removing superfluities and excrementa (I.032.1). Their

common point is the lack of a natural bond between the removed material and the substance. "Gross" here must therefore be read through the relation in question, not as proof that every bodily condition is disposable.

The second kind is a distinctio of related parts, unequal in situ et figura, position and form (I.033.1). Creation supplies its model. God did not sever the elements absolutely, but left each within the others and distinguished them by higher and lower position (I.034.1). The golden chain image expresses this linked nature. The work imitates that order rather than breaking the essential bonds of the whole.[78]

At p. 35 the author makes the practical consequence explicit. Mercury, Sulphur and Salt can each be extracted and separately presented; yet Mercury is not without Sulphur and Salt, and the same holds reciprocally (I.035.1). The dry water is their shell and vehicle. Anyone boasting of absolute elemental separation deceives himself and others. This passage should accompany every apparently unqualified instruction to separate the principles elsewhere.

The discussion of prime matter also requires care. The accidental shell is removed after the subject's reduction to prime matter. The author warns that Hermetic and ordinary philosophers may reverse what they call first and second matter (I.033.1). He also maintains a genuine reduction for the appropriate subject while denying practical reduction of particulars to the universal principles. Separation alone does not erase these differences of subject and vocabulary.

At pp. 165–166 the principle becomes an argument about anatisation. Elements separated from water may appear disproportionate and contrary, but their opposition is accidental, concerning qualities rather than essence (II.165.2). Perfection occurs by removing superfluities: nothing is to be added or diminished except what is superfluous. The perfected magistery cannot then be returned to its former rawness, any more than flour becomes grain again (II.166.1). Purification is transformative without being an essential reversal of natural order.

The reply letter restates the account in Latin. Lower bodies consist of essential substance and accidental residues (II.218.2). Although every substance has three principles and they can be separated, they cannot be divided essentially; each is found in its companion (II.219.1). Substance admits no contrariety, and our Mercury receives only what is homogeneous with its essence (II.219.2). The author uses these propositions to explain why art can render the subject pure.

[78] The source's in situ & figurâ at I.033.1 specifies position and form as the respects in which related parts differ. It does not say those parts are unrelated in substance; the following clause explicitly says the opposite.

Putrefaction precedes the laborious removal of residues, and the resulting regeneration supplies an image of bodily resurrection (II.222.2–II.223.2). Separation consequently has practical, ontological and theological force. The analogy does not reduce the operation to a moral allegory, but neither does it turn bodily resurrection into an alchemical procedure.

Places to read

I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34); I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). The two separations, the twofold shell and the essential unity of the principles.

II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166); II.166.1 (source p. 166). Accidental opposition, removal of superfluities and irreversible perfection.

II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.219.1 (source p. 219); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220); II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223); II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224). The Latin restatement and the relation of putrefaction to regeneration.

Connections

Substance and Accident are the conceptual partners of this distinction. Residues explains the removable material. Body soul and spirit and the three principle entries explain why separate presentation need not imply independent existence. Anatisation must remain a provisional contextual rendering; the clear removal-of-superfluities explanation should not be used to invent an exact unprovided balancing procedure.

Translation in this edition

Scheidung is translated “separation,” distinctio as “distinction,” and essentialiter dividi as “be divided essentially.” Preserving those differences helps prevent a familiar English word from carrying more force than the author permits. Excrementa means residues or wastes in this account, not exclusively bodily excretion. Superflua removendo is the concise expression for removal of superfluities.

The edition retains the source’s opening and resolving language while allowing its context to define the result. It does not systematically translate every resolutio as a return to universal first matter, which would contradict the explicit restriction on particulars.

Attested forms

zweyerley Arten der Scheidung — two kinds of separation. I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33).

distinctio — distinction. I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34).

superflua removendo — by removing superfluities. II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166).

essentialiter dividi nequeunt — they cannot be essentially divided. II.219.1 (source p. 219).

Cautions

The text describes principles and relations more fully than manipulations. The lexicon should not manufacture a modern separation scheme, assign chemical species to every component or claim complete disclosure of the process. Above all, “purification” cannot be reduced to removing the body as such: the author distinguishes an accidental coat from a necessary substantial vehicle.

See also

Substance; Accident; Residues; Body soul and spirit; Anatisation; Putrefaction; Golden chain

Sublimation

sublimation · auffsteigt · condensation

Upward movement before the cold formation of stones

At a Glance

The word. Sublimation appears within the sequence leading from mercurial moisture to precious stones.

In the Candida. Uncoloured matter is said to rise more easily than coloured matter, because fatness or Sulphur does not ascend without force.

In this edition. The translation keeps sublimation as a historical operation and distinguishes it from the later cold congelation.

A place to read. Read p. 117, then p. 155 for the qualification concerning colourless diamond and Sulphur.

Meaning

Sublimation has a focused local role. The author does not provide an independent general manual of the operation. He names it as a preceding condition of precious-stone formation from mercurial moisture, together with condensation and followed by congelation through cold (II.117.1). Its meaning should be read through that sequence rather than supplied by a modern phase-change definition alone.

Use in the book

The chapter begins by describing precious stones as noble works of God and by explaining that their generation further illustrates the subject's operation. At p. 117 the author contrasts their formation with metallic hardening. Metals harden after gradual coagulation under continued warmth; stones congeal through cold after the earlier condensation and sublimation of mercurial moisture.[79]

The parenthetical qualification concerns colour. Sublimation occurs more readily in uncoloured than coloured matter, because no fatness or sulphur rises without force (II.117.1). The statement gives the adjective uncoloured an operative consequence. It does not establish that all uncoloured matter is pure universal subject or that every coloured material must be treated violently throughout the work.

The later diamond argument is a useful corrective. A reported opinion says diamond comes from nature's vapour without Sulphur. The author

[79] At II.117.1 the words "without force" belong to the rising of fatness or sulphur. They should not be read as a general endorsement of violent operation, which II.167.1 and II.171.1 explicitly qualify or reject.

replies that it can no more exist without sulphur than without salt, and notes white and red Sulphur in his philosophy (II.155.1). Thus difficulty in raising sulphurous coloured matter should not be converted into the claim that a colourless stone essentially lacks the fire principle.

The general account of gradual operation also remains applicable. Nature acts by degrees and not violent leaps (II.167.1). The local phrase "without force" describes the difficulty of raising a particular component; it does not reverse the criticism of uniformly maximal fire as the entire route from raw matter to perfection.

Places to read

II.117.1 (source p. 117). The sequence of condensation, sublimation and cold congelation, with the colour qualification.

II.155.1 (source p. 155); II.167.1 (source p. 167). The diamond rebuttal and the larger rule of graduated operation.

Connections

Congelation supplies the final operation in the local sequence. Colours concerns the meaning of coloured and uncoloured conditions. Sulphur philosophical explains why colourlessness does not imply essential absence. Heat and fire distinguishes this local difficulty from an indiscriminate instruction to use the strongest heat.

Translation in this edition

Sublimation is retained as the source's term. Auffsteigt is translated rises or ascends; it supplies the explicit spatial description in the qualification. Condensation remains distinct rather than being merged with sublimation. The edition does not claim that the historical word maps exactly onto one modern process in every occurrence.

Attested forms

sublimation — sublimation. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

auffsteigt — rises or ascends. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

condensation — condensation. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

Cautions

No temperature, vessel or complete stone-making method is disclosed. The source's statement is a historical account of mineral formation, not modern verification. Its limited textual footprint supports a focused entry connecting sequence, colour and principle, rather than an imported universal history of sublimation.

See also

Congelation; Colours; Sulphur philosophical; Heat and fire

Time and maturation

per gradus, und nicht per saltus · Zeit und Gedult · Zeitigung

Natural degrees, variable ripening and figurative days

At a Glance

The word. Time is a condition of natural and philosophical maturation, not a guaranteed fixed timetable.

In the Candida. The author contrasts gradual ripening with violent haste and interprets the four-day report through principal colours.

In this edition. The English preserves literal duration where reported and figurative duration where the author expressly explains it.

A place to read. Read pp. 166–170 with pp. 133–135 and p. 243.

Meaning

Time and maturation addresses the relation between natural order and the claimed acceleration of art. The author says gold matures very slowly in the earth and that the philosophers seek to advance this through art (II.133.2). Yet he also insists that nature works by degrees and does not bring things forth before their time (II.167.1). The two claims are not simply contradictory: art may promote suitable maturation without forcing arbitrary leaps or ignoring the condition of the matter.

Use in the book

At pp. 133–134 metallic generation supplies the motive. Metals differ in perfection and imperfection; philosophers bring gold-essence to the highest maturity and tincture imperfect metals, accomplishing rapidly what nature would not effect in many centuries (II.133.2–II.134.1). The author calls this natural gold-making. The claimed acceleration is conditional on the right essence and philosophical work, not a promise that every raw substance can be perfected at once.[80]

The four-day report tests that distinction. Helvetius's artist is said to have placed the entire work in four days, open fire and a crucible (II.166.2). The author objects that entirely raw matter cannot reasonably reach supreme perfection in that interval under uniform maximum heat (II.168.1). Nature in all three kingdoms operates gently, by degrees and not leaps (II.167.1).

He nevertheless says the report can be true in philosophical speech. Four days signify four principal colours, and his own three-day boast signifies

[80] II.168.2 explains one four-day saying through colours but does not redefine every numerical duration. In particular, the reported twenty-year exposure of mine waste at II.124.2 and the historical dating of events should not be silently converted into colour stages.

three principal colours (II.168.2). The correction does not disclose the number of calendar days. The text does not justify applying this substitution to every duration elsewhere in the book.

At p. 169 the seasonal comparison explains variability. One cannot reap in spring or gather grapes in summer, yet more or less sunshine changes when fruits mature. So diligence, negligence and right or wrong governance of fire affect how soon the work finishes and may spoil it (II.169.1). A fixed universal completion time cannot be stated independently of conditions.

At p. 170 the practical advice is to cook water little by little through putrefaction, passing from colour to perfect colour. Time and patience are expressly required (II.170.1–II.170.2). The author also interprets hindrances providentially and says he encountered the greatest obstruction where he expected security. Patient attendance therefore concerns circumstances as well as the matter's changes.

The final rainwater remark gives a different concrete scale. Its wet-way process is somewhat lengthy at first, but other workers have spent much longer in vain on unsuitable materials (II.243.1). Length alone is neither proof of failure nor a guarantee of eventual success. Correct subject and ordered practice make the difference.

Places to read

II.133.2 (source pp. 133–134); II.134.1 (source p. 134). Slow metallic maturity and the claimed acceleration of art.

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167); II.167.1 (source p. 167); II.168.1 (source p. 168); II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170). Raw matter, degrees, figurative days and variable seasonal conditions.

II.170.1 (source p. 170); II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171); II.243.1 (source p. 243). Gradual cooking, patience, obstruction and the initially lengthy rainwater way.

Connections

Regimen of fire explains one cause of variable completion time. Labour and patience concerns the required discipline. Colours explains the particular figurative timetable, while Wet and dry ways supplies the final wet-way context. Anatisation concerns the transformation called highest maturity without pretending its exact manipulation is fully known.

Translation in this edition

Zeitigung is rendered maturation or maturity according to the sentence. "By degrees, not by leaps" preserves the explicit contrast. The edition keeps the literal numbers in reports and follows the author's colour explanation where he supplies one. It does not convert every year, day or hour into a universal symbolic unit.

Attested forms

per gradus, und nicht per saltus — by degrees and not by leaps. II.167.1 (source p. 167).

Zeit und Gedult — time and patience. II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171).

Zeitigung — maturation. II.134.1 (source p. 134).

vier Tagen — four days; inflected German phrase. II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167).

Cautions

The quoted centuries and hour are historical claims of efficacy, not measured outcomes reproduced by the edition. No timetable or guarantee can be extracted from them. The book's own warnings make duration conditional: haste can fail, patient work on a wrong material can remain vain, and a right work can be delayed by its conditions.

See also

Regimen of fire; Labour and patience; Colours; Wet and dry ways; Anatisation

Vessels and furnaces

Gläser · Ofen · Tiegel

Real apparatus, narrated failures and figurative crucibles

At a Glance

The word. Vessels, furnaces and crucibles belong to real chymical narratives, but their mention does not always constitute a literal complete procedure.

In the Candida. Broken glass illustrates poor fire management, Bier's furnace belongs to testimony, and the crucible appears in a claim the author interprets.

In this edition. The English preserves the apparatus and the evidential status of each occurrence.

A place to read. Read p. 112, pp. 117–118, pp. 166–171 and p. 229 together.

Meaning

Apparatus is a useful check on both excessive literalism and excessive allegorizing. The book describes glass vessels breaking under careless fire management and a water thickening in a furnace. Those are presented as material events. Yet a reported crucible operation is subjected to philosophical interpretation, and the cosmos is expressly denied to be a single mass melted as in a crucible. The same familiar equipment can occur as apparatus, report or comparison.

Use in the book

At p. 112 the author says that one or more glass vessels broke while he followed Artephius, owing to careless management of fire (II.112.1). The fragments showed black, whitish, yellow and other flowers. He emphasizes regimen and weight, while refusing to infer from the colours a proposed succession of metallic transformations. Actual apparatus does not make every interpretation of an outcome secure.[81]

The Bier narrative has a different source. A princely court physician tells the author that Bier placed a special water in his furnace, observed it considerably thickened after a time, and found a solid transparent greenish mass when it cooled (II.117.2). Pieces were later cut and assessed by a

[81] The furnace episode at II.117.2 is explicitly introduced as what a court physician told the author. The glass-breakage episode at II.112.1 is introduced as his own past work. Preserving that distinction prevents all apparatus narratives from being presented as equally direct observations.

jeweller (II.118.1). The furnace is a concrete part of this reported episode, but neither its design nor the water's secure identity is fully disclosed.

At p. 166 Helvetius's artist is reported as saying the whole work occurs in four days in open fire and a crucible (II.166.2). The author rejects the literal timetable and the proposed uniform maximum heat. Days signify principal colours, and the open-fire claim is limited to a particular fermentation (II.168.2; II.171.1). Retaining the crucible in translation is necessary because its proposed literal significance is precisely what the discussion tests.

In the cosmic conclusion, the author explicitly says the world will not all be melted together as one melts material in a crucible (II.229.1). He instead distinguishes the resolution of particular natures and transformation of universal substance. The apparatus supplies a familiar comparison whose misleading extension he corrects.

Places to read

II.112.1 (source p. 112). Broken glass and restraint in interpreting the visible fragments.

II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118); II.118.1 (source pp. 118–119). The reported furnace operation and later assessment of the mass.

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167); II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). The interpreted crucible claim and the rejected cosmic melting comparison.

Connections

Regimen of fire explains the practical lesson from broken glass. Bier gives the account's testimonial setting. Allegory and analogy clarifies why equipment language is not always a direct instruction. World and its end explains the negative crucible comparison in the conclusion.

Translation in this edition

Gläser is rendered glass vessels in the working context, rather than drinking glasses. Ofen becomes furnace; Tiegel and Tigel both become crucible. The variant spellings do not identify different kinds of equipment. The edition does not add a specific furnace model, vessel shape or material where the source has not supplied one.

Attested forms

Gläser — glass vessels. II.112.1 (source p. 112).

Ofen — furnace. II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118).

Tiegel — crucible. II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167).

Tigel — crucible; variant spelling. II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230).

Cautions

No complete apparatus plan or reliable reconstruction of the operation follows from these occurrences. The claim of a physical vessel should not be dissolved into a purely inward symbol, but its mere presence does not turn a narrative or philosophical comparison into a reproducible recipe.

See also

Regimen of fire; Bier; Allegory and analogy; World and its end; Experience and conjecture

Weight and measure

Gewicht · schwere · schwerer

Practical proportion, heaviness and the limits of disclosed quantity

At a Glance

The word. Weight is both a practical concern and a disputed property in the argument about water, earth and gold.

In the Candida. It ranks with regimen of fire as a foremost point of practice, while heaviness is attributed to water in the author's causal account.

In this edition. The English distinguishes practical weight from a claim about heaviness, and does not invent unprovided proportions.

A place to read. Read p. 112, pp. 127 and 142, and p. 160.

Meaning

Weight and measure is an organizing headword for two connected but distinguishable questions. One is the practitioner's need to observe appropriate weight or proportion. The other is the explanation of heaviness and its relation to water and earth. The book names the first as essential without disclosing a general quantitative schedule. It develops the second through argument and claimed observation rather than numerical measurement.

Use in the book

At p. 112 the author calls fire regimen and weight the two foremost points to observe in practice (II.112.1). The remark appears within the account of glass vessels breaking through careless management. It establishes that practical success depends on more than knowing a material name or copying a verbal process. It does not state the specific weights needed for each operation.[82]

At p. 127 an opponent appeals to the rule that a cause must be nobler than its effect. If gold is supremely noble, he argues, it cannot arise from water; its weight suggests an earthly origin (II.127.1). The author later says this preference is contradictory: water is a nobler body than earth, and heaviness itself comes from water (II.142.1). A calcined earth thrown onto water is said not to sink until it has drawn water into itself.

[82] II.142.1 describes a qualitative sinking observation, not a controlled measurement of equal volumes or a stated density. The entry therefore preserves the author's inference while avoiding a modern quantitative claim stronger than his account.

This observation supports the author's causal ranking, but he immediately adds another distinction. Water must be considered not merely in diffusion and excessive humidity but in its coagulated and fixed essence, while earth is itself coagulated water (II.142.2). The argument about weight is therefore part of a theory of water's inward condition, not simply a comparison of ordinary vessels filled with familiar liquids and soils.

At p. 160 the author says that one who has reached the described operation by God's grace knows for certain that water is heavier than earth (II.160.1). This follows the reintegration of the subject's own purified earth with spirit and living gold. The context limits the reader's inference: the claim is attached to philosophical operation and its objects, even while it participates in a broader account of natural heaviness.

The text gives some quantities in reported medicinal or tincturing claims elsewhere, but those figures do not constitute an all-purpose rule of measurement. A projected effect, a medicinal unit and the proportion appropriate to an operation are different kinds of number. The lexicon should not assemble them into a missing process.

Places to read

II.112.1 (source p. 112). Weight and regimen as the two principal practical concerns.

II.127.1 (source p. 127); II.142.1 (source p. 142); II.142.2 (source pp. 142–143). The opponent's inference from gold's weight and the author's water-based reply.

II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161). The claim following the coordinated second operation.

Connections

Regimen of fire is the practical partner. Nobility and perfection explains the opponent's causal rule, while Coagulation supplies the fixed-water distinction. Knowledge and practice concerns why named principles still require practical judgment. Earth philosophical keeps the subject's earth distinct from common ground.

Translation in this edition

Gewicht is translated weight. Schwere can be heaviness or weight, but its occurrence concerns a property rather than necessarily a prescribed amount. The English does not silently add "specific gravity," which would impose a more precise modern measurement than the author reports. "Heavier" retains his claim without editorial endorsement.

Attested forms

Gewicht — weight. II.112.1 (source p. 112).

schwere — heaviness or weight. II.142.1 (source p. 142).

schwerer — heavier. II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161).

Cautions

The argument does not establish a modern general density law or supply exact mass ratios. Its observations and conclusions are historical claims. The absence of disclosed proportions should remain a limit of the text, rather than an invitation to infer quantities from unrelated projections or recipes.

See also

Regimen of fire; Nobility and perfection; Coagulation; Knowledge and practice; Earth philosophical

Wet and dry ways

viâ humidâ · viâ siccâ · via humida

Two modes whose distinction shapes the book's chapter order

At a Glance

The word. Wet and dry ways are named modes of philosophical operation, not automatically different universal subjects.

In the Candida. The author links the wet way to his principle discussion and rainwater, and the dry way to the preceding accounts of metals and stones.

In this edition. The English retains both names without inventing complete apparatus-based processes.

A place to read. Read p. 121, then pp. 236 and 243, where the structural distinction and the rainwater qualification are restated.

Meaning

The distinction has an explicit structural function. At the beginning of chapter six the author explains why the chapters on metals and precious stones were placed before it. His account of the three philosophical principles had already said something about the wet way. He then wished to add remarks on the subject's dry-way operation through descriptions of mineral generation (II.121.1). The chapter order is thus part of the teaching method, not merely an accidental sequence of topics.

Use in the book

The wet-way reference points backward to the account of Mercury, Sulphur and Salt, their single root and ordered extraction. The author warns that reversing or confusing the order spoils the matter and wastes time (II.089.1). He then declines a detailed second-operation process because other writers offer sufficient information and that full practical description is not his purpose (II.090.1). Naming the wet way therefore does not mean the earlier chapter has disclosed every manipulation.[83]

The dry-way reference concerns chapters four and five, on metallic and precious-stone generation. These descriptions are also intended to illuminate the operation of the universal subject. Metals are associated with gradual coagulation under warmth, while stones congeal through cold after condensation and sublimation (II.117.1). It would be too simple to define

[83] II.121.1 says the mineral chapters might otherwise have followed chapter six in their natural order. The author deliberately places them earlier to supply dry-way explanations. That statement supports the entry's account of structure without implying that the printed chapter order should be rearranged.

dry way as “always strong heat,” since the author includes this differentiated mineral account within its explanatory setting.

At p. 108 the author has already said there are several ways to prepare the philosophical magistery, and that differing processes help explain disagreements among philosophers (II.108.1). The two named ways fit within that admitted plurality, but do not permit arbitrary starting subjects. The one-root requirement and rejection of unsuitable particulars continue to constrain practice.

The conclusion claims that the difference between operation in via sicca and in via humida has been sufficiently indicated (II.236.1). That is the author’s assessment of his disclosure, not proof that a modern reader possesses complete procedures. He also warns that knowing the name gold does not help unless one knows what kind is required. The mode of operation cannot rescue a mistaken subject.

At p. 243 he says that the wet way is best applied to rainwater and that its process is somewhat lengthy at first (II.243.1). He compares this with much longer vain labour on other materials. The qualification “best applied” is a local suitability claim. It does not say that all water is suitable or that rainwater and the precise Hermetic subject are identical.

Places to read

II.089.1 (source pp. 89–90); II.090.1 (source p. 90); II.121.1 (source pp. 121–122). The prior principles account, withheld detailed procedure and explicit chapter-order explanation.

II.108.1 (source p. 108); II.117.1 (source p. 117). Several ways and the varied mineral operations illuminating the dry way.

II.236.1 (source p. 236); II.243.1 (source p. 243). The concluding disclosure claim and the suitability of the wet way for rainwater.

Connections

Magistery explains the plurality of correct ways. Generation of metals and Generation of precious stones supply the dry-way descriptions. Rainwater concerns the final wet-way qualification. Secrecy and publication explains why a structural distinction can be clearly stated while detailed manipulations remain absent.

Translation in this edition

Via is rendered way, keeping the source’s own names. The forms viâ humidâ and viâ siccâ are grammatical variants of via humida and via sicca. The edition does not replace them with a modern wet-chemistry and dry-chemistry classification, which would suggest criteria and protocols not given here.

Attested forms

viâ humidâ — by the wet way; inflected Latin phrase. II.121.1 (source pp. 121–122).

viâ siccâ — by the dry way; inflected Latin phrase. II.121.1 (source pp. 121–122).

via humida — wet way. II.243.1 (source p. 243).

via sicca — dry way. II.236.1 (source p. 236).

Cautions

The book does not provide two complete recipes that can be reconstructed merely by sorting every watery or heated passage into a column. Wet and dry are names within its historical philosophy. The useful distinction is supported by the author's own chapter explanation and concluding remarks, and its limits should remain explicit.

See also

Magistery; Generation of metals; Generation of precious stones; Rainwater; Secrecy and publication

Earth metals and stones

Diamonds and rock crystal

Böhmische Diamanten · Chrystallen · Diamant

Colourless stones and the limits of a sulphur-free reading

At a Glance

The word. The book distinguishes inferior "Bohemian diamonds," crystals, and the diamond discussed as a colourless mineral body.

In the Candida. Colourless appearance supports an argument about absent external colouring assistance, later qualified by the necessity of sulphur and salt.

In this edition. Historical stone names remain historical identifications; the entry does not certify samples.

A place to read. Read pp. 115–120 together with p. 155; either passage alone can mislead.

Meaning

Diamonds and crystals serve two connected purposes. They are examples of comparatively inferior stones that the philosophical elixir is said to improve, and they illustrate how mercurial moisture may remain without a specified colour. The local question is not a general survey of diamond properties. It concerns the relation between common mineral matter, external assistance, colour, and perfection.

At II.115.2 Bohemian diamonds are listed with crystals and garnets among stones said to become more perfect, Oriental precious stones through red and white elixirs. The historical trade-name must be preserved rather than silently modernized to genuine diamond. A later Smithsonian gem catalogue uses "Bohemian diamond" for rock crystal, offering a useful terminological comparison without identifying the actual specimens the Candida imagined.[84]

At II.119.2 the narrator says that crystal and diamond retain water's colour because they lack suitable assistance and a particular external sulphur. Water is said to contain all colours, yet actual acquisition of a distinct form and colour requires conditions through which a potential becomes specified.

[84] George P. Merrill, Handbook and Descriptive Catalogue of the Collections of Gems and Precious Stones in the United States National Museum (1922), Smithsonian Bulletin 118, uses the trade-name for quartz rock crystal: https://repository.si.edu/items/289deca0-e4d8-4e8a-a9fb-b2eae543f28d. This later terminology is a comparison, not an analysis of the Candida's materials.

Colourlessness therefore illustrates a lack of this external determination. It does not imply absence of every principle named Sulphur.

Use in the book

The later discussion at II.155.1 makes that distinction explicit. Philosophers may say diamond is generated from the vapour of nature without sulphur, but the narrator refuses an absolute reading. Diamond can no more exist without sulphur than without salt; Nuysement is invoked for salt's contribution to hardness. White and red sulphur also belong to the philosophical vocabulary. An uncoloured body can thus contain sulphur in the author's sense without displaying the colour associated with a particular external sulphur.

The entry is a useful example of how a negative claim changes with its qualifier. "Without an external particular sulphur" and "without sulphur" are materially different statements. The first concerns a forming or colouring addition; the second would remove an essential principle. The narrator accepts the former description of the colourless cases and corrects the latter when it is understood absolutely.

The distinction also connects gemstones with the larger assertion that no element or principle exists entirely without the others. Common matter contains the relevant principles even when a particular operation makes one manifest or predominant. Colour can indicate a process or specification, but it cannot simply be used as a visual inventory of all principles present.

No physical specimen of the chapter is available for modern testing within the edition. The references to diamond, crystal, topaz, and emerald consequently remain statements within a historical account of mineral formation. Their value for reading lies in the argumentative contrast between coloured and uncoloured bodies and in the author's correction of an overly literal principle claim.

Places to read

II.115.2 (source pp. 115–116). Bohemian diamonds and crystals among stones allegedly improved by elixir.

II.119.2 (source pp. 119–120). The colourless cases and the absence of an external particular sulphur.

II.155.1 (source p. 155). The explicit refusal of an absolutely sulphur-free diamond.

Connections

Generation of precious stones explains the formation theory; Sulphur philosophical and Salt philosophical explain why colour and hardness do not map directly onto modern chemical ingredients.

Nobility and perfection supplies the ranking behind the claim that an inferior stone can become a better one. The ranking is not simply a list of today's mineral species arranged by price.

Translation in this edition

Chrystall may be "crystal" or "rock crystal" where the stone is intended. The original forms are retained in the term list so readers can distinguish the passage from the author's eschatological "crystalline clarity."

Absque Sulphure is "without sulphur," but it is the philosophers' reported formulation that the narrator qualifies. It should not be printed as his final unqualified conclusion.

Attested forms

Böhmische Diamanten — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.115.2 (source pp. 115–116).

Chrystallen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.115.2 (source pp. 115–116).

Diamant — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.119.2 (source pp. 119–120).

absque Sulphure — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.155.1 (source p. 155).

Cautions

The headword does not imply that every historical use of diamond denotes the same material.

The later correction at p. 155 must accompany the earlier account of external sulphur.

See also

Generation of precious stones; Gemstone testing; Sulphur philosophical; Salt philosophical; Nobility and perfection

Earth philosophical

eine Erde / so über unsern Häuptern geschwebt · eine Philosophische · seine eigene Erde

The subject's own purified body, rather than common ground

At a Glance

The word. Philosophical earth is the appropriate bodily principle required to coagulate and fix the spirit.

In the Candida. It must belong to the right matter, have a heavenly association, and be freed from every superfluity.

In this edition. "Earth" may denote a prepared principle or body rather than ordinary soil.

A place to read. Read pp. 128–129 and pp. 159–160 together to see both its derivation and its role.

Meaning

Earth is not a single unqualified material throughout the Candida. It can be the terrestrial ground, an element originating from water, a deposit obtained from rainwater, or the purified bodily principle of the philosophical work. The adjective philosophical directs attention to the last of these roles. It tells the reader not to substitute any soil that looks earthy for the body appropriate to the subject.

At II.085.1 Salt is water and at the same time earth and the body of all the others. That statement provides the principial background. An earth can name the bodily aspect of a matter whose other principles are Mercury and Sulphur, or air and fire. Its relation to water is therefore not an accidental contradiction. The book's own definitions join earth and water under Salt, while distinguishing bodily and more spiritual functions.

The practical qualification is stricter still. The spirit cannot be coagulated or fixed without earth, but the needed earth is not the ground underfoot. It is an earth said to have hovered above our heads, and it must be completely freed from superfluities and stain. Both origin and condition matter. A correct general category without the right preparation does not meet the requirement.

Use in the book

The rainwater argument on pp. 128–129 distinguishes remote and proximate matter. Rainwater gives access to remote matter; when allowed its proper putrefaction, it deposits slime and earth. The reader must then proceed philosophically, removing superfluities, in accordance with the earlier account. The earth is characterized as having hovered above our heads. The passage therefore links an earthy deposit with its aerial history

and its further purification, rather than identifying unprocessed sediment as the completed agent.

Chapter Seven invokes the heavenly earth to exclude other waters. Gold obtained from waters that have received no particular blessing and command can be called living in the stated sense; ordinary waters found on or within the ground cannot yield the same earth with that aerial history. The argument is internal to the author's classification of waters. It should not become a claim that any substance collected from a high place automatically qualifies.

At II.159.2 the author cites Lull and the Opened Philosophical Father's Heart for the distinction between common ground and philosophical earth. The appeal does not replace the need for purity. The very next requirement is liberation from every superfluity. This prevents a merely nominal solution in which calling a material philosophical would suffice.

The next paragraph describes the subject's own earth as water that does not wet the hands. It is imbibed and fermented again with the spirit and its soul, living gold, then made to flow like wax and treated with the paired language of watery fire and fiery water. Power increases through reunion and maturation. The repeated "own" is important: the body is to receive what belongs with it, not a heterogeneous addition chosen solely because it has a promising name.[85]

In the final chapter the narrator speaks of the true foliated earth in the renewed world. That cosmic application is related to the purified-body vocabulary but should remain distinct from the operational earth of Chapter Seven. The same family of terms can describe a present stage of the work and an anticipated perfected creation without making them one material sample.

Places to read

II.085.1 (source p. 85). Salt as water, earth, and body within the book's explicit principles.

II.128.1 (source pp. 128–129); II.129.1 (source p. 129). Rainwater, deposit, removal of superfluities, and the earth's aerial history.

II.159.1 (source p. 159); II.159.2 (source pp. 159–160); II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161). The exclusion of common waters and the earth's role in the second operation.

II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). The later cosmic application of true foliated earth.

[85] II.160.1 couples the earth with spirit and soul, identified as living gold. The passage cannot be reduced to adding ordinary metallic gold to ordinary soil; the book elsewhere distinguishes living from common gold and warns against substituting the latter.

Connections

Body soul and spirit, Salt philosophical, and Fixation explain the earth's bodily and stabilizing functions. Rainwater explains the account of its remote origin; Foliated earth treats the distinct expression used at the world's final perfection.

The same-material requirement connects Earth philosophical with Homogeneity. Purification and reunion are more central than the visual resemblance of an ingredient to ordinary earth.

Translation in this edition

"Earth" preserves Erde while contextual explanation prevents automatic identification with soil. "Its own earth" retains the possessive force that ties the body to its appropriate spirit and soul.

"Water that does not wet the hands" is a received descriptive expression in the operation. It does not provide enough information to identify a modern substance or to reconstruct its preparation.

Attested forms

eine Erde / so über unsern Häuptern geschwebt — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.129.1 (source p. 129).

eine Philosophische — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.159.2 (source pp. 159–160).

seine eigene Erde — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.160.1 (source pp. 160–161).

Cautions

The rainwater deposit is a stage within a longer account, not a recipe completed by standing rainwater in a vessel.

Do not merge the separate references to ordinary earth, philosophical earth, and the future true foliated earth.

See also

Salt philosophical; Body soul and spirit; Rainwater; Fixation; Homogeneity; Foliated earth

Foliated earth

terra foliata · Chrystallinische Klarheit

A qualified name for the transformed world

At a Glance

The word. Foliated earth translates terra foliata, applied to the new heaven and earth at the close of the cosmic argument.

In the Candida. The phrase is introduced with "so to speak" and concerns enduring substance transformed into perfected spiritual clarity.

In this edition. The English retains foliated earth rather than treating it as ordinary soil or silently identifying a laboratory product.

A place to read. Read pp. 229–231, where the difference between disappearing accidents and enduring substance is made explicit.

Meaning

Foliated earth is a precise but qualified image in the book's final account of the world. The author says that what is now invisible will become visible, that there will be a new heaven and earth, and, so to speak, the true terra foliata (II.231.1). The qualifying phrase matters. He is applying philosophical vocabulary to cosmic renewal, not abruptly inserting an independently disclosed mineral recipe.

Use in the book

The argument begins by asking whether the world will perish only in accidental features or also in substance and being (II.227.1). The author answers through the pattern of the philosophical operation. Accidents pass away; excrementitious earth is corrupted and burned; present moving heavens end (II.228.1). Their substance, however, is transformed into crystalline clarity and the most perfect spiritual being (II.229.1).[86]

He expressly denies that everything is simply melted into one mass as material in a crucible. Particular natures are resolved into universal principles; universal natures are transformed rather than annihilated. The new condition is not merely the old world's superficial arrangement surviving unchanged. It is a more perfect state of what endures substantially.

The reason given is theological. Universal natures originate through God's universal substantial Word, which is eternal and imperishable. Particular decrees and natures can cease in the described manner, while

[86] The German qualifier also zu reden oder zu schreiben, "so to speak or write," precedes terra foliata at II.231.1. It signals analogical application and is not an assertion of a literal botanical structure.

universal natures do not perish in their being (II.230.1). Foliated earth therefore belongs to an argument about origin, permanence and transformation, not simply a visual resemblance to leaves.

At p. 231 the author joins the phrase to the final purpose, God's glory. Corruption frees substances, especially the elements, from wastes and superfluities and brings them into a new more-than-perfect form. The true foliated earth is presented as part of that perfected condition. It is "true" in the passage's cosmic application, not verified here as a particular substance that can be made by a specified technique.

Places to read

II.227.1 (source pp. 227–228); II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). The question of the world's end and the distinction between accidents and transformed substance.

II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). The substantial Word, enduring universal natures and the qualified terra foliata expression.

Connections

World and its end supplies the complete argument; Annihilation and transformation distinguishes the competing possible conclusions. Earth philosophical explains why earth may have a philosophical sense other than common ground. Residues concerns what is removed, while Phoenix supplies another image of renewal whose local setting must likewise be preserved.

Translation in this edition

Terra foliata is translated "foliated earth," leaving the historical expression recognizable. The English does not substitute a modern mineral name, ordinary leaf mould or a conjectured salt. "So to speak" translates the author's explicit qualification and should not be dropped when quoting the phrase.

Attested forms

terra foliata — foliated earth. II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232).

Chrystallinische Klarheit — crystalline clarity. II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230).

Cautions

The local occurrence does not justify identifying every historical terra foliata with the author's transformed cosmos. Nor does the cosmic account provide a laboratory procedure. The lexical value lies in the carefully bounded application of an alchemical expression to enduring substance and its perfected future condition.

See also

World and its end; Annihilation and transformation; Earth philosophical; Residues; Phoenix

Gemstone testing

Jubilier von Nürnberg · erfahrner Steinschneider · guten Schmaragd

What the jeweller and lapidary are reported to judge

At a Glance

The word. Gemstone testing here is historical assessment by practitioners who cut, set, engrave, or judge stones.

In the Candida. The narrator uses these judgments to strengthen reports that watery preparations became valuable mineral bodies.

In this edition. An expert's reported identification remains distinct from a modern compositional analysis.

A place to read. Read the two examples at pp. 117–119 and the inference drawn at pp. 119–120.

Meaning

The gemstone chapter does not rely solely on the author's abstract theory. It introduces materials handled and judged by specialists. A hard green mass is broken, polished, engraved, cut, and set in a ring; a jeweller calls a piece an emerald. Crystals sent to the narrator are judged by a lapidary as good stones and topazes. These acts make the reports more concrete and give expert testimony a place in the argument.

The evidence is nevertheless layered. Bier's preparation is related by an unnamed court physician, who received a small piece and had it cut and mounted. He showed it to a Nuremberg jeweller. The narrator thus reports an assessment conveyed through another person. By contrast, the 1667 crystals are said to have been sent to the narrator himself, though the identifying judgment is still attributed to a lapidary. These are different chains of testimony.

Use in the book

The first report emphasizes durability and workmanship. Considerable force is required to break the transparent green mass; larger pieces can carry engraved arms; a smaller piece can be cut and worn. These details support the claim that the material is a usable hard stone, rather than merely a transient coloured moisture. They do not state how a modern mineralogist would identify its crystal structure or composition.

The jeweller's verdict is qualified: pale, but otherwise good emerald. That qualification should remain visible. It conveys an evaluation of the actual appearance and quality claimed in the report, rather than an unreserved assertion of an ideal gem. The word good is a practical judgment within the story, not a modern certification standard.

The second example concerns crystals derived from rainwater and formed in cold. The correspondent's title is given through initials rather than a securely expanded identity. An experienced stone-cutter judges them good stones and topazes. The author combines this with partial knowledge of the process and his own experience to infer that mercurial moisture acquires particular form and colour when it encounters a sulphur.

The inferential step should be distinguished from the assessment. A lapidary's opinion about a stone does not itself prove the author's theory of mercurial moisture, cold, and external sulphur. It supplies one piece of reported experience that he interprets through that theory. The lexicon makes both parts legible without treating the explanation as an additional observation.[87]

The entry also helps clarify how authority works elsewhere in the book. Expertise has a defined scope. A mining master may know much yet not explain the entire hidden process of metallic generation; a lapidary may judge a stone without establishing every causal claim made about its production. Respect for a practitioner does not require enlarging his reported verdict beyond what the text gives.

Places to read

II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118); II.118.1 (source pp. 118–119). Bier's green mass, working of the pieces, and the jeweller's qualified emerald judgment.

II.119.1 (source p. 119). The 1667 crystals and the lapidary's verdict.

II.119.2 (source pp. 119–120); II.120.1 (source p. 120). The author's further inferences about form, colour, and sulphur.

Connections

Bier and Generation of precious stones give the narrative and the formation theory. Authority and testimony and Experience and conjecture explain how the reports are used.

Diamonds and rock crystal cautions against equating historical stone names with securely tested modern species. The same restraint applies to emerald and topaz here.

Translation in this edition

Steinschneider is "lapidary" or "stone-cutter," preserving the craft named in the source. Jubilier is "jeweller." These are not interchangeable with a modern laboratory mineral analyst.

[87] The verdict at II.118.1 is pale but otherwise good emerald; II.119.1 reports topazes. Preserving the different witnesses, materials, and qualifications avoids producing a single more impressive claim than either example actually gives.

"Judged" retains judicirt and erkannt as assessments made by the reported experts. It should not become the stronger claim "proved chemically."

Attested forms

Jubilier von Nürnberg — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.118.1 (source pp. 118–119).

erfahrner Steinschneider — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.119.1 (source p. 119).

guten Schmaragd — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.118.1 (source pp. 118–119).

Topasen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.119.1 (source p. 119).

Cautions

The account provides no surviving sample or modern mineral analysis.

The unnamed or initialled witnesses should not be identified by guesswork.

See also

Bier; Generation of precious stones; Diamonds and rock crystal; Authority and testimony; Experience and conjecture

Generation of metals

Gebährung der Metallen · scientiâ conjecturali · Metalla alle einen Ursprung

A conjectural science of a hidden process

At a Glance

The word. Generation is the coming-to-be of metals within the earth, distinguished from the practitioner's operation.

In the Candida. The author affirms a common origin but treats the detailed underground process as conjectural.

In this edition. The account's admitted uncertainty is part of its content; it must not be edited into a settled theory.

A place to read. Read Chapter Four, pp. 106–114, with the explanation of its placement at pp. 121–122.

Meaning

Metallic generation is both a necessary subject of Hermetic study and a hidden process beyond secure observation. The narrator begins with metals as noble works of God and says that philosophers consider their generation important for learning the art. He immediately qualifies the knowledge available: we know metals are generated in the earth, but nobody, in his judgment, has thoroughly investigated how this happens. He calls it a conjectural science. That qualification governs the entire chapter.

The author distinguishes two levels of confidence. He maintains, with the philosophers, that all metals have one origin and spring from one matter. He does not claim equivalent certainty about the sequence of their underground formation. Common matter is a general principle supported elsewhere by his account of water and the elements. The routes by which places, vapours, sulphurs, moisture, and earth determine that matter into a particular metal remain matters of inference.

Observation of the alchemical subject offers the closest available model, but it does not make mine generation identical with the art. Different philosophers have used different initial processes and interpreted the hidden natural process accordingly. Their agreement on a final magistery does not erase their disagreement about beginnings. The author therefore explains diversity of theory partly through diversity of practical experience.

Use in the book

One account, associated conjecturally with followers of Bernard, reads the subject's changes of colour and appearance as a sequence of actual metals: Mercury becomes lead, tin, silver, copper, iron, and finally gold. The narrator refuses that interpretation. Silver is, after gold, the purest and

noblest metal; making it decline into copper and iron contradicts the tendency of nature towards ennoblement. The sequence of appearances is better read as an account of the subject's operation than as literal metallic genealogy.

A second account, tentatively linked with Artephius's process, begins from the vapour of nature. Rising through clean, warm places, it takes up sulphurous moisture from rocks and becomes greasy. It then meets a subtle moist earth, fills its pores, and generates one metal or another according to the purity, warmth, coldness, and sulphur encountered. A third formulation from the True Chemical Foundations describes mercurial vapour cooked by subterranean fire into thick water and determined by the sulphur it absorbs.

The author of On the Metamorphosis of Metals differs again, denying an added sulphurous fatness and assigning Mercury an internal digesting power from celestial influences. The narrator reports this disagreement without dissolving all versions into a single consensus. His own preference is the account in which universal spirit encounters differently disposed places and, after thickening, a predisposed matter and matrix. He explicitly leaves room for a more experienced person's judgment.

Personal experience supplies evidence but also a restraint. When he worked according to Artephius, a failure in fire management broke vessels. He found differently coloured flowers in the fragments. These appearances did not persuade him that the proposed sequence of metals was true. The episode demonstrates the distinction between seeing colours and correctly identifying what those colours prove.[88]

Chapter Six later explains why these chapters precede its fuller account of the subject. The mineral discussions add remarks about the dry way, just as Chapter Two had given hints about the wet way. Metallic generation thus performs two tasks at once: it concerns a natural process and indirectly describes the art. Neither task licenses forgetting that they are distinct.

The mature argument returns to minerals' lack of a particular seed. Unlike plants and animals, they arise from universal elements and have essential rather than vegetative or sensitive life. Their improvement by tincture follows their common mineral nature and degrees of perfection. This explains why metallic generation matters to the possibility of transmutation even though its exact underground course remains conjectural.

[88] Flores, translated "flowers," designates the coloured products noticed in the broken vessel. The report does not independently establish their modern chemical composition or identify them as successive metallic species.

Places to read

II.106.1 (source pp. 106–107); II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108). The devotional purpose and explicit classification as conjectural science.

II.108.1 (source p. 108); II.109.1 (source p. 109). Different processes and the proposed succession of metals.

II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110); II.110.1 (source p. 110); II.110.2 (source pp. 110–111); II.111.1 (source p. 111). The competing vapour, sulphur, and celestial-influence accounts.

II.111.2 (source pp. 111–112); II.112.1 (source p. 112); II.112.2 (source pp. 112–113); II.113.1 (source pp. 113–114). The narrator's common-origin thesis, experimental restraint, and preferred conjecture.

II.121.1 (source pp. 121–122); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133). The chapters' practical placement and the mineral order's distinctive life.

Connections

Experience and conjecture is the methodological companion to this entry. Lazarus Ercker exemplifies the limits of mining expertise, while Artephius and Bernard the Count identify contrasting practical traditions through which the hidden process is interpreted.

Seeds and Transmutation explain why the argument need not give each metal a reproductive seed like an animal or plant. The common mineral basis and different degrees of maturity do the work instead.

Translation in this edition

Gebährung and generation are rendered "generation" rather than ordinary biological birth. "Conjectural science" retains scientia while marking the author's explicit limitation; it is neither complete ignorance nor demonstrated certainty.

