Philosophy

Yes, Yes, Yes, and Therefore?

Critias gives a string of short answers while Socrates tests whether temperance can spot a fake doctor. The argument is easier to judge when you slow it down.

Follow the medical example one premise at a time and the quick agreements begin to look different. The hardest question is what a knowledge of knowledge could tell us about medicine.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Listen to the rhythmCritias’ brief answers make each step feel easy to grant. The argument still needs premises that can withstand a closer look.
  • What the medical test asksSocrates asks whether the examiner can tell a true medical claim from a false one and a sound treatment from a bad one. Those are judgments about health and disease.
  • Where the weight fallsCritias grants that knowledge of knowledge can register that someone knows something. He never shows why it would be unable to identify the subject of that knowledge.
  • Judge the argument separatelyAristotle distinguishes an argument’s merits from the way it is presented in questions. A reader can pause where Critias says yes and ask what that concession commits him to.

Charmides 170a–b, 170b–e, 170e–171c, 171c · Aristotle, Topics 8.1, 8.11 · Freedman and Fraser Experiment II, pp. 200–201

Read the doctor argument aloud and you hear its rhythm before its logic. Socrates asks a short question, and Critias answers, “Of course,” “Yes,” “It seems so,” “Apparently not,” “Necessarily,” “Certainly not,” “That is so,” and after a dozen such exchanges the conclusion arrives, that temperance as knowledge of knowledge couldn’t tell a real doctor from a fake at all, unless the temperate man happened to be a doctor himself. The pattern is persuasive in itself, since each step feels small and each agreement seems to cost nothing, but whether the argument works depends on the premises, not on how readily they were granted.

A study by Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser helps explain why a small agreement is worth noticing. In one condition, householders were first asked to display a small safe-driving sign. A later request for a large lawn sign got more agreement in that group than among householders approached only with the large request. The researchers tested compliance with requests. They didn’t ask people to judge the truth of a series of propositions. Still, the experiment offers a useful comparison. A little yes can change how the next question feels, even when it gives you no reason to accept the next claim.

So let’s take the premises out of the conversation. The first is that a knowledge of knowledge can distinguish a case of knowledge from a case of ignorance but can’t tell what it is knowledge of. Critias grants the first limit with “No, only that much.” The second is that each expertise is distinguished by its subject, as medicine is distinguished by the healthy and the diseased. There is a third commitment in play too. Critias assigned knowledge itself to temperance alone, leaving the doctor with knowledge of health and disease.

Socrates then asks what examining a doctor would involve. The fourth premise is that to test a doctor as a doctor, you have to judge whether what he says about health and disease is true and whether what he does is right. The fifth is that you need medicine to do that. On those terms, the bare knowledge Critias has assigned to temperance leaves the examiner unable to distinguish a real doctor from someone who “pretends or thinks he does.” The conclusion follows if we grant the limits Socrates and Critias have put on the examiner’s knowledge.

The second and fourth premises look plausible once you take them out of the exchange. Medicine can be distinguished from building by the things it studies and treats. If you want to assess a doctor’s clinical judgment directly, you have to look at a case in which the doctor exercises it. The fifth premise needs care. An informed outsider can sometimes see that a medical argument has gone wrong. Socrates’ case is strongest when he’s asking who can decide whether a disputed diagnosis or treatment is right on its medical merits.

The first premise carries a surprising amount of the weight. Why should knowing that something is knowledge leave you unable to see what it concerns? Critias might have said that understanding a kind of knowledge includes recognizing its object, the way understanding a map includes knowing what territory it shows. His exclusive assignment of knowledge to temperance makes that reply hard to give. It also produces a strange consequence Socrates draws out aloud. The doctor, on their arrangement, doesn’t even know medicine, since medicine is itself a kind of knowledge.

Aristotle gives us a way to read the exchange in the eighth book of the Topics. He considers how a questioner can arrange premises so that the answerer has trouble seeing what they lead to. Later he asks readers to assess an argument on its own merits as well as in the form in which the questions were put. The distinction is worth keeping here. We can see that Critias grants the premises quickly. Whether the claims deserve assent is something we can take time to ask.

My verdict is that the rhythm makes the doctor argument easy to follow and easy to grant too quickly. Once the steps are on the table, the sharpest question is whether a knowledge of knowledge would be as thin as Critias allows. The medical conclusion follows from the limits the speakers have accepted