Ertz can designate metal or ore according to context. Rendering every occurrence as a modern purified metal would obscure the mining setting and the range of material forms under discussion.

Attested forms

Gebährung der Metallen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.106.1 (source pp. 106–107).

scientiâ conjecturali — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108).

Metalla alle einen Ursprung — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.111.2 (source pp. 111–112).

Cautions

The chapter reports several theories and selects among them. Do not attribute every reported account to the narrator.

The book's progressive ennoblement is a teleological claim within its natural philosophy, not a modern geological model.

See also

Mines and mineral vapours; Seeds; Mother and matrix; Nobility and perfection; Transmutation; Experience and conjecture

Generation of precious stones

generation der Edelgestein · Mercurialischen Feuchtigkeit · congelation

Cold, colour, and the formation of a noble body

At a Glance

The word. Precious stones are generated bodies sharing the mineral order's common matter.

In the Candida. The author contrasts their cold-induced congelation with the warmth involved in metallic hardening.

In this edition. His colours, moisture, sulphur, and salt are interpreted within the book's principles, without imposing modern mineral identities.

A place to read. Read Chapter Five, pp. 114–121, then the qualification about diamond at p. 155.

Meaning

Precious stones extend the mineral argument beyond metals. The narrator calls them splendid wonders and noble creatures of God, recalling their use in the priestly breastplate and shoulder ornaments. Their beauty and scriptural dignity make them appropriate objects of contemplation. Their formation also supplies a further description of the subject's operation. As in the preceding metal chapter, the natural history and the indirect practical teaching are joined without becoming identical.

The principal assertion is that stones arise from the same matter as metals and minerals. Chapter Six later explains that water and the elements possess mineral nature actually as well as potentially and that mineral beings do not require the particular seed given to animals and plants. The shared origin supports the claim that the philosophical elixir can improve inferior stones, consolidate broken ones, and enlarge small ones. These are claims of the text, rather than authenticated transformations supplied by this lexicon.

The distinctive account of formation is brief. Metals harden after gradual coagulation through continued hidden warmth. Precious stones congeal from mercurial moisture through cold, after condensation and sublimation. Uncoloured matter sublimes more easily than coloured matter because fatness or sulphur does not rise without force. Formation is consequently described through temperature, movement, concentration, and the acquisition or absence of a colouring assistance.

Use in the book

The narrator says description is hazardous and gives only what he considers sufficient for explaining the operation of the subject. That announced limit is important. Chapter Five is not a complete mineralogical

treatise, and the compact sequence should not be expanded into a recipe with invented quantities or apparatus. Its force rests on analogy and reported examples.

The first example is Bier's special water, reported by a court physician. It becomes purple when mixed with wine and is thickened at a furnace, then cooled into a hard transparent green mass. Pieces are cut and engraved; a small ring stone is judged by a Nuremberg jeweller to be a pale but good emerald. The narrative's stages are meant to support both the role of cold and the capacity of a watery mineral precursor to become a noble solid.

A second example comes from crystals sent to the narrator in 1667. They were derived from rainwater and formed in cold; an experienced lapidary judged them good stones and topazes. The narrator partly knows the correspondent's process and combines that knowledge with his own experience to infer that mercurial moisture acquires particular form and colour when it meets a sulphur in the earth. The expert judgment strengthens his report, but it does not supply modern compositional testing.[89]

Crystal and diamond are then treated as cases retaining water's colour because they lack the assistance of a particular external sulphur. This is a statement about the acquisition of a specified colour, not an absolute denial that they contain the principle Sulphur. At p. 155 the author explicitly refuses the claim that diamond can exist without sulphur or salt, and mentions both white and red sulphur. The later qualification prevents a simple equation of colourless appearance with absence of every sulphurous principle.

Bier's purple wine mixture leads to another inference. The water is already inwardly specified towards green, as the resulting emerald is said to show, while wine's essential inner colour is red. Their mixture yields a third colour. The author connects green-to-red development with vitriol and the blood of the green and red lions. Thus the gemstone chapter also becomes a lesson in interpreting colour changes within the art.

Places to read

II.114.2 (source pp. 114–115); II.115.1 (source p. 115); II.115.2 (source pp. 115–116). Nobility, common origin, and the alleged improvement of stones.

II.117.1 (source p. 117). The contrast between metallic warmth and stony congelation through cold.

II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118); II.118.1 (source pp. 118–119); II.119.1 (source p. 119). Bier's material and the crystals judged by a lapidary.

[89] The separate chains of evidence matter: the emerald judgment is reported through the court physician; the 1667 crystals are said to have been sent to the narrator himself and assessed by a lapidary. Neither account includes modern mineral analysis.

II.119.2 (source pp. 119–120); II.120.1 (source p. 120); II.155.1 (source p. 155). Colouring sulphur, colourless stones, and the later qualification.

Connections

Congelation and Coagulation help distinguish the formation terms used here. Diamonds and rock crystal isolates the colourless examples; Gemstone testing examines what the jeweller and lapidary are actually reported to establish.

The chapter's hymn about Saint John relates restored gems to giving to the poor. Noble materials are therefore connected with Charity as well as with technical perfection and the possibility of an elixir.

Translation in this edition

"Mercurial moisture" names a generative principle-bearing material; it should not be replaced by ordinary liquid mercury. "Congelation" preserves the historical formation term rather than assuming that every instance is modern crystallization.

"Emerald" and "topaz" report the historical judgments named in the examples. The English does not certify that the products would meet present mineralogical definitions.

Attested forms

generation der Edelgestein — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

Mercurialischen Feuchtigkeit — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

congelation — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.117.1 (source p. 117).

Cautions

The narrative does not establish what Bier's water contained, and the partly known process is not disclosed in full.

The common origin of gems and metals is a proposition of the author's philosophy. It should not be presented as a modern scientific equivalence.

See also

Diamonds and rock crystal; Gemstone testing; Bier; Nobility and perfection; Congelation; Green and red lions

Mines and mineral vapours

Vapor Naturæ · Einwitterung · Bergschwaden

Underground names for partially specified matter

At a Glance

The word. Mine vapours and related names describe stages or forms of mineral matter within conjectures about underground generation.

In the Candida. The book gathers a diverse mining vocabulary into elements specified towards minerals and metals.

In this edition. Unidentified materials retain their names; there is no automatic modern chemical equivalent.

A place to read. Read pp. 109–114 for the conjectures and pp. 138–139 for their conceptual reduction.

Meaning

The mining vocabulary provides the Candida with a language for matter that has not yet reached the state of a mature metal. Vapour, greasy material, mineral water, and unripe metal are not presented as independent species with fully established identities. They describe transitions in the proposed determination of universal matter within the earth. The vocabulary is concrete enough to evoke mining practice, yet the narrator repeatedly admits that the actual hidden process is conjectural.

One reported theory begins with Vapor Naturæ rising from the centre of the earth. The author says this might be called Einwitterung or Bergschwaden in miners' speech. It takes up sulphurous moisture from rocks in clean warm places, becomes greasy, and changes its name from vapour to unctuosity. Name-change follows a proposed material change. It does not prove that every miner used the words with exactly the same scope.

The greasy stage may be called Metallferch. It meets pure, subtle, moist earth, fills pores, and unites with that earth. Pure warm conditions yield gold; other dispositions yield other metals. The narrator offers these as reported explanatory possibilities and later states his own qualified preference for a broadly similar model of universal spirit meeting predisposed matter and a matrix.

Use in the book

The author's own synthesis on pp. 113–114 puts local conditions at the centre of specification. Veins and shafts can be pure or impure, warm or cold. After thickening, matter encounters a predisposed receiving material. One metal rather than another results according to these circumstances. The mine is not simply a container filled with finished metals; it is imagined as a

differentiated environment within which the shared mineral basis acquires a particular condition.

At II.138.1 the vocabulary is gathered into a higher-level account. Mercury, Sulphur, Salt, Colostrum, Bergschwaden, Metallferck, Gur, and other names designate, in their respective cases, elements specified towards minerals and metals: mineral water and unripe metal or mineral. This passage supplies an interpretive principle for the earlier mining descriptions. The many names do not require many unrelated ultimate matters.

The reduction does not erase differences among stages. A vapour, an unctuous material, and a thickened mineral water have different roles in the narrated process. Their common grounding explains why the philosopher traces them back through the elements to God's universal and substantial Word. The author is moving between local description and a general causal account, not claiming that each observed mine substance is physically identical in every respect.

Basilius Valentinus receives praise for writing plausibly about mines and metallic generation, especially through miners' language. That praise concerns usefulness to the investigator. It does not revoke the narrator's admission that even a celebrated mining master cannot give secure knowledge of the entire hidden process. Specialist language and conjectural restraint are allowed to coexist.

These passages also prevent a common mistake about the universal subject. A mine substance already specified towards a particular mineral is not, simply because it is called Mercury or a vapour, automatically the universal matter required for the highest work. The book's larger distinction between universal and particular remains operative. Names must be interpreted by the state and role of the material they describe.[90]

Places to read

II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110); II.110.1 (source p. 110). The proposed passage from vapour to sulphurous unctuosity and a metallic body.

II.110.2 (source pp. 110–111); II.113.1 (source pp. 113–114). Thick mineral water and the role of local conditions and matrix.

II.114.1 (source p. 114). The value attributed to Basilius's miners' terminology.

II.138.1 (source pp. 138–139). The gathering of named precursors into specified elements and unripe mineral matter.

[90] II.138.1 says respectivè: the named materials are specified elements in their respective cases. Retaining that qualification avoids asserting that all the listed mine products are one indistinguishable substance.

Connections

Mother and matrix concerns the receiving conditions that make particular generation possible. Generation of metals concerns the disputed models as a whole. Mercury philosophical explains why a principle-name cannot by itself identify a common terrestrial substance as the subject of the art.

The backward tracing of mineral precursors parallels the tracing of the carnation through plant, seed, earth, and water. Both are completed by reference to the universal and substantial Word; their different kinds of generation remain distinct.

Translation in this edition

Bergschwaden is rendered “mine vapours.” Metallferch and the variant Metallferck are retained as historical terms, with the functional gloss of an unctuous precursor. Gur is likewise retained rather than assigned a modern chemical formula.

Colostrum is a received name in the list. The lexicon does not infer that the mine material is literal milk or identify it solely through the modern medical sense of that word.

Attested forms

Vapor Naturæ — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110).

Einwitterung — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110).

Bergschwaden — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110).

Metallferch — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.110.1 (source p. 110).

Gur — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.138.1 (source pp. 138–139).

Cautions

This is not a glossary of standard modern mining terminology.

The narrator marks his linkage to Artephius’s process as conjectural. The reported vapour theory should not be promoted into a documented account of Artephius’s own mining observations.

See also

Generation of metals; Mother and matrix; Mercury philosophical; Universal and particular; Basilius Valentinus; Artephius

Mother and matrix

Mutter und Ursprung · materiam prædispositam und matricem · extra matricem

Origins and receptive conditions in different orders of generation

At a Glance

The word. Mother can mark an origin; matrix names a receptive place or matter in which generation takes place.

In the Candida. Water is mother of the elements, mineral generation encounters a predisposed matrix, and human generation requires a natural mother.

In this edition. The biological, mineral, and primordial uses are related analogically but remain different claims.

A place to read. Compare I.009.1, II.113.1, and the homunculus rejection at II.198.2.

Meaning

Maternal language joins several levels of the Candida's account without erasing their differences. Water is mother and origin of the other elements. A mineral matrix is a disposed receiving matter that helps determine the metal produced. A natural mother is indispensable to the human generation that the homunculus story falsely claims to bypass. The reader should ask which level of generation is in view before treating mother or womb as a technical synonym.

The primordial use expresses derivation. Fire is hidden in water, air is subtle water, and earth likewise comes from the waters. Calling water mother therefore gathers the elemental account under one source. It does not imply that water reproduces by a biological seed or that the elements are offspring in the same manner as human children. The name makes origin intelligible through a familiar relation.

The mineral matrix expresses reception and disposition. Universal spirit, after thickening, meets a matter prepared by its qualities and situation. Pure or impure, warm or cold places, veins, and shafts help explain why one metal rather than another results. The matrix is not the ultimate origin of all mineral being. It is part of the local account of how common matter acquires a particular condition.

Use in the book

At II.113.1 the narrator offers this model as a conjecture consonant with his practice. A matrix appears at the end of a chain of conditions, not as an isolated sufficient cause. Thickening, spirit, locality, and disposed matter belong together. The account remains open to the judgment of someone

more experienced. Maternal language does not turn a hidden underground process into directly observed fact.

The homunculus chapter uses the bodily womb in a very different argument. The reported Theophrastian procedure claims to generate a human child outside the woman's body and without a natural mother from male semen alone. The narrator rejects it because the order of human generation requires the conjunction of both parents' seed under God's blessing and command. The natural matrix belongs to an established reproductive order, not an optional container replaceable by a laboratory vessel.

The distinction is reinforced by the comparison with the philosophical work. At II.198.1 the magistery likewise cannot be perfected through one of its paired principles alone. The analogy concerns the need for appropriate conjunction. It does not prove that the mineral operation is sexual reproduction or that a woman's body is an alchemical apparatus. The book argues from a shared requirement while preserving different kinds of beings.

These uses explain why the lexicon does not assign one universal definition to matrix. It can be translated as a womb when human generation is meant, and as matrix or receiving matter in the mineral context. The conceptual bridge is a condition for formation; the agent, material, order, and promised result differ. Keeping those distinctions visible helps prevent a supposedly universal symbolism from overwhelming the argument.[91]

Places to read

I.009.1 (source p. 9). Water as mother and origin of the elements.

II.110.1 (source p. 110); II.113.1 (source pp. 113–114). Pores, disposed earth, and the mineral matrix.

II.195.1 (source p. 195); II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198); II.198.1 (source p. 198); II.198.2 (source p. 198). The natural mother, conjunction of seeds, analogy, and rejection of generation outside the womb.

Connections

Seeds explains the difference between particular reproductive seed and universal mineral nature. Homunculus and Soul propagation explain why the author insists on both parents in human generation.

Earth philosophical also concerns a prepared bodily principle, but it should not be substituted automatically for every matrix encountered in the conjecture of mine generation. The terms overlap in receptivity without becoming identical.

[91] The final phrase extra matricem at II.198.2 belongs to an explicit rejection. Indexing it as a term for the author's own method would reverse the passage's conclusion.

Translation in this edition

Matricem is the inflected Latin form of matrix; the cited wording combines Latin and German. “Matrix” retains the mineral sense, while “womb” makes the human reproductive sense clear.

“Mother and origin” preserves the paired German words in I.009.1. Dropping “origin” would make the metaphor more biological and less explicitly explanatory than the original.

Attested forms

Mutter und Ursprung — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.009.1 (source p. 9).

materiam prædispositam und matricem — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.113.1 (source pp. 113–114).

extra matricem — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.198.2 (source p. 198).

Cautions

The book gives no warrant for treating every maternal image as a concealed reference to one laboratory ingredient.

The natural mother is a substantive requirement in the rejection of homunculi, not merely an ornamental personification.

See also

Seeds; Homunculus; Soul propagation; Earth philosophical; Generation of metals; Water primordial

Nobility and perfection

Edele Geschöpffe · veredlen · perfectione & imperfectione

The hierarchy that gives purification its direction

At a Glance

The word. Nobility and perfection evaluate a creature's purity, maturity, form, and effective power.

In the Candida. The art is said to advance mineral beings towards their proper perfection, while contemplation and charity outrank mere acquisition.

In this edition. The hierarchy belongs to the book's teleological philosophy, not simply to monetary value.

A place to read. Read the rejection of silver's decline at pp. 112–113 and the maturation argument at pp. 133–134.

Meaning

The Candida describes metals and stones as noble works of God. Nobility here includes worthiness for contemplation, beautiful appearance, purity, and a place in an ordered created world. Gold adorns the tabernacle and priestly garments; precious stones bear the names of Israel's tribes. These scriptural uses establish dignity before the discussion turns to production or transmutation. Valuable materials are not dismissed as mere temptations, but their value is placed within worship and created order.

Perfection gives natural and artificial change a direction. The narrator says every nature seeks continually to ennoble itself. He therefore objects to the theory that silver must decline into copper and then iron before reaching gold. Since silver is the purest and noblest metal after gold, that sequence would make the process reverse its proper tendency. The hierarchy is an argumentative premise, not just descriptive praise.

Later the metals are said to differ in perfection and imperfection while sharing an origin in water and the elements. Gold matures very slowly in the earth. Philosophers seek to advance that maturation by art and bring the essence of gold to its highest maturity. The art improves within the same mineral nature rather than creating a new order of beings. This is the role of perfection in the defence of lawful gold-making.

Use in the book

The gemstone chapter applies a corresponding distinction. Inferior stones can allegedly become more perfect, costly stones through the red and white elixir. Broken pieces can be consolidated, small stones enlarged. Material wholeness, colour, hardness, and excellence are joined in the

account without being reduced to a single numerical measure. The author's language of Oriental stones expresses an esteemed class in the narrative, rather than a modern gemological standard.

The first mineral chapter also shows what the hierarchy does not establish. The author accepts common origin and an orienting tendency towards ennoblement, yet still calls the detailed underground process conjectural. A belief about perfection cannot settle the exact mechanics of generation. His use of that belief to reject a declining metallic sequence is narrower than a complete theory of how each metal arises.

Perfection can describe the finished medicine and tincture as well as mineral recipients. A lower-order preparation may have therapeutic effects without the transmuting power of the perfected natural tincture. The three medical orders therefore distinguish degrees and kinds of efficacy, not merely stronger and weaker versions of one ordinary drug. The perfected elixir's wider claims fit the larger language of a common nature brought to maturity.

The theological conclusion extends perfection beyond present materials. The second letter describes a subject freed from grossness and dregs, regenerated into a noble spiritual form. The final chapter imagines universal natures purified into a more than perfect form and crystalline clarity. These applications share the direction from impurity or incompletion to manifested excellence, while assigning the final cosmic transformation to God.

The ethical hierarchy prevents a purely acquisitive reading. Solomon can value wisdom above every worldly treasure and choose contemplation instead of exercise. The author claims benefit chiefly in medicine and ends with charitable and Christian uses. Gold's high place among metals does not mean making gold is the highest human good. Perfection of the practitioner's purpose matters alongside perfection of the work.[92]

Places to read

II.106.1 (source pp. 106–107); II.114.2 (source pp. 114–115). Metals and stones as noble works and priestly ornaments.

II.112.2 (source pp. 112–113). Nature's ennobling tendency used against a declining sequence of metals.

II.133.2 (source pp. 133–134); II.134.1 (source p. 134); II.134.2 (source pp. 134–135). Common mineral origin, maturity, and art proceeding according to nature.

[92] At II.134.2 the author expressly calls Hermetic gold-making natural rather than supernatural. The movement towards perfection is meant to follow created nature, even though its possibility and usefulness are ultimately grounded in God.

II.180.1 (source p. 180); II.184.1 (source p. 184). Improvement of metals and stones as powers claimed for perfected tincture.

II.200.1 (source pp. 200–201); II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). Wisdom above wealth and the spiritual and cosmic extensions of perfection.

Connections

Transmutation and Tincture and elixir explain how the art is said to confer material perfection. Charity and Solomon and wisdom explain the higher purposes that regulate its use.

Residues and Separation explain what perfection excludes. Purity is not just brilliance of appearance; it involves liberation from accidental burdens that obscure or spoil the appropriate substance.

Translation in this edition

Veredlen is "ennoble" or "improve towards nobility." "Maturation" renders Zeitigung where the passage concerns the development of gold's essence. These words preserve the directed character of change.

Perfect and imperfect should not be replaced uniformly with pure and impure. Purity is one component of the evaluation, but maturity, form, and effective power are also at issue.

Attested forms

Edele Geschöpffe — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.114.2 (source pp. 114–115).

veredlen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.112.2 (source pp. 112–113).

perfectione & imperfectione — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.133.2 (source pp. 133–134).

Cautions

The hierarchy is a claim within historical natural philosophy; it is not a modern ranking of elemental stability or atomic structure.

The book's praise of precious materials must be read with its repeated preference for wisdom, medicine, and charity over greed.

See also

Generation of metals; Generation of precious stones; Transmutation; Tincture and elixir; Solomon and wisdom; Charity

Seeds

Samen aller sichtigen Dinge · keinen particular Samen · universal-Samen

Particular reproduction and the universal mineral root

At a Glance

The word. Seed can mean the particular reproductive principle of a kind or the universal source from which mineral nature arises.

In the Candida. The distinction prevents the false search for a metal's seed on the model of plants and animals.

In this edition. The English retains "seed" but explains its different scopes; it is not always a small reproductive object.

A place to read. Read pp. 77–83, then the developed distinction of animal, vegetable, and mineral orders at pp. 129–138.

Meaning

The word seed is central because the book both requires it and denies it. No nature can be improved except in and with its own nature and original seed; nevertheless metals and minerals have no particular seed. The statements become consistent when particular reproduction is distinguished from universal origin. Plants and animals reproduce their kinds through seeds implanted under God's particular commands. Mineral nature arises from universal elements without that species-like seed.

Rainwater is described as containing the seed of all visible things because it contains the beginnings of the elements and the powers through which visible creatures are nourished and maintained. That is a claim about universal capacity and derivation. It does not mean every animal or plant is already present in rainwater as a miniature organism, nor that a practitioner can create each one at will from a jar of water.

The universal seed of metals is identified with nature or the elements, where true gold is said to be found still in its growing root. Giving each metal a particular seed like an animal or vegetable is, for the narrator, a foundational error. It sends practitioners to already specified materials when their proposed end requires a universal basis. The metaphor of root directs them behind finished metal to its common source.

Use in the book

The argument at pp. 77–80 begins from homogeneity. Each nature keeps its order: one animal does not generate another kind, lettuce seed does not give cabbage, and an apple pip does not produce a pear tree. A heterogeneous mixture of materials cannot produce the simple universal

agent. The rule limits what art may do; it does not allow a universal seed to abolish the distinct orders of generation.

The author then denies particular mineral seed at II.081.1 and uses that denial to locate the proper basis of transmutation. The cautionary history of Bernard, who wasted years and resources seeking a metallic seed in particulars, dramatizes the practical cost of the error. The correct theory must precede the operation, or the practitioner will choose the wrong matter even while following an apparently impressive process.

At pp. 129–132 the distinction receives its scriptural rationale. Earth and water possess animal and vegetable nature potentially, but no plants or animals arise until God gives their particular commands. The resulting creatures are ordered to multiply through their own seeds. Humans cannot speak such an agency into the elements or create these creatures by art. The inability to make a fly does not therefore prove an inability to prepare a mineral tincture.

Minerals have no separately recorded particular command or particular life of that kind. Citing Nuysement, the author says they have essential life rather than sensitive or vegetative faculty. Water and elements consequently possess mineral nature actually as well as potentially. A quotation attributed to Dienheim says metals arise from elements in the first instance without seed or proximate matter. This is the context in which the lack of particular seed supports, rather than defeats, mineral preparation.

The backward tracing of a carnation on pp. 136–137 shows another distinction. Flower leads to plant, plant to seed, seed to earth, and earth to water. The theosophical account also traces seed to the command that earth bring forth and finally to the universal and substantial Word. Physical ancestry and divine ordering are complementary lines of explanation. A philosopher is expected to go farther than a gardener, without denying what the gardener knows.

The homunculus chapter concerns actual parental semen. There the narrator insists on the conjunction of both parents' seed under God's blessing. The word's bodily reproductive sense must not be replaced by the universal mineral sense. Context determines the order, role, and limits of seed in each argument.[93]

Places to read

I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.024.2 (source pp. 24–25); I.048.1 (source pp. 48–49). Universal seed, nourishment, and the perfection of the first waters.

[93] The contradiction disappears only if "particular" is retained. The author rejects a particular mineral seed, while positively using the expression universal-Samen at II.082.1. Summaries that merely say "metals have no seed" lose the hinge of the argument.

II.077.1 (source p. 77); II.079.1 (source pp. 79–80); II.081.1 (source p. 81); II.082.1 (source p. 82). Homogeneity, order of kinds, and the denial of particular mineral seed.

II.129.2 (source pp. 129–130); II.130.1 (source p. 130); II.130.2 (source pp. 130–131); II.131.1 (source p. 131); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133); II.133.1 (source p. 133). The differentiated scriptural account of the three natural orders.

II.136.2 (source pp. 136–137); II.137.1 (source pp. 137–138); II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198). Tracing the carnation to its causes and the distinct human reproductive use.

Connections

Universal and particular and Blessing and command explain why one seed-language cannot be applied unchanged to every creature. Generation of metals and Transmutation explain the practical conclusion for the mineral art.

Mother and matrix concerns the receiving conditions of generation; Homunculus tests a false attempt to bypass those conditions in human reproduction.

Translation in this edition

Samen and Saamen retain the English “seed,” while semen in the human reproductive context can be “semen” or “seed” according to the sentence. An original term list makes the German spelling variation visible.

“Growing root” is the book’s image for the mineral source. It does not reverse the author’s denial that metals have vegetative life in the same sense as plants.

Attested forms

Samen aller sichtigen Dinge — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.048.1 (source pp. 48–49).

keinen particular Samen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.081.1 (source p. 81).

universal-Samen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.082.1 (source p. 82).

seu materiâ proximâ — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.133.1 (source p. 133).

Cautions

Universal seed is not an authorization to manufacture animals or plants from elements.

A particular seed, remote matter, proximate matter, and a prepared ferment are not interchangeable names for one stage of the work.

See also

Universal and particular; Blessing and command; Homogeneity; Generation of metals; Homunculus; Soul propagation

Solar and lunar parents

Sonnen und Mond · als dessen Vatter · Veränderung des Monds

A disputed image of generation under a wider account of celestial action

At a Glance

The word. Solar and lunar parentage is an explanatory image that the author explicitly resists when applied to dew.

In the Candida. He denies that sun and moon beget dew as its father, while allowing celestial action and concordance in other contexts.

In this edition. The entry concerns a limited disputed image, not an endorsement of every familiar Hermetic solar-lunar formula.

A place to read. Compare the dew paragraph at pp. 103–104 with tides at pp. 105–106 and concentrated Mercury at pp. 177–178.

Meaning

The solar and lunar parents headword identifies a problem in reading, rather than a comprehensive doctrine accepted by the Candida. In the dew discussion the narrator rejects the opinion that dew is begotten by sun and moon as by its father. He accepts Arnd's description of dew as a fruit of the dawn, supported by Psalm 110, and insists that God remains first cause. Familiar celestial language cannot therefore be imported wholesale into the book as its own explanation.

This rejection does not remove the heavens from the natural account. The author preserves the elements' operations through God's universal Word and the stars' influence and concordance. Sun, moon, and stars also exemplify the exact keeping of created order. The important question is whether a particular causal claim is warranted, not whether a heavenly body can ever have any relation to an earthly change.

Parenthood, concordance, and operation consequently have different argumentative roles. Parenthood claims generation by an agent. Concordance names an ordered correspondence that may occur without one phenomenon being the efficient cause of another. Operation names an activity allowed within the divine order. The author's refusal of one paternal image cannot be used to deny every other relation.

Use in the book

The tides passage gives the most explicit distinction. The narrator acknowledges that, to his knowledge, ebb and flow in most places follow lunar changes. He nevertheless distinguishes cause from concordance and traces both the sea's motion and the heavenly signs to God's commands.

The observation of correspondence does not, in his account, authorize the inference that the moon is the true cause of the sea's motion.

Chapter Eight supplies a different positive role for celestial action. The subject is said to participate in astral, animal, vegetable, and mineral nature, with mineral nature predominating. The author rejects an opponent's proposed distinction between unspecified universal matter and nature-prepared metallic matter as irrelevant in this case. Preparation and specification are described as the stars' action, especially the sun's, upon the water from which concentrated Mercury arises. This is a local affirmative account, not a return to the rejected dew-parentage formula.

The sun also appears in ordinary examples of maturation. Fruit and grapes ripen earlier or later depending on how much it shines. The analogy helps explain why the philosophical work cannot be assigned an exact universal duration independent of diligence and fire management. Solar activity here illustrates variable timing within an ordered process rather than a universal parental identity.

These passages invite a disciplined reading of celestial terms. Their presence is real and consequential, but their roles differ from passage to passage. The narrator is willing to deny a traditional-sounding phrase, accept observed concordance, and affirm a specified astral operation. A lexicon must keep those judgments separate rather than replacing them with a single doctrine of the sun as father and moon as mother.[94]

Places to read

II.076.2 (source pp. 76–77). Sun, moon, and stars as examples of nature's ordered regularity.

II.103.1 (source p. 103); II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104). Allowed influence and the explicit denial of dew's solar-lunar parentage.

II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106). Lunar changes distinguished from the efficient cause of tides.

II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170); II.177.1 (source pp. 177–178). Solar maturation and the claimed action producing concentrated Mercury.

Connections

Dew, Efficient cause, and Air and wind provide the immediate causal setting. Mercury philosophical explains why concentrated Mercury is not simply ordinary quicksilver.

[94] The headword is editorial. The attested local expression is sun and moon "as its father" at II.103.2. Preserving this unusual wording is preferable to replacing it with a canonical formula that the passage does not give.

Saturn and planetary names concerns another use of celestial language: names for the universal matter and its operations. It should not be merged automatically with actual celestial influence or the rejected account of dew.

Translation in this edition

Vatter in II.103.2 is singular. The English should preserve the statement as written rather than silently substitute the more familiar pair of a solar father and lunar mother.

Concordantia is "concordance," retaining the distinction from causa. "Action of the stars" translates Würckung der Astrorum without importing a modern account of radiation or gravity.

Attested forms

Sonnen und Mond — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104).

als dessen Vatter — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104).

Veränderung des Monds — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106).

Würckung der Astrorum — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.177.1 (source pp. 177–178).

Cautions

The text's narrow rejection should not be generalized into a denial of all celestial action.

This entry does not claim a direct quotation of a particular Hermetic tablet at the dew passage; no such exact attribution is established there.

See also

Dew; Efficient cause; Mercury philosophical; Saturn and planetary names; Time and maturation

Tincture and elixir

Tincturam Physicam · vollkommene Elixir · tingiren und transmutiren

A perfected agent of improvement, distinguished from mere colouring

At a Glance

The word. Tincture and elixir name a perfected preparation said to heal and to improve metals and stones.

In the Candida. The natural tincture belongs to the third medical order and has powers denied to lower preparations.

In this edition. Tincturing is an effective change claimed by the book, not merely painting an object's surface.

A place to read. Read pp. 179–184 with the restrictions on ordinary gold and multiplication at pp. 144–146.

Meaning

The tincture is an agent whose perfection is demonstrated, within the book's claims, by what it can communicate to other bodies. It is not simply a coloured liquid. The author attributes to the perfected natural tincture the healing of bodily diseases, the improvement of lesser metals into gold, and the transformation of inferior precious stones. The shared vocabulary of tincture and elixir brings medical and mineral effects into one account of effective power.

The adjective natural is consequential. Physica belongs to the book's physics and natural philosophy; it does not merely mean a medicine for physical symptoms. The making of gold is called natural rather than supernatural because art prepares and matures within the mineral order. The tincture's extraordinary claimed power does not, for the narrator, authorize creation of new beings against God's laws.

The agent must be appropriate to the nature acted upon. No nature can be improved except with its own nature and original seed, and nothing can be fixed unless homogeneous and of one nature. A tincture assembled from heterogeneous particulars cannot meet that requirement. The common mineral basis, rather than a random collection of powerful ingredients, explains why a universal preparation is said to improve more than one metal or stone.

Use in the book

The Proem's quotation from Sendivogius identifies the Philosophers' Stone with the physical or natural tincture: modern practitioners may possess countless operations and still lack the one thing earlier philosophers

achieved. The issue is the effective end of the art, not the multiplication of procedures. This establishes the tincture as a test of successful practice.

Chapter Nine places it within a hierarchy. The first-order medicine is philosophical Salt; the second-order preparation joins Sulphur and Salt and can have particular or compound uses; the third-order medicine is the natural tincture. The third is distinguished by transmuting power as well as the breadth of its medical claims. The first and second cannot accomplish those mineral transformations. The author says spirits alone tincture and transmute, whereas one body or matter does not act upon another in that manner.

The account nevertheless contains qualifications. Polemann's limitation concerning stone disease is reported, and particular remedies can help in that disease. The entry should not flatten every medical statement into one absolute promise. The narrator's own claims of lower-degree therapeutic benefits are also distinguished from the perfection to which he still aspires.

Ordinary gold poses another test of interpretation. When a medicine is already prepared well and then fermented with common gold, the author says it can tincture a great quantity of ordinary metals but afterwards cannot be multiplied. This differs from the living philosophical gold required in other discussions of continued development. The reported ratio is part of the historical claim, not a verified yield supplied by the edition.[95]

The material and theological uses of tincture meet in the second letter, where water brought to highest colour and fixity is the Stone. Regeneration of the subject becomes an image of resurrection. Yet the narrator does not equate the tincture's medicinal effect with forgiveness of sin. The same discourse can connect material perfection to faith while leaving Christ's saving action distinct.

The Conclusion is candid about disclosure. General theory, beginning, means, and end are said to have been given, but individual manipulations are withheld. The lexicon therefore explains the tincture's role and asserted powers without supplying a modern procedure that the historical author chose not to publish.

Places to read

II.055.1 (source p. 55). The Stone or natural tincture as the missing achievement amid many operations.

II.077.1 (source p. 77); II.134.1 (source p. 134); II.134.2 (source pp. 134–135). Homogeneity, maturation, and lawful natural gold-making.

[95] II.145.2 gives a thousandfold tincturing ratio while denying subsequent multiplication. The two claims belong together; quoting the ratio without the restriction would misrepresent the passage.

II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146). Fermentation with ordinary gold and the loss of further multiplication.

II.179.2 (source pp. 179–180); II.180.1 (source p. 180); II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182); II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183); II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184); II.184.1 (source p. 184). The medical hierarchy and the third order's transmuting power.

II.225.1 (source p. 225); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242). Highest colour and fixity, with limits on practical disclosure.

Connections

White and red tinctures and Colours explain the chromatic distinctions. Medicine and its orders explains the hierarchy of powers; Transmutation follows the claim in metals and stones.

Multiplication and Gold living clarify why an agent that can produce gold in one reported operation is not automatically capable of unlimited further increase.

Translation in this edition

Tingiren is translated "tincture" where its technical agency matters; "transmute" is reserved for the corresponding transformation term. Neither should be reduced to dyeing a surface.

Elixir remains "elixir." "Perfected" emphasizes a preparation brought to its intended condition rather than a timeless magical object disconnected from operations.

Attested forms

Tincturam Physicam — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.180.1 (source p. 180).

vollkommene Elixir — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.180.1 (source p. 180).

tingiren und transmutiren — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.184.1 (source p. 184).

Cautions

The historical efficacy claims are not medical or chemical validation.

The term does not identify a modern compound. The author's internal definition and distinctions take priority over retrospective ingredient guesses.

See also

Medicine and its orders; Transmutation; White and red tinctures; Multiplication; Gold living; Homogeneity

Transmutation

transmutationem Metallorum · Gold tingirt · tingiren und transmutiren

Improvement within nature and the difference from creation

At a Glance

The word. Transmutation is a change into a perfected condition, especially from lesser metals to gold and inferior stones to better ones.

In the Candida. It is defended as preparation and maturation according to nature, while the creation of animals or plants from elements is denied to human art.

In this edition. The lexicon explains the historical claim and its limits without validating it chemically.

A place to read. Read pp. 126–135 with the third medical order at pp. 183–184.

Meaning

The Candida treats transmutation as the effective improvement of a body through an agent appropriate to its nature. It is not merely a deceptive change of surface colour, and it is not creation from nothing. The author insists that art must proceed in and with the relevant nature and original seed. Because metals share a universal mineral basis and differ in perfection, the perfected tincture is said to advance imperfect metals into gold.

The defence depends on a distinction between orders of being. Animals and plants have particular lives, seeds, and commands of propagation. Humans cannot speak the divine agency that creates those kinds into water or earth. Minerals, by contrast, are said to possess essential life and arise from universal elements without a particular reproductive seed. The inability to make a fly therefore does not entail the inability to prepare a mineral tincture. The author rejects the premise that these would be equivalent acts.

Preparation and tincturing are lawful because they follow nature; creating new beings or changing God's order is not. On pp. 133–134 the art is described as accelerating the maturation of gold's essence. Nature takes a long time in the earth, while philosophers discover ways to bring the mineral basis to highest maturity. The resulting Stone can then communicate perfection to imperfect metals. This is the book's own account of natural gold-making.

Use in the book

The objection sequence on pp. 126–128 helps identify the scope of the proof claimed. A reported projection may have changed only silver to gold and therefore been particular, rather than an unrestricted universal

transformation. The author still cites Sendivogius for the importance of a genuine, nonfraudulent tincturing of even a small amount of metal that endures the required tests. Such an achievement would open the doors of nature to higher investigation. Partial success and the highest universal end are not simply equated.

The tests also distinguish true change from fraud and mere appearance. The colour of Sun or Moon must endure the required examinations. Profit is expressly not the sole criterion. The cited statement values reality and permanence of the effect, even if the operation is economically unprofitable. The lexicon preserves this standard without claiming those examinations would satisfy modern analytical chemistry.[96]

Chapter Nine assigns transmuting power to the third-order natural tincture. First- and second-order medicines cannot perform it. The narrator says one body or matter does not act upon another in this manner; only spirits tincture and transmute. The statement gives the effective agent a principial role that cannot be reproduced simply by putting ordinary metals together.

Precious stones belong to the same mineral field. The elixir is said to transform inferior stones, consolidate broken pieces, and enlarge small ones. The gem stories and expert judgments support the author's broader mineral reasoning, but their precise evidential chains remain separate from the strongest general claims. A lapidary's verdict on a stone is not itself a demonstration of every possible elixir effect.

Ordinary gold and living gold must also be distinguished. A medicine fermented with common gold after its preparation is said to tincture a great quantity of metal, yet to lose the possibility of further multiplication. Other passages require living philosophical gold as soul in the operation. A reported gold-producing effect does not therefore identify every successful stage or agent as the same.

The vocabulary reaches beyond laboratory and mine. In the second letter the regenerated subject becomes a type and living image of resurrection. In Chapter Fourteen universal natures are transmuted into crystalline clarity and perfected spiritual being. These analogical extensions depend on continuity through purification, but they do not make the practitioner the creator of the final world. Divine transformation has a different agent and horizon.

[96] The Sendivogius quotation at II.127.2 requires a genuine effect without fraud, with the colour surviving all required tests, and says it may occur with or without profit. These qualifications are more informative than a bare statement that any golden colour proves transmutation.

Places to read

II.077.1 (source p. 77). Improvement only through the appropriate nature and original seed.

II.126.2 (source pp. 126–127); II.127.1 (source p. 127); II.127.2 (source pp. 127–128). Particular projection, the fly objection, and required tests.

II.131.1 (source p. 131); II.131.2 (source pp. 131–132); II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133); II.133.2 (source pp. 133–134); II.134.1 (source p. 134); II.134.2 (source pp. 134–135). Creation distinguished from preparation and maturation within the mineral order.

II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146); II.184.1 (source p. 184). The limitation on common-gold fermentation and the third order's power.

II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). The resurrection image and cosmic extension of transformation language.

Connections

Tincture and elixir concerns the agent; Generation of metals concerns the conjectural natural process; Nobility and perfection concerns the direction of improvement. Seeds explains why the mineral argument differs from biological reproduction.

Annihilation and transformation concerns the final world's enduring universal being. Its use of transmutation should be read as a further application of the purification model, not as a claim that the universe is one ordinary metallic projection.

Translation in this edition

Transmutiren is "transmute," tingiren "tincture," and verwandeln "transform." Preserving the distinctions helps show when the text stresses the agent's action and when it stresses the changed condition.

"Natural tincture" renders Tinctura Physica in the book's natural-philosophical setting. It is not a modern product classification.

Attested forms

transmutationem Metallorum — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.077.1 (source p. 77).

Gold tingirt — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.134.1 (source p. 134).

tingiren und transmutiren — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.184.1 (source p. 184).

transmutirt und verwandelt — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230).

Cautions

The claims are historical assertions, not established chemical results.

The universal rainwater argument does not authorize mixing rainwater with the exact Hermetic subject: II.077.2 explicitly rejects that supposed shortcut.

See also

Tincture and elixir; Generation of metals; Nobility and perfection; Seeds; Medicine and its orders; Annihilation and transformation

Signs images and language

Allegory and analogy

Gleich- und Geheimnuß des Regenwassers · dem Buchstaben nach · Philosophischer Redart

How literal words can conceal a real operation

At a Glance

The word. The entry groups the book's comparisons, figurative names and warnings against a literal reading.

In the Candida. The author treats the work as real while saying that its language can name relations, stages or colours indirectly.

In this edition. The English preserves the images and distinguishes analogy from identity instead of supplying a universal decoding key.

A place to read. Read pp. 150–154 for names and pp. 166–171 for the interpretation of four days, open fire and women's work.

Meaning

The Candida asks for neither indiscriminate literalism nor a wholly allegorical reading that dissolves the material work into ideas. Its title promises an account of the matter of the stone and philosophers' Mercury through the analogy and mystery of rainwater (I.001). The author claims practical experience, yet repeatedly explains why the surface wording of an authoritative maxim can mislead. Images and analogies are ways to describe a real subject indirectly, and also ways to conceal or qualify its disclosure.

"Allegory and analogy" is an English organizing headword, not a claim that the author gives a formal definition of those two modern categories. His actual expressions concern Gleichnuß, philosophical modes of speech, interpreting according to the letter and a type or living image. Their differences should remain visible.

Its method is therefore selective: some expressions are interpreted figuratively because the author supplies a reason, while others remain concrete examples, reported observations or unresolved names.

Use in the book

Rainwater provides the most extended analogy. The author argues from its origin, potentialities and reported effects toward the universal subject. Yet he also distinguishes rainwater and dew from the precise subject, and warns that mixing common waters with it may fail (II.077.2; II.078.2). A comparison can therefore reveal relevant properties without making its two members identical in every practical respect. The book's title should not be

flattened into an instruction to use any rainwater as the whole undisclosed process.

At p. 129 Bernard's saying that the work takes all things is explained as meaning the elements (II.129.1). The same author's objection concerning remote matter must not be read simply according to the letter. Context and the writer's other statements constrain interpretation. This is a local argumentative method, not permission to choose whatever hidden meaning best saves a preferred recipe.[97]

Mineral names receive the fullest explicit explanation. The subject may be called by many metallic and mineral names because it possesses mineral nature abundantly, because raw and purified matter differ, because names mislead the ignorant, and because they indicate changes of form and colour (II.150.2). The list at p. 151 includes spiritual gold beside milk, vinegar, honey and the drink of the gods (II.151.2). Its variety makes a literal shopping list implausible within the author's argument. Ordinary vitriol is then rejected despite resemblance, excellent virtues and the philosophers' use of its name.

The four-day claim gives a worked example of interpretation. Helvetius's artist is reported as saying that the whole work takes place in four days in open fire and a crucible (II.166.2). The author objects to forcing raw matter into supreme perfection under uniform maximum heat. He nevertheless declines to call the speakers liars. Four days mean four principal colours; his own three-day claim means three principal colours (II.168.2). The explanation preserves a claim of truth while changing the reference of the temporal expression.

The same passage limits how far the explanation can be extended. It does not provide an exact colour-by-colour timetable or prove that every day mentioned anywhere means a colour. Nature has its time, and diligence and regimen alter how quickly the work ripens (II.169.1). The figurative interpretation is tied to this particular contested claim.

At p. 171 "burn our brass" must be accomplished differently from violent heating, although fire remains necessary. Women's work and a labour of Hercules can both be true in a philosophical sense. The knight of the Golden Fleece marks the difficulty of dissolving nature's firm bond (II.171.1). These images communicate aspects of effort, skill and operation, not one uniform measure of physical exertion.

The theological analogies have another function. The regenerated subject is a type and living image of resurrection and transmutation (II.223.2). The work's purification also informs the author's account of the world's end

[97] II.129.1 uses one saying attributed to Bernard to constrain the literal reading of another. The method is comparison within the cited authority's language, rather than an unrestricted permission to choose any hidden meaning.

(II.228.1–II.231.1). These comparisons depend on patterns of enduring substance and removed accidents. They should not be reduced to a claim that the work is merely inward psychological renewal, nor expanded into a claim that art causes the events it images.

Places to read

I.001 ([1], title page); II.077.1 (source p. 77); II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.078.1 (source p. 78); II.078.2 (source pp. 78–79); II.079.1 (source pp. 79–80); II.129.1 (source p. 129). Rainwater's analogy and a local correction of literal interpretation.

II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151); II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152); II.152.1 (source pp. 152–153); II.154.1 (source p. 154). Four reasons for names and the ensuing rejection of literal vitriol.

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167); II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172); II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229). The worked interpretation of days and fire, followed by theological images.

Connections

Hermetic names supplies the particular theory of naming. Colours explains the days-colours substitution, while Secrecy and publication concerns the limits of disclosure. Creation and imitation and Resurrection show why analogies have ontological and theological weight as well as rhetorical force.

Translation in this edition

Gleich- und Geheimnuß is rendered through "analogy and mystery," preserving the title's paired promise. "According to the letter" or "literally" translates dem Buchstaben nach. "Philosophical mode of speech" retains the author's own signal that a phrase requires interpretation. The edition does not insert a hidden meaning in place of the image before the author has explained it.

An image may have a supported local function without an exhaustive historical decoding. The source forms and passage locators allow readers to test the proposed interpretation against the immediate argument instead of accepting an editor's universal symbolic dictionary.

Attested forms

Gleich- und Geheimnuß des Regenwassers — analogy and mystery of rainwater. I.001 ([1], title page); II.233.2 (source pp. 233–234).

dem Buchstaben nach — according to the letter or literally. II.129.1 (source p. 129); II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167).

Philosophischer Redart — philosophical mode of speech; inflected expression. II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169).

Cautions

No unsupported external chain of influence or comprehensive esoteric system is needed to explain these passages. Analogy does not abolish the difference between subjects, and philosophical truthfulness does not make every apparent inconsistency a cipher. Where the author withholds a manipulation or leaves a name unidentified, the lexicon should mark the limit rather than invent the missing key.

See also

Hermetic names; Colours; Secrecy and publication; Creation and imitation; Resurrection; Rainwater; Subject of the art

Bees and concealment

Bienen · Arbeit verbergen

A natural image used to justify limited disclosure

At a Glance

The word. Bees provide an example of work the author says cannot be fully investigated.

In the Candida. Their concealment becomes an argument for reserving further alchemical disclosure.

In this edition. The claim is treated as the author's analogy, without presenting it as a verified account of bee behaviour.

A place to read. II.240.1, pp. 240–241.

Meaning

Bees appear in the final answers to dissatisfied readers. The author imagines people who are not content with what he has communicated and directs them to observe how wisely bees conceal their work. He says that even ingenious devices do not fully disclose it. From this, he asks readers to infer that God, through nature, forbids further revelation of the art.

The example is a compact argument by analogy. A natural creature performs valuable work whose full process is not open to the observer. The author takes that concealment as a model for his own restraint. Its force depends on the religious interpretation: nature can indicate a divine limit, not merely a temporary obstacle to human curiosity.

Use in the book

The placement is important. Immediately before the bees, the author answers scoffers and qualifies his own boast as concerning medicine and divine grace. Immediately after them, he explains that the book has indicated beginning, means and end but has not disclosed all manipulations (II.241.1). The image therefore supports an explicit reserve about practical handling, rather than a general refusal to explain anything.

The next paragraph invokes the labour of earning bread and asks diligence of the reader. These moves distribute responsibility in two directions. The author acknowledges a limit on what he will tell; the reader must still make a serious effort with what has been told. The bees should not be used to erase either statement. Some detail remains withheld, and the existing argument still demands attention.

The final seal of silence extends concealment to the successful possessor (II.243.2). There the reasons include preventing abuse and avoiding personal danger. The bee image belongs to a different but related

justification: it gives reserve a natural and theological model. Reading them together explains how several grounds for discretion accumulate in the closing pages.

The image also distinguishes the book's natural analogies from laboratory instructions. No operation involving bees, honey or wax is prescribed here. The reader should not turn the figure into a hidden ingredient simply because the work elsewhere uses material names philosophically. Its local rhetorical task is already stated: to excuse the author from revealing more.[98]

Places to read

II.239.1 (source pp. 239–240); II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242). Self-defence, the bees and the express reservation of manipulations.

II.243.2 (source pp. 243–244). The related counsel of silence for the possessor of the arcanum.

Translation in this edition

Bienen is bees. Arbeit verbergen is conceal their work. The English preserves the claim's attribution and its movement from animal example to divine prohibition. Wise in the passage expresses the author's valuation of the concealment.

Attested forms

Bienen — bees. II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241).

Arbeit verbergen — conceal their work. II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241).

Cautions

The paragraph is neither a modern ethological finding nor an alchemical recipe involving bee products. Such extensions would require evidence the passage does not provide.

See also

Secrecy and publication; Allegory and analogy; Providence; Labour and patience

[98] No instruction to use honey, wax or bees is present in II.240.1. The explicit inference concerns concealment. The possibility of philosophical material names elsewhere does not license a new ingredient in this paragraph.

Colours

Farb · vier Hauptfarben · fixe röthe

Visible signs whose interpretation remains conditional

At a Glance

The word. Colours can reveal a material's condition, mark stages and lend names to the work.

In the Candida. The author distinguishes seeing colours from proving a theory of metallic change and interprets the four-day claim through principal colours.

In this edition. The translation preserves white, red and other colour terms without imposing a complete standardized stage chart.

A place to read. Read p. 112 for caution, p. 120 for mixture and pp. 168–170 for principal colours and fixed redness.

Meaning

Colour is evidence in this book, but it is not self-interpreting evidence. It may disclose an inward condition, arise from a mixture, indicate a transformation or be used as a philosophical name. An observer can see a colour and still infer too much about its material cause or its place in the work. The author's own restraint at p. 112 makes this qualification especially important.

The plural headword gathers different contexts without assuming that every coloured appearance belongs to one canonical sequence. The book discusses all colours contained in rainwater, mineral green and purple, fading false gold, three or four principal colours, and fixed redness. These are related topics, not identical statements.

Use in the book

At p. 21 rainwater appears outwardly almost white but is said to contain all colours. Repeated distillation through an alembic followed by drying produces many visible colours, and rain-exposed glass supplies another example (I.021.1). Hollandus is then cited for taste, smell and colour as spirits resting in natural warmth, the soul, life and quintessence of things. The author uses sensory properties to support an inward account; this does not establish a modern analysis of the coloured film or the universal subject.

The next page uses loss of those properties to criticize spoiled distilled medicines and a decayed apple (I.022.1). Colour is one member of a sensory triad. Its disappearance signifies the author's judgment about remaining waste, but it is not the only sign he considers. Reading colour alone would detach the observation from its relation to taste, smell and useful life.

At p. 112 the author recounts finding black, whitish, yellow and other flowers on fragments after careless fire management broke vessels. He refuses to infer from this the proposed succession of metallic transformations (II.112.1). The passage is a strong internal warning against treating a laboratory colour sequence as proof that one common metal has become another. Direct observation and the theory used to interpret it remain distinct.

At p. 120 Bier's water and wine produce purple in the narrated mixture. The author attributes wine an inward red and the water a prior green specification, inferred from the emerald associated with it. Two colours yield a third; green can also itself give rise to red, as vitriol illustrates (II.120.1). The lion maxim follows. The later exclusion of ordinary vitriol prevents this colour comparison from becoming a recommendation to use that mineral as the universal starting subject.

At p. 150 changes of form and colour are one of four reasons philosophers give the subject many mineral and metallic names (II.150.2). Colour thus helps explain language as well as observation. A name may indicate the state of a single subject rather than a different purchased material. The explanation still does not supply an exact correspondence for every name in the ensuing list.

The criticism of B.'s Gold of the Breeze turns on instability: the product pales and loses colour in sunlight, and is therefore judged not to be Hermetic philosophical gold (II.163.1). An impressive coloured product can fail the relevant criterion. Yet the converse does not follow that every stable colour proves the stone. The author's larger requirements of subject and proper principles remain in force.

The four-day dispute at pp. 166–170 gives colour its most explicit stage-marking role. Four days are interpreted as four principal colours. The author says he has seen the perfect stone or red king completed in three days, because strictly there are only three principal colours (II.168.2). He does not list those principal colours there or explain the numerical difference through a complete chart. The lexicon should preserve the qualification rather than import a standardized scheme from elsewhere.[99]

Finally, the tincture is possessed when water moves from colour to colour to the highest colour and fixed redness (II.170.1). Rosarius supports slow cooking through putrefaction until perfect colour. Redness matters together with fixation and ordered maturation; a brief red appearance alone does not meet the description.

[99] II.168.2 says four principal colours in explaining the four-day report, then says strictly three in explaining the author's own three-day expression. The passage does not enumerate a full palette. The entry preserves the numerical qualification rather than importing an external standardized chart.

Places to read

I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22); I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23). Rainwater's colours and the sensory triad of taste, smell and colour.

II.112.1 (source p. 112); II.120.1 (source p. 120); II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151); II.163.1 (source p. 163). Observation, mixture, naming and unstable colour.

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167); II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169); II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170); II.170.1 (source p. 170). Principal colours, figurative days and fixed redness.

Connections

Green and red lions explains the short maxim arising from the vitriol comparison. Fixation and Regimen of fire explain the endpoint and conditions. White and red tinctures distinguishes the final pair and its biblical application from a complete colour sequence. Experience and conjecture is particularly useful for the author's refusal to overinterpret the vessel fragments.

Translation in this edition

Farb and Farben are rendered colour and colours. Hauptfarben is "principal colours," preserving the author's hierarchy without deciding its full membership. "Fixed redness" keeps the qualification that distinguishes the endpoint from an unstable hue. Regem rubrum is translated "red king," retaining the image rather than replacing it with a presumed chemical product.

The edition does not add normalized stage names where they are absent from the local original. Likewise, the quoted authorities' sensory theories remain their claims, not editorial definitions of modern colour perception or chemistry.

Attested forms

Farb — colour. II.163.1 (source p. 163); II.170.1 (source p. 170).

vier Hauptfarben — four principal colours. II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169).

fixe röthe — fixed redness. II.170.1 (source p. 170).

Regem rubrum — red king; inflected Latin phrase. II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169).

Cautions

No standardized black-white-yellow-red timetable is asserted solely from these passages. The author's three-versus-four statement should be recorded as stated. Colour observations do not by themselves establish transmutation, a gemstone's modern identity or medicinal efficacy. Their significance depends on the subject, stability, operation and argument in which they occur.

See also

Green and red lions; Fixation; Regimen of fire; White and red tinctures; Experience and conjecture; Hermetic names

Golden chain

guldenen Kette · die gantze Natur aneinander hange · güldine Kette
The linked nature that separation does not sever

At a Glance

The word. The golden chain is an image of the bond joining earth and heaven.

In the Candida. It illustrates essential continuity among elements that may be distinguished by position without being absolutely severed.

In this edition. The edition translates the image without treating it as a literal apparatus or a complete historical doctrine.

A place to read. Read p. 34 within the discussion of the second kind of separation.

Meaning

The golden chain is introduced at a precise argumentative point. It is not an independent recipe symbol or a decorative promise of wealth. The author has distinguished removing contrary superfluities from distinguishing parts that remain related in substance and powers. The chain gives a memorable image of that second relation: differentiation does not destroy the connected order of nature.

Use in the book

At p. 34 the Hermetic art is recalled as an imitation of creation. God did not truly sever the elements; each remains within the others, and all the rest can be found in each one. Their distinction is by position, especially higher and lower, rather than absolute division (I.034.1). The author then cites Arndt for the proposition that all nature hangs together.

The golden-chain sentence follows. Homer, described on Nuysement's report as no less a philosopher than a poet, says earth is fastened to heaven by a golden chain. The attribution is mediated: the Candida presents Homer through Nuysement. The lexicon should not erase that mediation or invent an exact Homeric quotation in the German wording. What is clear locally is how the author uses the reported image.[100]

The next paragraph applies the principle to Mercury, Sulphur and Salt. They may be individually extracted, but none exists without its companions (I.035.1). The substantial shell or dry water makes the threefold spirit visible

[100] The attribution is mediated by the source's referent. Nuysemann. at I.034.1. The German sentence is therefore not presented as an independently verified verbatim quotation from a specific line of Homer.

and tangible. A claim to separate the elements absolutely is rejected as deception. The chain therefore concerns a bond preserved through operations, not a prohibition against every practical distinction.

A later discussion develops the same connectedness without repeating the chain image. The waters above heaven benefit humanity partly because all nature hangs together and each part has influence and effect on another (II.174.2). Their support of the cosmic structure and the spiritual descent of water are discussed in that setting. The later passage helps show that the chain's force is cosmological and relational, extending beyond the immediate laboratory comparison.

At p. 176 the image becomes one name within the catalogue identifying the heavenly subject: this is the finest golden chain fastening earth to heaven (II.176.1). It stands beside the earth above our heads and the element without a particular blessing and command. This later use gives the earlier image an explicitly material and operative application, without turning it into ordinary metallic gold or a literal chain. The connected order and the proposed subject illuminate one another.

Places to read

I.033.1 (source pp. 33–34); I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). The second separation, the chain image and the mutual implication of the principles.

II.174.1 (source p. 174); II.174.2 (source pp. 174–175); II.175.1 (source pp. 175–176). A later account of cosmic support, mutual influence and descending heavenly water.

II.176.1 (source p. 176). The chain as a name in the identifying catalogue of the heavenly subject.

Connections

Separation is the main companion entry because it supplies the distinction the image explains. Elements concerns their continued interrelation. Heavenly water shows the later cosmological application. Allegory and analogy explains why an image can support an argument without providing a literal material identification or a set of operations.

Translation in this edition

The German guldenen Kette is translated "golden chain." The inflected phrase is attested, while "golden chain" is the English headword. "Fastened" preserves the structural bond. The edition does not replace the chain with a modern force or assume that "golden" secretly names ordinary gold as a required ingredient.

Attested forms

guldenen Kette — golden chain; inflected German phrase. I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35).

die gantze Natur aneinander hange — all nature is linked together. I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35).

güldine Kette — The later catalogue applies the image to the proposed heavenly subject. II.176.1 (source p. 176).

Cautions

The local passage supports an interpretation of interconnected nature and mediated attribution to Homer. It does not by itself establish a documented influence from any particular ancient commentary, a complete chain-of-being system or an exact classical source for the German sentence. Those larger historical claims require evidence beyond the occurrence here.

See also

Separation; Elements; Heavenly water; Allegory and analogy; Nuysement

Green and red lions

grünen Löwen · rothen Löwen · Blut

A colour maxim beside a qualified mineral comparison

At a Glance

The word. The lions are colour-bearing images in a maxim about making red blood from green blood.

In the Candida. They follow a discussion of purple, green and red in Bier's water and vitriol, without identifying ordinary vitriol as the universal subject.

In this edition. The English preserves the lions and blood instead of silently decoding them as chemical species.

A place to read. Read p. 120, then pp. 151–154, where ordinary vitriol's suitability is explicitly denied.

Meaning

The lion image is compact and should be interpreted through its immediate setting. The author has discussed a greenish mineral water, wine, an emerging purple colour and the possibility of a red arising from green itself. The maxim names the blood of the green and red lions. It does not separately define two materials, list their preparations or claim that every historical green-lion image elsewhere means the same thing.

Use in the book

At p. 120 the author offers his judgment about Bier's water becoming purple when poured into wine (II.120.1). Wine's inward essential colour is said to be red; the water has already been specified toward green, as the emerald made from it is taken to show. Mixing two distinct colours yields a third rather than leaving either unchanged. The explanation belongs to the author's interpretation of the reported episode, not to a modern verified theory of colour chemistry.

He then adds that a beautiful red can arise from green itself, as may be seen in vitriol. Hence the maxim: from the blood of the green lion must be made the blood of the red lion. The "hence" makes the colour transition the closest supported interpretive link. Blood may express a material's active or extracted condition, but the local text does not spell out a complete technical definition for either blood.[101]

[101] The lion maxim is introduced by Unde, "hence," at II.120.1, immediately after the vitriol comparison. No separate author is supplied there. The local argumentative connection is firmer evidence than an invented precise source attribution.

The extended vitriol discussion later guards against a literal shortcut. Philosophers can call vitriol Sulphur, yet neither ordinary vitriol nor antimony serves the intended purpose (II.151.1). Ordinary Roman or Hungarian vitriol is particular, however excellent its virtues, and cannot supply the universal tincture (II.152.1–II.154.1). Thus the example of colour change in vitriol is not a disguised withdrawal of that exclusion.

The general account of names at p. 150 explains why this restraint matters. Mineral names may indicate the subject's abundance of mineral nature, its raw or purified condition, concealment from the ignorant, or changes of form and colour (II.150.2). The lions belong naturally with the last possibility, but the author does not explicitly assign each named lion to a complete stage chart. Reading them as indicators is better supported than pretending their chemistry has been disclosed.

Places to read

II.120.1 (source p. 120). The single local lion maxim and the discussion of Bier's water, wine and vitriol.

II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151); II.151.1 (source p. 151); II.152.1 (source pp. 152–153); II.154.1 (source p. 154). The reasons for philosophical names and the rejection of ordinary vitriol as the subject.

Connections

Colours gives the broader treatment of signs and the danger of inference from appearance. Vitriol preserves the distinction between a useful comparison and an approved starting substance. Hermetic names explains why a vivid material image can carry a technical relation while withholding literal identification.

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps "blood," "green lion" and "red lion" because the author's image is itself part of what readers need to interpret. Replacing the lions with named modern chemicals would insert a solution the book has not provided. The attested German forms are inflected; the headword uses ordinary English nominative expressions.

Attested forms

grünen Löwen — green lion; inflected phrase. II.120.1 (source p. 120).

rothen Löwen — red lion; inflected phrase. II.120.1 (source p. 120).

Blut — blood. II.120.1 (source p. 120).

Cautions

No universal decoding of lions across alchemical literature follows from this occurrence. Nor does the local green-to-red relation establish that the complete work has only these two colours. The author elsewhere discusses three or four principal colours and fixed redness under different argumentative conditions. Those passages should complement, rather than be forced into, this short maxim.

See also

Colours; Vitriol; Hermetic names; White and red tinctures; Bier

Hermetic names

mineral- und metallische Nahmen · materiam crudam · materiam à superfluitatibus jam separatam

One subject under many names, conditions and forms

At a Glance

The word. Hermetic names are the varied expressions philosophers give the universal subject and its changing conditions.

In the Candida. The author gives four reasons for them and warns that common alchemists mistake the names for separate ordinary materials.

In this edition. The translation keeps the names visible and supplies contextual explanation rather than replacing them with speculative modern identities.

A place to read. Read pp. 150–154 with pp. 235–236, where the closing warning restates the interpretive rule.

Meaning

Naming is not a peripheral obstacle in the Candida. A wrong interpretation of a material name can make even the clearest process fail from its beginning. The author therefore treats interpretation as part of practical knowledge. Names of metals, minerals and familiar liquids may point to one universal subject under different aspects or conditions, rather than to a collection of unrelated ingredients.

The category does not imply that every ordinary noun is a cipher. The author uses real common materials in examples and rejects some as starting subjects. The reader needs context to distinguish an ordinary referent, a comparison and a philosophical name. An indiscriminate rule that every substance mentioned must mean the stone would be as misleading as literalizing every name.

The practical consequence of interpretation is unusually explicit: a sound sequence cannot rescue a wrong referent, because the operation's causal possibilities begin with the nature of its subject.

Use in the book

At p. 150 the author offers four reasons for the subject's many mineral and metallic names (II.150.2). First, it possesses mineral and metallic nature richly. Second, raw matter must be distinguished from matter already freed of superfluities. Third, names may mislead the ignorant. Fourth, they may indicate changes in form and colour during operation. These reasons allow overlap; the author does not assign every subsequent word to exactly one category.

The first reason concerns capacity rather than ordinary appearance. A universal material can produce or perfect mineral things without already being a common metal. The second concerns condition: a name suitable to raw matter need not describe the same visible state after purification. The third acknowledges concealment, complicating the book's promise of sincerity without cancelling it. The fourth ties language to operation, so that a sequence of names may follow one subject through transformation.

At p. 151 the saying that antimony is Mercury and vitriol Sulphur is immediately qualified: neither ordinary mineral serves the purpose (II.151.1). Antonius de Abbatia's longer list then includes vegetable salt, gold made spiritual, common metallic names, arsenic, sal ammoniac, vitriol, magnesia, alum, Hybith, sulphur, milk, vinegar, urine, honey, fountain, dew, wine and a blessed drink (II.151.2). The possessive "our" and the opening condition of knowing how to labour rightly govern the list. It is not an inventory to be combined literally.

The vitriol argument tests the rule rather than merely repeating it. Ordinary Roman or Hungarian vitriol appears promising because philosophers use its name, it resembles dry water, nature has begun but not completed it, and it has excellent virtues (II.152.1). The author answers each reason and concludes that particular excellence does not establish universal capacity (II.153.1–II.154.1). Interpretive correction therefore has a causal foundation, not just an appeal to secrecy.

The Löwenstein manuscript presents a harder case. It explicitly distinguishes ordinary mercury from the philosophers' Mercury and describes a red substance drawn from the mine, while another maxim says matter touching earth is useless (II.147.1). The author supplies sayings in tension so that the reader must distinguish their referents and modes of speech. He does not authorize a modern editor to solve the mine's exact identity by unsupported substitution.

The concluding return at pp. 235–236 is especially decisive. The philosophers' Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Moon, Sun, arsenic, vitriol, antimony and marcasite were mistaken by common alchemists for the separate particulars bearing those names (II.235.1). These workers alternate among materials or combine several, while the philosophers meant their universal matter. The author says a wrong beginning necessarily yields a wrong end even with a clear procedure.

This rule also applies to apparently practical expressions. "Make Mercury through Mercury" at p. 135 should be interpreted within the appropriate subject, not automatically converted into treatment of quicksilver (II.135.1). Four days can mean principal colours (II.168.2). The author repeatedly demonstrates that linguistic competence and operational competence

belong together. Yet none of these explanations completely discloses the precise manipulations he says he will not describe.

Places to read

II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151); II.151.1 (source p. 151); II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152). Four reasons for names and the long list of philosophical products.

II.152.1 (source pp. 152–153); II.153.1 (source pp. 153–154); II.154.1 (source p. 154). Vitriol as a worked test of literal interpretation.

II.135.1 (source p. 135); II.147.1 (source pp. 147–148); II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169); II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236). Mercury, mining language, figurative days and the concluding rule.

Connections

Allegory and analogy gives the broader interpretive method. Universal and particular explains why ordinary named minerals can fail. Colours supplies one stated reason for changing names, while Secrecy and publication addresses the acknowledged purpose of misleading the ignorant. Antimony and Vitriol provide concrete examples that must be read as full local arguments.

Translation in this edition

The edition retains unfamiliar names rather than normalizing them into an allegedly known modern substance. Hybith, for example, remains as printed because a secure identification is not established. Inflected Latin names and German forms are not additional materials. The possessive “our” remains important when it marks the philosophers’ usage.[102]

The translated wording distinguishes raw matter from matter already separated from superfluities. Suppressing that distinction would make all names appear simultaneous and erase the role of operation. Conversely, inventing a precise stage for every list member would claim more order than the author provides.

Attested forms

mineral- und metallische Nahmen — mineral and metallic names. II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151).

materiam crudam — raw matter; inflected Latin phrase. II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151).

materiam à superfluitatibus jam separatam — matter already separated from superfluities. II.150.2 (source pp. 150–151).

[102] Hybith appears as a name in II.151.2. Its secure historical or chemical identification has not been established for this edition, so retaining the form is an intentional limit rather than a claim that the word denotes a known modern reagent.

Cautions

This is a local account of naming in the Candida, not a complete lexicon for every alchemical author. It does not establish a universal cipher or a one-to-one chemical decoding. Where the author gives reasons without exact assignments, the entry should keep the resulting openness. Interpretation is constrained by principles and passages, not licensed by the mere possibility of a hidden meaning.

See also

Allegory and analogy; Universal and particular; Colours; Secrecy and publication; Antimony; Vitriol; Subject of the art

Light

Lux · lucem · Lumen

An accident in the first letter, a substance in the reply

At a Glance

The word. Light is the subject of two opposed Latin letters, not a doctrine expressed in one undivided voice.

In the Candida. The first correspondent treats visible light as an inhering accident; the reply defends primordial light as a created bodily substance.

In this edition. The translation preserves the opposing syllogisms, their negations and the distinction between light and its luminaries.

A place to read. Read pp. 203–208 for the first case and pp. 209–218 for the reply, then pp. 218–219 for the definition of substance.

Meaning

The light controversy is central because it forces the book to define what it means by substance. Chapter thirteen introduces two letters, one responsive and one refutatory, concerning whether light is an accident or a substance (II.202.1). The editor of the chapter says the latter letter also explains the intended meaning of substance in the treatise. Reading the two letters as one continuous exposition would attribute mutually contrary claims to the same argumentative voice.

The issue is not a modern choice between particle and wave theories. It concerns creation, inherence, independent subsistence, the relation of light to luminous bodies, and the permanence of God's natural order. Each writer uses syllogisms and Scripture, but they dispute the premises and the scope of key terms. Their shared language does not eliminate the disagreement.

Use in the book

The first letter opens by recalling the proposed argument: whatever is created through God's Word is a substance; light is so created; therefore light is a substance (II.203.1). The correspondent objects that the major premise is not universally true. God creates accidents that involve no imperfection or corruption, including colour, heat, moisture and cold (II.203.2). The image of God created with humanity supplies his further example (II.204.1). He fears that a loose universal premise could encourage the claim that sin is substance and make God its author, though he expressly says his addressee does not assent to those errors (II.204.2–II.205.2).

His positive arguments at p. 206 turn on inherence. Whatever inheres in a body is an accident; light inheres in a body; therefore it is an accident. Alternatively every substance subsists of itself, but light does not, so light is

not substance (II.206.1). A body remains a body in darkness; light belongs to fire, sun, stars or other bodies rather than existing in and through itself (II.206.3). The argument about corporeal and incorporeal substance similarly aims to exclude light from both classes (II.207.1).

The correspondent specifies natural light perceived by the eyes. He calls it a subtle quality or affection of a luminous body. Extraordinary primordial light preceded the luminaries; ordinary light later proceeds from sun, moon and stars (II.207.2; II.208.2). He distributes the earlier light's inherence among waters, air and eventually heavenly bodies across the days of creation (II.208.1). This is the first letter's account, not an uncontested teaching of the book.

The second letter changes the direction. Its writer distinguishes things created from things created together with something else; accidents can be called created only relatively (II.209.2). He restates the case through two syllogisms: light is a creature created by God's Word, and every creature is a substance (II.210.1). Arndt's proposition that God's spoken creative Word became the life of creatures supports a further chain: light has life, therefore form, therefore substantial being (II.211.1).

The reply grants the major premises of the correspondent's two inherence arguments but denies their minors (II.211.3). Light does not inhere in a body, he argues, and Job 38's reference to the dwelling or way of light gives it locality. Fire itself needs its own subject, so its dependence cannot automatically make it the independent subject of light (II.213.1). The first writer's explanations are challenged as assertions still requiring proof, rather than accepted conclusions.

The creation sequence then becomes decisive. Light and day form one created substance and order; the later stars belong to other created substances and another order (II.214.1). The decree "Let there be light" was not abolished by "Let there be lights." The sun's governing the day presupposes the day's continued existence (II.214.2). Thus primordial light cannot simply have been distributed into the luminaries and ceased as its own created reality. A writer S. is criticized for calling light first substance and later quality (II.215.1).

The reply reverses the visibility argument. Since light is visible and the opponent admits that the wholly incorporeal is not visible in mortal life, the reply concludes that light is or possesses a supremely transparent and subtle body (II.216.1). Corporeality here is the writer's inference, not a concession that light inheres in ordinary opaque matter. He means especially natural primordial light, what God called Day. He rejects the first correspondent's ordinary-extraordinary distinction as contrary to natural order (II.217.1–II.217.2).

The discussion of radiance requires a final distinction. If the correspondent's later light means universal fire giving splendour and colour, this too is elemental rather than accidental: radiance in stars, fat in animals, oil in plants and Sulphur in minerals (II.217.1). The reply then defines substance as pure and simple being admitting no contrariety (II.218.1). The light dispute therefore opens into the substance-residue distinction that governs the subsequent account of purification, sin and regeneration.

Places to read

II.202.1 (source p. 202); II.203.1 (source p. 203); II.203.2 (source pp. 203–204); II.204.1 (source p. 204); II.205.2 (source p. 205); II.206.1 (source p. 206); II.206.3 (source pp. 206–207); II.207.1 (source p. 207); II.208.1 (source p. 208); II.208.2 (source pp. 208–209). The chapter's frame and the first correspondent's created-accident and inherence arguments.

II.209.2 (source pp. 209–210); II.210.1 (source p. 210); II.211.1 (source p. 211); II.211.3 (source pp. 211–212); II.213.1 (source p. 213); II.214.1 (source p. 214); II.214.2 (source pp. 214–215); II.215.1 (source p. 215). The reply's creation, life, permanence and natural-order arguments.

II.216.1 (source p. 216); II.217.1 (source p. 217); II.217.2 (source pp. 217–218); II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.219.1 (source p. 219). Subtle corporeality, elemental radiance and the concluding definition of substance.

Connections

Accident and Substance are indispensable companions. Logos uttered and Logos subsistent explain why creation through a particular decree and ultimate dependence on the substantial Word cannot be treated as identical claims. Original sin and its polemics supplies the first letter's reductio and the reply's later application. Heat and fire clarifies the universal-fire exception.

Translation in this edition

Lux is translated "light," while Lumen may be "radiance" where that distinction clarifies the reply's elemental account. The edition retains the difference between light and luminaria, the luminaries. "Inhere," "subsist" and "subject" are technical relations; replacing them all with "exist in" would blur the exact point disputed.

The first letter's problematic nec incorporea is preserved in translation and noted as a source incongruity rather than silently rewritten into the expected opposite. Honorific addresses do not securely identify either writer by name. The chapter's framing associates the reply with the treatise's

intended definition, which is firmer evidence for position than any speculative personal identification.[103]

Attested forms

Lux — light. II.203.1 (source p. 203); II.206.1 (source p. 206); II.210.1 (source p. 210).

lucem — light; inflected Latin form. II.211.3 (source pp. 211–212); II.218.1 (source p. 218).

Lumen — radiance in the reply's elemental account. II.217.1 (source p. 217).

Cautions

The historical arguments should not be presented as modern optical findings. Nor should the presence of the first letter be mistaken for the author's endorsement of its position. The safest reading follows the successive claims, concessions and denials, keeping the first correspondent's accident thesis distinct from the reply's substantial and corporeal account.

See also

Accident; Substance; Logos uttered; Logos subsistent; Original sin and its polemics; Heat and fire

[103] II.207.3 preserves nec incorporea in a passage where the following examples would make a corporeal/incorporeal contrast awkward. The original is retained as a probable printer or wording incongruity. No silent conjectural replacement is used to improve the first correspondent's argument.

Phoenix

Phœnix · Phœnicem · CANDIDA PHŒNIX PHILOSOPHICA

Title, Christian emblem and the renewed philosophical subject

At a Glance

The word. The phoenix is the book's title image and appears in a Christian frontispiece motto and the author's arms.

In the Candida. At the conclusion the philosophical phoenix is linked to the universal matter described through the mystery and analogy of rainwater.

In this edition. The title is translated The White Philosophical Phoenix, while the historical Latin title remains available.

A place to read. Read the unnumbered emblem and arms explanation with pp. 233–234, where the author states what he has described.

Meaning

Phoenix is a title image with several explicitly attested settings. It belongs to the book's public presentation, to an account of inherited arms and to the author's final description of his subject. These settings should be distinguished before interpreting the image as a single technical code. The text itself gives a Christian frame and a relation to philosophical renewal; it does not provide an exhaustive mythological commentary.

Use in the book

The frontispiece motto says that the phoenix, the bird reborn, portrays Christ (PRE.EMBLEM). This is the clearest explicit symbolic explanation. The image's renewal is Christian in the paratext; an interpretation that presents the book as merely a secular mineral manual would miss that framing.

The arms explanation has a different function. The author places his family arms in the position of a philosophical emblem, recounting their grant and confirmation to his forebears by Maximilian II in 1570 for military services (PRE.ARMS). He says the phoenix incorporated in the arms may be not without an omen. The document thus turns an inherited heraldic feature into a fitting emblem for the book without revealing the anonymous author's name. The account is what the paratext states; it does not independently establish a modern genealogical identification.[104]

[104] The arms explanation in PRE.ARMS names rulers and services but withholds a family name. The phoenix's presence in the arms may guide further historical research, yet this entry does not convert that clue into a secure identification of the anonymous author.

The title joins candida, philosophical phoenix, the matter of the stone, philosophers' Mercury and rainwater's analogy and mystery (I.001). The English "white" follows the title's adjective. It should not automatically be taken as proof that the book concerns only a white tincture, since fixed redness and red perfected matter also receive major attention.

At pp. 233–234 the author says he has sincerely described the philosophical phoenix and universal matter through the analogy and mystery of rainwater, and universal matter in itself according to being and properties (II.233.2). This retrospective statement places the image within the entire theoretical undertaking. The phoenix is not simply any bird or a particular purchased material. It names or images the philosophical subject whose ordered transformation the book has sought to explain.

The regeneration passages supply a close internal connection. Putrefaction and separation free the subject from grossness and impurity and bring it into a new noble spiritual form; this is a type and living image of resurrection (II.223.2). The world's enduring substance is likewise transformed rather than absolutely annihilated (II.229.1). These passages support a renewal reading without requiring an invented stage-by-stage phoenix recipe.

Places to read

PRE.EMBLEM (unnumbered frontispiece); PRE.ARMS (unnumbered explanation of the arms); I.001 ([1], title page). The Christian motto, heraldic explanation and bilingual title.

II.233.2 (source pp. 233–234); II.242.1 (source pp. 242–243). The concluding reference to the philosophical phoenix and the subject of the art.

II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). The internal pattern of regeneration and enduring substance.

Connections

Resurrection and World and its end explain the renewal framework, while Subject of the art gives the positive referent discussed in the conclusion. Anonymous author concerns the limits of what the heraldic passage reveals. White and red tinctures prevents the title adjective from narrowing the whole operation to white alone.

Translation in this edition

Phœnix and its inflected Phœnicem are the same source word in different grammatical settings. The ligature is preserved in the original. "Bird reborn" conveys the motto's reparabilis ales in this context, and "portrays Christ" retains its explicit theological identification rather than substituting a general idea of renewal.

Attested forms

Phœnix — phoenix. PRE.EMBLEM (unnumbered frontispiece).

Phœnicem — phoenix; inflected Latin form. PRE.ARMS (unnumbered explanation of the arms); II.233.2 (source pp. 233–234).

CANDIDA PHŒNIX PHILOSOPHICA — The White Philosophical Phoenix. I.001 ([1], title page).

Cautions

The paratext does not warrant a complete history of phoenix symbolism, a secure author attribution from the arms or an exact material identity. The source's own explanations should take priority over imported esoteric correspondences. The image illuminates the book's subject and aspirations while leaving substantial parts of the practical process unstated.

See also

Resurrection; World and its end; Subject of the art; Anonymous author; White and red tinctures

Residues

Excrementen · excrementis · excrementum

Accidental impurities rather than essential contrariety

At a Glance

The word. Residues are the accidental impurities that obscure and burden substance without constituting its essential nature.

In the Candida. Their removal explains purification, regeneration and the analogy between the philosophical work and the world's renewal.

In this edition. Excrementa is rendered residues or wastes rather than restricted to bodily excretion.

A place to read. Read pp. 218–223 with pp. 32–35 for the distinction between accidental coat and substantial vehicle.

Meaning

Residues is a crucial English rendering because a misleadingly narrow sense of excrementa would distort the book's natural philosophy. The term includes the impure and superfluous material mingled with substance in lower bodies. It is not confined to digestive excretion. The author opposes residues to essential substance, and assigns corruption's evil to the accidental part rather than making contradiction intrinsic to substance itself.

This does not mean the residues are imaginary or harmless. They are said to exceed substance, contaminate its apparent purity and threaten to choke it unless art intervenes. The distinction concerns their relation to essential being: they can be removed, whereas the substance and its coordinated principles are not thereby absolutely destroyed.

The resulting distinction is relational and causal: a residue can obstruct a body's apparent perfection without becoming one of the essential principles by which that body has substantial being.

Use in the book

Part One supplies the practical groundwork. The visible shell of the subject has substantial and accidental aspects. The first separation removes contrary and superfluous things that lack a natural bond with the substance, including elemental superfluities and Excrementen (I.032.1). The second distinguishes parts related in substance and power. Thus residues are not identical with every bodily condition. The substantial shell is also the vehicle through which the spirit becomes tangible.

The early account of spoiled remedies uses a related vocabulary. Apothecaries' distilled waters that lose taste, smell and colour leave only phlegm; an apple that loses those qualities through decay leaves an

Excrementum (I.022.1). These examples explain what the author regards as the loss of a thing's useful life and essence. They do not establish that every sensory change is a sufficient modern analysis of the remaining matter.

At p. 165 opposition among separated elements is called accidental, concerning qualities rather than essence. The perfection of the work occurs by removing superfluities (II.165.2). The maxim that nothing is to be added or diminished must be read with its final qualification: superfluous things are to be removed. Purification is selective, not a denial that any material leaves the work.

The reply letter gives the fuller definition. Lower bodies consist of substance and residues; the former is essential, the latter accidental (II.218.2). Substance considered in itself is pure. The residue exceeds it and mingles with it, contaminating or distorting its purity, yet can be separated by art. Nuysement is cited for assigning the evil of corruption following the first parents' sin to residues rather than substance. The causal and theological claims are the reply's argument, not neutral definitions imposed by the edition.

At p. 219 the writer explains why substance is also simple and admits no contrariety. Its three principles may be separated but not essentially divided; each is in its companion (II.219.1). Our Mercury is said to receive only what is homogeneous with its essence (II.219.2). An objection that impurity visibly occurs in a body is therefore answered by distinguishing accidental mixture from essential admission of a contrary nature.

The application to sin at pp. 220–222 is careful in one respect and forceful in another. "Whatever is in man is substance" is rejected; sin is not substance (II.220.2). Corruption adheres principally to the accidental residual flesh, while sin nevertheless contaminates the whole earthly human being (II.221.1–II.222.2). The argument should not be simplified either into sin being an independently created substance or into an innocent body whose outward dirt alone needs washing.

The physical analogy describes residue as threatening to choke the substance unless removed by art after putrefaction and with great diligence (II.222.2). Putrefaction is preparatory; separation is the subsequent intervention. At p. 223 regeneration frees the subject from grossness and impurity and gives a living image of resurrection (II.223.2). The same logic governs the cosmic conclusion, where excrementitious earth and accidental features pass away while enduring substance is transformed into crystalline clarity (II.228.1–II.231.1).

Places to read

I.022.1 (source pp. 22–23); I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33); I.035.1 (source pp. 35–36). Spoiled matter, accidental residue and the necessary substantial vehicle.

II.165.2 (source pp. 165–166); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.219.1 (source p. 219); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). Removal of superfluities and the substance-residue definition.

II.220.2 (source pp. 220–221); II.221.1 (source pp. 221–222); II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223); II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229); II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). The application to sin, purification and cosmic renewal.

Connections

Substance and Accident supply the conceptual opposition. Separation gives the two operations that must not be confused. Putrefaction explains the preparatory stage, while Corruption and sin and World and its end address the theological extensions. Salt philosophical is a useful corrective to any reading that treats all bodily material as waste.

Translation in this edition

Excrementum and excrementa are rendered residue or residues in the natural-philosophical passages, with waste where that best fits the example. "Excrementitious earth" preserves the source's unusual adjective in the cosmic conclusion; it identifies the impure condition, not all earth or every substantial body. Superfluities translates the related but not verbally identical superflua vocabulary.

The active suffocare in the crucial Latin comparison is understood as the residue choking substance, not substance choking residue. The grammar and subsequent demand for separation support that direction. Preserving the relation matters because the theological comparison takes its force from impurity threatening what it contaminates.[105]

Attested forms

Excrementen — residues or wastes; German plural. I.032.1 (source pp. 32–33).

excrementis — residues; inflected Latin plural. II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219).

excrementum — residue; Latin singular. II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223).

superfluitatibus — superfluities; inflected Latin plural. II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232).

[105] At II.222.2 suffocare is active: the excessive residue threatens to choke substance unless separated. A passive or reversed reading would distort both the physical comparison and its ensuing application to sin.

Cautions

The account is neither a modern theory of toxins nor an instruction to identify sinful human flesh as a disposable chemical residue. The author's physical-theological analogy requires interpretation at each level. His distinction of essential and accidental parts should also not be turned into an assertion that particular natures remain unchanged through the world's end: he explicitly allows their resolution while universal natures endure.

See also

Substance; Accident; Separation; Putrefaction; Corruption and sin; World and its end; Salt philosophical

Signs and miracles

Wunder- und Zornzeichen · andeuten

Visible events interpreted as divine indications

At a Glance

The word. A sign is an event read as indicating a divine intention beyond its visible occurrence.

In the Candida. Comets are interpreted as God's temporary creations and as signs of wrath.

In this edition. The reading separates a claim about an event's origin from the author's interpretation of its significance.

A place to read. II.093.1–II.094.1, pp. 93–94.

Meaning

The comet discussion explicitly distinguishes origin from significance. The author says that the appearances of 1664 and 1665 occasioned strange judgements on both questions. His own account then connects the temporary star to God's direct action and to a purpose of signification. The visible event belongs within a providential interpretation of history.

Signs should therefore not be reduced here to physical symptoms of an impersonal mechanism. The author denies that nature acts independently and treats the comet as created when God wishes it to shine and indicate something. Its disappearance follows the same account. This is a theological explanation of a natural appearance, with an intended message attributed to God.

Use in the book

At II.093.2, the author recalls the modest opinion stated in his earlier rainwater treatise of 1665. Scripture, he argues, says stars are made to shine upon the earth rather than remain hidden until a particular time. He therefore regards the comet as created for its appearance and later removed. The argument is part of his wider insistence that no nature acts of itself.

At II.094.1, he turns to significance and says that recent events in various places have shown comets to be wondrous signs and tokens of divine wrath. He does not provide a catalogue of those events in this brief passage. A lexicon should preserve that limitation rather than invent wars, deaths or disasters to complete the association.[106]

[106] II.094.1 appeals generally to recent events in various places without enumerating them. Any identification of a particular disaster as the intended fulfilment would therefore be an additional historical conjecture, not information stated here.

The entry also helps distinguish several kinds of meaning in the book. A colour arising in a vessel may be interpreted within an operation. A philosophical material name may refer to universal matter. A comet can be read as a divine warning. All involve interpretation, but they do not establish one general code that can be applied without context.

The discussion belongs near the chapters on thunder, lightning, weather and witchcraft because these too concern the powers responsible for unusual events. The author repeatedly limits the independent agency of created powers. The resulting picture is providential, though the specific explanation differs from one phenomenon to another. The comet entry supplies the fuller account of the event; this entry isolates its function as a sign.

Places to read

II.093.1 (source p. 93); II.093.2 (source pp. 93–94); II.094.1 (source p. 94). The two questions of origin and significance, and the appeal to an earlier treatise.

II.063.1 (source p. 63). The wider account of nature as a capacity and subject in which God acts.

Translation in this edition

Wunder- und Zornzeichen is rendered as wondrous signs and tokens of wrath. The compound retains both the extraordinary character and the theological judgement. Andeuten is to signify or indicate. The translation does not replace these terms with an invented astrological prediction.

Attested forms

Wunder- und Zornzeichen — wondrous signs and tokens of wrath. II.094.1 (source p. 94).

andeuten — to signify or indicate. II.093.2 (source pp. 93–94).

Cautions

The passage states the author's interpretation of comets. It establishes neither a modern astronomical mechanism nor a verified connection between an appearance and a specific later calamity.

See also

Comets; Providence; Efficient cause; Weather and witchcraft; Allegory and analogy

Urim and Thummim

Urim und Thumim · URIM & THUMIM · Album & Rubrum Philosophicum

A biblical identification offered through philosophical White and Red

At a Glance

The word. Urim and Thummim are biblical names which the author identifies with the philosophical White and Red.

In the Candida. The identification supports claims about Solomon's wisdom and purified universal substance, with a later appeal to ruby-like crystals.

In this edition. The English uses the conventional name Thummim while preserving the source's spellings in the original.

A place to read. Read p. 201 with p. 224; the latter makes the grounds and degree of the author's assent especially clear.

Meaning

The entry concerns the author's alchemical interpretation of the biblical names, not an established identification of ancient objects. Urim and Thummim enter first through the priestly ornament described in the precious-stone chapter, then through the argument for Solomon's knowledge, and finally through the reply letter's discussion of purified substance. The changing settings matter: a scriptural description, a historical-theological inference and a reported philosophical experience are not the same kind of evidence.

Use in the book

At pp. 114–115 the author recalls the twelve stones of the high priest's breastplate, with the names of Israel's tribes, and places Urim and Thummim within that splendid priestly ornament (II.114.2). The passage explains why precious stones deserve attention as noble works of God and as analogies for the operation of the subject. It does not yet demonstrate that the breastplate's objects are philosophical tinctures.

At p. 201 the identification becomes explicit. Solomon's wisdom and the supposed greater knowledge of the art among the Jews support the assertion that Urim and Thummim were nothing other than the philosophical White and Red (II.201.1). Wisdom 7 is then invoked for knowledge of the world's making and the power of the elements. The author directs the reader toward the following letter and chapter thirteen, connecting the claim with the book's account of substance.

At p. 224 the reply writer states his grounds more carefully. Considering the preceding arguments, and especially because he has more than once seen

crystals like rubies in his labours, he agrees with those who maintain this identification (II.224.1). He says it seems highly probable that God answered Israel through that purified substance. The language marks assent and probability, not an eyewitness report about the ancient priesthood.[107]

The explanation depends on purity and origin. This substance is freed of every impurity, immediately created through God's substantial Word, the source from which all things were formed, and more precious than anything except the human soul. The Urim-Thummim interpretation consequently reinforces the book's hierarchy of causes and perfection. It is not merely an observation that red gems exist.

The passage also follows the subject's regeneration through putrefaction and separation, which is called a living image of Christian transmutation and blessedness (II.223.2). That sequence gives the biblical identification a theological setting. The author is interpreting a divinely ordered substance whose purification discloses significance across nature and Scripture.

Places to read

II.114.2 (source pp. 114–115). The high-priestly ornament in the precious-stone chapter.

II.201.1 (source p. 201). The explicit White-and-Red identification in the Solomon discussion.

II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.224.1 (source p. 224). Regeneration, ruby-like crystals, probability and purified substance in the reply.

Connections

White and red tinctures explains the philosophical pair. Solomon and wisdom supplies the argument in chapter twelve; Generation of precious stones supplies the earlier setting. Substance and Logos subsistent clarify why the reply places such weight on purity, immediate origin and permanence.

Translation in this edition

The original varies between Thumim and THUMIM. The English uses Thummim as a recognizable form of the biblical name, without claiming that the translation resolves the historical identity of the objects. Album and Rubrum are rendered White and Red where used substantivally; "philosophical" remains explicit. They should not be silently converted into two specified modern gemstones or chemicals.

[107] The reply says he agrees with those who maintain the identification and calls the proposed divine use highly probable (II.224.1). Those qualifications distinguish inherited interpretation and personal assent from a claim to have directly witnessed the ancient objects.

Attested forms

Urim und Thumim — Urim and Thummim in German connective spelling. II.201.1 (source p. 201).

URIM & THUMIM — Urim and Thummim in the Latin reply. II.224.1 (source p. 224).

Album & Rubrum Philosophicum — philosophical White and Red. II.201.1 (source p. 201); II.224.1 (source p. 224).

Cautions

The author's identification is an interpretation, and the reply's highly probable judgment should remain a judgment. Ruby-like crystals do not establish an ancient material identity by themselves. No unsupported derivation of the Hebrew names or archaeological conclusion is required to understand the local argument, and none is asserted here.

See also

White and red tinctures; Solomon and wisdom; Generation of precious stones; Substance; Logos subsistent

White and red tinctures

Tinctura Solis & Lunæ ad rubeum & album · album & rubrum Sulphur · Album & Rubrum Philosophicum

A philosophical pair distinct from a full colour sequence

At a Glance

The word. White and red occur as tincturing ends, forms of Sulphur and the philosophical pair identified with Urim and Thummim.

In the Candida. The pair has technical and theological uses, while fixed redness is separately named as an endpoint of the work.

In this edition. The translation preserves the actual local expression: tincture, Sulphur, or substantival White and Red.

A place to read. Read p. 91, p. 155 and pp. 201 and 224, attending to what the colour adjectives qualify.

Meaning

White and red should not be collapsed into one universal technical formula. The book uses them in several related constructions: the tincture of Sun and Moon for red and white, white and red Sulphur, and philosophical White and Red as names identified with Urim and Thummim. The relation among these constructions belongs to the book's system of principles and perfected powers, but their verbal differences remain significant.

Use in the book

At p. 91 a quoted hierarchy places the philosophers' stone first, followed by the tincture of Sun and Moon ad rubeum et album, then other named tinctures (II.091.1). The next paragraph says all arise from one seed and matrix (II.091.2). The pair therefore belongs to derivative philosophical works flowing from a common source, not two unrelated ordinary starting materials.

At p. 155 white and red qualify Sulphur. The author is answering the claim that diamond arises from nature's vapour without Sulphur. A diamond can no more be without sulphur than without salt; he then notes that both white and red Sulphur occur in his philosophy (II.155.1). The existence of white Sulphur helps resist a simplistic inference from visible colourlessness to the absence of the fire principle. The passage does not give a recipe or assign a modern composition to either form.

At p. 170 water changes through colours to the highest colour and fixed redness, at which point the tincture is possessed (II.170.1). The importance of red here includes fixation and perfection. It should not be reduced to any

red appearance, nor should it be assumed that this one sentence explains every use of white elsewhere.

The theological identification at p. 201 says Urim and Thummim were the philosophical White and Red (II.201.1). At p. 224 the reply writer agrees with those holding this view and finds it highly probable that God answered Israel through the purified substance, appealing especially to ruby-like crystals seen in his own labours (II.224.1). White and Red here function substantivally. The claim concerns purified substance and sacred knowledge as much as ordinary colour.

The title's White Philosophical Phoenix supplies another reason for restraint. Although white frames the title, the work repeatedly discusses red perfected matter. The title adjective cannot alone define the work as an exclusively white operation or cancel the later endpoint of fixed redness.

Places to read

II.091.1 (source p. 91); II.091.2 (source pp. 91–92). White and red within the hierarchy of tinctures from one source.

II.155.1 (source p. 155); II.170.1 (source p. 170). White and red Sulphur and the separate endpoint of fixed redness.

I.001 ([1], title page); II.201.1 (source p. 201); II.224.1 (source p. 224). The title and the biblical identification of philosophical White and Red.

Connections

Colours covers the larger range of signs and the three-or-four principal-colour statement. Sulphur philosophical supplies the elemental relation. Urim and Thummim develops the qualified biblical interpretation. Tincture and elixir concerns the powers of the resulting preparations, while Phoenix explains the title's paratextual force.

Translation in this edition

Album and rubrum are translated as white and red; when they act as names, the English can use White and Red. The edition does not silently append "tincture" where the source has substantival adjectives, or replace Sulphur with tincture where Sulphur is actually written. The headword gathers the pair for reference while the individual passages keep their grammar.[108]

Attested forms

Tinctura Solis & Lunæ ad rubeum & album — tincture of Sun and Moon for red and white. II.091.1 (source p. 91).

[108] The objects qualified by white and red differ: tincture at II.091.1, Sulphur at II.155.1, and substantive White and Red at II.224.1. Keeping the grammar avoids treating related expressions as three verbatim definitions of one fully specified product.

album & rubrum Sulphur — white and red Sulphur. II.155.1 (source p. 155).

Album & Rubrum Philosophicum — philosophical White and Red. II.224.1 (source p. 224).

Cautions

No complete standardized sequence or exact chemical identity follows from this pair alone. The Urim-Thummim identification is the author's interpretation, not an archaeological conclusion. Likewise, white and red Sulphur do not authorize treating ordinary white and red substances as interchangeable philosophical ingredients.

See also

Colours; Sulphur philosophical; Urim and Thummim; Tincture and elixir; Phoenix; Fixation

Knowledge proof and ethical practice

Art and science

Wissenschafft · Kunst · Theoria

Theory gives reasons and art performs the work

At a Glance

The word. Art names disciplined making; science names the knowledge that makes its operations intelligible.

In the Candida. The author places the present treatise chiefly on the side of theory, while repeatedly insisting that theory must guide work.

In this edition. Art and science retain their historical breadth. Neither is automatically equivalent to a modern academic department.

A place to read. I.003.2, pp. 3–4, followed by II.186.2–II.189.1, pp. 186–190.

Meaning

The distinction first enters through Claude Germain, presented as a physician at Paris. On pp. 3–4, the author reports his division between theory as science and practice as art. The division explains what sort of book the reader has opened. Its principal undertaking is to describe rainwater, the universal medicine and the subject of the art through an account of nature. It promises reasons and relations before complete practical directions.[109]

Art nevertheless has a wider setting than manual competence. The opening appeal to Gerlandus or Hortulanus and to Sendivogius presents the art as an imitation of the creation narrated in Genesis. A successful operation follows an order already established by God. Its intelligibility consequently depends on theology and natural philosophy as well as on trained handling. The author's distinction between science and art does not separate natural investigation from religious understanding.

Science here should also be distinguished from mere possession of statements. The theoretical account must identify the appropriate matter and explain why a proposed operation can lead to its desired end. A collection of recipes, authorities or attractive names does not yet accomplish this. The repeated criticism of mistaken labours is a criticism of operations whose causal foundation has not been understood.

[109] The report concerning Germain is at I.003.2, pp. 3–4. The present entry follows the Candida's use of his distinction; it does not claim a fresh collation of the cited French author's work. On the practical consequences within the Candida, compare II.055.2 and II.186.2.

Use in the book

The Second Part opens by explaining why a theoretical treatise discusses failed laboratory work: mistaken operations proceed from false theory (II.055.2). The relationship runs in both directions. Theory selects and interprets the work, while manual labour can clarify obscure philosophical statements and deepen knowledge of nature. The order of learning is therefore structured without becoming purely bookish.

Chapter Ten makes this structure explicit. The practitioner needs knowledge of nature, of the matter, of the process and a Christian life (II.186.2). These requirements are connected. Without knowing nature one cannot recognize the matter; without the matter, practical effort is vain. Labour in turn discloses further secrets of nature and increases recognition of divine wisdom and beneficence. The account of art is thus simultaneously causal, practical and ethical.

The account also explains the author's restricted disclosure. A theoretical exposition can indicate the beginning, means and end without giving every manipulation. At the close, the reader is urged to read and reflect before approaching the fire. A recipe pursued without sound theory produces uncertainty: even someone who happens upon the right matter may change the process, abandon it prematurely and conclude that the art is false (II.189.1). This argument describes the author's rationale for the book's form; it does not independently establish that the promised work succeeds.

The imitation of creation is also a rule about the relation between a model and an operation. The author does not say that the artist creates a world from nothing. Rather, the artist works within a created order, with capacities already present in an appropriate matter. This matters when the language of divine work seems to grant unlimited power to the human worker. The book places restrictions on what can be done with particular materials and repeatedly rejects ambitious procedures whose starting nature cannot support their intended end. Art imitates an order; it does not abolish that order. The explanation of particular preparations in I.012.1 and the later warning about philosophical metal names at II.235.1 make that restriction concrete. Their shared point is that a name, an analogy or a clear account of handling cannot replace a causally adequate subject.

The work's science likewise includes judgement about the kinds of explanation available. Metallic generation is called conjectural at II.107.1, while operations provide opportunities for observation at II.108.1. The author thus allows a reasoned account to have a qualified evidential standing. He also separates the learned understanding of nature from the mere accumulation of prestigious opinions. At the close of the First Part, authorities are to be weighed rather than counted. These qualifications belong to the meaning of science in the book: systematic knowledge is

sought through interpretation and comparison, but individual claims still need an account of their grounds. For a reader moving between the theological, mineral and medical chapters, the theory-and-art distinction is therefore a useful starting point rather than a complete sorting rule. Each claim must still be read according to its speaker, intended object and mode of support. The entries on testimony and conjecture continue the inquiry begun here.

Places to read

I.003.1 (source p. 3); I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4). Creation as the model of art and Germain's distinction between theory and practice.

II.055.2 (source pp. 55–56). The causal diagnosis of mistaken labours as effects of false theory.

II.186.2 (source p. 186); II.186.3 (source pp. 186–187); II.188.1 (source p. 188); II.189.1 (source pp. 189–190). The ordered qualifications and the reciprocal work of reading and experiment.

II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242); II.243.1 (source p. 243). Partial disclosure and the final injunction to read before working.

Translation in this edition

Kunst is rendered as art where the subject is a disciplined practice. It can imply skill, method or an entire tradition, rather than fine art in the narrower contemporary sense. Wissenschafft and the Latin Theoria belong to the account of knowledge and explanation. Practice renders Praxis and its inflected forms. The English words should be read together: science supplies an intelligible account, and art undertakes the corresponding work.

Attested forms

Wissenschafft — science or systematic knowledge. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Kunst — art. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Theoria — theory. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Praxi — practice in an inflected Latin form. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Cautions

The theoretical and practical distinction is the author's declared arrangement. It should not be turned into a claim that the book gives a complete experimental protocol. Nor does its use of science validate its natural or medical conclusions by present standards.

See also

Creation and imitation; Knowledge and practice; Experience and conjecture; Subject of the art; Prayer reading and meditation

Authority and testimony

Zeugnuß · Authorum

How named witnesses support an anonymous argument

At a Glance

The word. Authority identifies a speaker or tradition; testimony supplies a reported observation or achievement.

In the Candida. The anonymous author assembles scriptural, philosophical, medical and legal witnesses while denying that numbers of authorities decide truth.

In this edition. Reported testimony remains attributed. The lexicon distinguishes what the author says he observed from what he cites.

A place to read. I.050.1–I.051.1, pp. 50–52, and II.179.2–II.185.1, pp. 179–185.

Meaning

The book is full of voices. Scripture, alchemical writers, physicians, legal maxims, unnamed correspondents and the author's own experience appear in different argumentative roles. An authority can provide an interpretation, a warning, a technical distinction or a claim of successful practice. Testimony is especially prominent when the author argues for the scope of the medicine. Reading these voices requires attention to who speaks and what kind of support is being offered.

The author's anonymity makes this attention particularly useful. He presents himself as a Christian investigator with practical experience, but readers cannot simply verify the identity behind that claim from the printed name. His case is instead built from reasons, citations, reports and assertions about his own conduct. The lexicon preserves that distribution of evidence without supplying an identity the source does not establish.

Authority is also not a single hierarchy in which any famous philosopher settles every question. The author praises Paracelsus for useful instruction yet subsequently disputes the account of homunculi. He can cite an author approvingly on one subject and reject him on another. The same care is necessary with the two Latin letters on light, whose correspondents defend opposing positions.

Use in the book

The close of the First Part states the rule with unusual clarity. Common opinion is insufficient; opinions must be weighed rather than counted. The author appeals both to Scripture and to Justinian's injunction against deciding by the multitude of authors. These authorities support an

argument for evaluating authorities. The effect is not a rejection of all tradition, but a demand that the reader assess reasons within it (I.050.1–I.051.1).

The medicine chapters offer a particularly dense test. At II.179.2, the author invokes writers and the epitaph of Theophrastus for wide curative claims. At II.180.2, he speaks more narrowly of his own experience at the lowest degree of the medicine. Higher degrees, preservation of health, metallic transmutation and the enhancement of gemstones are then supported through further reports, distinctions and expectations. These claims should not be flattened into a single declaration that the author personally demonstrated every effect.[110]

The account of broken vessels offers another valuable distinction. The author reports seeing coloured flowers after careless management of fire (II.112.1). That observation illustrates a practical encounter with colours; it does not demonstrate every theory of metallic generation discussed nearby. Conversely, an author's admitted conjecture should not be promoted to eyewitness certainty merely because it is printed in a confident treatise.

The book's polemical judgement also shapes its testimony. Honest physicians are represented as potential beneficiaries, while fraudulent claimants are accused of giving opponents grounds to revile the art. The lexicon identifies these as the author's classifications. They tell us how he organizes assent and opposition, but do not independently settle the credibility of each historical person.

The two Latin letters make the cost of careless attribution particularly clear. The first correspondent argues for light as an accident; the reply defends light as substance. The fact that both are printed in the same work does not make their propositions jointly the doctrine of one speaker. A summary must preserve the sequence of objection and answer, just as a discussion of a cure must preserve the difference between a cited report and autobiographical experience. The relevant question is always local: who asserts this proposition here, and is the passage endorsing, contesting or merely presenting it? Entries on Light, Substance and Accident supply the detailed locators for that exchange. Their separation helps the reader recognize that a multi-voiced book can contain a structured dispute rather than a list of interchangeable authorities.

Attribution can also be mediated. The money maxim on pp. 192–193 is assigned to Geber according to the Lamp of the Philosophers' Salt. That chain is part of the evidence. Removing the intermediate work would make the edition appear to have verified a direct quotation it has not separately

[110] II.180.2 describes personal experience at the lowest degree. II.181.1 then turns toward further degrees and preservation of health. This change of evidential level is easily lost when the whole medical discussion is summarized as one autobiographical claim.

collated. Likewise, the double duty of the philosopher on p. 194 is received through the Candida's attribution to Antonius de Abbatia. The lexicon can explain its role with confidence while leaving the exact earlier printed source open. This is especially important in an alchemical literature where names, titles and collections can circulate in complex forms. An entry's caution about an attribution does not render the passage useless. It identifies exactly what has been established: this anonymous author invokes this named voice for this argument at this place. Further bibliographic confirmation would add a different kind of evidence, rather than change the present passage's immediate rhetorical function.

Places to read

I.050.1 (source pp. 50–51); I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52). The refusal to decide truth by the size of an intellectual majority.

II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108); II.108.1 (source p. 108); II.112.1 (source p. 112). Conjecture, observation and the limited inference warranted by a reported accident.

II.179.2 (source pp. 179–180); II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181); II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182); II.184.1 (source p. 184); II.185.1 (source p. 185). Several levels of medical and material testimony.

II.191.1 (source pp. 191–192); II.192.1 (source p. 192); II.194.1 (source p. 194). Selective approval of Theophrastus followed by criticism.

Translation in this edition

Zeugnuß is testimony: its presence signals an appeal to witness, rather than a demonstration supplied to the present reader. Expressions such as the author reports, the cited writer claims and the author says he experienced preserve the source's attribution. They are especially important where the English summary would otherwise make an inherited claim sound like a result independently confirmed for this edition.

Attested forms

Zeugnuß — testimony. II.179.2 (source pp. 179–180).

Authorum — of authors in the quoted Latin argument. I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52).

Cautions

A citation establishes that the book invokes a witness. It does not by itself establish the witness's accuracy, the exact authorship of every work circulating under a famous name, or the successful replication of a reported process.

See also

Anonymous author; Common opinion; Experience and conjecture; Truth and falsehood; Physicians; Paracelsus and Theophrastus

Axioms

axioma · Quod nempe non detur regressus in naturâ · qualis causa talis effectus

General propositions used to control practical inference

At a Glance

The word. An axiom is a general proposition invoked as a stable rule of reasoning.

In the Candida. The rules against a return in nature and for correspondence between cause and effect restrict the choice of alchemical matter.

In this edition. The maxims are interpreted through the author's examples rather than expanded into unrestricted laws.

A place to read. I.012.1, pp. 12–13.

Meaning

The early discussion of particular bodies culminates in two compact Latin maxims. The first denies a return in nature; the second correlates the character of a cause with its effect. Their immediate purpose is practical. They explain why preparations from particular animals, plants or minerals do not yield the universal medicine merely because those things ultimately descend from more general principles.

An axiom in this setting is not a numbered chemical equation. It is a proposition the author treats as established and uses to judge proposed operations. The reader must therefore attend to its application. What kind of return is denied? What makes a cause particular? Which effect is being sought? The surrounding discussion supplies the necessary limits.

Use in the book

At I.011.1, the author traces human nourishment and metallic constitution toward simpler origins. At I.012.1, he prevents the reader from turning that conceptual account into a reversible practical chain. Chymistry may obtain vegetable water, oil and salt, or the Mercury, Sulphur and Salt of a particular metal. It does not thereby recover the universal principles in their original condition.[111]

The cause-and-effect maxim provides the second restriction. A particular starting nature yields effects corresponding to that nature. Combining several particular preparations does not remove their specification and produce a universal subject. The universal medicine therefore requires a

[111] I.012.1 names Ristius immediately after the Latin maxims. Ristius is the reading in the checked corpus; it should not be silently replaced by the more familiar alchemical name Ripley.

subject universal in itself. The account of the Sudum Philosophicum on p. 13 reinforces this reading: universality is gathered in one matter rather than assembled by bringing an ingredient from every separate thing.

The same rule helps explain the warning about rainwater's kinship with the Hermetic subject. Related materials are not automatically interchangeable. The author denies that treating or fixing rainwater and the Hermetic subject together will succeed, and cites the warning that mixing can ruin even the right matter. A general proposition becomes useful only when the worker recognizes the relevant nature and seed. The axioms thus support a discipline of refusing unwarranted practical conclusions.

The closing claim that a wrong beginning produces a wrong end belongs to the same argumentative pattern (II.235.1). A clear process cannot compensate for a matter whose capacities are unequal to the proposed goal. These maxims give the theoretical treatise much of its practical force: they are meant to rule out false beginnings before resources are committed.

Places to read

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); I.013.1 (source p. 13). Conceptual reduction, the two maxims and the meaning of universality.

II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76); II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78). Particular powers and the failure of an apparently plausible mixture.

II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236). The wrong beginning and the necessarily mistaken end.

Translation in this edition

Axioma is axiom. The no-return maxim is kept close to its wording, with the local discussion explaining the intended practical claim. The cause-and-effect maxim is rendered as as the cause is, so is the effect. Neither should be silently substituted by a modern conservation law or a claim that no natural process can ever recur.

Attested forms

axioma — axiom. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13).

Quod nempe non detur regressus in naturâ — that there is no return in nature. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13).

qualis causa talis effectus — as the cause is so is the effect. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13).

Cautions

The entry describes propositions the author invokes, not self-evident principles binding all natural inquiry. Their scope here is established by the particular argument about matter and operation.

See also

Knowledge and practice; Universal and particular; Subject of the art; Efficient cause

Charity

Liebe des Nächsten

The neighbour as the intended beneficiary of the art

At a Glance

The word. Charity is practical love of the neighbour and the moral use of knowledge and material benefits.

In the Candida. The author makes service to others a motive for publication and a qualification for successful practice.

In this edition. Love of the neighbour is retained as an ethical expression; it is not reduced to financial giving alone.

A place to read. II.237.2–II.239.1, pp. 237–240, and II.244.1, pp. 244–245.

Meaning

Charity places the alchemical undertaking within the author's account of Christian life. The desired medicine and knowledge of nature are goods to be used for the neighbour. Their value is therefore inseparable from the purpose for which a practitioner seeks and possesses them. Wealth, health and skill can serve a Christian end, but they can also feed avarice, pride and licence.

The term has a public as well as a personal dimension. The author explains publication by appealing to divine beneficence. God communicates good without distinction; the person made in God's image should imitate that generosity through service. The resulting argument supports explaining and defending the art, even while the book withholds certain manipulations. Charity and secrecy consequently inhabit the same argument and require interpretation together.

Charity is also broader than the relief of poverty. The closing pages envisage honest physicians recognizing the appropriate matter and using it in their calling. Helping those physicians to understand the medicine would, in the author's account, benefit their patients. Intellectual instruction and useful treatment can thus be forms of neighbourly service.

Use in the book

Chapter Ten names a Christian life among the four qualifications for the work (II.186.2). The requirement is not added after a complete account of technique. The author claims that without such a life the practitioner cannot reach a favourable end. He also describes a reciprocal movement: labour deepens knowledge of nature, recognition of God's power and

mercy, faith and gratitude. Ethical formation is therefore woven into the account of knowing and working.

The discussion of Theophrastus shows the same selective moral evaluation. The author praises the sharing of wealth with the poor and presents Christian belief and neighbourly love as grounds for defending him against accusations (II.191.1). Yet he immediately limits his discipleship and later rejects the homunculus claim. Charity helps explain the praise without making it an endorsement of everything attributed to Theophrastus.

At II.238.2, the author invokes the preference associated with Dr Dienheim: better that some unworthy persons benefit than that all worthy persons be deprived. This makes the cost of excessive concealment visible. Complete withholding would also exclude sincere physicians and needy people. The author nevertheless insists that possessors of the secret should protect it from abuse and protect themselves from danger (II.243.2). The reader encounters a negotiated boundary, rather than a simple command to disclose everything.[112]

The final appeal returns to the same standard. Honour to God, confirmation of Christian faith and benefit to poor Christians are presented as the proper ends. The warning against avarice and pride explains why the art is imagined as a gift with obligations. Reading the chapter only as a promise of enrichment misses the author's declared account of what enrichment is for.

Places to read

II.186.2 (source p. 186); II.186.3 (source pp. 186–187). Christian conduct among the qualifications and effects of practical work.

II.191.1 (source pp. 191–192); II.192.1 (source p. 192). Theophrastus praised for useful instruction and charity within a limited endorsement.

II.237.2 (source pp. 237–238); II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239). Divine generosity, neighbourly service and the argument for publication.

II.243.2 (source pp. 243–244); II.244.1 (source pp. 244–245). Protective silence and the final account of proper ends.

Translation in this edition

Liebe des Nächsten is translated as love of the neighbour. Charity is used as the entry's organizing headword because it connects the passage to the broader ethical argument, but the German expression should remain

[112] Dr Dienheim is named in the comparison at II.238.2. The proposition is cited here as it is received in the Candida; no independent identification of an exact earlier printed passage is implied. The contrast between communicating benefit and preventing abuse is explicit in II.243.2.

audible. It identifies a relation to other persons, not simply an agreeable feeling or a discretionary donation.

Attested forms

Liebe des Nächsten — love of the neighbour. II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239).

Cautions

The author claims that moral purpose matters to attainment. The lexicon explains that historical claim without offering character as evidence that the medical and alchemical promises have been verified.

See also

Creation and imitation; Knowledge and practice; Secrecy and publication; Money and expense; Physicians; Prayer reading and meditation

Common opinion

communem opinionem · ponderandæ

Opinions are to be weighed rather than counted

At a Glance

The word. Common opinion means an accepted view supported by the agreement of many people or writers.

In the Candida. The author refuses to let a majority decide whether the spirit over the waters is created.

In this edition. The expression concerns argumentative authority, rather than a statistical survey of readers.

A place to read. I.050.1–I.051.1, pp. 50–52.

Meaning

Common opinion appears near the end of the First Part as an argument the author must answer. The issue is whether the great spirit hovering over the waters should be identified with God the Holy Spirit or regarded as created. The author argues for a created spirit and refuses to regard widespread assent to the opposing view as decisive.

His position does not reject every inherited interpretation. He relies on Scripture, named philosophical sources and a legal injunction. The target is a particular way of using inheritance: counting supporters in place of considering what their reasons establish. The famous contrast between weighing and counting opinions summarizes this demand.

Use in the book

At I.050.1, the author invokes the prohibition on following the multitude to evil and the admonition to test all things and keep the good. These scriptural appeals give a Christian justification for examining an accepted view. He then adds the Latin maxim that a multitude of people in error provides no defence for error. Agreement can coexist with mistake.

At I.051.1, Justinian's instruction makes the point in a different register. The opinion of one, even a less eminent person, may surpass many greater authorities in some respect. The author concludes that opinions must be weighed rather than counted. He then restates his own conclusion about the created spirit and closes with an explicit confession of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.[113]

[113] The legal reference at I.051.1 is given in the source as the Code's title on elucidating the old law, with the opening Sed neque ex multitudine. Its function here is to reject counting authorities. The natural and theological conclusion that follows still depends on the preceding argument.

That final confession prevents a misleading reading of the dispute. Rejecting the identification of this created spirit with the Holy Spirit is not presented as a rejection of the Trinity. The author takes pains to distinguish his natural interpretation of the Genesis passage from his Christian confession. A summary that suppresses the confession would make the polemic appear more sweeping than the source permits.

The rule is also useful elsewhere in the book. A famous alchemical name does not receive universal assent: Theophrastus is praised for some instruction and criticized on homunculi. The two Latin correspondents on light likewise must be distinguished rather than combined into an authoritative consensus. Common opinion is therefore a local entry with a wider reading consequence: attributed arguments remain arguments even when they arrive surrounded by prestigious names.

Places to read

I.050.1 (source pp. 50–51). Scriptural and proverbial grounds for refusing a majority argument.

I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52). Justinian, the weighing of opinions and the concluding Trinitarian confession.

II.192.1 (source p. 192); II.194.1 (source p. 194). Selective approval and criticism of Theophrastus.

Translation in this edition

Common opinion preserves the sense of communem opinionem. Ponderandæ is represented by to be weighed in the maxim about opinions. The metaphor calls for assessment of reasons and relative merit; it does not prescribe a numerical weighting system.

Attested forms

communem opinionem — common opinion in an inflected Latin phrase. I.050.1 (source pp. 50–51).

ponderandæ — to be weighed. I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52).

Cautions

The author's refusal of majority authority does not itself prove his interpretation of Genesis. It states a rule for assessing the dispute, after which the substantive reasons still need examination.

See also

Authority and testimony; Spirit; Trinity; Truth and falsehood

Definition and demonstration

definition · Major · Minor

Describing a nature and arguing from its description

At a Glance

The word. A definition states what is meant; a demonstration seeks to establish a conclusion through reasons and premises.

In the Candida. The extended definition of rainwater supplies propositions that the Second Part develops into a causal argument.

In this edition. The lexicon distinguishes the author's stated proof from a result independently demonstrated to the present reader.

A place to read. I.017.2–I.021.1, pp. 17–22, and II.126.1, p. 126.

Meaning

The rainwater definition is an organized programme for the treatise. It describes an artfully made, thin, subtle, transparent, sweet, pleasant, spiritual and simple thing. It then adds more consequential claims: rainwater is an element and throne without a particular divine blessing or command, contains the powers and seeds of visible nature and resides in the air beneath the firmament. These clauses invite different forms of explanation.

Some clauses appeal to visible properties, such as transparency. Others require scriptural reasoning, an account of particularization or an interpretation of latent powers. Calling the whole passage a definition does not make all its clauses equally observational. The author must argue for the relations that allow the sensory, theological and alchemical claims to stand together.

Use in the book

The First Part proceeds through the definition clause by clause. At I.020.1, the claim concerning blessing and command is tied to the account of terrestrial waters and plants in Genesis and to the statement that rain had not yet fallen. The absence of a particular blessing is central. It supports universality and should never be reversed into a claim that rainwater received the same particular command as the waters or earth.[114]

At I.021.1, the claim to contain all colours is illustrated by reported appearances after distillation and drying. The relation between the observed colours and universal capacity is an inference. The entry on experience

[114] The rain clause discussed at I.020.1 is printed with a reference to Genesis 2:2, although the wording concerning the absence of rain belongs to Genesis 2:5. The reading edition records this source misreference rather than silently rewriting the historical citation.

explains why a local appearance and a general conclusion require separate attention.

The later syllogism makes the argumentative structure explicit (II.126.1). Whatever contains animal, vegetable and mineral nature is a perfect subject; rainwater contains these natures; therefore rainwater is a perfect subject. The author identifies the major and minor premises and says the preceding deduction has proved them. From the conclusion he infers the possibility of a metallic tincture and universal medicine.

The passage is valuable because it lets the reader ask precise questions. Whether the inference follows is distinct from whether the premises have been established. Whether rainwater is a perfect subject in this argument is also distinct from whether a particular practical preparation has been disclosed. Definition, demonstration and recipe occupy related but separate positions in the book.

Places to read

I.017.2 (source p. 17); I.019.1 (source p. 19); I.020.1 (source pp. 20–21); I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22). The definition and several different ways its clauses are explained.

II.059.1 (source p. 59). Nature defined in the particular sense intended by the author.

II.126.1 (source p. 126). The explicitly marked major premise, minor premise and conclusion.

Translation in this edition

Definition is retained where the source uses that term. Major and Minor are explained as the major and minor premises of the syllogism. Proved describes what the author says he has established; where necessary, the English attribution makes clear that the edition is reporting his argument.

Attested forms

definition — definition. I.020.1 (source pp. 20–21).

Major — major premise. II.126.1 (source p. 126).

Minor — minor premise. II.126.1 (source p. 126).

Cautions

A formally arranged syllogism can display the structure of a claim without settling the truth of its premises. The lexicon reconstructs that structure without manufacturing additional experimental evidence.

See also

Rainwater; Blessing and command; Experience and conjecture; Axioms; Subject of the art

Error and fraud

Irrthumb · Betrügerey · Sophisterey und Betrug

Mistaken reasoning deceptive claims and the reputation of the art

At a Glance

The word. Error can be a sincere mistake; fraud concerns deceptive dealing and presumptuous claims.

In the Candida. The author says false theory wastes labour and that fraudulent disciples give critics grounds to revile the art.

In this edition. The distinction remains visible without assuming that the author's classification of every opponent is correct.

A place to read. II.055.2–II.057.2, pp. 55–58, and II.238.1, p. 238.

Meaning

The defence of alchemy depends partly on distinguishing the art from failures committed in its name. The author identifies two sources of reputational damage: mistaken operations grounded in false theory and fraudulent claimants who boast of achievements they do not possess. Both can lead outsiders to dismiss the art, but they involve different relations to truth.

An error need not be deliberate. A worker may misunderstand nature, take a philosophical metal for an ordinary material or pursue a process unsuitable to the selected matter. Fraud adds deceptive conduct. The lexicon keeps these possibilities separate because the author's argument about instruction addresses error, while his moral polemic addresses deceit.

Use in the book

The Second Part begins by saying that erroneous labours flow from false theory (II.055.2). This gives the theoretical exposition its practical justification. Explaining nature is meant to prevent waste before it occurs. At II.057.2, the cost becomes explicit: many thousands of gulden may be spent fruitlessly, causing people to regard the royal art as fraud. The author even criticizes inadequate definitions among writers he otherwise regards as successful.

The practitioner is warned against sophistry and fraud in Chapter Ten. Such speech can unsettle a worker, particularly one who lacks sound theory and changes processes under pressure. The warning belongs with patience, but it cannot mean that every objection is fraudulent. The same author admits conjecture about metallic generation and urges readers to weigh opinions rather than count them. His own text provides resources for distinguishing a substantive objection from mere discouragement.

Near the end, false disciples are accused of presumptuous boasting and wholly fraudulent dealing (II.238.1). The author says they give opponents ample cause to revile the art. He also accuses some deniers of defending their financial interests. These are polemical claims about motives, not identifications independently demonstrated by the lexicon.[115]

The practical consequence is interpretative caution. A reader should neither treat every failure as a disproof of the author's entire theory nor accept his theory solely because he attributes failures to other people's mistakes. The entry explains the distinctions by which he defends his position; the reasons and testimony for the position still require their own assessment.

Places to read

II.055.2 (source pp. 55–56); II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58). False theory, fruitless expense and the art's damaged reputation.

II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189); II.189.1 (source pp. 189–190). Unsettling speech and the unprepared worker.

II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236); II.238.1 (source p. 238). Misreading philosophical names and fraudulent boasting.

Translation in this edition

Irrthumb is error; Betrug and Betrügerey are fraud or deceit according to context. Sophisterey is sophistry. These words should not be collapsed into a single label for unsuccessful work. The text itself differentiates mistaken understanding, unstable practice and dishonest pretence.

Attested forms

Irrthumb — error. II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58).

Betrügerey — fraud or deceit. II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58).

Sophisterey und Betrug — sophistry and fraud. II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189).

Cautions

The author's defence explains how he assigns blame. It does not supply independent proof that every person he criticizes acted deceitfully, or that a correctly understood process would achieve the promised effects.

See also

Truth and falsehood; Knowledge and practice; Money and expense; Literal and philosophical senses; Authority and testimony

[115] The motives attributed to false disciples and interested deniers at II.238.1 are the author's polemical judgements. The lexicon has no independent evidence that establishes the motives of unnamed individuals.

Experience and conjecture

scientiâ conjecturali · observation

The unequal reach of observation and inference

At a Glance

The word. Experience concerns encountered events; conjecture supplies an account where the process itself is not fully known.

In the Candida. The author acknowledges the conjectural character of metallic generation while defending the value of laboratory observation.

In this edition. Different levels of warrant remain explicit, especially in medical claims and reports of material change.

A place to read. II.107.1–II.112.1, pp. 107–113.

Meaning

The Candida does not give every natural claim the same evidential status. In discussing metals, the author calls knowledge of their generation conjectural science. Nobody, he argues, knows the process within the mines thoroughly enough to speak with complete authority. This admission matters because the surrounding chapters offer confident accounts of seeds, matrices, vapours and metallic development. Conjectural explanations remain explanations, but their status is qualified.

Experience enters as a means of getting closer to nature. The author favours the alchemists' opportunities for practical observation, while acknowledging that workers disagree according to their operations. A vessel, furnace or separation reveals effects under particular conditions. Those effects do not necessarily disclose every stage of a hidden natural process. The account leaves room for practical access without claiming an unrestricted view into nature.

These distinctions are especially useful in a work that moves continually between Scripture, analogy, testimony and reported experiment. An analogy between creation and art can guide interpretation, and a named witness can encourage belief in a result. Neither should silently be relabelled the author's own observation.

Use in the book

At II.107.1, the appeal to conjecture checks the authority of mining knowledge itself. Even Lazarus Ercker, invoked as a knowledgeable figure, cannot remove the limits imposed by an unseen process. At II.108.1, practical workers are said to approach the matter more closely through observation. Their differences nevertheless produce multiple accounts and ways of accomplishing the magistery.

The reported fire accident at II.112.1 supplies a carefully bounded example. Carelessness broke vessels, and the author saw black, whitish and yellow flowers. This is a report of appearances after an operation failed. It can support the claim that colours arise and require interpretation. It cannot by itself establish a sequence in which lead becomes tin, silver, copper, iron and finally gold. The lexicon preserves the difference between the reported event and the larger model placed around it.[116]

The medicinal discussion makes another division. At II.180.2, the author describes personal experience with the lowest degree and with diseases he regards as curable by ordinary pharmaceutical means. The higher degrees are discussed through expectations, other writers and more expansive promises. The autobiographical statement should not be extended to every subsequent effect, including transmutation or the perfection of stones.

There is also a practical limit to the reader's own ability to test these claims from the book. The author declines to state every manipulation. The reader can examine his theory and compare passages, but cannot reconstruct a complete procedure merely by turning each image into a laboratory instruction. Recognizing conjecture in the text is consequently part of accurate reading, not a dismissal of every practical observation it contains.

The sensory examples in the definition of rainwater require the same care. Transparency is offered as something visible: one can see into water. The capacity to contain all colours is explained through reported effects of repeated distillation and drying, and even of rain on glass exposed to the sun (I.019.1; I.021.1). These examples do not have identical scope. Seeing through a sample supports a statement about its appearance. Seeing colours after a treatment enters a larger inference about powers concealed in the matter. The author brings both into his definition, but the reader need not confuse the immediate appearance with the entire account of universal capacity. This distinction allows the natural examples to be read closely without either dismissing their observations or silently granting every conclusion the author draws from them.

The shape of the medicine argument adds another level. Particular plants are said to have effects on different parts or functions of the body; rainwater and especially the subject and medicine are then credited with those powers collectively (II.074.2). This is an inference within a universal causal theory. The later personal experience passage does not independently test every step of that earlier inference. The reader should therefore connect the two discussions while preserving their different tasks: one explains why a

[116] The coloured flowers in II.112.1 belong to the report of broken vessels. An observation of these appearances is narrower than a demonstration of the surrounding metallic sequence. The entry preserves the narrower inference rather than treating every adjacent proposition as experimentally witnessed.

universal medicine could exist in the author's model, while the other asserts some practical benefit at a specified degree. Evidence is distributed across the argument rather than concentrated in one conclusive experiment. The lexicon's references allow that distribution to be reconstructed. They also explain why the words proved, experienced and testified should remain attached to their particular claims, speakers and contexts whenever they appear.

Places to read

II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108); II.108.1 (source p. 108). Conjectural knowledge of mines and the comparative access of working alchemists.

II.112.1 (source p. 112). An accident, colours and the limits of the resulting inference.

II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181); II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182); II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184). Personal medical experience distinguished from higher-degree expectations and testimony.

II.237.1 (source p. 237); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242). The practical limits of disclosure.

Translation in this edition

The Latin phrase scientiâ conjecturali is rendered as conjectural science. Science here names an organized account rather than a guarantee of experimental certainty. Observation is kept where the source uses the term. Where the author claims personal experience, the English should identify him as the speaker rather than transform the report into an impersonal fact.

Attested forms

scientiâ conjecturali — conjectural science in an inflected Latin phrase. II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108).

observation — observation. II.108.1 (source p. 108).

Cautions

Neither old age nor confident wording turns a reported observation into a replicated modern result. Equally, a concession of conjecture in one discussion should not be used to erase the separate observations and distinctions the author actually records.

See also

Authority and testimony; Generation of metals; Colours; Universal medicine; Knowledge and practice; Lazarus Ercker

Jurisprudence

Jurisprudenz · Scienz · memoire

A science set aside and a legal authority retained

At a Glance

The word. Jurisprudence denotes the study and knowledge of law.

In the Candida. The author sets it aside as outside his present account, yet earlier invokes Justinian on assessing authorities.

In this edition. The French maxim is presented as a reported judgement, not a settled definition of law.

A place to read. II.058.2, pp. 58–59, read beside I.051.1, pp. 51–52.

Meaning

Jurisprudence receives only a short explicit discussion, but that discussion reveals how the author defines the scope of his inquiry. He says that most people do not regard it as a science and reports a French saying that makes it more a matter of memory than science. He then leaves the subject in its own domain because it does not belong to the present undertaking.

The wording is deliberately limited. The author says more might be said, but does not supply a philosophy of law. The passage should therefore not be expanded into a comprehensive account of legal knowledge or treated as proof of a general contemporary consensus. It records the author's stated reason for setting one field aside.

Use in the book

The placement follows a discussion of natural knowledge and the errors that arise when nature is poorly understood. The author is arguing for the relevance of his natural philosophy to other kinds of learning. Jurisprudence interrupts that expansion with a boundary: not every field is to be absorbed into the present discourse. This makes the short passage useful beside the broader entry on art and science.

An earlier legal appeal complicates any simple claim that the author dismisses law. At the end of the First Part, he invokes Justinian's injunction against deciding according to the multitude of authors (I.051.1). The legal authority supplies an argumentative rule: one opinion may outweigh many prestigious ones. He applies it to the interpretation of the spirit over the waters.[117]

[117] The French saying is reported at II.058.2 without a named originator. It is treated here as a maxim quoted by the Candida, rather than assigned conjecturally to a particular jurist.

The two passages are compatible if their functions are kept distinct. Jurisprudence as a subject is outside the announced programme, but a legal text can still offer an apt maxim. The author likewise draws on physicians and philosophical writers without treating every subject they discuss as part of his present exposition. Citation is selective use, not wholesale adoption of a discipline.

The entry has a practical reading consequence. When an authority appears, the reader should ask what it is being asked to establish. Justinian is used to support the assessment of opinions, not to identify the Hermetic matter. The French maxim is used to close a digression, not to demonstrate the theory of rainwater. Keeping these local tasks visible prevents the book's wide range of references from becoming an undifferentiated catalogue of authorities.

Places to read

I.050.1 (source pp. 50–51); I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52). The legal injunction employed against deciding by a majority of authors.

II.058.1 (source p. 58); II.058.2 (source pp. 58–59); II.059.1 (source p. 59). Natural knowledge, the brief legal digression and the return to the definition of nature.

Translation in this edition

Jurisprudenz is jurisprudence. Scienz is science in the historical sense of an organized kind of knowledge. The French memoire is memory. The translation preserves the reported character of the saying and the author's decision to leave the subject aside.

Attested forms

Jurisprudenz — jurisprudence. II.058.2 (source pp. 58–59).

Scienz — science. II.058.2 (source pp. 58–59).

memoire — memory in the French maxim. II.058.2 (source pp. 58–59).

Cautions

The short passage does not establish a modern distinction between legal practice and legal science, nor does it justify attributing a detailed legal training or professional identity to the anonymous author.

See also

Art and science; Authority and testimony; Common opinion; Anonymous author

Knowledge and practice

Theoria · Labores

Knowing nature recognizing the matter and undertaking the work

At a Glance

The word. Knowledge supplies recognition and reasons; practice undertakes an operation with a selected matter.

In the Candida. The sequence nature, matter and process organizes the qualifications of the practitioner.

In this edition. Theory and practice are connected without treating the treatise as a complete manual.

A place to read. II.186.2–II.189.1, pp. 186–190.

Meaning

The crucial practical problem in this work is recognition. A reader must know what sort of matter could produce the promised effect before choosing an operation. The author repeatedly argues that particular substances cannot be assembled into universality merely by accumulating enough of them. A beautifully described process will fail if it begins from the wrong subject. Knowledge must therefore precede practice in a precise causal sense.

The order is clearest in the four qualifications named in Chapter Ten: knowledge of nature, the matter, the process and a Christian life. Each bears on the others. Knowing nature makes recognition of the matter possible. Recognizing the matter gives practical directions an appropriate object. A process detached from those conditions is a recipe whose words may be clear while its application is mistaken.

Practice nevertheless contributes knowledge of its own. The author says manual labour can illuminate obscure sayings and enlarge understanding of nature. This feedback prevents the sequence from being read as a claim that books contain everything and hands merely execute it. Labour is an occasion for learning, and the improved understanding returns the worker to texts and natural processes with better questions.

Use in the book

The early conceptual reduction from human bodies and metals to simpler materials is a useful test (I.011.1–I.012.1). An account may trace how particular things originate, but that does not establish a practical method for recovering universal prime matter from them. The author insists on the difference between understanding an origin and reversing a process.

Knowledge of the art must include this prohibition on an unwarranted practical inference.[118]

The warning about rainwater sharpens the point. Rainwater is very closely related to the Hermetic subject, yet the author denies that treating or fixing the two together will succeed (II.077.2–II.079.1). Recognizing kinship does not establish that two materials can be substituted or mixed. A practitioner who knows the general theory still needs the correct relation between matter, seed and operation.

Chapter Ten describes the unstable worker who begins without sound theory. Encountering uncertainty, he changes the process, loses confidence even if he has the right matter, abandons the work and declares the art false. The author's answer is not simply more effort. It is an ordered preparation that makes persistence intelligible and helps the worker judge what difficulties mean (II.189.1).

The conclusion returns to practical restraint. Beginning, means and end have been indicated, but all manipulations have not been disclosed. The reader is asked to read and meditate before taking up the fire. Thus the finished book occupies an intermediate position: it teaches how the author thinks the work must be understood, while keeping some of the work itself outside its explicit account.

The fourfold preparation of prayer, reading, meditation and labour explains how the desired knowledge is to be sought. It answers a different question from the list of qualifications. Nature, matter and process identify objects of understanding, and Christian life identifies a required condition of the person. Prayer, reading, meditation and labour identify activities by which the person is prepared. Keeping the lists distinct makes the pedagogy more intelligible. Reading is not itself the knowledge of matter, since a reader can misidentify the subject; labour is not itself successful practice, since workers can spend years on false beginnings. The author requires a relation among preparation, recognition and operation. A person may perform one of these activities intensively without satisfying the other requirements. This is why the book can encourage study and labour while also narrating error among learned or hardworking people.

The resulting account places considerable demands on judgement. The worker needs to distinguish a genuine difficulty from evidence that the chosen beginning is wrong, a philosophical designation from an ordinary material, and a general account from a complete process. The treatise offers rules and examples for those distinctions, but it also assigns the reader responsibility for diligence. At the conclusion, someone who has not

[118] The no-return maxim is applied in I.012.1 to the attempted practical recovery of universal principles from particular preparations. It should not be expanded into a denial of every repeated cycle or circulation described elsewhere in the book.

recognized the subject may nevertheless gain a negative benefit: the rainwater argument can help him avoid further waste upon particulars. Knowledge therefore has a practical value even short of the promised attainment. It can restrict an undertaking, postpone an operation or correct a false identification. This is a more precise account than saying that the book urges the reader simply to work harder. Its declared teaching is meant to alter what the reader does and the reasons for doing it, including the decision to leave the fire alone while understanding remains insufficient.

Places to read

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). The distinction between conceptual reduction and a practicable return to universal matter.

II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.078.1 (source p. 78); II.079.1 (source pp. 79–80). Kinship with the subject does not make a proposed mixture succeed.

II.186.2 (source p. 186); II.186.3 (source pp. 186–187); II.188.1 (source p. 188); II.189.1 (source pp. 189–190). Ordered preparation, learning through labour and premature abandonment.

II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242); II.243.1 (source p. 243). The final relation between disclosed theory and undisclosed manipulations.

Translation in this edition

Theory renders Theoria without assuming that it means an untested guess. In this work it is a reasoned account intended to direct practice. Labores are practical labours or undertakings, often with a critical implication when their theory is false. Knowledge of the matter means recognition of the appropriate subject; it should not be paraphrased as possession of a named modern chemical.

Attested forms

Theoria — theoretical knowledge. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Labores — labours or practical undertakings. II.055.2 (source pp. 55–56).

Cautions

The sequence explains the author's teaching. It does not provide the missing manipulations, establish a modern identification of the subject, or warrant treating every difficulty as proof that a worker should continue.

See also

Art and science; Axioms; Subject of the art; Labour and patience; Prayer reading and meditation; Error and fraud

Labour and patience

gedultig · standhafftig Gemüth · Zeit und Gedult

Steadfast work grounded in an intelligible undertaking

At a Glance

The word. Labour is sustained practical work; patience is the steadiness needed to carry it through.

In the Candida. The author opposes both premature abandonment and decades of work pursued from false theory.

In this edition. Patience is read with knowledge, resources and purpose, rather than as an unconditional command to persist.

A place to read. II.188.1–II.193.1, pp. 188–193.

Meaning

Patience belongs to the qualifications of the worker. It is a disposition to remain steady through difficulty, to resist unsettling talk and to allow a natural operation its required time. The author joins it to subtle understanding and a steadfast mind. The desired practitioner is neither easily diverted nor merely stubborn: the prior account of nature and matter is supposed to give the work its direction.

Labour is also a mode of attention. Reading and meditation bring a person toward theory and recognition of the matter, while manual work may reveal the sense of obscure statements. The worker is expected to learn through doing. Patience allows that learning to develop; it is not simply waiting while an automatic process runs.

The book's frequent criticisms of wasted years make the term more discriminating than it may first appear. The author regards mistaken theory as a cause of mistaken labour and acknowledges that people may spend decades fruitlessly. Duration alone gives no evidence that an operation is correct. A lexicon entry on patience must therefore include the book's account of error, not merely collect its exhortations to perseverance.

Use in the book

At II.188.2, the worker's composure is threatened by sophistry, fraud and discouraging accounts of people who have spent thirty, forty or fifty years without success. The author urges steadiness against such influences. The next passage explains why an unprepared person is especially vulnerable: uncertainty leads him to change procedures, abandon the work and condemn the art. Patience depends on an understanding sufficiently settled to interpret setbacks (II.189.1).

The practical discussion then turns to time, distraction and subsistence. A person burdened with other business cannot readily maintain the meditation and work envisaged. Funds may run out before completion. Labour therefore requires a workable setting, not merely an admirable temperament. Cheap matter and moderate instruments do not remove the ordinary expense of living (II.192.2–II.193.1).

The natural image of time appears elsewhere in the book's account of maturation. Time and patience belong to processes whose effects cannot simply be commanded at once. Yet this does not mean the author supplies a dependable timetable for the reader. Exact manipulations remain withheld, and the rainwater argument is presented as guidance toward the right beginning rather than a calendar of guaranteed success.[119]

The closing instruction gives the ethical and intellectual boundary: read and reflect, or leave the fire alone (II.243.1). The same author who recommends patience also asks for restraint before work begins. His account of perseverance is coherent only when connected to matter, theory, financial prudence and the Christian ends of the undertaking.

Places to read

II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171). Time and patience within the wider account of natural change.

II.188.1 (source p. 188); II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189); II.189.1 (source pp. 189–190). Labour as learning and the steadfast disposition of the worker.

II.192.2 (source pp. 192–193); II.193.1 (source p. 193). Freedom from distraction, adequate means and the cost of subsistence.

II.243.1 (source p. 243). The final warning to reflect before working.

Translation in this edition

Gedultig is patient; standhafftig Gemüth denotes a steadfast disposition or mind. Labour is preferred for the practical work because the source treats it as sustained exertion with an intellectual and ethical dimension. The phrase Zeit und Gedult is preserved as time and patience, rather than converted into a modern technical duration.

Attested forms

gedultig — patient. II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189).

standhafftig Gemüth — steadfast disposition. II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189).

Zeit und Gedult — time and patience. II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171).

[119] II.193.1 expressly excepts the necessities of life from its statement that the art requires little expense. The cost of subsistence remains a condition of sustained labour even where matter is inexpensive.

Cautions

These exhortations belong to a historical discipline whose successful outcome the author asserts. They should not be read as a present recommendation to repeat hazardous operations or continue spending money on an unverified process.

See also

Knowledge and practice; Time and maturation; Money and expense; Prayer reading and meditation; Error and fraud

Literal and philosophical senses

particularia · universal-Materiam

Why a familiar material name can mislead

At a Glance

The word. A literal material reading takes a named metal or mineral for the ordinary particular substance.

In the Candida. The author says the philosophers' names often refer instead to their universal matter.

In this edition. The distinction is established passage by passage and does not authorize an unlimited symbolic reading.

A place to read. II.235.1–II.236.1, pp. 235–237.

Meaning

The concluding discussion identifies a recurrent failure of reading. When philosophers name Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Moon, Sun, arsenic, vitriol, antimony or marcasite, ordinary alchemists take the words to designate corresponding particular materials. They then work with one, another or several together. The author says the philosophers mean their universal matter.

This is a distinction between intended referents, not a claim that the words have ceased to matter. The named substances and planetary metals belong to the language through which the art is described. Their local relation to universal matter must be understood before the process can be applied. A clear recipe interpreted with the wrong referent remains a wrong beginning.

Use in the book

At II.235.1, the author makes the practical consequence explicit: failure at the beginning entails failure at the end, even with the clearest process. This joins the linguistic problem to the account of causes. The mistake is not merely translating a word awkwardly; it is choosing a matter whose nature cannot yield the desired effect.[120]

The next example concerns sowing. From the fact that wheat or barley must be sown, an impatient reader may infer that ordinary gold should be sown to obtain the philosophical result. The author rejects the inference where the wrong kind of gold is meant (II.236.1). Living or philosophical

[120] The list at II.235.1 includes planetary metals and named minerals. It supplies explicit evidence for the distinction between ordinary particulars and the philosophers' universal matter. It does not identify that matter in modern chemical terms.

gold must therefore be read with attention to the larger discussion of seeds and the particular versus universal.

The distinction also helps with Mercury, Sulphur and Salt. Those names can designate principles in the author's account, the principles of a particular body, or common materials in a rejected operation. A single modern chemical identification would conceal the shifts. Conversely, labeling everything symbolic would conceal the concrete natural and practical claims the author still makes.

The lexicon treats translation as part of this recognition. It preserves important technical terms, lists attested forms and directs the reader to the places where a distinction is made. It does not replace each name with a speculative secret ingredient. The result is a clearer map of the text's uses, with the remaining uncertainty left visible.

Places to read

I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). Particular preparations retain their particular nature.

II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236); II.236.1 (source p. 236). The explicit warning about philosophical metals and the inference from sowing grain to sowing gold.

II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242). The boundary between indicated principles and omitted manipulations.

Translation in this edition

Particularia is rendered as particular substances in this context. Universal-Materiam means universal matter, with the source's inflected form recorded. Philosophical in a headword marks a technical use requiring contextual explanation, rather than a guarantee that the name encodes one recoverable modern material.

Attested forms

particularia — particular substances. II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236).

universal-Materiam — universal matter in an inflected Latin compound. II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236).

Cautions

The author provides the interpretative distinction but withholds complete handling. An editor should not manufacture the missing referents or turn a contextual warning into a universal rule that every material word is allegorical.

See also

Hermetic names; Allegory and analogy; Subject of the art; Gold living; Mercury philosophical; Axioms

Money and expense

Gülden · Unkosten · Lebens-Mitteln

Cheap matter costly subsistence and the prevention of waste

At a Glance

The word. Expense includes the matter and instruments as well as the ordinary means of living while the work continues.

In the Candida. The author contrasts enormous waste from error with a work whose material need not be costly.

In this edition. The distinction between cheap materials and adequate subsistence is kept explicit.

A place to read. II.192.2–II.193.1, pp. 192–193.

Meaning

The art's economic promise is accompanied by an economic discipline. The author says that matter may be obtained cheaply, sometimes for nothing, and that instruments are reasonably priced. Yet he does not conclude that the practitioner needs no resources. A person must live, remain free enough from burdensome business to attend to the work and avoid being forced to abandon it prematurely.

Money therefore belongs to the account of preparation. Adequate means protect time and attention; prudence preserves those means. The argument concerns the conditions under which a sustained undertaking can be pursued. It is not a transparent budget, since the book does not give a complete process, duration or itemized list of apparatus.

Use in the book

The earlier warning about many thousands of gulden fruitlessly spent identifies the chief source of waste: failure to understand nature and the consequent pursuit of mistaken operations (II.057.2). Expensive materials do not compensate for a false theory. The theoretical treatise presents its guidance as a way to prevent that kind of loss.

At II.192.2, the author turns to the worker's circumstances. Other business can interrupt meditation and attendance upon the work; lack of funds can end it before completion. A maxim attributed to Geber through the Lamp of the Philosophers' Salt urges the artist to preserve money rather

than squander it. The mediated attribution matters: the book identifies the source through which the maxim is being received.[121]

The following paragraph makes the apparent paradox precise. The art is said to require little expense apart from the necessities of life, which cannot be dispensed with (II.193.1). Cheap matter, moderately priced instruments and adequate living resources are compatible claims. A summary that says simply the work is free would omit the qualification most relevant to the worker.

The closing ethical warning supplies another limit. The art should not be sought to satisfy avarice or indulge pride. Means are required for the undertaking and benefits are imagined for others, but acquisition itself is not the highest end. Economy and charity thus belong together: the worker preserves resources without treating the secret as a licence for unlimited enrichment.

Places to read

II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58). Fruitless expenditure as the practical consequence of mistaken natural knowledge.

II.192.2 (source pp. 192–193); II.193.1 (source p. 193). Adequate means, economy and the irreducible expense of living.

II.244.1 (source pp. 244–245). Avarice rejected as the governing purpose of the art.

Translation in this edition

Gülden is rendered as gulden, without an invented present monetary equivalent. Unkosten means expenses. Lebens-Mitteln here means the necessities or means of life. Translating the last expression merely as ingredients would obscure the contrast between laboratory expenditure and subsistence.

Attested forms

Gülden — gulden. II.057.2 (source pp. 57–58).

Unkosten — expenses. II.192.2 (source pp. 192–193).

Lebens-Mitteln — necessities of life. II.193.1 (source p. 193).

[121] The attribution in II.192.2 is expressly mediated: Geber is cited according to the Lamp of the Philosophers' Salt. The entry preserves that chain and does not treat the sentence as a newly verified quotation from a separately collated Geber edition.

Cautions

The price statements belong to the author's period and argument. They establish neither a present cost estimate nor a reason to invest in an unverified operation.

See also

Labour and patience; Error and fraud; Charity; Knowledge and practice; Vessels and furnaces

Physicians

Medicorum · Medicin

Medical vocation testimony and recognition of the matter

At a Glance

The word. Physicians appear as witnesses, critics, experimenters and intended beneficiaries.

In the Candida. The conclusion particularly addresses honest physicians who wish to recognize the medicine's matter for the sake of their calling.

In this edition. The identity and evidential role of each physician remain separate.

A place to read. II.238.2, pp. 238–239, with II.180.2–II.183.1, pp. 180–184.

Meaning

The physician is one of the book's most important readers. Medicine gives the author a charitable purpose for communicating knowledge: physicians who recognize the proper matter may better fulfil their calling. The closing appeal imagines their desire as sincere and their benefit as extending to the people they treat.

Physicians are also part of the evidence assembled within the treatise. Claude Germain contributes a distinction between theory and art. An unnamed physician reports the kinship of rainwater with the Hermetic subject. Other medical voices and authorities help distinguish medicinal orders and effects. These functions should be read separately; professional designation does not make every statement the same kind of testimony.

Use in the book

At I.003.2, Germain's theory-and-practice distinction helps the author define his own undertaking. In the later rainwater discussion, a physician's report introduces a particularly important qualification: close kinship with the subject does not make attempted mixtures succeed (II.077.2–II.078.1). The medical witness does not remove the need for causal discrimination.

The medicine chapters then differentiate the author's own experience from broader testimony. He claims practical benefit at the lowest degree for diseases he regards as curable by pharmacopoeial means (II.180.2). Higher degrees, corrected preparations and the natural tincture are discussed through additional distinctions and cited reports. An editor should not merge those voices into a claim of one physician personally demonstrating every promised cure.

At II.182.1, a doctor's request occurs in a passage whose source grammar is incomplete. The translation preserves that difficulty rather than inventing the missing resolution. The detail is a reminder that the medical narrative survives in a particular printed text, with limits an interpreter must respect.[122]

At II.238.2, the honest physicians' desire to recognize the matter joins the argument for publication. The author prefers that some unworthy people benefit rather than deprive all worthy readers. The appeal does not abolish secrecy, but gives the cost of secrecy a concrete human face. In the surrounding polemic, he also accuses some opponents of defending their own profit. Those motive claims remain his, rather than findings established by this lexicon.

Places to read

I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4). Germain supplies a distinction used to frame the treatise.

II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.078.1 (source p. 78). Medical testimony concerning kinship and unsuccessful work.

II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181); II.182.1 (source p. 182); II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184). Personal experience, a difficult doctor passage and medicinal degrees.

II.238.1 (source p. 238); II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239). The polemic and the positive appeal to honest physicians.

Translation in this edition

Medicorum is recorded in its Latin genitive form and translated according to the sentence as physicians. Medicine may name the prepared agent as well as the field of healing. Where a physician is unnamed, the translation does not supply an identity from resemblance or conjecture.

Attested forms

Medicorum — of physicians in an inflected Latin form. II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239).

Medicin — medicine. II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241).

[122] The incomplete source construction at II.182.1 is already noted in the reading edition. The lexicon leaves the narrative unresolved at that point and does not invent an answer to the doctor's request.

Cautions

Professional status and good intentions are parts of the historical argument. They do not independently validate the medicine's effects. The incomplete passage on p. 182 remains incomplete rather than being repaired through an invented story.

See also

Claude Germain; Universal medicine; Medicine and its orders; Authority and testimony; Charity

Prayer reading and meditation

Prece, lectione, meditatione, & labore

The fourfold preparation prece lectione meditatione et labore

At a Glance

The word. The Latin formula names prayer, reading, meditation and labour as complementary activities.

In the Candida. The author treats knowledge and success as divine gifts requiring serious intellectual and manual preparation.

In this edition. Meditation means reflective consideration of what is read and worked; the entry does not supply an invented contemplative ritual.

A place to read. II.187.1–II.188.1, pp. 187–188.

Meaning

The formula answers the question of how a prospective practitioner becomes qualified. It places prayer beside reading, meditation and labour, joining dependence upon God with sustained human activity. The four activities are not interchangeable. Prayer addresses the giver of good gifts; reading encounters the philosophical account; meditation works toward understanding; labour brings that understanding into practical engagement with nature.

The immediate biblical setting matters. The author invokes the Father of lights and the gift of wisdom, presenting the insight needed for the art within a Christian account of divine generosity. This prevents prayer from being treated as a detachable technique for manipulating the material. It belongs to the disposition and purpose of the practitioner, and to the author's conviction that successful understanding ultimately depends on God.

Reading is similarly purposeful. It is intended to bring the worker toward theory and the recognition of matter. The book criticizes an accumulation of recipes pursued without their causal ground. Meditation consequently means more than remembering the printed words. It requires comparing sayings, considering natural relations and recognizing what sort of subject the argument permits.

Use in the book

At II.187.1, the author connects the formula to James 1:17 and to the praise of wisdom in Wisdom 7. He also reports Denis Zachaire's insistence that study alone is insufficient without divine inspiration. These references establish the religious frame of the advice. They do not remove the need for

learning; the very next discussion describes how reading and meditation acquire theory and recognition of the matter.[123]

Manual labour then returns the reader to the books. The author says work can clarify obscure sayings and increase knowledge of nature (II.188.1). This reciprocal movement is one of the most important features of his pedagogy. Texts guide operations, while operations may disclose what the texts mean. Prayer remains part of the undertaking as the worker seeks a fortunate outcome rather than claiming sole mastery over it.

The formula also links the art to the four requirements named just before it: nature, matter, process and a Christian life. These are the things one must know or possess; prayer, reading, meditation and labour are ways of becoming prepared. The two lists serve different roles and should not be merged into a single mechanical sequence of four stages.

The closing pages repeat the intellectual demand. A reader who fails to recognize the subject may still learn from the rainwater argument to avoid wasting effort upon particulars. The final warning asks the person to read and reflect before approaching the fire. Meditation thus has a practical consequence: it is meant to prevent a premature operation as much as to encourage a promising one.

Places to read

II.186.2 (source p. 186); II.186.3 (source pp. 186–187). The qualifications to which the fourfold preparation responds.

II.187.1 (source pp. 187–188); II.188.1 (source p. 188). The formula, its scriptural setting and the relation between study and labour.

II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189); II.189.1 (source pp. 189–190). The disposition required to resist discouragement and instability.

II.242.1 (source pp. 242–243); II.243.1 (source p. 243). Reflection as a protection against mistaken practical beginnings.

Translation in this edition

The Latin ablatives are rendered by prayer, reading, meditation and labour. Meditation here is reflective consideration, especially of philosophical writings and natural processes. The edition keeps the religious language explicit. Rendering the formula simply as research and experiment would erase the author's declared dependence on divine wisdom.

[123] The scriptural references are part of the author's own appeal at II.187.1. His use of Wisdom 7 is retained as a feature of the source. This entry makes no inference about the anonymous author's denomination from that citation alone.

Attested forms

Prece, lectione, meditatione, & labore — by prayer reading meditation and labour. II.187.1 (source pp. 187–188).

Cautions

The passage supplies an account of preparation, not a complete devotional exercise or a laboratory protocol. The lexicon does not invent spoken prayers, timings or ritual actions that the book does not prescribe.

See also

Art and science; Knowledge and practice; Labour and patience; Charity; Providence; Subject of the art

Secrecy and publication

Handgriffen · Sigillum Silentii

Why the book speaks and where it withholds

At a Glance

The word. Publication communicates the argument; secrecy restricts disclosure of the decisive practical handling.

In the Candida. The author defends writing for the common good while reserving some manipulations and advising successful possessors to keep silence.

In this edition. Silence and disclosure are described at their specific points rather than assumed to explain every obscure phrase.

A place to read. II.237.1–II.244.1, pp. 237–245.

Meaning

The Candida is written to teach, defend and benefit, yet it refuses to disclose everything. This tension is explicit. The author anticipates disappointment when readers discover that the general account of operations does not include every manipulation. He answers by placing disclosure within a moral economy: the art should serve God and the neighbour, but unworthy use can harm both the possessors and those around them.

Secrecy consequently has several functions. It protects a valuable possession, resists abuse and marks a boundary the author says he must respect. Publication has several functions too: explaining the theory, defending the art against misrepresentation, helping honest physicians and preventing wasted labour. The text does not simply choose one over the other. It argues that a certain kind of public account can coexist with reserved practical knowledge.

This distinction is useful for reading the lexicon itself. An explanation of a term or a relation between passages can make the argument clearer without recovering a secret procedure. Identifying universal matter as the intended referent of a metal name does not establish the modern substance, quantity, apparatus or handling that would complete a recipe.

Use in the book

At II.237.1, warnings attributed to philosophers and the malice of the world help justify restraint. The following passage develops the positive reason to publish: the human being made in God's image should imitate divine goodness through service. The ethical appeal is followed by criticism of fraudulent disciples and of those who resist a medicine from self-interest

(II.238.1–II.238.2). These are the author's judgements about the audience and its needs.

The author then explains his anonymity and defends the truthfulness of what he has claimed. At II.240.1, he invokes bees concealing their work as an image of a divinely appointed limit. The image gives concealment a natural model, but it should not be promoted into an independent scientific account of bees. Its role here is justificatory and analogical.

At II.241.1, the author says that the beginning, means and end have been disclosed, while all manipulations have not. He shifts some responsibility for obscurity to the reader's diligence. The reader must nevertheless keep both halves of that statement: effort is demanded, and practical detail has genuinely been withheld. It would be misleading to claim that every missing direction can therefore be deduced with certainty from the printed words.[124]

The seal of silence at II.243.2 concerns the person who has attained possession. The advice links discretion to the danger described elsewhere in the book and to the risk of unworthy use. It belongs after the theoretical and practical argument, not as a blanket prohibition on the explanatory writing that has just occurred. The final Christian ends give the boundary its stated purpose.

Anonymity is related to reserve but should be kept distinct from it. The author says that other reasons prevent him from giving his name, while maintaining that he could defend what he has written. A withheld personal name does not have the same object as a withheld manipulation. The first limits the reader's access to the speaker's identity; the second limits access to practical handling. The preliminary heraldic material gives a family claim, but does not independently supply the missing identification. Combining these forms of reserve into one vague secret would conceal the different kinds of evidence each would require. An original name could clarify biography without revealing the operation, and a fuller operation could remain anonymous. The entries on Anonymous author and Authority and testimony keep those separate questions visible.

The language of publication also allows a useful distinction between communicating a benefit and making every detail available without discrimination. The author thinks his theory can defend the art, guide physicians and prevent waste even when it stops short of a full procedure. Whether readers find that sufficient is one of the tensions he anticipates. The preference associated with Dienheim acknowledges that excessive reserve can deprive worthy people along with the unworthy. The later warning against

[124] The concession at II.241.1 is positive evidence of incomplete practical disclosure. It is distinct from the author's accompanying claim that sufficient beginnings, means and ends have been indicated. Both statements are retained rather than resolving the tension by inventing omitted handling.

deliberate disclosure to unworthy hands acknowledges the opposite cost. Neither statement cancels the other. Together they show the author considering two kinds of loss and defending a particular boundary between them. The lexicon follows that boundary as a feature of the text. It makes the explanations accessible, records where the author stops and resists promising that commentary can supply the precise handling he has chosen not to communicate.

Places to read

II.090.1 (source p. 90). An earlier refusal to disclose the complete practical process.

II.237.1 (source p. 237); II.237.2 (source pp. 237–238); II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239). The restriction and the charitable case for writing.

II.239.1 (source pp. 239–240); II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242). Anonymity, the bees and the explicit reservation of manipulations.

II.243.2 (source pp. 243–244); II.244.1 (source pp. 244–245). The seal of silence and the moral ends of possession.

Translation in this edition

Handgriffen is rendered as manipulations or practical handling where the author discusses omitted operations. Sigillum Silentii is the seal of silence. The latter is retained in Latin when its named character matters. Neither expression warrants reading every common material word as a cipher; meanings must still be established locally.

Attested forms

Handgriffen — manipulations or practical handling. II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242).

Sigillum Silentii — seal of silence. II.243.2 (source pp. 243–244).

Cautions

This entry explains a policy stated by the author. It does not claim to have decoded the missing directions or to know a complete procedure concealed behind the treatise.

See also

Charity; Anonymous author; Bees and concealment; Hermetic names; Subject of the art; Truth and falsehood

Subject of the art

Subjectum · Subjecto artis Hermeticæ

The matter that must be recognized before any process can succeed

At a Glance

The word. Subject denotes the matter upon which the art works and whose capacities make its effects possible.

In the Candida. The author argues for a universal matter and distinguishes its precise recognition from general statements about rainwater.

In this edition. Subject is retained as a technical term and explained as the appropriate underlying matter.

A place to read. I.011.1–I.016.1, pp. 11–16, and II.077.2–II.079.1, pp. 77–80.

Meaning

The subject is the practical centre of the book's theoretical inquiry. It is what a worker must recognize before operations can be directed toward the universal medicine or tincture. The term does not simply mean the topic under discussion. It names an underlying matter with the powers required for the proposed work. Causal adequacy, rather than a promising name or familiar appearance, is decisive.

The argument for universality explains why the author rejects a heap of particular ingredients. Particular natures have received determinate powers; collecting them does not recover an unrestricted universal principle. The subject must possess universality in its own nature. The explanation attached to the Sudum Philosophicum makes the distinction especially clear: universal does not mean that every separate thing must contribute an ingredient (I.013.1).

The early reduction of bodies to seeds, blood, chyle, bread, grain, earth and water is also limited. It follows a conceptual account of origins. The author denies that one can simply reverse this chain in practice and regain universal prime matter from particular things (I.011.1–I.012.1). Recognition of the subject therefore requires understanding how a thing is constituted and specified, not merely naming an ultimate material ancestor.

Use in the book

Rainwater provides the treatise's leading approach to this problem. The author describes it as universal and argues from its relation to creation and the divine Word. His syllogisms try to show that a subject embracing animal, vegetable and mineral nature can yield a universal medicine and metallic

tincture (II.126.1). The lexicon explains this reasoning as the author's case, without identifying the secret matter with a present chemical.

The decisive qualification occurs at II.077.2. An unnamed physician is reported to say that rainwater has a very close kinship with the subject of the Hermetic art. Yet the author denies that treating or fixing the two together will succeed. Further unsuccessful workers are mentioned, and natural seed orders are invoked to explain why kinship does not guarantee a fruitful union (II.078.1–II.079.1). Ordinary rainwater, dew and the precise philosophical subject should consequently not be treated as unrestricted substitutes.[125]

Chapter Ten places recognition before process. Without nature the matter is unknowable; without the matter, practice is vain. Even a clear procedure cannot repair a wrong beginning. The conclusion repeats the point through the metals and minerals named by philosophers. Readers who take those names for ordinary particulars fail at the start, despite possessing what they think is an excellent process (II.235.1).

The author says the subject has been disclosed sufficiently for an attentive reader, while conceding that all manipulations have not been supplied. These statements set the interpretative task and its limits. The reader can track the requirements placed upon the subject, reject incompatible identifications and compare the book's descriptions. The text does not entitle an editor to invent a fully specified substance and procedure to close the remaining gap.

The argument also differentiates a thing's present qualities from its underlying nature. Waters can vary in strength, clarity or subtlety while retaining a universal nature in the author's account (I.016.1). Such differences do not necessarily make one water a new particular species. Conversely, a plant or mineral that has received determinate powers does not become universal merely when separated into water, oil and salt. The subject question is therefore not settled by inspecting one attractive property or by obtaining a familiar-looking liquid. The worker must ask what constitution and capacity the theory assigns to the material. This is why the definition of rainwater combines sensory predicates with claims about creation, blessing and seed. Each contributes to the proposed recognition, though each requires its own kind of explanation.

The later seed language makes the restriction vivid. Art improves nature in and with its own nature and seed, and the comparison with grapes and thorns or figs and thistles excludes an indiscriminate crossing of kinds (II.077.1; II.079.1). A result must bear an intelligible relation to its origin.

[125] II.077.2–II.079.1 are essential qualifications to any identification of ordinary rainwater with the Hermetic subject. The text asserts close kinship and reports failure when materials are mixed or fixed together. A universal replacement rule would contradict that discussion.

The philosophical subject is sought because it could support a more comprehensive effect while remaining one appropriate nature, not because the author imagines that any material can be forced into any end. This reading also explains the importance of philosophical names. Saturn, Jupiter, vitriol or antimony may direct the prepared reader toward properties of the intended matter; taking them as instructions to collect ordinary particulars changes the object of the operation. The entry therefore concerns recognition under several descriptions. It does not concern a modern catalogue number hidden behind one privileged word. The criteria, examples and prohibitions can be reconstructed even where a definitive identification remains beyond the printed disclosure.

Places to read

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13); I.013.1 (source p. 13); I.016.1 (source p. 16). Universality, particular natures and the limits of practical reversal.

II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.078.1 (source p. 78); II.079.1 (source pp. 79–80). Rainwater's kinship with the subject and failed mixtures.

II.126.1 (source p. 126); II.179.1 (source p. 179). The universal-subject syllogism and the author's claim to recognition.

II.186.2 (source p. 186); II.235.1 (source pp. 235–236); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242); II.242.1 (source pp. 242–243). Recognition before process and the limits of the closing disclosure.

Translation in this edition

Subjectum and its inflected forms are generally subject, with matter supplied in explanation. Subject of the art translates the technical expression without conflating it with prime matter wherever that separate question is under discussion. The distinction between rainwater in general and the precise Hermetic subject is maintained even where their kinship is strongly emphasized.

Attested forms

Subjectum — subject or underlying matter. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Subjecto artis Hermeticæ — subject of the Hermetic art in an inflected Latin phrase. II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78).

Cautions

The entry reconstructs the criteria and claims of the text. A definitive modern identification of the hidden subject would require evidence beyond the verbal correspondences offered here.

See also

Rainwater; Matter prime; Universal and particular; Catholic; Knowledge and practice; Hermetic names; Literal and philosophical senses

Truth and falsehood

Unwarheit · Warheit

The philosopher's double duty and the author's self-defence

At a Glance

The word. Truth concerns what is rightly asserted; falsehood concerns what the philosopher must neither advance nor leave unchallenged.

In the Candida. The author invokes a double duty before criticizing homunculi and later defends his own claims against scoffers.

In this edition. Assertions of truth are attributed to their speaker and assessed beside their stated reasons.

A place to read. II.194.1, p. 194, and II.239.1–II.240.1, pp. 239–241.

Meaning

The double duty attributed to Antonius de Abbatia sets the terms of Chapter Eleven. A philosopher should put forward no falsehood and expose someone who does. The author says he has observed the first duty while often withholding the names of people whose opinions he has criticized. He now names Theophrastus because the preceding discussion has already named Zeiller's attack upon him.

Truth thus has an ethical and a polemical dimension. The philosopher must care for the accuracy of statements, yet correction can offend a person. The author's earlier use of anonymity or initials is explained as an attempt to limit personal offence without leaving opinions entirely unexamined. Naming becomes a deliberate act requiring a stated reason.

Use in the book

The immediate subject is homunculus-making. The author has praised Theophrastus for useful instruction and charitable conduct, but now rejects a claim associated with him. The double duty permits this selective judgement: gratitude for one contribution does not require assent to another. It is an important corrective to reading a cited authority as a single, indivisible endorsement.

The author's own truthfulness becomes an issue near the conclusion. He says he can stand by what he has written and that God has entrusted truth to him (II.239.1). He explains that other reasons have prevented him from giving his name. These statements establish his self-presentation, not an independently confirmed identity or achievement.

The following passage narrows what he says he has boasted of: only the medicine, and even there the praise belongs to divine grace rather than himself (II.240.1). Read beside his limited personal experience claim at

II.180.2, this is another reason to avoid crediting him with personally demonstrating every material transformation discussed in the book.[126]

The wider rules of assessment remain relevant. Common opinion is insufficient, and witnesses must be weighed. The author's confidence does not dispense with those rules. The lexicon consequently separates three things: the proposition being defended, the support offered for it and the character the speaker claims for himself. Keeping them separate makes both the polemic and the philosophical argument easier to evaluate.

Places to read

I.050.1 (source pp. 50–51); I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52). The assessment of opinions rather than reliance upon their number.

II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181); II.192.1 (source p. 192); II.194.1 (source p. 194). Limited experience, limited discipleship and the philosopher's double duty.

II.239.1 (source pp. 239–240); II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241). The author's final self-defence and qualification of his boasting.

Translation in this edition

Unwarheit is falsehood; Warheit is truth. The translation preserves assertions such as truth has been entrusted to me as the author's own declarations. It does not convert religious confidence into an editorial certificate that all associated claims are established.

Attested forms

Unwarheit — falsehood. II.194.1 (source p. 194).

Warheit — truth. II.239.1 (source pp. 239–240).

Cautions

The maxim is received through the Candida's attribution to Antonius. It establishes how the present author frames his criticism; it should not be treated as a verified quotation from an unidentified modern edition of Antonius's writings.

See also

Authority and testimony; Error and fraud; Homunculus; Anonymous author; Paracelsus and Theophrastus; Antonius de Abbatia

[126] II.240.1 says the author boasted only of the medicine. Read with the limited personal experience claim at II.180.2, it prevents a careless attribution of every cited transmutative achievement to the anonymous author himself.

Universal medicine

Medicin · Panacæam

A universal capacity expressed through unequal orders and claims

At a Glance

The word. Universal medicine is the medicine whose power the author grounds in a universal subject.

In the Candida. Its scope is argued through creation, particular medicinal effects, degrees of preparation and cited testimony.

In this edition. The author's personal claims at the lowest degree remain distinct from higher-order promises.

A place to read. II.179.1–II.185.1, pp. 179–185.

Meaning

Universal medicine names a leading goal of the work. Its universality is causal: the medicine is said to derive from a subject that is not confined to one particular natural order. The author contrasts this with particular medicines whose determinate powers answer to their determinate origins. The phrase should therefore be read within his account of creation, blessing, matter and seed, rather than as an isolated promise of an exceptionally powerful drug.

The rainwater argument supplies the theoretical foundation. The author links universal waters and the subsistent Word to a medicine of universal reach (II.074.1). He then lists effects associated with particular plants and claims that these powers are present in rainwater, especially in the subject and medicine (II.074.2). The argument moves from particular medicinal actions to an asserted common capacity. Its theological and analogical structure should remain visible.

Universal does not, however, mean that every preparation has the same power or that any sample of rainwater is already the perfected medicine. The later chapters distinguish orders and degrees. Some products may be useful while still unable to perform the effects assigned to the natural tincture. These differences are necessary for understanding the range of medical and transmutative language.

Use in the book

At II.179.1, the author thanks God for revealing the subject. He then invokes the testimony of writers for an expansive panacea, including severe internal and external disorders (II.179.2). At II.180.2, the voice changes to his own experience. He describes the lowest degree and diseases he considers curable by pharmaceutical means, offering a list of conditions. That

narrower autobiographical passage should not be made to prove every higher claim surrounding it.

The following discussion looks toward further degrees, preservation of health and the usefulness of corrected Sulphurs and philosophical Salt. The treatment of the first and second orders distinguishes individual particulars from a compound universality. At II.183.1, the third order, the natural tincture, is described as something further. At II.184.1, the lower orders are explicitly denied the transmutative effects attributed to the perfected tincture.[127]

Metallic and gemstone claims extend the argument beyond treating human illness. The perfect tincture is said to improve metals and stones, and a later report of accelerated fruiting in a vine is used to support universal power (II.180.1; II.185.1). These reports belong to the author's effort to demonstrate the breadth of a common principle. They are not separate modern confirmations of the medicine's efficacy.

The ethical conclusion identifies the intended beneficiaries. Honest physicians might recognize the matter and use it in their calling; poor Christians should benefit from the knowledge and its fruits. The medicine is thus tied to neighbourly service, not merely the possession of a private secret. This moral purpose explains why the author publishes an account while still protecting parts of the practical handling.

The medical lists should also be read at the level of the source's descriptions. A historical disease name may refer to a cluster of symptoms, a period classification or a condition described through a medical theory different from present usage. The lexicon therefore does not silently translate every name into a present diagnosis. What matters for the argument is how the author groups the claimed effects and which degree or order receives them. The lowest-degree passage lists a range of conditions to illustrate useful practice within the sphere he regards as pharmaceutically curable. The later natural tincture is assigned a different reach. Those distinctions would be blurred if every disease name were modernized and every degree treated as the same preparation.

The medicine's universality is also connected to the ethical defence of the art. The author condemns fraudulent boasting partly because it damages confidence in a possible benefit to others. He imagines physicians who would use recognition of the matter to serve their calling and poor Christians who would gain from the art's fruits. These purposes help explain why a medicine receives such prominence even in a work that discusses metals and precious stones. At the conclusion he expressly says his own

[127] II.184.1 denies the perfected tincture's transmutative effect to medicines of the first and second orders. Consequently universal language in the medical discussion should not erase the source's stated differences among orders and degrees.

boast concerned medicine, and assigns the credit to divine grace. That declaration is important beside the wider transmutative testimony: the existence of a claim in the book does not establish that it belongs to the same personal experience. Reading the medicine through its causal origin, degree, witness and intended use makes the argument more exact. It also prevents the word universal from becoming a substitute for examining the specific preparation and evidential level under discussion.

Places to read

II.074.1 (source p. 74); II.074.2 (source pp. 74–75); II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76). The universal origin and the contrast with particular medicinal powers.

II.126.1 (source p. 126). The syllogism linking a universal subject to medicine and tincture.

II.179.1 (source p. 179); II.179.2 (source pp. 179–180); II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181); II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182). Revelation of the subject, testimony and the limited personal experience claim.

II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183); II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184); II.184.1 (source p. 184); II.185.1 (source p. 185). The orders of medicine and the additional effects assigned to the tincture.

II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239); II.244.1 (source pp. 244–245). The physician, the neighbour and the final ethical ends.

Translation in this edition

Medicine can denote the prepared agent or its medicinal use. Panacea is retained where the expansive claim is central. Universal is not paraphrased as effective against every illness without qualification: the source itself differentiates degrees, orders, personal experience and reported effects. Historical disease names are kept as historical descriptions rather than silently matched to present diagnoses.

Attested forms

Medicin — medicine. II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181).

Panacæam — panacea in an inflected Latin form. II.179.2 (source pp. 179–180).

Cautions

These are seventeenth-century therapeutic and alchemical claims. The entry supplies their structure and attribution; it supplies no treatment advice, validated dosage or evidence that the described preparations are safe or effective.

See also

Medicine and its orders; Rainwater; Subject of the art; Universal and particular; Authority and testimony; Charity; Tincture and elixir

Controversies humanity and the world to come

Annihilation and transformation

transmutirt · principia universalia · dem Wesen nach vergehen

What passes away when universal being endures

At a Glance

The word. Annihilation means an end of being; transformation means a change into another condition or form.

In the Candida. Chapter Fourteen argues that the final destruction of present conditions does not annihilate the universal natures.

In this edition. Read "perish," "corruption," and "resolution" by their stated objects rather than giving each a single destructive meaning.

A place to read. The decisive distinction is on pp. 229–231, after the question posed at p. 227.

Meaning

The world's end is formulated as a precise alternative: does the world perish only in its accidental things, or also in substance and being? This is not merely a question about how violent the Last Day will be. It asks what can remain through a complete change of the present cosmic order. The narrator answers by distinguishing particular natures, present accidents, universal principles, and the divine Word that gives those principles their enduring basis.

The surviving reality is not described as an unchanged stock of ordinary materials. Present moving heavens pass away. The visible earth, called residual earth, burns and is corrupted. Particular natures are resolved into universal elements and principles. Those universal natures themselves are transformed into crystalline clarity and a most perfect spiritual being. Continuity of being is therefore compatible, in this account, with a radical change in its mode of manifestation.

The difference between annihilation and transformation is grounded in the book's account of creation. Universal natures were created through God's universal and substantial Word, which is eternal and imperishable. The narrator infers that these natures cannot wholly cease or perish in being. Particular decrees and the natures governed through them can cease in their present form. The distinction is theological before it is a claim about material persistence.

Use in the book

At II.228.1 the author appeals to his learning and trials in the Hermetic art. The operation of the subject and the perfection of the magistery supply a model for the final transformation. His procedure is analogical: observed or claimed purification within the art makes a cosmic purification conceivable. He presents this as a modest opinion, yet expects agreement from readers who understand both Scripture and nature practically as well as theoretically.

The following paragraph denies a crude interpretation of that model. Everything will not be melted together as though gathered into one crucible. The denial anticipates ridicule and protects the difference between a laboratory image and the whole cosmic event. What corresponds is the passage through resolution and purification, not an identical apparatus enlarged to contain the universe.

Resolution of particular natures into universal principles marks a change of level. It is not simply the death of each familiar object followed by the reassembly of equivalent objects. The final heaven is new and immovable, the final earth new, and the previously invisible becomes visible. The author calls this the true foliated earth. Existing alchemical vocabulary is being used to articulate an eschatological condition beyond ordinary appearances.

At II.231.1 corruptio is called the medium by which substances, especially the elements, are freed from residues and superfluities and brought into a more than perfect new form. This sentence is the strongest local warning against translating corruption as annihilation. What disappears is the burden of impurity and the present corruptible condition; what is perfected is the underlying substance. The passage also explains why the book can describe destruction in emphatic terms without embracing total extinction.

The argument's purpose is finally devotional. Finis is God's glory as well as the world's end. The author uses the same model to reinforce confidence in bodily resurrection, then admits the limit of what mortal readers can know. Transformation provides an intelligible pattern, not a complete inventory of the coming world.[128]

Places to read

II.227.1 (source pp. 227–228). The exact question: accidental conditions or substance and being?

II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230). Destruction of the present order and rejection of the single-crucible caricature.

[128] Finis at II.231.1 carries the connected senses of end and purpose. God's glory answers what the transformed creation is for, not only what chronological event concludes it.

II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231). The distinction between enduring universals and ceasing particular decrees.

II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232); II.232.1 (source pp. 232–233); II.233.1 (source p. 233). Purification, resurrection, and the limit of mortal knowledge.

Connections

The second Latin letter prepares this distinction by defining substance as pure, simple being and locating corruption in residues. Chapter Fourteen moves from that account of lower bodies to the entire world. The narrator's application should be read as a further inference, rather than a claim that the letter has already demonstrated the cosmic conclusion.

Transmutation has a narrower application to metals and stones elsewhere, but here the same vocabulary describes the final perfection of the world. The shared term does not make the two transformations equal in scale, agent, or certainty.

Translation in this edition

"Annihilation" is an explanatory English headword for the alternative the text refuses; the recorded original phrase is "perish in respect of being." "Transmuted" and "transformed" retain the paired expression transmutirt und verwandelt.

Universal-Naturen names universal natures within this theological physics. Rendering it as conserved matter would import a modern physical category that the argument does not formulate. "Spiritual being" should likewise retain the book's association of spiritual perfection with crystalline clarity rather than be reduced to immaterial absence.

Attested forms

transmutirt — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230).

principia universalia — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231).

dem Wesen nach vergehen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231).

Cautions

The claim that universal being endures is not a modern law of conservation, and the book gives no quantitative equivalent of such a law.

The account remains an authorial interpretation of Scripture through the art. It should not be presented as agreed doctrine among all the theologians whose disagreement introduces the chapter.

See also

World and its end; Resurrection; Corruption and sin; Transmutation; Foliated earth

Corruption and sin

malum corruptionis · peccatum · corruptio

What putrefaction can remove, and what requires redemption

At a Glance

The word. Corruption can name decay, the spoiling admixture in a body, or a necessary transition towards purification.

In the Candida. The book connects these material meanings with sin while keeping Christ's saving action distinct from laboratory art.

In this edition. Read the agent and object carefully: a body's corruptible residues, a person's sin, and the operation called corruption are not interchangeable.

A place to read. Read the second letter at pp. 218–224 alongside the cosmic application at pp. 231–232.

Meaning

Corruption has a deliberate double force in the Candida. It is an evil from which perfection must be freed, yet the breakdown of an existing bodily condition can also be the means of that freeing. The word therefore cannot be translated everywhere as simple destruction. When the second Latin correspondent says that corruption adheres to residues, he is describing what spoils a lower body. When he says putrefaction must precede the operations of the art, he is describing a necessary passage towards a better condition. The argument depends on maintaining the difference.

The account begins with a special definition of substance. Substance is pure, simple being that admits no contrariety; lower bodies contain this essential component together with accidental residues. These residues exceed the substance, mingle with it, and contaminate its purity. The evil of corruption consequent upon the curse after the first parents' sin adheres to the residues rather than to substance considered in itself. This is a theory of what bodily impurity belongs to, not an assertion that actual bodies are already pure.

That qualification matters when the argument turns to humanity. The second correspondent denies that sin is substance, yet says sin contaminates and perverts the person's whole substance. There is no contradiction if the first statement identifies what sin is and the second describes the reach of its effects. The distinction protects the created good without minimizing the corruption of the creature. Reading only the definition of pure substance would miss the severe account of human helplessness that follows.

Use in the book

On pp. 220–222 the writer moves from lower bodies to the human being. The earthly human is corruptible, the heavenly human or soul immortal; the earthly bodily component and soul are joined in one hypostasis. Sin properly adheres to the accidental, residual flesh. Romans 7:18, "in my flesh dwells no good thing," becomes the scriptural warrant. The phrase is used to distinguish corruption's seat from the pure being created by God, not to make the human body an independently evil substance.

At II.222.1 the chronology of sin is decisive. God had already created the human being before sin entered through the first parents' transgression under the Devil's deception. Therefore God is not the author of sin. The material classification serves an ethical and theological denial: creation does not make God responsible for the later corruption of the creature. This argument responds directly to the controversial syllogisms of the first letter.

The second letter then compares two kinds of rescue. Art can separate bodily residues through diligence following putrefaction. The human being, however, requires faith in Jesus Christ, his merit, and cleansing through his precious blood. The text does not say that a chemical separation forgives sin. Its analogy makes purification intelligible while the account of salvation names a different agent and ground. This is one of the strongest reasons to resist reducing its Christianity to decorative alchemical symbolism.

The analogy expands at II.223.2: regeneration of the subject through putrefaction and separation gives a type and living image of resurrection. Finally, II.231.1 generalizes corruption into a medium by which substances and elements are liberated from residues and superfluities and brought into a more than perfect new form. Corruption here can be a route through the loss of a present condition into perfection. It is not necessarily the extinction of the underlying being.[129]

Places to read

II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219). The special definition of substance and the attachment of corruption to residues.

II.220.2 (source pp. 220–221); II.221.1 (source pp. 221–222); II.222.1 (source p. 222). The application to human flesh and the denial that God authors sin.

II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223); II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224). Material separation compared with redemption and resurrection.

II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232). Corruption as a medium of cosmic purification.

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[129] At II.231.1 the claim concerns a divinely effected final transformation. It is not an early formulation of a modern conservation law, nor does the book offer laboratory evidence that its account of the world's end must occur.

Connections

The pairing of bodily and spiritual purification connects this entry with Medicine and its orders, but it also limits that connection. Medical improvement belongs to the powers claimed for the art; release from sin belongs to Christ. The book can place these within one Christian account of creation without assigning them identical efficacy.

Putrefaction, Separation, Resurrection, and Annihilation and transformation describe different stages or aspects of the same network of reasoning. Keeping them separate makes the author's transitions easier to evaluate: a change in the condition of a body does not by itself establish a claim about the salvation of a person.

Translation in this edition

Corruptio is translated according to its object and argumentative setting. "Corruption" preserves the broad semantic connection; "decay," "breakdown," or "purification through corruption" may clarify a particular sentence. It should not become "annihilation" where enduring substance is expressly asserted.

Excrementa is rendered "residues." In these passages it denotes removable, nonessential material rather than only bodily waste. "Sin" translates peccatum; it should not be softened into a merely technical imbalance.

Attested forms

malum corruptionis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219).

peccatum — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.221.1 (source pp. 221–222).

corruptio — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232).

Cautions

The doctrine is stated in the second of two opposed letters. Attribute its definitions to that speaker before relating them to the narrator's approving use of the model.

Neither material purity nor the assertion that sin is accidental makes sin trivial or external to lived humanity. The second letter explicitly describes its pervasive effects.

See also

Original sin and its polemics; Resurrection; Annihilation and transformation; Medicine and its orders

Homunculus

Homunculis · extra matricem · in ventre equino

The reported artificial child and the argument that rejects it

At a Glance

The word. The Latin plural homunculi names the alleged artificially generated little human beings discussed in Chapter XI.

In the Candida. The book reports the Paracelsian claim, analyzes its errors and expressly rejects generation outside the womb from a man's seed alone.

In this edition. The report is translated as a contested claim. Its apparatus must not be detached from the rejection that follows.

A place to read. Read II.195.1 through II.198.2, with the disclaimer of discipleship at II.192.1.

Meaning

The homunculus is not the Candida's proposed achievement. It is the subject of a controversy over the limits of legitimate Hermetic art. The chapter's question asks what is to be thought of Theophrastus's homunculi; its answer is that the described generation is false, speculative and contrary to nature's order. The distinction between reporting and endorsing is therefore indispensable.

The negative conclusion rests on a positive theory of generation. The writer holds that the soul originates from God and is thereafter propagated through the union of both parents. He treats the formation of Eve and the blessing to multiply as scriptural evidence for that account. The disputed artificial child matters because it seems to remove the mother and to make the father's seed sufficient.

Use in the book

The chapter begins with an ethical obligation attributed to Antonius de Abbatia: do not put forward falsehood and expose those who do, II.194.1. The author says he has generally avoided personal offence by omitting names or using letters, but now names Theophrastus after having discussed his reputation. The dispute is presented as an act of intellectual responsibility, not an abandonment of all the preceding praise.[130]

At II.195.1 the report identifies a work on the generation of natural things and describes the claim of a truly living child, fully limbed but smaller

[130] The phrase in ventre equino is retained as part of the reported procedure. The lexicon does not turn that compact alchemical expression into a reconstructed recipe. The narrator's conclusion is rejection, not an invitation to perfect the procedure.

than an ordinarily born child. It mentions sealed cucurbits and treatment in the horse's belly, while saying the full account need not be repeated. The language of great miracle, mighty work and secret belongs to that reported claim. The narrator's own use of mighty work at the end of the chapter will identify a different object of wonder.

The first explicit criticism appears at II.195.2. The writer allows that Theophrastus is right to prefer soul-propagation over separate creation of each soul. He objects that the soul is propagated through the father alone and that the proposed procedure disregards nature's order. He expressly leaves undecided whether the reported theory would explain the father's contribution by eduction or by transmission. A lexicon should preserve that reserve rather than solve a mechanism the text sets aside.

The argument from Eve follows in II.196.1. Adam receives the divine breathing; the narrative of Eve's formation does not describe a second independent breathing. The writer infers that Adam's rib was already animated and that the woman formed from it possessed a soul. This is his interpretation of the scriptural sequence, not a direct biblical statement about laboratory generation.

At II.197.1-II.197.2 the power of multiplication belongs to the soul, but ordinary generation brings it into actuality through the joining of both parents' seed under divine ordinance. Neither male nor female alone can multiply. This symmetrical denial of sufficiency is the operative answer to the male-only homunculus claim. The account also depends upon the distinction between the hypostatic Word and a particular uttered blessing.

The author then brings in a comparison from his own art, II.198.1. A magistery cannot be completed with ferment alone or Azoth alone; both are needed, and multiplication requires further mercurial water. This is an analogy of complementary conditions. It does not mean that ferment literally becomes the mother or that the laboratory vessel literally becomes a human womb. The author uses the art to reinforce an argument against unilateral generation.

At II.198.2 the conclusion makes the reversal of wonder explicit. The soul's origin from God and its subsequent propagation are called the arcanum and mighty work. Theophrastus's generation outside the womb, without a natural mother and from a man's seed alone is rejected entirely. Thus the chapter returns the language of miracle from a reported artificial marvel to the divinely ordered natural generation the writer accepts.

Places to read

II.192.1 (source p. 192); II.194.1 (source p. 194). Selective disagreement follows the disclaimer of discipleship and an ethical rule against falsehood.

II.195.1 (source p. 195); II.195.2 (source pp. 195–196). The claim is reported before its two errors are identified.

II.196.1 (source p. 196); II.197.1 (source p. 197); II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198). The positive scriptural account of soul and parental union.

II.198.1 (source p. 198); II.198.2 (source p. 198). The art's complementary principles provide an analogy; the final verdict rejects the claim.

Connections

This controversy sharpens Creation and imitation. The art may imitate and perfect nature without being authorized to disregard the conditions of human generation. It also complements the earlier answer that an artist need not create an animal or plant in order to perfect mineral matter, II.127.1-II.132.1. The author defends an operative art while insisting that different kinds of operation have different conditions.

Translation in this edition

Extra matricem is outside the womb. The reported in ventre equino literally means in the horse's belly and can name the incubation context discussed in the edition's note. That vocabulary explains a received account; it does not make the lexicon an instruction for attempting it. Homunculi remains a plural even where the English headword uses a singular dictionary form.

Attested forms

Homunculis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.194.1 (source p. 194).

extra matricem — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.198.2 (source p. 198).

in ventre equino — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.195.1 (source p. 195).

mera speculativa — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.198.2 (source p. 198).

Cautions

The source does not anticipate a modern technology of reproduction. Its conclusion and its supporting theory should both be read historically. Most importantly, reporting the apparatus without the rejection would falsely make the Candida an advocate of the procedure it condemns.

See also

Paracelsus and Theophrastus; Soul propagation; Creation and imitation; Ferment and Azoth; Knowledge and practice; Original sin and its polemics

Medicine and its orders

Medicina primi ordinis · Medicina secundi ordinis · Medicina tertii ordinis

Particular principles, compounds and the transmuting third order

At a Glance

The word. The three Latin order-names classify preparations within the author's account.

In the Candida. First-order Salt, second-order compound and third-order tincture have different claimed capacities; broad medicinal use alone does not make them equivalent.

In this edition. The historical therapeutic assertions remain assertions. Order is retained as a classificatory term rather than converted into dosage or a present-day drug grade.

A place to read. Read pp. 181-184, II.181.1-II.184.1, continuously rather than isolating the most expansive cure claims.

Meaning

Medicine in the Candida can mean a particular preparation, a compound with broad bodily use or the perfected tincture whose powers extend across the natural kingdoms. Chapter IX distinguishes these levels explicitly. Its language sometimes calls a compound universal in relation to medicine while reserving the transmutation of metals for the third order. Context determines the scope of universal; a single adjective is not enough to collapse the classification.[131]

The orders concern preparation and attributed capacity. They do not offer an independently validated medical taxonomy, standard dose schedule or measure of clinical efficacy. The writer makes strong therapeutic claims and relates some to his own practice, others to authorities. Understanding his classification requires preserving these differences of source and scope.

Use in the book

The chapter begins from three previously announced effects: cure of bodily diseases, metallic improvement and gemstone transformation, II.179.2-II.180.1. The writer then says that even medicine at its lowest degree has helped in disorders curable by the pharmacopoeia, II.180.2. His list includes fevers, haemorrhages, dysentery, difficult childbirth and other conditions. The expression lowest degree is part of the claim from which he reasons towards still greater effects at the highest degree. It should not

[131] The three orders are the book's classification, developed on printed pp. 181–184. Its reports of cures and bodily effects are historical assertions, not clinical evidence for present treatment. "Order" should not be replaced by a modern drug class.

automatically be treated as a fully defined fourth class alongside the named orders.

The first named order is philosophers' Salt, II.181.1. The writer claims that it can be used in every disease and that a small historical weight can cure many people of fever. He also invokes Helmont on corrected and perfected sulphurs. The association gives the reader an explanation of why a principle may be medicinally valuable even before the final tincture. It does not make this Salt ordinary kitchen salt, nor turn the stated quantity into a safe modern dose.

The following anecdote, II.182.1, concerns a doctor's eager requests for the secret. Philosophers' Salt is called a master key: lacking it means lacking wisdom and the whole art. The rhetorical elevation of the first-order medicine therefore concerns its indispensability as well as its alleged medical power. A key can be indispensable to the completed undertaking without being the completed undertaking itself.

The second order appears at II.182.2. Philosophical Sulphur and Salt are individually praised as particular remedies; their compound is called universal and identified as the medicine of the second order. The writer claims that these preparations strengthen and expel offending matter, described as a black slime, in convulsive illnesses. The anatomical report associated with General Spar is part of the testimony he offers. It is not a modern diagnosis or proof that the same visible material explains every convulsion.

The contrast sharpens at II.183.1. The natural tincture, medicine of the third order, is another thing. Its claimed power embraces swiftly removing bodily diseases, while the passage preserves a qualification reported from Polemann concerning the stone. The ensuing explanation mentions protection against the stone and particular assistance in its pain. The writer thus allows qualified and particular benefits within a chapter that otherwise speaks in universal language. A summary should not erase these qualifications to make the medical promise more absolute.

At II.184.1 the practical boundary is categorical. The third-order tincture can, according to the author, tincture imperfect metals into gold and transform inferior precious stones. The first and second orders cannot do this. His reason is that bodies or matters do not act upon one another in the required manner; spirits alone tincture and transmute. Whatever difficulties that theory presents, it is the source's stated explanation for separating the orders.

The subsequent claims extend beyond bodily medicine and metals. Glass may be made stretchable and malleable, II.184.2; the tincture is said to strengthen plants and accelerate a vine's fruiting, II.185.1. These effects are adduced from the Lamp and other authors as further evidence of the

subject's universal power. They explain why this perfected medicine cannot be understood simply as a stronger version of one particular remedy.

Places to read

II.179.2 (source pp. 179–180); II.180.1 (source p. 180); II.180.2 (source pp. 180–181). The announced three effects and the author's lower-degree medicinal claim.

II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182); II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183). First-order Salt and the second-order compound.

II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184); II.184.1 (source p. 184). The third order's distinct identity, the stone qualification and the exclusion of lower orders from metallic transmutation.

II.184.2 (source pp. 184–185); II.185.1 (source p. 185). Glass and vegetation extend the account of universal power.

Connections

The classification connects Universal medicine with Universal and particular. It also explains why the authority Basilius can be praised for a particular spirit that eases stone-pain without that spirit being equated with the completed third-order tincture. Tincture and elixir develops the perfected preparation's relation to the Stone; this entry concentrates on the book's explicit hierarchy.

Translation in this edition

Primi, secundi and tertii ordinis mean of the first, second and third order. Materia peccans is offending or diseased matter, not a patient's personal moral guilt. Its vocabulary can echo the book's theological language, but the immediate passage concerns a bodily explanation. Physica in Tinctura Physica is natural or pertaining to natural philosophy, rather than modern physics.

Attested forms

Medicina primi ordinis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182).

Medicina secundi ordinis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183).

Medicina tertii ordinis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184).

materiam peccantem — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.182.2 (source pp. 182–183).

Cautions

The lexicon supplies neither treatment recommendations nor missing preparation details. The historical disease terms and cure assertions must not be silently mapped to a modern diagnosis, efficacy claim or dose. The source's insistence on right application does not establish what a safe application would be.

See also

Universal medicine; Universal and particular; Salt philosophical; Sulphur philosophical; Tincture and elixir; Basilius Valentinus; Transmutation

Ophir

Ophir

Imported gold and an invalid inference about ability

At a Glance

The word. Ophir is the place-name used in the objection from Solomon's gold imports.

In the Candida. The author denies that importing gold proves an inability to make gold or ignorance of the art.

In this edition. No modern geographical identification is imposed on the biblical name.

A place to read. Read the opening of Chapter Twelve, pp. 199–200.

Meaning

Ophir enters the Candida as a premise in an argument, not as a destination in a geographical account. Opponents of the Hermetic art appeal to Solomon's having gold brought from Ophir. If he had been able to make gold, they reason, he would not have imported it. The narrator contests that connection. The place-name matters because it marks the acquisition of already created gold from elsewhere.

The reply distinguishes obtaining a good from possessing a method that could produce it. A person may legitimately use what God has created even if he knows another way of acquiring the same kind of benefit. Solomon, as a wise ruler, would understand that divine goods should not be left unused. Import and possible art are therefore compatible in the narrator's argument.

Use in the book

A second inference is rejected at the same time. Even if Solomon did not practise the art, it would not follow that he did not know or possess it. Governmental duties might have prevented exercise, and contemplation of wisdom could be preferable to manual work. The Ophir objection consequently fails twice: importing does not prove inability, and nonexercise does not prove ignorance.

The distinction is particularly useful because it keeps the author's answer from becoming a claim he does not need to establish. He need not prove that every shipment was unnecessary or that Solomon actually maintained a laboratory. He seeks to show that the opponents' historical premise does not entail their conclusion. The defence concerns validity of inference before it concerns the reconstruction of a king's activities.

The chapter then gives positive reasons for possible Solomonic knowledge, including Wisdom 7 and an alchemical interpretation of Urim

and Thummim. Those belong to Solomon and wisdom rather than to a topography of Ophir. The final paragraph also says the art's real foundation in nature matters more than determining whether this or that predecessor possessed it.

The lexicon therefore leaves Ophir geographically unlocated. The Candida's local argument does not require a modern identification, and supplying one would introduce a disputed external question without helping to explain the reasoning. Its gold is important as a created treasure legitimately brought into use, not as a chemically distinctive ingredient for the philosophical work.[132]

Places to read

II.199.1 (source p. 199). The opponents' argument from Solomon's imported gold.

II.199.2 (source pp. 199–200). The explicit denial of both inferences and the appeal to use of created goods.

II.200.1 (source pp. 200–201); II.201.2 (source pp. 201–202). Alternative purposes and the eventual limit placed on the historical question.

Connections

Solomon and wisdom gives the larger chapter's theological and intellectual argument. Definition and demonstration and Knowledge and practice explain the distinctions between an observed action, an ability, a body of knowledge, and its exercise.

Gold ordinary concerns an existing noble material. Gold living concerns a different role within the art; the imported Ophir gold must not automatically be called living philosophical gold.

Translation in this edition

Ophir remains the biblical proper name. "Had gold brought" preserves the mediated acquisition; it need not be turned into a claim that Solomon personally visited the place.

"Does not follow" is the central logical expression of the reply. The passage defeats a purported entailment rather than proving the opposite historical event.

Attested forms

Ophir — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.199.1 (source p. 199); II.199.2 (source pp. 199–200).

[132] II.199.2 presents the two invalid inferences separately. Keeping both is necessary: the first concerns ability to make gold, the second concerns knowledge or possession of the art despite possible nonpractice.

Cautions

No location, route, or geological source is established here.

The reply is not proof that Solomon actually manufactured gold.

See also

Solomon and wisdom; Knowledge and practice; Gold ordinary; Gold living; Definition and demonstration

Original sin and its polemics

Flaccianorum · Calvinianorum quorundam · DEUM authorem esse peccati

Flacian and Calvinist names inside an argument about substance

At a Glance

The word. The controversy concerns whether sin can be called the substance of the fallen human being.

In the Candida. Two Latin letters use that controversy to test definitions of substance, accident, light, and the image of God.

In this edition. Names of confessional opponents remain attributed polemical descriptions; the letters' conclusions must not be merged.

A place to read. Begin with the first letter's syllogisms, pp. 204–205, then compare the reply at pp. 218–227.

Meaning

Original sin enters the Candida through a dispute that initially concerns light. One party argues that light is substance because everything God created is substance and God created light. The first correspondent rejects the unrestricted major premise. Created heat, colour, cold, and moisture can be innocent accidents rather than substances. His theological warning follows from this distinction: if everything in a human being is substance, sin too must be substance. A mistaken physical classification would produce a dangerous account of the fallen person.

He labels that conclusion the opinion of the Flacians. The presented syllogism runs: everything in the human being is substance; sin is in the human being; therefore sin is substance. The first correspondent does not endorse it. He displays it as the result of accepting a premise that should be refused. The name is thus part of a reductio, not a detached survey of a denomination. Its force lies in marking an error that he believes his addressee also wishes to avoid.

A second syllogism then makes the consequences sharper: God is the author of all substances; sin is substance; therefore God is the author of sin. The first correspondent connects this, cautiously but polemically, with certain Calvinists, adding that the consequence may follow even if it is not stated directly. The qualifier "certain" is essential. The book does not say that all Reformed believers openly profess the conclusion, nor is its hostile inference a neutral account of Calvinist theology.[133]

[133] The Latin at II.205.1 says Calvinianorum quorundam and distinguishes direct assertion from a purported necessary consequence. Both qualifications belong to the evidence; neither should disappear in a summary.

Use in the book

The first letter's account of the image of God helps explain the dispute. It treats the image as co-created with the human being rather than as the human substance itself. The image is not matter, form, or a third intrinsic cause; the correspondent therefore classifies it as an accident. He warns that confusing image and substance invites the claim that what succeeds the image after the Fall, sin, must also be substance. Physical vocabulary is doing theological work at every step.

The second letter accepts the denial that sin is substance but rejects the route through ordinary Aristotelian classification. It offers its own physical definition: substance is pure and simple being that admits no contrariety. Lower bodies comprise substance and accidental residues. Corruption properly adheres to the latter, although it contaminates the whole embodied creature. Consequently the claim that everything in the human being is substance is false. The reply reaches an anti-Flacian conclusion through a different account of bodily constitution.

The second correspondent also supplies a narrative reason God cannot author sin. Creation precedes the first parents' violation of God's command under the Devil's deception. Sin enters after the human being already exists. It is therefore neither the original substance of the creature nor something God must have created simply by creating that substance. The chronology supplements the distinction between essential being and its corruption.

The reply's final pages disagree with the first correspondent over the image of God. It stresses the wording that the human being was created as God's image, rather than a separate image being created alongside humanity. Genesis 9, where human life remains protected because of God's image after the Fall, shows that the image has not simply vanished. The closing examples include dominion and imitation of holiness, justice, and other virtues. The letters agree on rejecting God as author of sin while disputing the conceptual machinery behind that rejection.

This shared conclusion should not erase the severity of the account. At II.222.2 the second letter says sin so clings to and perverts humanity that salvation requires faith in Christ and his merit. Calling sin an accident is therefore not a denial of its inherited, pervasive effects. The accident/substance distinction answers what sin is; it does not diminish what sin does.

Places to read

II.203.1 (source p. 203); II.203.2 (source pp. 203–204). The initial disagreement over created light and the unrestricted premise.

II.204.1 (source p. 204); II.204.2 (source pp. 204–205); II.205.1 (source p. 205); II.205.2 (source p. 205). The first letter's image-of-God argument and two rejected syllogisms.

II.218.1 (source p. 218); II.220.2 (source pp. 220–221); II.222.1 (source p. 222). The second letter's alternative definition and denial that God authors sin.

II.225.2 (source pp. 225–226); II.226.1 (source p. 226); II.226.2 (source pp. 226–227); II.227.L (source p. 227). The disagreement over God's image and its survival after the Fall.

Connections

The Formula of Concord's discussion of original sin likewise distinguishes the nature created by God from its corruption. That primary confessional text provides a useful comparison for understanding the stakes of calling sin substance. It does not establish that either correspondent is quoting it or that the Candida's unusual physical definition is identical with its teaching.[134]

The controversy brings Light, Substance, Accident, and Corruption and sin into one argument. The result is not a self-contained theological appendix: definitions used in the physical art are being tested by their consequences for creation and redemption.

Translation in this edition

Flaccianorum is preserved as "of the Flacians," with the historical group-name explained here. Calvinianorum quorundam is "of certain Calvinists"; dropping quorundam would materially enlarge the accusation.

Accidens is "accident" in a technical sense, not a chance event. Substantia requires attention to which letter is speaking. The reply's pure, simple being cannot be silently equated with every ordinary use of "substance."

Attested forms

Flaccianorum — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.204.2 (source pp. 204–205).

Calvinianorum quorundam — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.205.1 (source p. 205).

DEUM authorem esse peccati — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.222.1 (source p. 222).

[134] Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, "Original Sin": https://bookofconcord.org/solid-declaration/original-sin/. The comparison concerns the distinction between created nature and corruption; it is not evidence of direct textual dependence.

Cautions

Do not reproduce the letters' polemical labels as current statements of what whole Christian traditions believe.

The letter closing is II.227.L. II.227.1 is the opening of the next chapter and must not be cited as the epistle's final paragraph.

See also

Corruption and sin; Resurrection; Light; Substance; Accident

Resurrection

resurrectura · Typum & vivam imaginem · Aufferstehung der Todten

A transformed body and the living image supplied by the art

At a Glance

The word. Resurrection names the future rising and glorification of the dead, not the mere recovery of a present bodily condition.

In the Candida. The regenerated alchemical subject supplies an image of this transformation and reinforces the narrator's Christian expectation.

In this edition. "Spiritual" describes perfected embodiment here; it should not automatically be read as bodilessness.

A place to read. Compare the second letter at pp. 223–225 with the narrator's concluding assurances at pp. 232–233.

Meaning

Resurrection is one of the destinations of the Candida's physical reasoning. The work begins from creation and ends by considering a perfected future world and transformed human bodies. Between them, the alchemical subject is said to pass through putrefaction, separation, and regeneration into a noble new form. This sequence supplies a type and living image of what Christian Scripture promises. The comparison gives the art a devotional purpose beyond medicine or metallic improvement.

The clearest formulation occurs in the second Latin letter. After explaining why sin is not substance and why salvation requires Christ, the correspondent says that human bodies will rise after death and putrefaction on the Last Day, perfect, free from stain and corruption, glorious, and spiritual. The language follows Paul's contrasts in 1 Corinthians 15: corruption and incorruption, dishonour and glory, weakness and power, natural body and spiritual body. The argument requires the body's transformation rather than its simple continuation unchanged.

The philosophical parallel is then explicit. The subject of the art is regenerated through putrefaction and separation, freed from grossness and dregs, and brought into a most noble new form, spiritual essence, and perfect virtue. This is called a type and living image. The wording matters: an image illuminates or confirms the promised transformation; it does not place an alchemical practitioner in the role of the agent who raises the dead. The Christian claim remains grounded in divine action and scriptural promise.

Use in the book

The second letter quotes the anonymous author called Filius Sendivogii to connect the Stone with the triune God's works of creation, redemption, regeneration, and future blessedness. That chain makes resurrection part of a comprehensive theological interpretation of the art. Its material transformations are not treated as spiritually neutral techniques to which pious language is later attached. They are said to disclose the pattern of God's works.

At pp. 224–225 the correspondence extends the comparison through white and red. The philosopher's white and red are related to Urim and Thummim, Christ's ransom, and water and the Holy Spirit in baptism. These are interpretive applications, not proof that the biblical objects were alchemical preparations. The author presents the material colours and fixation as occasions for confirming faith. The reader should follow the proposed analogy while keeping its evidential status visible.[135]

The narrator resumes the theme at II.232.1 after explaining the world's final transformation. A new assurance of the resurrection of the dead follows from the account of universal substances freed from residues and brought into perfection. He invokes Paul's teaching in 1 Corinthians 15 and the promise that human bodies will become like Christ's glorified body. Daniel's radiant righteous and star-like figures add the imagery of shining perfection. What was hidden or obscured becomes manifest.

The next paragraph compares the risen state with angels, then closes with the admission that no eye has seen, no ear heard, and no human heart conceived what God has prepared for those who love him. The sequence places a limit on the preceding physical discourse. The art is claimed to yield assurance and an intelligible analogy; it does not make the entire future state available to present technical description.

This ending also returns to the book's opening emblem. A phoenix renewed from flame portrays Christ in the frontispiece's legend. The emblem and the later argument share a language of restored life through an apparent passage of destruction. That connection is thematic and explicit at the level of Christian imagery; it need not turn every fire used in the art into the same event as Christ's death and resurrection.

Places to read

II.222.2 (source pp. 222–223); II.223.1 (source p. 223). Christ's saving action and the Pauline account of the body's future rising.

[135] At II.224.1 the interpretation of white and red as Urim and Thummim is presented as highly probable. This is an argumentative judgment by the correspondent, not an established identification of ancient priestly objects.

II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224); II.224.2 (source pp. 224–225); II.225.1 (source p. 225). The art as type and living image, with Christological and baptismal applications.

II.232.1 (source pp. 232–233); II.233.1 (source p. 233). The narrator's assurance and the stated limit of present knowledge.

PRE.EMBLEM (unnumbered frontispiece). The phoenix legend as a Christian image of restored life.

Connections

Corruption and sin explains why putrefaction can be part of a passage towards perfection rather than only an evil endpoint. Annihilation and transformation explains why the final state is described as a transformation of enduring being. Together they supply the physical vocabulary used in this account of the risen body.

Soul propagation concerns the origin and transmission of human life within the present order. Resurrection concerns God's promised transformation beyond death. Their common interest in soul and body does not authorize collapsing their different questions into one physical mechanism.

Translation in this edition

Corpus animale in the Pauline quotation is rendered "natural body." Translating it simply as "animal body" would suggest a species classification foreign to the contrast. Corpus spirituale is "spiritual body," retaining the noun that prevents an easy equation with bodiless spirit.[136]

Aufferstehung is modernized as "resurrection"; the original German form is recorded among the attested terms. Perfect virtue in the alchemical parallel means perfected effective power, rather than only moral excellence.

Attested forms

resurrectura — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.223.1 (source p. 223).

Typum & vivam imaginem — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224).

Aufferstehung der Todten — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.232.1 (source pp. 232–233).

[136] The contrasts quoted at II.223.1 come from 1 Corinthians 15:42–44. The lexicon follows their bodily grammar while leaving the theological interpretation attributed to the book.

Cautions

Do not describe the book as claiming an experimentally demonstrated resurrection. Its argument combines scriptural warrant, authorial confidence, and analogy from the art.

The second letter is a quoted voice with a specific definition of substance. The narrator's later adoption of the model does not make the two passages one uninterrupted speech.

See also

Corruption and sin; Annihilation and transformation; World and its end; Soul propagation; Phoenix

Solomon and wisdom

König Salomone · Weißheit · Urim und Thumim

Knowing the art without proving its exercise

At a Glance

The word. Solomon is the biblical king whose wisdom and imported gold become evidence in a dispute about the art.

In the Candida. Chapter Twelve separates knowledge, possession, practice, and royal duty.

In this edition. The book's defence of possible Solomonic knowledge is not a documented history of Solomon's laboratory work.

A place to read. Read pp. 199–202, then compare the second letter's white-and-red interpretation at p. 224.

Meaning

Solomon appears as an exemplary test of what can and cannot be inferred from a revered person's conduct. Opponents say he did not know or possess the Hermetic art because he had gold brought from Ophir. If he could make gold himself, they suppose, he would not have imported it. The narrator rejects the inference. Importing a good does not prove an inability to produce it, and refraining from an art does not prove ignorance of that art.

The distinction is broader than a defence of one ancient king. Knowledge and exercise are separate states. A person can understand the highest earthly wisdom and nevertheless choose contemplation over manual practice. Other obligations can prevent exercise. Existing natural treasures can legitimately be used even if an art offers another route to valuable substances. The narrator consequently refuses to make historical conduct an infallible index of theoretical knowledge.

Wisdom is also valued above the riches the art might yield. The author invokes the Solomonic voice in Wisdom 7, where wisdom is preferred to kingdoms, principalities, and worldly treasures. This fits his argument that contemplation of nature and God's works can be a sufficient end of study. The possession of a method for making gold is not the only measure of success. Solomon's stature therefore supports an ethical hierarchy within the defence of alchemy.

Use in the book

Chapter Twelve begins with the opponents' appeal to Ophir. The narrator answers that God's created goods should not remain unused merely because a king knows an alternative art. He then considers royal business: many matters of government could have kept Solomon from practical

exercise. This is a possible explanation, not proof that it was the actual reason. The cautious structure should be retained. He is defeating a purported disproof rather than documenting each step of Solomon's life.

The argument next gives positive grounds for attributing knowledge. Solomon is the wisest king; the art is said to have been known among the Jews; Urim and Thummim are interpreted as the philosophical white and red; and Wisdom 7:17 is cited for knowledge of the world's constitution and the powers of the elements. These grounds combine scriptural authority with the author's alchemical interpretation of biblical objects. Their different evidential kinds should not be flattened into a single historical demonstration.

The Urim-and-Thummim assertion is especially consequential. At II.201.1 the narrator speaks strongly, saying they were nothing other than the philosophical white and red. In the second letter, II.224.1, a similar interpretation is called highly probable and related to ruby-like crystals produced in the art. The two formulations belong to different speakers and have different degrees of expressed certainty. Reading them together shows both the importance and the interpretive character of the identification.[137]

The chapter finally reduces the practical importance of settling the biographical question. If the art is true and its foundation in nature has been established, the reader need not be consumed by whether a particular predecessor possessed or practised it. Contemplation of God's works is itself a worthy result. Solomon therefore begins as disputed evidence and ends as an example of why wisdom should not be reduced to acquisitive practice.

That shift connects this chapter with the author's own guarded self-presentation. He claims benefit chiefly in medicine, conceals his name, and withholds individual manipulations. The reader repeatedly encounters a distinction between what someone knows, what he performs, what he publicly reports, and what ends he chooses to pursue. Solomon is one distinguished case within that larger discipline of inference.

Places to read

II.199.1 (source p. 199); II.199.2 (source pp. 199–200). The Ophir objection and the distinction between importing and inability.

II.200.1 (source pp. 200–201). Wisdom above wealth and the possible demands of government.

II.201.1 (source p. 201); II.201.2 (source pp. 201–202). The positive scriptural and alchemical grounds, followed by the limit of the question.

[137] Compare the narrator's assertive wording at II.201.1 with the second correspondent's probability claim at II.224.1. A uniform English summary would conceal a real difference in argumentative force.

II.224.1 (source p. 224). The second letter's qualified interpretation of the philosophical white and red.

Connections

Ophir concerns the source of imported gold within the objection; Solomon and wisdom concerns the validity of the inference drawn from that import. Keeping the entries distinct helps preserve the difference between a biblical place-name and a theory of intellectual achievement.

Nobility and perfection explains why gold and precious stones can be honoured without making wealth the highest good. In this chapter wisdom explicitly outranks the riches to which the art may lead.

Translation in this edition

Weißheit is "wisdom," not merely technical information. Wissenschafft in the surrounding argument can mean knowledge of the art and its grounds rather than modern institutional science.

The book cites Wisdom in a Solomonic voice. The lexicon reports that usage without turning the attribution into an independently established historical authorship of the biblical book.[138]

Attested forms

König Salomone — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.199.1 (source p. 199).

Weißheit — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.200.1 (source pp. 200–201).

Urim und Thumim — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.201.1 (source p. 201).

Cautions

The Candida's reasoning leaves open a distinction between Solomon's knowledge and his practice. Do not summarize it as proof that he manufactured gold.

The identification of Urim and Thummim with alchemical white and red belongs to this text's interpretation. It should remain attributed.

See also

Ophir; Nobility and perfection; Anonymous author; Tincture and elixir

[138] The quotation at II.201.1 corresponds to Wisdom 7:17. "The Solomonic voice" describes how the Candida reads the passage without making a new claim about its historical composition.

Soul propagation

anima sive spiritus hominis · propagatio · conjunctione seminis utriusque

Divine origin and the union of both parents

At a Glance

The word. Propagatio names the continuation of human life in body and soul through generation.

In the Candida. The soul first originates from God and thereafter is propagated through the union of both parents, in the author's account.

In this edition. Propagation is distinguished from the separate creation of each new soul, and from a father-only theory the author rejects.

A place to read. Read II.195.2-II.198.2, especially the transition from Eve's formation to the ordinary union of both parents.

Meaning

Soul propagation is the positive doctrine that answers the homunculus claim. The writer denies that each new soul must be separately created, but does not deny divine creation as the original source of the soul. He says the soul first arose from God and still arises through propagation. The two statements concern different stages in his account and must be read together.[139]

The soul is called a ray of the divine essence, according to the cited Cartolossæus, II.197.1. This attributed expression is coupled with a distinction between the hypostatic Word and particular uttered decrees. It should not be paraphrased as a simple claim that a human being is God, or as an independently established definition of the soul's material composition.

Use in the book

The immediate disagreement with Theophrastus is carefully bounded. At II.195.2 the author approves propagation against separate creation, then rejects propagation through the father alone. He postpones the question whether the father-only account would operate by eduction or transmission. His main objection concerns the missing partner and the order of nature, rather than a fully elaborated account of each competing scholastic mechanism.

The first scriptural example is Eve, II.196.1. The author emphasizes that Genesis describes God breathing a soul into Adam but does not describe a

[139] At II.195.2 the narrator expressly leaves the distinction between eduction and transmission aside. Reading the entry as a full technical solution of the origin of individual souls would suppress that stated limit.

second breathing into the woman. The rib taken from Adam must therefore, he reasons, already be animated. The exceptional act of the Creator bringing Eve forth makes actual a power associated with the already ensouled Adam. The inference serves as an explanation of why a second individual need not require a second separately created soul.

The passage then distinguishes capacity from its actualization, II.197.1. The soul possesses a power to multiply, which the Creator brought into effect through Eve's formation. This does not establish that an isolated person can reproduce alone. On the contrary, the next paragraph says that ordinary human propagation requires union, even though the capacity belongs to the soul. Capacity is not sufficient independently of the appointed circumstances that bring it into action.

At II.197.2 marriage and the blessing Be fruitful and multiply establish the ordinary order. Human propagation concerns both body and soul, and the conjunction is explicitly the joining of the seed of both. Neither the man's soul nor the woman's alone can multiply. The contribution of both parents is thus stated in the source rather than supplied by a modern editor to soften a male-only account.

The divine blessing is described as a subordinate cause. This vocabulary recalls the book's earlier distinction between God's universal Word and particular creative commands. Here the author places ordinary human multiplication within an order established by a particular pronounced blessing, while distinguishing the soul's original coming-to-be. The argument is theological as well as natural-philosophical; removing the Word and blessing would change the explanatory structure.

The alchemical comparison at II.198.1 requires both ferment and Azoth for the completed magistery and further mercurial water for multiplication. The comparison shows why possessing a principle with a capacity does not remove complementary conditions. It is not an identification of human reproductive materials with those laboratory terms. In both domains, the author wants to prevent one-sided sufficiency from being mistaken for a complete cause.

The final statement, II.198.2, joins origin and continuation explicitly: from God originally, through propagation thereafter. This is the arcanum celebrated against the alleged artificial child. The book's wonder therefore rests in the divine order working through natural union, not in freeing generation from the natural mother.

Places to read

II.195.2 (source pp. 195–196). Propagation is approved, but father-only propagation is rejected.

II.196.1 (source p. 196); II.197.1 (source p. 197). Eve's formation and the distinction between capacity and actuality.

II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198); II.198.1 (source p. 198); II.198.2 (source p. 198). Both parents, the subordinate blessing, the alchemical analogy and the final conclusion.

Connections

See Body soul and spirit for the book's several senses of soul; see Seeds for the different treatment of animal, vegetable and mineral generation. The soul discussion is especially resistant to a single universal scheme in which every kind of seed behaves alike. The writer expressly differentiates the human soul's origin and subsequent propagation from the mineral generation he discusses elsewhere.

Translation in this edition

Anima sive spiritus hominis permits soul or spirit in this anthropological passage; it does not erase the distinctions among spirit, soul and body in the three-principle scheme. Copula is union, here sexual union under marriage. Conjunctio seminis utriusque is the joining of both parents' seed as the historical theory describes it. Potentia and actus distinguish capacity from realization; they are not genetic terms.

Attested forms

anima sive spiritus hominis — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.197.1 (source p. 197).

propagatio — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198).

conjunctione seminis utriusque — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198).

potentia — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.197.2 (source pp. 197–198).

Cautions

Do not treat propagation as a denial that God creates, or identify the account with modern inheritance. The author's equal necessity of both parents is clear, but it belongs to his specific theology of soul, blessing and nature. The identity of Cartolossæus is left unresolved in the edition.

See also

Homunculus; Seeds; Body soul and spirit; Logos subsistent; Blessing and command; Ferment and Azoth

Weather and witchcraft

Witterung · Unholden und Hexen · Wunderwercke Gottes

The Devil's apparent storms and God's reserved government

At a Glance

The word. Weather includes storms, wind, thunder, lightning, and related events discussed under meteors.

In the Candida. The author denies that the Devil or witches possess power to create true weather.

In this edition. This denial coexists with belief in the Devil and destructive demonic appearances; it is not a general denial of supernatural beings.

A place to read. Read the tightly connected argument at pp. 99–103, especially the interpretation of Job.

Meaning

The Candida's discussion of witchcraft is a consequence of its account of divine causation. The author reserves the government of storms and other weather to God. He regards attempts to assign such power to the Devil, sorcerers, or witches as wrong, superstitious, and godless. The denial is categorical within the stated domain: the Devil can neither create these wondrous works nor receive permission to perform them as true weather.

This position should not be converted into a modern naturalistic account of weather. The author challenges philosophers who assign too much causal power to nature and invokes angels, divine commands, and scriptural descriptions of God's action. He allows elemental motions and stellar concordances elsewhere. His argument is about which beings possess which powers under God, rather than a replacement of supernatural explanation by autonomous physical law.

Nor does the denial make the Devil harmless or imaginary. The author interprets Job's disasters as destructive acts performed in the appearance of immense fire and violent wind. The Devil and his host can strike and consume without producing the genuine elemental events that belong to God's government. The distinction between the form of an appearance and the true nature of a phenomenon carries the burden of the argument.

Use in the book

The immediate foundation is the scriptural account of rain and storms. Genesis 2 says the Lord had not yet caused rain; Job 38 presents snow, hail, downpour, lightning, and thunder as subject to divine allotment; Psalms 18 and 148 describe vapour, fire, and storm winds fulfilling God's Word. The narrator argues that no particular subordinate creative command gives

nature independent rule over these events. This is the premise from which he denies demonic weather-making.

He then rejects a specific interpretation of Christ's storm at sea. Matthew 8, he says, simply reports the storm arising and Christ rebuking wind and sea. It does not identify the Devil as the storm's maker. Assigning that cause adds something the narrative does not say. The argument is therefore also a rule of reading: a claim about an agent must be supported, not merely attached to a dramatic event.

The anticipated objection combines Job 1 with Paul's references to a prince ruling in the air and the darkness of the world. The narrator refuses the inference from a title of rule in the air to the power to create wind. Such a conclusion does not follow. The same distinction between association and efficient cause appears elsewhere in the book's account of lunar concordance and tides.

Job requires a more elaborate reinterpretation. The phrase "fire of God" is explained through the author's claim that Hebrew uses God's name for an exceedingly great thing. The fire and wind are consequently taken as the forms in which the Devil and his host act, rather than true fire and wind of the kind God or his angels produce. This preserves the reality of the narrative's destruction while excluding the causal power the author denies.[140]

The following paragraph marks another limit. The narrator does not wish to deprive elements of the motions and operations they possess through God's universal Word, or stars of their influence and concordance. His denial of witchcraft power is not a denial of all differentiated processes within creation. It must be read within his distinction between universal created powers and those events whose government God reserves to himself.

Places to read

II.094.2 (source pp. 94–95); II.099.1 (source pp. 99–100); II.100.1 (source p. 100). The scriptural basis for God's government over storms and rain.

II.100.2 (source pp. 100–101). The explicit rejection of weather power attributed to the Devil and witches.

II.101.1 (source p. 101); II.101.2 (source pp. 101–102); II.102.1 (source pp. 102–103). The Job and Pauline objections and the distinction between appearance and true weather.

II.103.1 (source p. 103). The qualification preserving elemental operations and stellar concordance.

[140] II.101.2 explicitly contrasts the Devil acting in the form of fire and wind with rechter Wind und Feuer, true wind and fire. Preserving both halves avoids making the narrator either a defender of demonic weather-making or a denier of the disasters he is interpreting.

Connections

Comets, Earthquakes, and Thunder and lightning develop neighbouring applications of the same causal commitments. They show that this chapter is a sustained reconsideration of phenomena under divine government, not an isolated comment about witchcraft.

The episode also belongs with Truth and falsehood and Definition and demonstration. An alleged cause cannot be accepted simply because it is rhetorically associated with an event or a scriptural phrase. The narrator repeatedly demands a valid connection between premise and conclusion.

Translation in this edition

Witterung is "weather" or "weather conditions." Unholden und Hexen is kept as "sorcerers and witches," marking the historical categories that the text itself names.

"In the form of" translates the repeated Gestalt language in the Job interpretation. Calling these appearances mere illusions would go too far: the passage still attributes destructive acts to the Devil and his host.

Attested forms

Witterung — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.100.2 (source pp. 100–101).

Unholden und Hexen — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.100.2 (source pp. 100–101).

Wunderwercke Gottes — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.102.1 (source pp. 102–103).

Cautions

The argument does not warrant a claim about the author's position on every witchcraft accusation, judicial procedure, or demonic act.

The Hebrew grammatical explanation is the author's asserted reading strategy. The lexicon does not adopt it as a general rule of modern Hebrew grammar.

See also

Comets; Earthquakes; Thunder and lightning; Air and wind; Efficient cause

World and its end

Erschaffung der Welt · jüngsten Tage · ein neuer Himmel

Creation, final renewal, and the bounds of present knowledge

At a Glance

The word. The world is the created order whose origin and final state frame the treatise.

In the Candida. The last numbered chapter returns from creation to the world's end and interprets that end as purified renewal.

In this edition. The author's future world belongs to Christian eschatology interpreted through his physical art.

A place to read. Read Chapter Fourteen, pp. 227–233, as a connected argument rather than as isolated predictions.

Meaning

The Candida's world is not an independent mechanism whose origin can be considered apart from its divine government. Its principles, motions, particular orders, and possibilities of perfection are discussed in relation to God's creative Word. When the narrator reaches the end of the book, he deliberately returns to its beginning: having started from the creation of the world, he will conclude by treating its end. The structure makes cosmology and eschatology the outer frame of the practical and mineral discussions.

The question is introduced as a live disagreement among theologians. The narrator distinguishes his own Evangelical circle and those of the so-called Reformed religion, while also acknowledging disagreements within his own side. He suggests, with a formula of respect, that both positions may be mistaken. This is not a claim to speak for every member of his confession. It establishes space for a physical argument drawn from the Hermetic art to contribute to a theological dispute.[141]

The author's declared modesty is coupled with a claim to experience. He says he has learned the art by God's grace and attempted much. From the operation of its subject and the perfection of its magistery, he proposes a model of the final world. The relation between knowledge of Scripture and practical knowledge of nature is crucial: he expects the reader who possesses both to find his interpretation persuasive. The art has become a source of explanatory confidence about divine renewal.

[141] The narrator's unserigen, benanntlich denen Evangelischen identifies his own side in the dispute. This supports a local confessional self-placement; it does not identify the anonymous author's person, institution, or every theological commitment.

Use in the book

The proposed final event has several stages or aspects. The accidents of the present order melt away; visible residual earth burns; the present moving heavens pass. Particular natures resolve into universal principles. Universal natures then become crystalline and most perfectly spiritual, yielding a new immovable heaven and a new earth. The text places these within one description without supplying a detailed chronological timetable. A lexicon should not turn the sequence of its exposition into an unsupported prediction of successive dates or eras.

The new world is both continuous and discontinuous with the present one. Continuity belongs to universal being grounded in God's imperishable Word. Discontinuity belongs to motion, impurity, particular conditions, and the present mode of appearance. What is now invisible becomes visible. This is why the author can speak of a new creation while rejecting the idea that all underlying being is reduced to nothing.

The passage uses the prophet Isaiah's wording for a new heaven and earth and later moves to Paul's account of bodily resurrection. Its new world is therefore not solely an alchemical construction. Scriptural language supplies the promise and horizon; the art supplies a model of transformation that the author believes makes that promise clearer. The relation should be stated in that direction as well as the reverse. The Bible is not simply a coded laboratory manual in this chapter.

The closing emphasis is the glory of God. Finis expresses purpose together with ending, and the narrator rebukes those who mock the physical account without understanding substance, accident, corruption, or resolution. Yet his final assurance does not remove all mystery. After comparing the risen state with angels, he invokes the Pauline statement that no eye or ear has grasped what God prepares for those who love him. The chapter ends with a boundary of mortal knowledge.

The unnumbered Conclusion then returns to rainwater, universal matter, principles, theory, and withheld practical details. The movement is significant. The book does not end with a complete map of the future cosmos, but with renewed guidance about how its present claims should be read and used. Cosmic contemplation is part of the ethical purpose of study, alongside medicine and charitable practice.

Places to read

II.227.1 (source pp. 227–228). The framing question and acknowledgement of theological disagreement.

II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229); II.229.1 (source pp. 229–230); II.230.1 (source pp. 230–231). The author's model of final renewal and its creation-based rationale.

II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232); II.232.1 (source pp. 232–233); II.233.1 (source p. 233). God's glory, resurrection, and the limit of present knowledge.

II.233.2 (source pp. 233–234). The unnumbered Conclusion's return to the treatise's practical and theoretical concerns.

Connections

World and its end connects Creation and imitation and Blessing and command with Annihilation and transformation. The first supplies the origin and divine grounding of universal natures; the second explains what can change without the extinction of being.

The same devotional purpose appears in the mineral chapters, where gold and precious stones invite contemplation of God's wondrous works. The world's final perfection is the largest-scale instance of a continuing interest in nobility, purification, and the manifestation of created excellence.

Translation in this edition

"World" translates Welt without replacing it by the narrower "planet." The argument includes heavens, elements, universal natures, and human bodies, rather than only the terrestrial globe.

"Last Day" preserves the eschatological force of jüngster Tag. "Evangelical" in the chapter's confessional setting should be explained historically rather than equated without qualification with every present movement that uses that name.

Attested forms

Erschaffung der Welt — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.227.1 (source pp. 227–228).

jüngsten Tage — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.228.1 (source pp. 228–229).

ein neuer Himmel — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.231.1 (source pp. 231–232).

Cautions

Chapter Fourteen actually begins at printed p. 227. The original contents gives an erroneous earlier number; a reader's outline should follow the body heading.

The book contains no numbered Chapter Fifteen. Its Conclusion begins on p. 233, after this final numbered chapter.

See also

Annihilation and transformation; Resurrection; Creation and imitation; Blessing and command; Nobility and perfection

Authors voices and authorities

Anonymous author

Insignia Authoris · meinen Nahmen · der Medicin

The unnamed voice, its self-presentation and its limits

At a Glance

The word. Anonymous is an editorial description of the historical author's withheld identity; the book presents the author's arms and a first-person voice.

In the Candida. The writer claims experience, defends a Christian Hermetic philosophy and explicitly gives reasons for withholding both name and manipulations.

In this edition. No conjectural name replaces Anonymous. Self-reports, quoted authorities and the two Latin correspondents remain distinguishable.

A place to read. Read PRE.ARMS, then the concluding defence of anonymity and medicinal attainment at II.239.1-II.240.1.

Meaning

Anonymous identifies an evidential limit, not an absence of personality or purpose. The writer repeatedly explains what he means to prove, distinguishes what he has experienced from what he judges or has been told, and addresses imagined opponents. These features make a recognizable authorial position without giving a secure civil identity. The Candida is not a neutral compilation of detached recipes.[142]

The historical bibliographical description also leaves the author unnamed. Later attributions should be assessed as separate claims requiring evidence; they cannot be inserted into the translated first person as though the 1680 witness printed them. The title's anonymity does not prevent study of the author's religious commitments, argumentative habits or account of practice. Those are available directly in the text.

Use in the book

The preliminaries establish an elaborate self-presentation. The phoenix is said to portray Christ, PRE.EMBLEM. The verso describes the image as the author's arms in place of a philosophical emblem, PRE.ARMS, and claims

[142] The original armorial statement, PRE.ARMS, claims an imperial grant to the writer's forebears at Speyer in 1570. A claim to inherited arms is not sufficient to identify the unnamed writer. The later assignment of a personal author's name should not replace the anonymity of the 1680 title page.

that Maximilian II granted them to his forebears at Speyer in 1570 for lengthy service. This is a claim made by the book. It supplies an avenue for historical inquiry but is not, without independent identification of the arms and family, proof of the writer's name.

The first proem states the intellectual project clearly: chiefly a theory of rainwater, the Hermetic principles and, by analogy, the subject of the art, I.003.2. The emphasis on theory coexists with claimed material experience. In Chapter II the writer insists that his definition of the principles comes from his own experience rather than speculation, II.085.1. A reader should neither erase this assertion nor treat it as independently verified merely because it is emphatic.

Other passages are deliberately more qualified. In the chapters on mines and stones, the writer speaks of his judgment, conjecture, acquaintances' reports and particular observations. Bier's water is communicated through a princely physician, II.117.2; the crystals sent in 1667 come from a person represented by initials, II.119.1. Such distinctions belong to the evidence the writer himself presents. They resist a flattened account in which he personally performed and proved every operation mentioned.

His relation to authorities is also selective. He cites Nuysement, Basilius, Bernard and Sendivogius, yet states that he is no disciple of Theophrastus, II.192.1. He praises practical illumination in the latter while rejecting the homunculus claim. This combination is an example of the book's declared independence of judgment, not proof that the writer had no intellectual debts.

Chapter XIII introduces two opposed letters rather than allowing a single narrator to decide the controversy in one voice, II.202.1. The second letter's definition of substance is expressly relevant to the treatise's intention. Nevertheless, the first letter's claim that light is an accident and the reply's claim that it is substance must remain assigned to their respective speakers. The historical author's decision to print both is itself meaningful, but it is not permission to attribute every sentence indiscriminately to him.

At II.239.1 the writer says that he would have supplied his name to answer scoffers had other reasons not restrained him. Those reasons are not specified. He declares that he can defend what he has written and thanks God for entrusted truth. The next unit narrows the claim of accomplishment: he has boasted only of the medicine, and of divine grace rather than himself, II.240.1. The distinction should govern descriptions of his success. It does not warrant reporting a witnessed demonstration of unlimited metallic transmutation.

The account of publication balances opposed obligations. Sharing gifts with neighbours imitates God's generosity, II.237.2; revealing individual manipulations would bring the philosophers' curse, II.241.1. The resulting

book claims to disclose enough theory and general operation to help a worthy diligent reader, while withholding more. Its anonymity belongs to this controlled presentation, though the text does not expressly equate the unnamed reasons for withholding his name with every reason given for technical secrecy.

Places to read

PRE.EMBLEM (unnumbered frontispiece); PRE.ARMS (unnumbered explanation of the arms). Christian phoenix imagery and the authorial heraldic claim.

I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4); II.085.1 (source p. 85). Declared theoretical purpose and claimed experiential knowledge.

II.202.1 (source p. 202); II.192.1 (source p. 192). The insertion of opposed voices and the refusal of unqualified discipleship.

II.239.1 (source pp. 239–240); II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242). Withheld name, the limited medicinal boast and limits on procedural publication.

Connections

The figure of the author is therefore best read through Authority and testimony, Experience and conjecture and Secrecy and publication. These entries help assess different kinds of assertion without substituting a biography for the book. The final emphasis on charitable Christian use also makes anonymity compatible, in the writer's presentation, with a public duty to defend the truth and benefit readers.

Translation in this edition

First-person pronouns should remain first person. A translation that replaces them with an invented author-name changes the evidence. Insignia Authoris means the author's arms, not an independent certificate of identity. The phrase concerning medicine in II.240.1 is a limit on the boast in the preceding passage and should stay connected with it.

Attested forms

Insignia Authoris — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. PRE.ARMS (unnumbered explanation of the arms).

meinen Nahmen — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.239.1 (source pp. 239–240).

der Medicin — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241).

Cautions

Do not infer a secure identity from the phoenix alone, treat every initial as a solved cipher, or equate all the printed voices. The work's self-presentation offers evidence for historical investigation while leaving its author unnamed.

See also

Phoenix; Authority and testimony; Experience and conjecture; Secrecy and publication; Charity; Paracelsus and Theophrastus; Light

Antonius de Abbatia

Antonius de Abbatia

A voice for right matter, philosophical names, and truthful speech

At a Glance

The word. Antonius de Abbatia is an authority named at three consequential points.

In the Candida. His sayings warn against ruining the right matter, multiply names for the work, and define a philosopher's duties towards truth.

In this edition. The received name is preserved without an unverified biographical identification.

A place to read. Read pp. 77–78, pp. 151–152, and the opening of the homunculus chapter at p. 194.

Meaning

Antonius de Abbatia is useful to the reader through the functions of his cited sayings. The book does not pause to give his life, and this entry does not supply a conjectural identity in place of that silence. His local footprint joins material discipline, interpretation of language, and philosophical ethics. These are not disconnected ornaments: each addresses a way in which a practitioner can mistake appearances or claims for a sound foundation.[143]

Use in the book

At II.077.2 his warning follows the distinction between rainwater and the exact Hermetic subject. Even those few who obtain the right matter can ruin it by mixing. Close relationship does not authorize combining the two subjects, still less adding another similar thing. Antonius's saying makes possession of matter insufficient without right treatment. It supports homogeneity and restraint rather than a search for more ingredients.

At II.151.2 a long list attributed to him includes "our" vegetable salt, spiritual gold, metals, arsenic, vitriol, milk, vinegar, children's urine, honey, fountain, dew of heavenly grace, wine, and the drink of the gods. The possessive is the interpretive safeguard. These names describe what the competent worker sees in the philosophical work; they do not constitute a shopping list of ordinary substances. The list belongs with the narrator's repeated distinction between common and philosophical names.

[143] The present entry deliberately limits identification to the name attested in the Candida. Similar names, translated names, or proposed historical authors require separate documentary verification before they can be merged.

At II.194.1 Antonius gives two duties: put forward no falsehood and expose the person who does. The narrator claims to have observed the first while usually withholding names in fulfilling the second, because he wishes to offend nobody. He then explains why he will name Theophrastus in the homunculus discussion after having named Zeiller earlier. The citation therefore frames an actual decision about public disagreement and attribution.

Taken together, the sayings make Antonius a witness to a disciplined art. Correct material can be spoiled, names can be misread, and authorities can be criticized truthfully. The narrator's use of him does not mean every assertion bearing this name is accepted without judgment. It gives the reader three practical standards by which claims in this book should be read.

Places to read

II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78). Mixing can destroy even the correctly obtained matter.

II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152). The repeated "our" in a catalogue of philosophical names.

II.194.1 (source p. 194). Truthful speech and the naming of a disputed authority.

Connections

Antonius's material warning connects with Homogeneity and Subject of the art. His catalogue connects with Hermetic names and Literal and philosophical senses. His ethical rule connects with Truth and falsehood and Anonymous author.

The narrator's reserve about naming opponents parallels his reserve about naming himself, but the motives should not be assumed identical. He expressly explains the former as avoidance of offence; he says other reasons restrain the latter.

Translation in this edition

The received Latin name remains Antonius de Abbatia. No translated personal name or expanded identification is imposed.

The repeated unser, "our," should be preserved in the catalogue. Removing it would erase the principal signal that common substance-names are being used philosophically.

Attested forms

Antonius de Abbatia — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.151.2 (source pp. 151–152); II.194.1 (source p. 194).

Cautions

The citations do not by themselves identify a particular surviving edition or manuscript of Antonius's writings.

The catalogue is descriptive and interpretive, not a complete procedure.

See also

Homogeneity; Hermetic names; Truth and falsehood; Subject of the art; Anonymous author

Artephius

Artephii Process und Practic · dem Artephio nachgearbeitet

A process tried in practice and a cautiously inferred theory

At a Glance

The word. Artephius names a practical authority and a process associated with him.

In the Candida. The narrator reports following his procedure and cautiously links it to a theory of metallic generation.

In this edition. The received attribution remains distinct from a verified historical biography.

A place to read. Read pp. 109–113, especially the narrator's broken-vessel experience.

Meaning

Artephius is more than a name in an inherited list. The narrator says he once worked according to him. That statement supplies a concrete connection between cited writing and personal practice, though it does not identify the exact text or edition used. A separate statement tentatively associates Artephius's process with one account of metallic generation. The difference between direct report and conjectural association is essential.

The tentative account begins with the vapour of nature rising from the earth, taking up sulphurous moisture, becoming greasy, and meeting disposed earth. The resulting metal depends on the conditions encountered. The narrator supposes that observers of a process like Artephius's may have formed this view. He marks the linkage as conjectural rather than reporting that Artephius himself observed underground generation.[144]

Use in the book

At II.112.1 the narrator recalls careless fire management breaking one or more glass vessels. He found black, whitish, yellow, and other flowers in the remaining pieces. Fire regimen and weight are named as the two principal points of practice. The incident gives the reader a rare glimpse of an unsuccessful or disrupted operation inside a work that often speaks confidently about the art.

The argumentative conclusion is restraint. The colours do not persuade the author that Mercury literally passes through a succession of common

[144] The qualification muthmaßlich at II.109.2 modifies the narrator's association with Artephius. His own practice at II.112.1 is reported more directly. An entry should not give the two statements the same evidential status.

metals. He separates a visible change within the vessel from the more ambitious claim it might be used to support. Thus his experience following Artephius functions partly as evidence against an unwarranted inference.

The following paragraph says philosophers use such analogies to describe the operation of the subject, and insists that the art differs from the generation of metals in mines. Practical observation can bring one closer to the hidden natural process without making the two identical. Artephius stands at that junction between imitation, experiment, and conjecture.

The entry accordingly concerns the authority's footprint in this book, rather than legendary longevity or an expanded account of the Artephian corpus. The relevant claims are modest enough to state precisely: a process was followed, an accident occurred, coloured products were noticed, and their interpretation remained disputed.

Places to read

II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110); II.110.1 (source p. 110). The conjectural association of a vapour theory with Artephius's process.

II.112.1 (source p. 112); II.112.2 (source pp. 112–113). The reported experiment, coloured flowers, and refusal of a literal metallic succession.

Connections

Generation of metals gives the surrounding debate. Regimen of fire and Weight and measure explain the practical points named in the accident. Experience and conjecture explains why observation does not automatically settle the theory.

Bernard the Count is associated with another process and another inferred account. The narrator's comparison permits plural starting procedures while maintaining one eventual end.

Translation in this edition

Artephii and Artephio are inflected Latin forms rendered by the headword Artephius. Process and Practic refer to a procedure and its exercise, not necessarily to two separately titled works.

Flores is "flowers," a historical name for the coloured products. It should not be converted into a modern chemical identification without further evidence.

Attested forms

Artephii Process und Practic — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.109.2 (source pp. 109–110).

dem Artephio nachgearbeitet — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.112.1 (source p. 112).

Cautions

The book supplies no adequate basis for a biography of the person behind the received name.

The reported experiment is not a full reconstruction of Artephius's method.

See also

Generation of metals; Bernard the Count; Regimen of fire; Weight and measure; Experience and conjecture

Basilius Valentinus

Basilius Valentinus · Basilio · Basilii

A received authority for one matter and mineral practice

At a Glance

The word. Basilius Valentinus is the full name printed in the mining discussion; Basilius and inflected forms occur elsewhere.

In the Candida. The authority supports the unity of the three principles and supplies references for mineral and medicinal operations.

In this edition. Basil Valentine is a conventional English reading name; received attribution is preserved without supplying an unverified life.

A place to read. Begin with the long quotation on pp. 88-89, II.088.1, then read II.114.1 and II.176.1.

Meaning

The Candida uses Basilius Valentinus as an alchemical authority whose writings can help readers connect general matter theory with minerals and particular preparations. The entry concerns that textual presence. It does not assume that the name proves the existence of a single author responsible for every work circulated under it. Nor does the book give a biography sufficient to establish that history.[145]

Several abbreviated references presume readers already know the writings. Most are not accompanied by full titles or page numbers. One passage names a twelfth key, II.145.2; that is more specific than the general recommendations in the mining and precious-stone chapters, but it still remains the Candida's attribution.

Use in the book

In Part I, the world-spirit may in a qualified sense be called a supernatural spiritual Mercury, with Basilius, I.030.1. Part II explains why supernatural can be used: the elements are not dependent on the particular subordinate causes assigned to specified creatures, II.067.1. The adjective is therefore integrated into a theological account of causes, not simply a promise that the material is immaterial or exempt from operation.

The substantial quotation at II.088.1 places the roots of philosophical Sulphur, supernatural Mercury and spiritual Salt in one matter rather than many. Separate discussion of the principles is explained through their

[145] Basilius Valentinus is the received authorial name used in the book. These passages do not establish the historical person behind the name, the dates of composition of the cited writings, or the narrator's possession of a particular printed edition.

differing abundance and their profitable particular uses. This supports the author's insistence that the universal work should begin from a single suitable subject. It also leaves room for useful particular preparations without promoting every extract into the universal medicine.

At II.114.1 the writer praises Basilius's account of mines and metallic generation as beautiful and plausible, especially its use of miners' language. The praise has a practical purpose: an investigator can learn from that vocabulary. It does not withdraw the surrounding qualifications concerning the author's own conjectures about underground generation. The recommendation returns briefly at II.120.2 for precious stones.

In Chapter VIII the name gathers a cluster of correspondences: supernatural spiritual Mercury, heavenly Sulphur and all in all, II.176.1. These are offered as descriptions of the heavenly water just discussed. The passage demonstrates how an established authority's terminology is absorbed into the anonymous writer's own account. The point is convergence upon one matter, not an instruction to assemble a substance for each name.

Other uses preserve narrower distinctions. The twelfth-key reference concerns a medicine fermented with ordinary gold after its preparation, whose capacity for further multiplication is then lost, II.145.2. The reference to Brother Basilius relieving his brother's pain from the stone belongs to particular medicine, II.184.1. Such a particular remedy can be praised while remaining distinct from the third-order tincture's claimed universal and transmuting powers.

Places to read

I.030.1 (source p. 30); II.067.1 (source p. 67). Qualified supernatural Mercury within the theory of causes.

II.088.1 (source pp. 88–89). One matter contains the roots of the three principles.

II.114.1 (source p. 114); II.120.2 (source pp. 120–121). Recommendations concerning mines and precious stones.

II.145.2 (source pp. 145–146); II.184.1 (source p. 184). A twelfth-key reference and a particular medicinal example.

Connections

Read this authority beside Mercury philosophical, Universal and particular and Medicine and its orders. The same name supports several different levels of discussion, so its presence alone does not identify the kind of preparation intended. The surrounding distinction is more informative than a list of names detached from the argument.

Translation in this edition

Basilii and Basilio are Latin inflections of the reading name. Brother in the medicinal anecdote reproduces the source's presentation; it should not be expanded into a verified monastic biography. All in all is the compact expression used in the heavenly-water list. It should retain its totalizing force rather than be converted into a modern chemical formula.

Attested forms

Basilius Valentinus — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.114.1 (source p. 114).

Basilio — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. I.030.1 (source p. 30).

Basilii — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.176.1 (source p. 176).

Cautions

The medicinal and transmutation claims are historical claims reported or endorsed by the Candida. This lexicon does not verify their effects, resolve the Basil Valentine corpus's authorship or identify the particular preparation employed in the stone-pain anecdote.

See also

Mercury philosophical; Sulphur philosophical; Salt philosophical; Universal and particular; Mines and mineral vapours; Medicine and its orders

Bernard the Count

Comes Bernhardus Trevisanus · Comite Bernhardo · Bernhardo

Costly particulars, remote matter and the reading of authorities

At a Glance

The word. The source uses Count Bernard of Treviso and several shortened Latin inflections.

In the Candida. Bernard is both a cautionary example and an authority whose apparently conflicting sayings need interpretation.

In this edition. The reading name gathers the book's references without resolving competing historical Bernard identifications.

A place to read. Read II.082.2 beside II.126.2-II.129.1: failure with particulars and the remote-matter objection belong together.

Meaning

Bernard the Count appears as a received alchemical authority, associated in the Candida with Treviso. The text supplies a story of long unsuccessful work, loss of wealth and eventual correction through study. It does not present independently established archival evidence for that life. A lexicon can explain the story's function without treating every autobiographical detail as verified.[146]

The count is not merely an exemplar to be imitated. Some readers invoke his words against the Candida's argument; the anonymous writer answers with another Bernard saying and distinguishes the senses in which the language should be read. Authority here requires discrimination within an attributed body of writing.

Use in the book

At II.082.2 ordinary laboratory workers are criticized for seeking the seed of metals and the physical tincture in already particular metals, minerals, animals and plants. Bernard's story gives this error a human scale. Many years of labour, a substantial part of an estate and the contempt of friends do not make a wrong starting matter right. In the narrated example, philosophical books eventually correct practice. The lesson is not that reading replaces all work, but that perseverance without understanding can perpetuate error.

[146] The Candida alternates forms including Comes Bernhardus Trevisanus and the shorter count's name. This entry records the identification made within the text without resolving the historical authorship of the larger Bernardine literature.

At II.109.1 the author judges that workers following Bernard inferred successive metallic changes from the changing colours and appearances of the subject. Mercury, lead, tin, silver, copper, iron and gold form the proposed sequence. The passage expressly concerns what the anonymous writer thinks others conjectured. It should not be converted into Bernard's securely established experimental finding or the Candida's proof of actual metallic succession.

At II.126.2 students object on Bernard's authority that the remote matter is unavailable to art, since possession of it would allow the creation of animals and plants. The reply develops distinctions of remote and proximate matter, and of creating species versus perfecting what nature supplies. On p. 129 Bernard himself is quoted to say that taking all things for the work means taking the elements, II.129.1. The writer concludes that the earlier opinion must not be understood simply according to its letter.

At II.134.1 Bernard's name also accompanies equal balancing of the elements or water. This is connected with bringing the gold-essence to high maturity and attaining a result more quickly than underground nature. Here Bernard supports the positive possibility of art, after his cautionary story had illustrated wasted labour. The combination is coherent within the writer's reading: the art succeeds through appropriate matter and understanding, not through accumulating unrelated particulars.

Places to read

II.082.2 (source pp. 82–83). The cautionary story of wasted labour and eventual recognition of error.

II.109.1 (source p. 109). An explicitly conjectural explanation of a metallic sequence.

II.126.2 (source pp. 126–127); II.129.1 (source p. 129); II.134.1 (source p. 134). The remote-matter objection, its reinterpretation and equal balancing.

Connections

Bernard also appears among older philosophers invoked against speculative multiplication of world-spirits, I.047.1. The phrase to my knowledge limits that negative appeal. Together, these uses show different kinds of authority: a received personal example, an attributed maxim and the writer's claim about what he has not found in older books.

Translation in this edition

The full Latin designation is retained among the attested forms. The entry's English headword avoids choosing a more elaborate biographical identification than this witness supports. Anatisiret in the later passage is provisionally equal balancing; it should not be assigned a precise modern chemical procedure through the authority of Bernard's name.

Attested forms

Comes Bernhardus Trevisanus — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.082.2 (source pp. 82–83).

Comite Bernhardo — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48).

Bernhardo — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.109.1 (source p. 109).

Bernhardus — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.129.1 (source p. 129).

Cautions

Distinguish what Bernard is quoted as saying from what the anonymous writer says about Bernard's followers. A list of metallic colours or names is especially vulnerable to losing this difference when excerpted.

See also

Seeds; Experience and conjecture; Labour and patience; Anatisation; Subject of the art; Universal and particular

Bier

Dr. Bier · Bierischen Wasser · granum Solis

Reported water, green mass and a grain of gold

At a Glance

The word. Bier is named as a doctor in Amsterdam in an account communicated by a princely court physician.

In the Candida. The reported effects of his water contribute to the book's arguments about stone formation and mineral specification.

In this edition. The name and intermediary are retained; neither a secure full identity nor the water's modern composition has been established.

A place to read. Read the report at pp. 117-118, II.117.2, and its return at pp. 157-158, II.157.1.

Meaning

Bier's place in the Candida is evidential rather than doctrinal. He is not quoted as the author of a general theory. Instead, the anonymous writer reports what a court physician told him about Bier's handling of an unusual water. The account thus has an explicit chain: Bier's alleged operation, another physician's report, and the author's retelling. It is not presented as an experiment the author personally witnessed.

The name should accordingly remain modestly identified. The source locates Dr Bier at Amsterdam but supplies no first name, dated publication or independently checkable chemical analysis. The account can be discussed as testimony within the book without using it to reconstruct a biography or to identify the material.

Use in the book

At II.117.2 the water tastes pleasant and resembles whey in colour. When mixed with wine it becomes purple. The narrator corrects his first phrasing: more exactly, the water is coloured with the wine rather than simply colouring the wine. This small correction shows attention to the description, but it does not settle the chemical cause of the colour.[147]

Bier is then said to have placed the water in a furnace, removed it after considerable thickening, and found after cooling an extremely solid, transparent, somewhat green mass. In the surrounding discussion of precious stones, the account gives the author a case of an earthy or stony

[147] The report reaches the narrator through an unnamed court physician. Its stated chain of testimony matters: the author does not claim to have performed Bier's experiment himself. Compare II.117.2 and the return to the story at II.157.1.

product arising from water. The report's role is to support his proposed material relation between waters and mineral bodies. It is not a demonstration that the mass was a natural emerald under a modern classification.

The water returns in II.138.1 among the evidence invoked for mineral precursors. Mercury, Sulphur, Salt, mine vapours, colostrum and gur are explained as elements specified towards metals and minerals. The Bier account is made to support this wider conception of mineral water and unripe mineral matter. The move from the report to the general scheme belongs to the author's argument.

At II.157.1 the same court physician is said to have added another detail: besides the transparent mass, Bier found a fine grain of gold at the bottom of the vessel. The author calls this bodily gold. It supports the distinction then being drawn between a particular product and the universal subject or medicine. A reported gold grain, even accepted on the author's terms, would not by itself establish the possession of the universal tincture.

Places to read

II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118). The narrated water, purple colour, furnace treatment and transparent green mass.

II.138.1 (source pp. 138–139). Bier's water is enlisted in the explanation of specified mineral precursors.

II.157.1 (source pp. 157–158). The report is supplemented by a grain of bodily gold and applied to terrestrial waters.

Connections

This entry illustrates the distinction between Authority and testimony and Experience and conjecture. Bier's reported operation supplies a particular case, while the anonymous writer interprets it through his own elemental scheme. Keeping those stages separate helps readers assess the book's evidence without either treating every report as established fact or dismissing its argumentative role.

Translation in this edition

Granum Solis literally names a grain of the Sun; the edition renders the metallurgical reference as a grain of gold. Serum lactis supplies a colour comparison, whey, not a claim that the water contains milk. Bierischen is a German adjectival form meaning associated with Bier. Retaining Bier's water is more accurate than inventing the name of a modern mineral water.

Attested forms

Dr. Bier — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118).

Bierischen Wasser — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. II.138.1 (source pp. 138–139).

granum Solis — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. II.157.1 (source pp. 157–158).

Serum lactis — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. II.117.2 (source pp. 117–118).

Cautions

The starting place remains unnamed, the substance is unidentified, and the products were not analytically established by the edition. The account should not become a preparation recipe, a claim of verified transmutation or a reason to equate all green transparent masses with emerald.

See also

Generation of precious stones; Mines and mineral vapours; Sea and terrestrial waters; Authority and testimony; Experience and conjecture

Claude Germain

Claud. Germain · Wissenschafft · Kunst

Theory as science and practice as art

At a Glance

The word. The original names M. Claud. Germain, doctor and physician of Paris. The entry follows the edition's expanded reading name.

In the Candida. He supplies the opening distinction between Hermetic philosophy considered theoretically and considered practically.

In this edition. The attribution is preserved as the anonymous writer gives it; no otherwise unverified biography is supplied.

A place to read. Read the first proem, pp. 3-4, I.003.2, together with the second proem at II.055.2.

Meaning

Claude Germain enters as an authority for a division within Hermetic philosophy, not as a character who speaks throughout the treatise. The anonymous writer says that philosophy consists of theory and practice: in the former respect it is a science, in the latter an art. The terms describe aspects of one undertaking. They do not divide a valid intellectual subject from a merely decorative or optional practical supplement.

The citation identifies its authority through learned and medical titles and the designation of Paris. That is the extent of the personal information supplied here. A reader can understand the argument without deciding which printed work transmitted the saying or adding dates to Germain's life. Neither an exact work-title nor a page reference accompanies the citation.

Use in the book

The placement is decisive. On p. 3 the book has just invoked creation as the pattern of Hermetic work. The writer then concedes that imitation concerns practice especially, before explaining that his own undertaking chiefly concerns theory. Germain's distinction allows that shift: a book can advance the Hermetic enterprise by explaining principles, even if its primary task is not to set out all its operations.[148]

This emphasis returns at the beginning of Part II. The passage attributed to Sendivogius contrasts a multitude of operations with failure to attain the Stone; the writer answers that erroneous labours arise from false theory,

[148] The title-page style of Germain's name here is an attribution made by the Candida, not independent documentation of a particular Parisian medical appointment. The entry therefore follows the cited role without supplying an unverified biography.

II.055.1-II.055.2. Read backward, Germain's opening distinction helps explain why such a practical book devotes so much space to Genesis, divine utterance, the elements and the meaning of nature. Those discussions are presented as conditions of sound work.

The distinction also reaches forward to the conclusion. The writer defends having described the beginning, means and end while withholding individual manipulations, II.237.1 and II.241.1. Theory is meant to guide judgment; it does not remove the requirement of experience or make the text a complete operating manual. Germain's attributed formula therefore sets a useful reading expectation for the whole book.

Places to read

I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4). The sole named citation gives the theory/practice distinction and states the book's chiefly theoretical purpose.

II.055.2 (source pp. 55–56); II.237.1 (source p. 237). Later statements connect mistaken practice to false theory and acknowledge omitted manipulations.

Connections

Within the Candida, this entry belongs beside Art and science and Knowledge and practice. The connection is textual: these entries develop the distinction Germain is cited to authorize. It is unnecessary to posit direct influence from an otherwise unidentified book or a personal relationship between Germain and the anonymous author.

Translation in this edition

Wissenschafft can be rendered science here because the passage expressly contrasts theoretical understanding with practical art. It should not silently import the institutions, methods or boundaries of a present-day scientific discipline. Kunst similarly names skilled practical activity, not fine art. The Latin titles embedded in the German establish an attributed learned authority; expanding the abbreviated personal name does not establish a biography.

Attested forms

Claud. Germain — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Wissenschafft — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Kunst — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. I.003.2 (source pp. 3–4).

Cautions

The Candida does not make Germain the author of its rainwater doctrine. It invokes him for a particular distinction and then states its own purposes. Treating this citation as proof that the whole system derives from Germain would outrun the evidence.

See also

Art and science; Knowledge and practice; Creation and imitation; Sendivogius; Secrecy and publication

Dr Dienheim

D. Dienheim · Dr. Dienheim · absque ullo semine, seu materiâ proximâ

Mineral generation and the charitable case for disclosure

At a Glance

The word. Dienheim is cited as a mediator of verse, an authority on mineral origin, and a companion in an ethical judgment.

In the Candida. His statements support minerals' origin without a particular reproductive seed and the preference for helping worthy readers despite some misuse.

In this edition. The title and surname are retained without an unsupported expansion of the person's identity.

A place to read. Read pp. 81–82 and p. 133 with the concluding argument for publication at pp. 238–239.

Meaning

Dr Dienheim's footprint joins physical doctrine to the ethics of communicating it. The physical passages distinguish minerals from seed-bearing animals and plants. The final passage weighs the risk of benefiting unworthy people against the injustice of withholding help from every worthy reader. These are different questions, yet both concern the scope of a universal good: how mineral nature arises, and who may receive knowledge intended to relieve human need.

The source gives the title Doctor and the surname but no full biographical explanation in these passages. The entry therefore avoids a guessed forename, appointment, or exact treatise. Its evidence is the way the Candida attributes and uses the statements, not a reconstructed life of the cited writer.[149]

Use in the book

At II.081.1 a French poet's verses are introduced as reported by Dienheim. The verse itself follows at II.081.2. It contests the saying that everything produces its like when applied to minerals. Plants and creatures with sensation nourish and reproduce themselves; metals do not feel or multiply through that same mode and take their being from elements in the earth. Dienheim is the mediator named in the attribution. He should not be called the poet merely because the poem appears under his reported authority.

[149] The direct naming evidence in these passages is D. or Dr. Dienheim. The lexicon leaves further identity and exact source-title unresolved rather than supplying an undocumented biographical expansion.

At II.133.1 his own cited proposition is more compact: metals are generated from elements in the first instance without any seed or proximate matter. The words “in the first instance” matter. The claim concerns their original elemental generation, not a denial that later operations can involve prepared proximate matter or a ferment. The narrator sets it beside reports of reworked silver-mine residue, Bier’s emerald, and a grain of gold as support for the mineral argument.

The wider conclusion is that minerals differ from animals and plants in their mode of life and origin. Art cannot create a fly by giving elements a divine reproductive command, yet it may prepare a tincture in accordance with mineral nature. Dienheim’s maxim helps defend that distinction. It does not authorize manufacturing organisms from water or equate all uses of seed in the book.

At II.238.2 the narrator invokes Dienheim in a first-person ethical preference. He would rather some unworthy persons enjoy the benefit together with the worthy than deprive all the worthy together with the unworthy. The immediate context is the desire of honest physicians to recognize the medicine’s matter and the Christian command to love one’s neighbour. Publication is justified through the needs of those who might use knowledge well.

The preference does not abolish every restriction. The narrator subsequently defends withholding individual manipulations and urges a seal of silence on those who attain the arcanum. Disclosure and reserve coexist. Dienheim’s cited judgment supports communicating enough to assist worthy readers, while the author continues to distinguish that help from indiscriminate transfer of complete practical secrets.[150]

Places to read

II.081.1 (source p. 81); II.081.2 (source pp. 81–82). Dienheim as mediator of the French verse on minerals and reproduction.

II.133.1 (source p. 133). The explicit proposition about first-instance elemental generation.

II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239). The preference for benefiting worthy readers despite some unworthy recipients.

II.240.1 (source pp. 240–241); II.241.1 (source pp. 241–242); II.243.2 (source pp. 243–244). The continuing limits on disclosure and the seal of silence.

[150] II.238.2 is an asymmetric judgment about the cost of withholding benefit from the worthy. II.241.1 and II.243.2 show that it is compatible, for this narrator, with withholding individual manipulations and requiring silence from the successful practitioner.

Connections

Seeds and Generation of metals explain the physical proposition. Secrecy and publication and Charity explain the concluding preference. Authority and testimony helps keep a reported poem separate from a statement explicitly attributed to the reporter himself.

Anonymous author is relevant because the narrator can explain why he publishes while still declining to give his own name. The ethics of disclosure cannot be reduced to either complete publicity or complete concealment.

Translation in this edition

D. and Dr. are rendered Dr, preserving the source's title without implying a modern institutional qualification beyond what the passage establishes.

Primâ instantiâ is "in the first instance." The seed and proximate-matter phrase remains attached to that qualification; dropping it would make the proposition more sweeping than the cited Latin.

Attested forms

D. Dienheim — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.081.1 (source p. 81); II.238.2 (source pp. 238–239).

Dr. Dienheim — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.133.1 (source p. 133).

absque ullo semine, seu materiâ proximâ — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.133.1 (source p. 133).

Cautions

The French poet is not securely identified by these cited passages, and Dienheim should not be made the poem's author.

The argument for publication does not say every recipient is worthy or every secret should be disclosed.

See also

Seeds; Generation of metals; Secrecy and publication; Charity; Authority and testimony; Anonymous author

Ernst of Saxe-Gotha

Hertzog Ernsten zu Sachsen Gotha

A princely saying about the priority of God's honour

At a Glance

The word. The late Duke Ernst is named as the source of a saying the narrator claims to have heard personally.

In the Candida. The maxim links seeking God's honour first with receiving wisdom in other matters.

In this edition. The passage is evidence for the narrator's self-presentation, not proof of a patronage relationship.

A place to read. Read the reflective paragraph at pp. 40–41 before the dispute over the created spirit.

Meaning

Ernst enters the Candida at a moment when the narrator explains why he is willing to pursue a controversial reading of creation. Since an earlier rainwater tract, he says, he has advanced in the art and in practice beyond his ability to thank God sufficiently. This progress has confirmed a saying he formerly heard from the late Duke Ernst's own lips: seek God's honour first, and God gives wisdom and understanding in other things.

The duke's role is moral and devotional rather than technical. The saying does not identify the subject, explain an operation, or authenticate a transmutation. It supplies an order of purposes: divine honour precedes the acquisition of other knowledge. That order supports the narrator's insistence that his study of nature belongs within Christian devotion rather than competing with it.

Use in the book

The paragraph's language is ceremonious and self-lowering. The narrator calls his former hearing unworthy and humble, while giving the prince an honorific title and marking him as deceased. These formulas locate the statement within respectful recollection. They should not be stripped away so completely that the claim appears as a casual conversation between equals.

The assertion of personal hearing is potentially biographical, but its limits are strict. It does not say when or where the encounter occurred, whether the narrator held an office, whether Ernst funded his work, or whether the

duke shared his physical theories. The passage can support a claimed connection without establishing a patron, employer, or authorial identity.[151]

Its placement matters. The narrator is about to distinguish the created spirit over the waters from God the Holy Spirit, a reading he knows may provoke suspicion. The recollection helps justify his confidence that seeking divine honour can yield insight even when an interpretation differs from common opinion. The duke's words are therefore part of the book's rhetoric of responsible dissent.

The same priority returns in the instruction to pray, read, meditate, and labour, and in the conclusion's preference for charitable use. Ernst's brief appearance makes a compact bridge between personal testimony and the treatise's ethical programme. Its significance does not require an embellished biography.

Places to read

I.040.1 (source pp. 40–41). The claim of personal hearing and the maxim about divine honour.

I.051.1 (source pp. 51–52). The narrator's Trinitarian confession after arguing for a created spirit.

II.187.1 (source pp. 187–188). The later priority of prayer and divinely given wisdom.

Connections

Anonymous author explains why one autobiographical claim does not solve the writer's identity. Prayer reading and meditation and Charity develop the order of purposes expressed in the maxim.

Authority and testimony helps distinguish a moral authority invoked through remembered speech from an authority quoted for a technical account of the art.

Translation in this edition

Hochseel. is rendered as a designation of the late, honoured prince. "Saxe-Gotha" gives the conventional English territorial form of Sachsen Gotha.

The direct saying retains wisdom and understanding as gifts following the pursuit of God's honour; it is not reduced to a promise of material success.

[151] The direct source is I.040.1. The phrase "from his own princely mouth" belongs to the anonymous narrator's testimony; independent confirmation of the encounter has not been supplied by this edition.

Attested forms

Hertzog Ernsten zu Sachsen Gotha — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.040.1 (source pp. 40–41).

Cautions

No claim of patronage or court employment is established by this passage alone.

The maxim does not show the duke endorsing the narrator's disputed interpretation of Genesis.

See also

Anonymous author; Authority and testimony; Prayer reading and meditation; Charity; Spirit

Helmont

Helmonti · Nympha Helmontii · Helmontius

Angelic causation, a philosophical nymph, and medical testimony

At a Glance

The word. Helmont is a received authority-name whose appearances concern nature, philosophical naming, and medicine.

In the Candida. The narrator accepts a reported view about angelic earthquakes, includes Helmont's nymph among subject-names, and cites medical powers.

In this edition. The entry keeps separate the author's direct quotation, a report through Bechmann, and a report through Polemann.

A place to read. Read pp. 98–99, p. 176, and pp. 181–184.

Meaning

Helmont's name occurs in several different evidential settings. It is not the label of one continuous theory copied into the Candida. The narrator uses a view on earthquakes, a name for the heavenly subject, and medical sayings within his own account. Their unity is a contribution to thinking about effective powers under divine order; their differences are equally important.

The source's shortened and Latinized forms are grouped under Helmont without supplying an unverified full biography or assuming that every received Helmontian attribution has been independently authenticated. The local passages give enough evidence for a useful entry while leaving the exact source-texts and routes of borrowing open.[152]

Use in the book

At II.098.2 the narrator returns to earthquakes after discussing wind and angels. Helmont's opinion should not be rejected, he says: the example of Matthew 28:2 assigns the earthquake's cause to an angel. Bechmann is named as another reporter. This supports a possible created ministry under God's government, while the narrator continues to reject nature as an autonomous efficient cause. It is not a claim that he personally observed an angel producing every earthquake.

At II.176.1 Helmont's nymph is placed in a catalogue identifying the water above heaven with the subject of the art. The list also includes the

[152] The entry deliberately limits itself to the source's received name and roles. A fuller identification and bibliography should be documented independently rather than inferred from one familiar surname.

golden chain, earth above our heads, Echeneis, Theophrastus's immature mineral electrum, and Basilius's Mercury and Sulphur. The narrator treats these as convergent philosophical names. The mere occurrence does not supply a complete explanation of the nymph or prove that its meaning is identical in every Helmontian writing.

The medical passage at II.181.1 quotes a proposition about certain sulphurs: once corrected and perfected, the whole company of diseases obeys them. The narrator applies this to his confidence in perfected medicine and the philosophers' Salt. The quotation concerns prepared and perfected agents, not every common substance called sulphur. Its extraordinary therapeutic scope remains a historical assertion.

At II.183.1 the chain of testimony changes. Polemann makes an exception for stone disease when discussing the natural tincture, but reports from Helmont that the philosophers' aroma offers the surest protection against it. Protection and cure should not be collapsed. Nor should this reported exception be erased by the surrounding language of universal medical benefit.[153]

Helmont therefore helps expose the book's discipline of attribution. One passage is an opinion also reported by Bechmann, one a received philosophical name, one a quotation, and one Polemann's report. The reader gains more by preserving those distinctions than by gathering them into an undifferentiated claim that Helmont proved the entire art.

Places to read

II.098.2 (source pp. 98–99). The opinion on angelic earthquakes, with Bechmann as another reporter.

II.176.1 (source p. 176). Helmont's nymph among names for the heavenly subject.

II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182). Corrected and perfected sulphurs in the medical argument.

II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184); II.184.1 (source p. 184). Polemann's stone-disease qualification and the philosophers' aroma.

Connections

Earthquakes provides the causal setting. Heavenly water and Hermetic names explain the naming catalogue. Medicine and its orders preserves the hierarchy into which the medical sayings are introduced.

Helvetius is a different cited name. His Golden Calf concerns the four-day report and its philosophical interpretation; it should not be confused with the Helmont passages because of superficial similarity.

[153] II.183.1 says Polemann reports from Helmont and speaks of protection against stone disease. Those qualifications prevent the passage from becoming an unqualified first-person claim of a universal cure by the Candida's narrator.

Translation in this edition

Helmonti, Helmontii, Helmontio, and Helmontius are grammatical forms grouped under Helmont. Nympha is translated nymph and remains an image, rather than being silently decoded as a modern reagent.

Aroma Philosophorum is "the philosophers' aroma." The entry retains the phrase without identifying a particular fragrance or preparation that the passage does not disclose.

Attested forms

Helmonti — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.098.2 (source pp. 98–99).

Nympha Helmontii — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.176.1 (source p. 176).

Helmontius — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.181.1 (source pp. 181–182).

ex Helmontio — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.183.1 (source pp. 183–184).

Cautions

The medical assertions are not clinical findings validated by the edition.

The cited contexts do not establish the exact work or edition behind each Helmontian reference.

See also

Earthquakes; Heavenly water; Hermetic names; Medicine and its orders; Helvetius

Helvetius

Dr. Helvetii Vitulo aureo · D. Helvetium

The Golden Calf report and the refusal of literal four-day completion

At a Glance

The word. Helvetius is cited through a report in the Golden Calf concerning Elias the Artist.

In the Candida. The narrator defends the report's truth while interpreting its four days philosophically as colour stages.

In this edition. The entry follows the book's report without supplying an unverified biography of the physician.

A place to read. Read the question at p. 166 and the resolution at pp. 168–171.

Meaning

Helvetius appears in a problem about how literally to read an apparently practical promise. His Golden Calf records words spoken by the so-called Elias the Artist: the entire philosophical work can be accomplished in four days, in an open fire, and in a crucible. The Candida asks whether these statements are to be understood according to the letter. Their significance lies in a dispute over language, time, and operation.

The narrator does not simply accuse the reported speakers of lying. He says both Helvetius and the practitioner spoke the truth, but in a philosophical manner. Four days signify four principal colours. In a corresponding mode of speech, he himself claims to have seen the perfected Stone or red king completed in three days, because strictly there are three principal colours. The number is thus not a reliable schedule of ordinary twenty-four-hour periods.

Use in the book

The passage demonstrates the difference between rejecting a literal inference and rejecting a testimony outright. The narrator preserves the possibility of truthful speech under a technical or figurative usage. He requires the reader to identify the relevant register before treating the phrase as a promise about duration.

The surrounding discussion gives practical reasons for resisting a fixed timetable. Nature keeps its times, but fruit and grapes mature earlier or later according to conditions. Similarly, diligence and the proper management of fire affect completion of the work; poor management can spoil it. The interpretation of four days therefore fits a broader account of variable duration rather than standing as a solitary symbolic substitution.

The open fire and crucible also require philosophical reading in the following argument. Fermentation, women's work, and Herculean labour distinguish senses and stages that an impatient reader might collapse. The book does not treat the reported phrase as permission to omit prior preparation.

Helvetius's role is consequently a test case for responsible reception of an alchemical witness. The narrator neither dismisses a surprising report merely because it is surprising nor repeats its words as a complete recipe. He interprets it through his principles and the operation's stated sequence. Whether that interpretation is ultimately persuasive remains a question for the reader; its structure should first be represented accurately.[154]

Places to read

II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167). The question about four days, open fire, and a crucible in the Golden Calf.

II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169). The explicit colour-stage interpretation and the narrator's corresponding three-day claim.

II.169.1 (source pp. 169–170); II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171); II.171.1 (source pp. 171–172). Variable duration, patience, and the philosophical interpretation of labour and fire.

Connections

Colours and Time and maturation explain the proposed meaning of days. Literal and philosophical senses explains the interpretive move. Regimen of fire explains why actual practical conditions still matter.

Sendivogius supplies neighbouring warnings about patience and the obstacles to the work. Neither authority removes the need for sound theory before an operation is attempted.

Translation in this edition

Vitulo aureo is an inflected Latin title rendered "Golden Calf." The cited wording identifies the report's book, not the completion of an independent bibliographic analysis of its editions.

"According to the letter" and "in a philosophical manner" preserve the contrast on which the argument depends.

Attested forms

Dr. Helvetii Vitulo aureo — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.166.2 (source pp. 166–167).

[154] II.168.2 contains both the four-colour explanation and the narrator's three-colour qualification. The apparent numerical discrepancy is acknowledged in the text and should not be silently harmonized away.

D. Helvetium — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.168.2 (source pp. 168–169).

Cautions

The narrator's defence of the report is not independent verification of the original transmutation claim.

Four days must not be printed as the Candida's literal promised completion time.

See also

Colours; Time and maturation; Literal and philosophical senses; Regimen of fire; Sendivogius

Hollandus

Hollandus · Hollando · Hollandi

Sensory life, procedural reserve and a closing warning

At a Glance

The word. Hollandus is the authority-name printed in the first part; other occurrences are Latin inflections.

In the Candida. The book cites sensory qualities as life, refers readers elsewhere for practice, and ends with a prophecy attributed to Hollandus.

In this edition. The name remains unexpanded because the cited passages do not securely identify an individual author or exact work.

A place to read. Read I.021.1 and II.090.1, then the final warning at II.244.1.

Meaning

Hollandus has a small but varied footprint. A saying attributed to him supplies an account of taste, smell and colour; a later reference directs readers to practical writings; the conclusion invokes his prophecy against misuse. The name thereby connects the interpretation of matter with the conduct of the practitioner.[155]

The Candida does not supply enough information to turn Hollandus into a detailed biographical entry. The spelling, case-forms and attributed functions are secure features of this witness. Whether each citation derives from the same work, and how that work's author should be identified, are questions the text itself does not settle. Restraint preserves the useful evidence rather than weakening it.

Use in the book

In I.021.1 the anonymous writer argues that rainwater contains all colours. Repeated distillation and drying of a glass are invoked as visible examples. He then recalls Hollandus's statement that the three spirits resting in natural warmth, taste, smell and colour, are the soul, life and quintessence of things. The citation supports a framework in which sensible qualities can signal an inner vital principle. It is not a modern analysis of the colours left by a dried water sample.

The immediate context also explains why losing taste, smell and colour through decay can be presented as losing the valuable life of a material.

[155] Hollandus functions as an authority's name. The cited passages do not decide between proposed individual authors or establish that every work bearing that name has one author; a fuller biographical identification would outrun the evidence used here.

Elsewhere an apple or aged distilled water left without those qualities is treated as residue or phlegm. Hollandus's attributed saying helps the reader connect these examples. It does not mean that every occurrence of colour is proof of a living universal subject.

At II.090.1 Hollandus stands with Kelley and the Son of Sendivogius among authors said to provide sufficient information about the second operation. The anonymous writer uses their existence as part of his reason not to give a detailed practice and process. This is a bibliographical gesture rather than a concealed complete recipe. Without an exact title or passage, the edition should not silently select one later procedure as the missing instruction.

The closing reference changes the function again. At II.244.1 the writer warns those who seek the art chiefly for avarice, pride or licence rather than God's honour, defence of faith and relief of poor Christians. Even success by divine permission may be followed by punishment, according to Hollandus's prophecy. The attributed authority intensifies a Christian ethical prohibition. It does not provide an independently verifiable prediction or identify a particular historical offender.

Places to read

I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22). Taste, smell and colour as the soul, life and quintessence of things.

II.090.1 (source p. 90). The second-operation referral accompanies an express refusal to supply a detailed procedure.

II.244.1 (source pp. 244–245). The concluding prophecy places attainment under ethical and religious conditions.

Connections

The three uses make Hollandus relevant to Colours, Secrecy and publication and Charity. Their connection is internal to the Candida: sensory signs describe what matters in bodies, while restraint and ethical purpose govern what should be done with the claimed gift. No documented influence on the whole treatise follows merely from the recurrence of this authority-name.

Translation in this edition

Hollando and Hollandi should be recognized as inflections, not separate people. Propheceyung is a prophecy or prediction in the closing appeal. Verhängnuß in the same passage means divine permission or dispensation; reading it automatically as disaster obscures the argument that an unworthy person might attain the art and still be punished for its misuse.

Attested forms

Hollandus — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. I.021.1 (source pp. 21–22).

Hollando — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.090.1 (source p. 90).

Hollandi — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.244.1 (source pp. 244–245).

Cautions

The precise source of the sensory saying and closing prophecy has not been established here. Neither should be attributed to a securely identified Hollandus biography without further primary evidence.

See also

Colours; Body soul and spirit; Residues; Secrecy and publication; Charity; White and red tinctures

Hortulanus and Gerlandus

Gerlandus · Hortulanus · Hortulanum

An opening identification and a premise about perfection

At a Glance

The word. The opening calls Gerlandus otherwise named Hortulanus; later citations use the Hortulanus name.

In the Candida. These authorities establish creation as the pattern of art and the three natural kingdoms as marks of a perfect subject.

In this edition. The source's identification is reported without pretending to resolve the identities of the historical authors behind the names.

A place to read. Read I.003.1, then the argument on pp. 125-126, II.125.1-II.126.1.

Meaning

This paired headword reflects a claim made by the Candida itself. Its first sentence names Gerlandus, otherwise called Hortulanus, together with Sendivogius. The text thereby treats the first two names as alternative designations of an authority. An edition should make that claim visible, while separating it from an independently demonstrated identity. The source gives neither a biographical account nor evidence establishing the equivalence.[156]

Hortulanus becomes important less as a person than as a bearer of sayings. The writer selects a statement about the perfection of the Stone and makes it the major premise of an argument about rainwater. The authority's textual function can therefore be described precisely even where the history of the name remains unsettled.

Use in the book

In the first proem, I.003.1, the attributed teaching is that Hermetic art imitates the great work of creation described in Genesis 1. That opening makes the book's scriptural account relevant to material art. It does not by itself establish how an operator repeats each event of creation. The anonymous writer immediately adds that his own emphasis is theoretical and analogical, I.003.2.

At pp. 125-126 the argument is more explicit. Hortulanus is credited with saying that the Stone is called perfect because it contains animal,

[156] The Candida itself presents Gerlandus as also called Hortulanus at I.003.1. That local identification is preserved as evidence about this book; it does not establish the historical identity of every work circulated under either name.

vegetable and mineral nature, II.125.1. The writer then reasons: whatever contains those three natures is a perfect subject; rainwater contains them; therefore rainwater is a perfect subject, II.126.1. From this he infers the possibility of preparing both a metal-improving tincture and a universal medicine.

The distinction between the attributed saying and its new application matters. Hortulanus's authority supplies the criterion of perfection. The Candida's preceding account of rainwater is offered as proof of the minor premise. The conclusion is consequently the anonymous writer's constructed inference, rather than a quotation in which Hortulanus simply names ordinary rainwater as the exact subject.

This also explains why the passage must be read with pp. 77-79. There the writer distinguishes rainwater from the precise subject of the Hermetic art. A universal capacity or a suitable remote matter does not erase every distinction of preparation and specification. Reading only the syllogism can make the work appear simpler than its fuller discussion allows.

Places to read

I.003.1 (source p. 3). The opening identification and creation-as-imitation formula.

II.125.1 (source p. 125); II.126.1 (source p. 126). The attributed definition of perfection becomes the premise of the rainwater syllogism.

II.077.2 (source pp. 77–78); II.078.1 (source p. 78). Read the argument alongside the distinction between rainwater and the exact Hermetic subject.

Connections

Gerlandus also appears among older philosophers cited against multiplying speculative world-spirits, I.047.1. Here the writer says only that he knows of no support for the opposing view in these authorities. That limited negative testimony should be kept distinct from the explicit positive statements attributed to Hortulanus elsewhere.

Translation in this edition

Hortulanum and Hortulani are inflected Latin forms; the English reading name is Hortulanus. The phrase sonst auch genannt is a claim that one name is an alternative to another. Translating it as otherwise called preserves that claim without adding a modern identification. Perfect subject renders vollkommenes Subjectum in the rainwater argument; perfection there initially means the possession of the three kingdoms' natures, not a finished laboratory product.

Attested forms

Gerlandus — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. I.003.1 (source p. 3).

Hortulanus — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. I.003.1 (source p. 3).

Hortulanum — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. II.125.1 (source p. 125).

Hortulani — Form as printed in the cited passage; the headword supplies the reading name. II.126.1 (source p. 126).

Cautions

Do not infer that every saying associated with Hortulanus or Gerlandus belongs to the same identifiable historical writer. The local argument is clear; the transmission and attribution are less secure. The lexicon treats those as different questions.

See also

Creation and imitation; Rainwater; Subject of the art; Seeds; Nobility and perfection; Universal medicine

Johann Arndt

Dr. Arndt · Arnd · Theologus Johann Arnd

The living Word, connected nature, and the use of a theological authority

At a Glance

The word. Arndt is repeatedly cited as a theological authority for the living creative Word and the connected order of nature.

In the Candida. His sayings support nourishment, elemental continuity, weather and tides, the watery root of metals, and the second letter's account of light.

In this edition. The entry follows his substantial footprint in the Candida without claiming an exact external source for every quotation.

A place to read. Read the recurrent creative-Word saying at pp. 67–68, pp. 105–106, and p. 211 alongside the nourishment argument at p. 24.

Meaning

Johann Arndt has a wider role in the Candida than a single approving citation. The narrator expressly calls him a celebrated theologian, repeatedly marks him as deceased and honoured, and invokes him across natural philosophy, medicine, mineral generation, and the defence of Theophrastus. His most influential local proposition is that God's Word spoken in creation did not disappear but became the life of all creatures. This lets creation explain continuing operation rather than only a remote beginning.

The authority is not a substitute for the narrator's own distinctions. Arndt's words are put to particular uses: the uttered Word accounts for created orders, the substantial Word grounds universal being, and divine government prevents nature from becoming an independent efficient agent. The Candida does not establish that every one of its technical distinctions is a verbatim doctrine taken from Arndt. A reader should distinguish the quoted saying from the argument built around it.[157]

Use in the book

At I.024.1 Arndt supplies a concise nourishment argument: we are nourished and preserved by what we consist of; we consist of the elements. The narrator connects this with the possibility of healing through elements brought to equal balancing. The quotation gives a causal rationale for nourishment; the ensuing universal therapeutic confidence is the narrator's

[157] The Candida identifies him as the theologian Johann Arndt at II.190.2 and II.210.2. The entry therefore needs no conjectural expansion of an unidentified surname, but exact titles and original page locations for every cited saying remain unestablished here.

further application. They should not be merged into one independently verified medical result.

At I.034.1 Arndt's statement that all nature hangs together supports the second kind of separation. Elements remain in one another and differ in position without being absolutely severed. The golden-chain image, attributed to Homer through Nuysement, follows. Arndt is one supporting voice in this argument, not the named source of every image within the paragraph. The distinction between removing residues and distinguishing essentially related principles remains the narrator's governing framework.

At II.067.2 the creative-Word saying supports the reality of a pronounced, audible utterance, rather than a mere divine thought, in the creation of particular natures. At II.073.2 another saying makes God's Word the nourishing power in bread. The Word therefore works through ordinary creaturely support. Bread is not denied its material place; its efficacy is interpreted through the continuing divine source that governs and preserves creation.

The weather chapter puts Arndt to several related uses. Dew is called a fruit of the dawn, with Psalm 110 as warrant, while God remains first cause. The narrator rejects solar-lunar parentage of dew rather than treating the poetic description as an autonomous generating agent. In the tides discussion, understanding the motion of all nature is said to illuminate the sea's motion. The creative-Word sentence is then quoted fully, and cause is distinguished from concordance. Lunar correspondence does not by itself establish the efficient cause of ebb and flow.

Mineral passages extend the account into the watery root. The story of mine waste exposed to rain for twenty years is interpreted through Arndt's statement that water, not earth, contains the root of metals. Later he is cited among witnesses that living spiritual metals and their seed must be sought in water. The report, the authority's proposition, and the narrator's confident inference remain distinct pieces of evidence. The same name does not make the whole narrated chain a directly observed demonstration.

Arndt also provides an occasion for a possible objection. At II.178.1 his use of Job's heavens like a cast mirror might hinder assent to the proposed descent of heavenly water. The narrator answers with the example of sweating window glass, inferring that air passes through it. That historical inference is unsound as an explanation of condensation, but its argumentative purpose is clear: an apparently firm barrier need not exclude the descent the author proposes. The entry records the answer without endorsing its physics.[158]

[158] The source note at II.178.2 distinguishes the observation of sweating glass from the false inference that outside air passes through the glass. This is the narrator's proposed analogy for heavenly water, not a sound modern explanation of condensation.

In the defence of Theophrastus, Arndt's title "excellent German philosopher" reinforces the Salzburg epitaph against Zeiller's attack. This is selective praise, not a reason to accept the homunculus story that the narrator rejects in the next chapter. Arndt's name helps distinguish an authority's valuable contribution from an obligation to follow every received claim.

The second Latin letter gives the creative-Word saying its sharpest inferential use. It introduces Arndt as a most deserving theologian, then argues: God's Word became the life of creatures; light is a creature; therefore light has life, form, and substance. This belongs to the second correspondent's case against the first letter's accident thesis. The recurrence shows how a theological maxim becomes a premise in a physical controversy, while the voice distinction prevents treating both letters as one doctrine.

Places to read

I.024.1 (source p. 24); I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35). Nourishment from the elements and the connectedness of nature.

II.067.2 (source pp. 67–68); II.073.2 (source pp. 73–74). The uttered creative Word and the nourishing power in bread.

II.103.2 (source pp. 103–104); II.104.2 (source pp. 104–105); II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106). Dew, tides, the enduring Word, and cause distinguished from concordance.

II.124.2 (source pp. 124–125); II.149.1 (source pp. 149–150). Water as the root and seed of living mineral nature.

II.178.1 (source p. 178); II.178.2 (source pp. 178–179). The cast-mirror objection and the narrator's window-glass answer.

II.190.2 (source pp. 190–191); II.210.2 (source p. 210); II.211.1 (source p. 211). Selective praise of Theophrastus and the second letter's argument for substantial light.

Connections

Logos uttered and Logos subsistent are the main conceptual companions. Efficient cause explains the distinction from concordance; Separation and Golden chain explain elemental interrelation. Light shows the creative-Word maxim used in a contested syllogistic argument.

Arndt's authority is theological, but the Candida does not separate theology from its inquiry into created nature. The local evidence supports that intertwined practice without requiring an unsupported history of influence or a claim that the narrator belonged to a particular Arndtian school.

Translation in this edition

Arnd, Arndt, and the inflected Joannis Arndts are grouped under Johann Arndt. The fuller identification is supplied within the source itself by the phrase Theologus Johann Arnd.

The honorific seel. is rendered as late or blessed according to the sentence. “Word” retains the theological force of Wort; it should not be replaced by a neutral natural law when the cited proposition makes divine speech the life of creatures.

Attested forms

Dr. Arndt — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.024.1 (source p. 24).

Arnd — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.034.1 (source pp. 34–35); II.105.1 (source pp. 105–106).

Theologus Johann Arnd — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.190.2 (source pp. 190–191).

Joannis Arndts — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.210.2 (source p. 210).

Cautions

The entry does not authenticate every quotation against an independently collated edition of Arndt’s works.

His presence supports specific local arguments; it does not prove his endorsement of every claim in the Candida or identify the anonymous narrator.

See also

Logos uttered; Logos subsistent; Efficient cause; Separation; Golden chain; Light; Paracelsus and Theophrastus

Lazarus Ercker

Lazarus Erkard · Bergmeister

Mining expertise invoked at the boundary of conjecture

At a Glance

The word. Ercker is the mining authority named as Lazarus Erkard in the source.

In the Candida. Even his expertise is said not to supply a complete account of hidden metallic generation.

In this edition. The conventional headword is separated from the actual spelling of the cited original.

A place to read. Read the opening qualification of Chapter Four at pp. 107–108.

Meaning

Lazarus Ercker appears only briefly but at a decisive methodological point. The narrator says knowledge of metallic generation is necessary for learning the art, then calls it a conjectural science. Metals are known to form in the earth; exactly how they form has not, in his judgment, been thoroughly investigated. Even the celebrated mining master Lazarus Erkard must remain silent. Expertise is invoked to measure the difficulty of the question, not to settle it.

The conventional identification of the name with Lazarus Ercker is supported by the authority record for that mining writer. The source spelling is still recorded as Erkard. No precise quotation from a particular Ercker work is given at this point, and the lexicon should not manufacture one.[159]

Use in the book

The rhetorical force depends on respect. Calling him celebrated and a mining master acknowledges competence in the domain. If even such a specialist does not explain the entire hidden process, the reader should be wary of confident speculative accounts. The sentence is not a rejection of mining practice or of the value of assaying and observation.

The chapter then presents several competing explanations: succession through metals, vapour taking up sulphurous moisture, thick mercurial water determined by sulphur, and Mercury's internal digesting power from

[159] The Kalliope authority record identifies Lazarus Ercker and records historical name variants: https://www.kalliope-verbund.info/de/eac?eac.id=119134403. The identification supports the conventional headword; the Candida's local statement still needs to be read independently.

celestial influences. The narrator evaluates them and offers his own qualified preference. Ercker's brief appearance has prepared the reader to understand why this discussion remains conjectural even when it uses practical vocabulary.

A further distinction follows. The narrator has operated the philosophical subject, but operation in a vessel is not identical with generation in mines. It may yield the closest available analogy without exposing the whole underground process. The invocation of Ercker helps guard precisely that boundary between practical skill and a comprehensive theory.

For a reader's reference, the entry's value lies in this disciplinary role. The Candida does not make the mining master an adept, credit him with a perfected Stone, or report him as endorsing its rainwater argument. Those possible associations would be additions, not explanations of what the passage says.

Places to read

II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108). The named mining authority and the classification of generation as conjectural.

II.111.2 (source pp. 111–112); II.112.2 (source pp. 112–113); II.113.1 (source pp. 113–114). The continuing limits of knowledge and the distinction between the art and mines.

Connections

Experience and conjecture is the principal companion entry. Generation of metals provides the theories whose uncertainty Ercker's name introduces.

Authority and testimony helps explain why a respected authority can be cited for a limit rather than for a positive doctrine. Such a use does not imply that the narrator rejects all expert knowledge.

Translation in this edition

The headword uses Ercker; the attested form remains Lazarus Erkard. Bergmeister is "mining master," preserving an office or specialist designation rather than turning it into a generic philosopher.

"Must remain silent here" concerns the stated question of exact generation. It should not be expanded into a claim that Ercker wrote nothing about metals.

Attested forms

Lazarus Erkard — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108).

Bergmeister — Attested wording in the cited original passage. II.107.1 (source pp. 107–108).

Cautions

No particular title or page in Ercker's writings is specified by the Candida at this point.

The sentence does not prove a personal acquaintance between Ercker and the narrator.

See also

Generation of metals; Experience and conjecture; Authority and testimony; Mines and mineral vapours

Nuysement

Nuysement · de Nuysement · Nuysemannum

Homogeneity, essential life and the purification of substance

At a Glance

The word. The book names Nuysement in German and Latin, including the Latinized Nuysemannum.

In the Candida. His attributed sayings connect air, elemental principles, mineral life, homogeneity and the distinction between substance and residues.

In this edition. The entry follows the citations' local use, distinguishing the anonymous exposition from the second Latin correspondent.

A place to read. Read II.077.1, II.086.1-II.087.1 and II.218.2-II.219.2 as a connected sequence.

Meaning

Nuysement is one of the Candida's most useful recurring authority-names because its citations illuminate several parts of one material account. The book appeals to him for relatively compact propositions, then uses those propositions in larger arguments. A reader should distinguish the quoted statement, the interpretation explicitly given to it, and the further conclusion drawn by the writer.

This distinction is particularly necessary in Chapter XIII. The second Latin letter cites de Nuysement in defending light as substance and explaining the purity of substance. Those words belong first to that correspondent's argument. The anonymous narrator has introduced both letters because they bear on the question and on his meaning of substance, but the two letters take opposed positions. An authority-name recurring in both the main exposition and a letter does not make every argument a single uninterrupted speech.

Use in the book

The first relevant citation concerns wind. On pp. 46-47, I.046.1, the writer disputes a gloss in the German Bible and invokes Nuysement's description of wind as air in motion. The same dictum returns in the weather discussion, II.097.1. Its immediate role is to identify wind and air against the supposition that wind was absent from the first creation. The further claim that air arose from water is supplied by the Candida's account of Genesis and experience. The short dictum alone does not prove that origin.

At II.077.1 the cited principle is homogeneity: nothing can be fixed unless it is homogeneous and of one nature. This limits what art can improve and transform. The following discussion distinguishes ordinary rainwater and dew from the exact Hermetic subject and warns that mixing related but heterogeneous materials can fail. Nuysement's saying therefore works against a careless equation of every watery substance with the required matter. The common appearance of water is not sufficient; the relevant nature and preparation must agree.

The account of the three principles gives another explicit interpretive move. At II.086.1 Nuysement is cited for the statement that nothing reaches sight or touch without Salt. The author identifies Salt with water, earth and body, through which a threefold spirit becomes sensible and can be treated. On the next pages, II.087.1, he explains how he understands Nuysement's spirit, soul and body: air, fire and Salt respectively. The phrase I understand marks the anonymous writer's reading. It should not be omitted when summarizing the relationship between Nuysement and the book-specific scheme.

Nuysement also supports the mineral kingdom's essential life. In II.132.1 the quoted distinction denies minerals sensitive or vegetative faculties while allowing them essential life. The writer relates this to his scriptural claim that minerals received no separate particular seed or command comparable to animals and plants. Minerals can nevertheless arise in the earth through providence and the universal Word. Their life is therefore not denied altogether, but neither are they made organisms with sensation or plant growth.

The second correspondent uses Nuysement in a different controversy at II.213.1. Fire, he argues, cannot exist or even be conceived without its own subject. Therefore an opponent who treats fire as the bearer of light must explain the dependence of fire itself. Nuysement's authority is joined to an appeal to experience. Here subject means the bearer in which something exists, not simply the starting material of an alchemical operation. Confusing those senses would make the objection unintelligible.

At II.218.2 the same correspondent passes from the definition of substance to lower bodies. They consist of substance and residues: the first essential, the second accidental. The evil of corruption following the first parents' sin is said, according to Nuysement, to attach to the residues rather than substance itself. Art can separate what contaminates the pure being. This is a theological account of material corruption, not just a vocabulary for separating laboratory dirt.

At II.219.2 Nuysement supports the proposition that substance admits no contrariety into itself. The correspondent reasons that otherwise the art could not restore purity and freedom from corruption. He adds his own

claimed observation: our Mercury receives only what is homogeneous with its essence. The chain joins a definition, an attributed principle and personal experimental testimony. It also brings the reader back to the earlier restriction on heterogeneity, while adding the doctrine of substance and removable residues.

Places to read

I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47); II.097.1 (source pp. 97–98). Wind as air in motion, cited in two different discussions.

II.077.1 (source p. 77). Homogeneity as a condition of fixation and improvement.

II.086.1 (source pp. 86–87); II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88). Salt makes the threefold spirit sensible; the writer states how he interprets spirit, soul and body.

II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133). Essential mineral life differs from sensitive and vegetative life.

II.213.1 (source p. 213); II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219); II.219.2 (source pp. 219–220). The second correspondent cites Nuysement on fire, pure substance and residues.

Connections

The primary bibliographical record of Nuysement's 1621 Traittez du vray sel gives useful historical context for the name, but identifying a book is not the same as matching each Candida quotation to its exact source. The entry's analysis depends on what this witness actually prints. It avoids assigning an exact external page or unverified influence-history to the several sayings.[160]

Translation in this edition

Nuysemannum is a Latinized accusative form in the discussion of spirit, soul and body. Homogeneum is homogeneous, sharing the required nature; it does not authorize a modern purity percentage. Essential life preserves the distinction from sensitive and vegetative faculties. Substance and residues should likewise remain differentiated: excrementa is broader than bodily excrement, and the correspondent's substance is explicitly pure, simple and without admitted contrariety.

Attested forms

Nuysement — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. I.046.1 (source pp. 46–47).

[160] A 1621 edition of the Traittez du vray sel is catalogued by Wellcome under Clovis Hesteau de Nuysement: https://wellcomecollection.org/works/hngyrnnr. This is a bibliographic point of comparison; the Candida's particular quotations still require examination in their local arguments.

de Nuysement — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.132.1 (source pp. 132–133).

Nuysemannum — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.087.1 (source pp. 87–88).

Domino de Nuysement — Attested source form; inflections are retained rather than replaced by an invented lemma. II.218.2 (source pp. 218–219).

Cautions

Do not turn all the citations into statements that the anonymous writer directly witnessed. Some are reported dicta, some are his interpretations, and some occur in the second letter. Their agreement is argued within the book. The citations do not by themselves verify transmutation, medical effectiveness or a modern chemical identity for Mercury or Salt.

See also

Air and wind; Substance; Residues; Fixation; Universal and particular; Medicine and its orders; Light

Paracelsus and Theophrastus

Philippus Theophrastus · Theophrasti · homunculis

Selective praise and explicit rejection of homunculus-making

At a Glance

The word. The text usually calls this authority Theophrastus; the Salzburg epitaph supplies Philippus Theophrastus. Paracelsus is the edition's identifying reading name.

In the Candida. His practical and Christian reputation is defended, while the alleged generation of a human outside the womb is rejected.

In this edition. The author expressly disclaims discipleship. Attribution of quoted or reported Paracelsian writings remains historical, not a newly solved authorship question.

A place to read. Read II.190.2-II.192.1 immediately before the homunculus discussion, II.195.1-II.198.2.

Meaning

The Candida's relationship to Theophrastus cannot be adequately described as either simple allegiance or simple hostility. The author finds useful guidance in some writings, praises Christian belief and charity, and then isolates a doctrine he considers false. The sequence is constructed to make this discrimination plain. Reading only the homunculus report or only the preceding praise would reverse the balance.

Theophrastus is the name used in the historical text. Paracelsus helps a modern reader recognize the authority, but it should not become a guarantee that every treatise or claim associated with that name was composed by the historical person. The book sometimes cites a work-title, sometimes a reputation, sometimes a technical name. Those are different kinds of evidence.

Use in the book

An early reference already limits the author's claimed knowledge. At I.047.1 he says, as far as he knows, that Theophrastus mentions only Huyle or Alkahest, in a discussion of speculative alternatives to the world-spirit. The limiting phrase matters: it is a report about the writer's reading, not a comprehensive catalogue of Paracelsian doctrine.[161]

[161] The Candida reports the homunculus story as coming from book one De generatione rerum naturalium. Its citation establishes how the narrator presents the story; it does not by itself authenticate that work's authorship or settle the history of the Paracelsian corpus.

In the account of heavenly water, Theophrastus's immature mineral electrum appears among several names said to designate the same sought matter, II.176.1. Here his vocabulary is assimilated to a larger Hermetic concordance. The passage does not define a modern alloy or provide an analysis by which an operator could identify an ordinary commercial substance. Its immediate subject is the universal heavenly water and the multiple names attached to it.

The sustained personal defence begins at II.190.2. The author answers accusations about the art by adducing the Salzburg epitaph and Johann Arndt's praise. The epitaph credits Philippus Theophrastus with cures of leprosy, gout, dropsy and other afflictions. These are claims contained in the cited testimony. Printing them is not the same as independently confirming those medical outcomes. Their argumentative use is to oppose denunciation of the art and of its celebrated practitioner.

At II.191.1 the writer says he found good illumination in Theophrastus concerning the second operation and especially multiplication. He also reads the writings as acknowledging God as Creator, Christ as Saviour, resurrection, judgment and eternal life. Charity to the poor, again supported by the epitaph, is evidence for the Christian reputation being defended. The account links the practical reputation of the art with the ethical and religious conduct expected of its possessor.

The disclaimer at II.192.1 is therefore essential. The anonymous writer is no disciple of Theophrastus and says he has read little beyond the subjects mentioned. He has included what serves his purpose, and he introduces the next chapter partly to show that he does not support Theophrastus's errors. The text offers neither a universal endorsement nor a wholesale rejection of an authorial corpus.

The homunculus discussion first reports the claim. A human being is supposedly generated outside a woman's body and without a natural mother through a spagyric operation, II.195.1. The reported apparatus and incubation belong to the position the writer will refute. Extracting that passage as the Candida's own recipe would suppress the controversy's conclusion. The source cites a work on the generation of natural things; the edition does not resolve the authorship of the Paracelsian text from this citation alone.

The reply distinguishes two alleged errors. Theophrastus is credited with rightly denying separate creation of each new soul, but criticized for making propagation depend upon the father alone and for overlooking nature's order, II.195.2. The writer's alternative requires contributions from both parents and appeals to Genesis, marriage and the formation of Eve. His reasoning is historical theological anthropology, not modern reproductive science.

At II.198.2 the verdict is explicit: the generation of a human outside the womb, without a natural mother and from a man's seed alone is false, merely speculative and contrary to nature's order. The wonderful secret celebrated by the writer is instead ordinary embodied propagation under divine ordinance. The juxtaposition of praise and rejection shows the book policing its own boundary between legitimate art and an unacceptable reported claim.

Places to read

I.047.1 (source pp. 47–48); II.176.1 (source p. 176). Qualified knowledge of the writings and a technical name in the heavenly-water list.

II.190.2 (source pp. 190–191); II.191.1 (source pp. 191–192); II.192.1 (source p. 192). Defence through testimony, selective practical praise and the explicit disclaimer of discipleship.

II.195.1 (source p. 195); II.195.2 (source pp. 195–196); II.198.2 (source p. 198). Reported homunculus-making, analysis of error and final rejection.

Connections

Compare Homunculus and Soul propagation for the positive account opposed to the reported artificial generation. Compare Authority and testimony for the use of the epitaph: a commemorative claim has an evidential and rhetorical role without automatically establishing each achievement it celebrates. The book applies the same demand for discriminating reading that it makes of its readers.

Translation in this edition

The English name Paracelsus identifies the authority conventionally; the attested forms show the text's preference for Theophrastus. Homunculi is plural, little men. Immature mineral electrum is retained as a historical technical expression rather than identified as an ordinary alloy. Praise of the second operation and multiplication should not be extended into approval of the rejected homunculus procedure.

Attested forms

Philippus Theophrastus — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.190.2 (source pp. 190–191).

Theophrasti — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.192.1 (source p. 192).

homunculis — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.194.1 (source p. 194).

Electrum minerale immaturum — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.176.1 (source p. 176).

Cautions

The historical theories of soul and seed are not modern biological claims. Nor does the inclusion of reported apparatus make the book an advocate of artificial human generation. Its clear conclusion rejects the reported undertaking.

See also

Homunculus; Soul propagation; Multiplication; Heavenly water; Authority and testimony; Charity; Basilius Valentinus

Ristius

Ristius · Ristii

A maxim that binds beginnings to their proper ends

At a Glance

The word. Ristius is the name attached to a brief maxim about beginnings and ends.

In the Candida. The saying concludes an argument that a universal medicine requires a universal subject.

In this edition. The original name is retained; it is not silently corrected to a more familiar alchemical authority.

A place to read. Read pp. 11–13 with the explicit repetition at pp. 75–76.

Meaning

Ristius has a compact but repeated textual footprint: the narrator cites him for the maxim that every beginning must witness to its end and every end to its beginning. The statement follows the rule that as the cause is, so is the effect. Its local force is causal and methodological. A practitioner seeking a universal effect must begin from a cause capable of that effect, rather than from a particular substance that remains restricted to its own nature.

The entry does not identify the person behind the name. The spelling Ristius is what the checked original gives. Substituting a better-known writer because a name looks unfamiliar would conceal the evidence and could manufacture an attribution. The maxim can be explained accurately without a conjectural biography.[162]

Use in the book

The preceding passage distinguishes theoretical reduction from practical recovery. In thought, a person can be traced through seed, blood, chyle, bread, grain, earth, and water; metals can be traced to Mercury, Sulphur, Salt, and the elements. Yet already specified particulars cannot in practice be restored to universal prime matter. Chymistry obtains a particular plant's or metal's water, oil, and salt, not an unrestricted universal agent.

The conclusion is that no universal medicine can be prepared from an animal, plant, mineral, or a mixture of them all. A universal and catholic subject is required. Ristius's maxim gives this conclusion a memorable form. The intended end should make the proper beginning recognizable; the nature of the beginning should account for the scope of the end.

[162] The checked source at I.012.1 reads Ristius. The edition treats identity as unresolved rather than using resemblance or an earlier faulty reading to assign the saying to a different writer.

The following paragraph reinforces the same point through the author of Sudum Philosophicum. Universal does not mean that every material in the world must contribute to the work; it means that the powers of the whole of nature are gathered in the chosen matter. Thus the maxim is not an invitation to assemble a comprehensive collection of ingredients.

The saying recurs explicitly at II.075.1, now as the dictum of Ristii. Particular natures were created through the uttered Logos and each has only its own created particular power. Neither one such nature nor all of them combined can yield the universal effect at issue. The maxim and the rule "as the cause is, so is the effect" are repeated together. This recurrence confirms that the saying is a structural test of causal scope, rather than a decorative quotation confined to the first discussion.

The saying also resonates with the later criticism of practitioners who attempt a process without knowing beginning, means, or end. Its significance is a discipline of selection and inference. It cannot replace a material identification, but it tells the reader what a satisfactory identification would have to explain.

Places to read

I.011.1 (source pp. 11–12); I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13). The distinction between theoretical tracing, practical reduction, and the universal subject.

I.013.1 (source p. 13). Universal power distinguished from a mixture of everything.

II.234.1 (source pp. 234–235). The later criticism of practice without knowledge of beginning and end.

II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76). The repeated maxim applied to particular powers and the uttered Logos.

Connections

Axioms and Ends and purposes explain the compact argumentative form. Universal and particular and Subject of the art explain the maxim's local application.

Anonymous author is relevant because inherited names and quotations do not resolve the narrator's identity or establish his personal relations with the authorities he cites.

Translation in this edition

The Latinized name Ristius remains unchanged. The English translates the German maxim rather than converting it into a supposed exact Latin original that the passage does not provide.

Beginning and end retain both practical and explanatory force: initial matter, intended product, and their causal compatibility are all in play.

Attested forms

Ristius — Attested wording in the cited original passage. I.012.1 (source pp. 12–13).

Ristii — Latin genitive, rendered by the headword Ristius. II.075.1 (source pp. 75–76).

Cautions

This passage is not evidence for a life history or a securely identified work by Ristius.

The name must not be silently replaced by Ripley or another familiar authority.

See also

Axioms; Ends and purposes; Universal and particular; Subject of the art

Sendivogius

Sendivogius · Filius Sendivogii · Fil. Sendivog.

Knowledge of nature and the distinct Son of Sendivogius

At a Glance

The word. Sendivogius and Filius Sendivogii are distinct designations in the book. The latter literally means Son of Sendivogius.

In the Candida. The citations support nature-directed practice, living rather than ordinary metals, patient labour and the religious image of the perfected Stone.

In this edition. The filial designation is not treated as proof of biological parentage or automatic identity with Sendivogius.

A place to read. Read the Part II proem, II.055.1, beside the warning concerning common metals at II.148.2.

Meaning

Sendivogius is a recurring authority for the claim that alchemical practice must follow an understanding of nature. The anonymous writer also repeatedly cites an author called the Son of Sendivogius. Keeping those names distinct is a basic condition of accurate reading. The Candida itself calls the latter an anonymous author at II.223.2; it does not supply a genealogy or establish that every saying under the two designations comes from one person.[163]

The sayings are used selectively within the Candida's argument. Some supply principles, some warn against common mistakes, and others support the disposition of the practitioner. Their authority is not a substitute for the work's own reasoning. The writer often places them in response to a specific objection, so their significance becomes clearest when that objection remains visible.

Use in the book

The opening invocation at I.003.1 joins Sendivogius to the claim that Hermetic art imitates creation. Part II gives him a more conspicuous place: its proem quotes a contrast between modern practitioners' many operations and the older philosophers' attainment of the Stone, II.055.1. Hermes, Geber and Lull, if revived, would appear as pupils in the numerous manipulations now practised; only the Stone or physical tincture is lacking.

[163] Filius Sendivogii means the Son of Sendivogius in the text's naming practice. It should not be silently turned into the same author as every passage simply attributed to Sendivogius; received names and titles can perform different evidential roles.

The contrast criticizes operational proliferation without the desired result, not practical labour as such.

The anonymous writer explains why he chose the quotation at II.055.2: mistaken labours proceed from false theory. The subsequent chapter on nature is accordingly part of a practical correction. Sendivogius's saying at II.084.1 makes the connection explicit: without nature's light and knowledge the art cannot be attained. Neither a collection of apparatus nor familiarity with a circulating process compensates for a mistaken account of the material.

Other sayings require interpretation rather than immediate literal application. At II.147.1 a familiar sentence beginning with digging a pit is juxtaposed with a maxim that the matter is useless as soon as it touches earth. The conflict sends the reader back to what philosophical matter, metals and earth mean in this work. At II.152.1 the writer uses the surrounding explanation to reject ordinary vitriol despite reasons drawn from alchemical names and its apparently watery character.

At II.148.2 Sendivogius expressly distinguishes common metals, especially ordinary gold, as dead, from the philosophers' living metals that possess spirit. This prevents the general instruction to work from metals, through metals and with metals from being automatically read as a direction to use any ordinary metal. It also connects the authority to the book's account of unspecific or still-generative mineral matter. The contrast is internal to the historical system; it is not a modern statement that metals lack all chemical reactivity.

At II.127.2 an attributed passage allows a limited but genuine particular attainment to open nature's doors. Whoever truly tinctures even a small amount of metal with solar or lunar colour, enduring the required tests and without fraud, has an opening towards higher secrets. The writer uses this to answer the objection that a reported projection was merely particular. The saying does not identify partial success with finished universal medicine; it explains why a restricted effect could still matter to the inquiry.

The Son of Sendivogius has a related but distinguishable role. At II.067.1 he is called the author of a previously mentioned tract against Glauber and supports the gathering of nature's powers in one matter. At II.144.1 a saying from the Lamp of the Philosophers' Salt directs the search for the strongest strength to our Azoth and one thing alone. The context excludes ordinary gold as a living starting subject. The authority's practical force depends upon understanding the restricted our.

The same designation supports patience and steadfastness. At II.170.2 the work requires time, while the devil is said to raise obstacles against possessors of the high secret. At II.188.2 subtle intelligence must be joined to a patient disposition that does not collapse under sophistry, disappointed

expectations or stories of others' wasted decades. These passages make the practitioner's intellectual and moral formation part of the art's conditions.

Finally, the second Latin correspondent cites the anonymous Son of Sendivogius on the Stone as a disclosure of the triune God, creation, redemption, regeneration and future blessedness, II.223.2. This occurs in the argument connecting purification of matter with resurrection. It is a statement about the Stone's exemplary religious significance, not a reason to replace material practice with an exclusively psychological interpretation. The comparison retains both operation and theological meaning.

Places to read

I.003.1 (source p. 3); II.055.1 (source p. 55); II.055.2 (source pp. 55–56); II.084.1 (source p. 84). Creation, the critique of fruitless operations and the need for knowledge of nature.

II.127.2 (source pp. 127–128); II.147.1 (source pp. 147–148); II.148.2 (source pp. 148–149); II.152.1 (source pp. 152–153). Particular attainment, conflicting maxims and the living/common metal distinction.

II.067.1 (source p. 67); II.144.1 (source pp. 144–145); II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171); II.188.2 (source pp. 188–189). The distinct Son of Sendivogius on one matter and the practitioner's disposition.

II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224). The second correspondent's citation explicitly calls the filial authority anonymous.

Connections

This entry connects Knowledge and practice with Hermetic names. The most consequential Sendivogian warnings concern what apparent instructions actually designate. It also belongs beside Labour and patience and Resurrection because the Son of Sendivogius is invoked for perseverance and the religious significance of material perfection. These links are attested uses in the Candida, not an assertion of a single uniform school.

Translation in this edition

Filius Sendivogii is rendered Son of Sendivogius as an authorial designation. Fil. Sendivog. is an abbreviation of that designation. Ordinary or common metals preserves vulgi; living metals preserves the claimed possession of spirit. The name does not authorize replacing philosophical Mercury, Azoth or gold with a predetermined modern substance.

Attested forms

Sendivogius — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.055.1 (source p. 55).

Filius Sendivogii — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.067.1 (source p. 67).

Fil. Sendivog. — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.170.2 (source pp. 170–171).

Author ille anonymus — The cited form is retained as printed; the headword is an editorial reading name. II.223.2 (source pp. 223–224).

Cautions

The source does not establish biological fatherhood, securely identify the anonymous Son, or demonstrate all the quoted attainments. It presents received authorities within an argument whose distinctions must be retained.

See also

Knowledge and practice; Nature; Mercury philosophical; Gold living; Gold ordinary; Labour and patience; Resurrection; Hermetic names

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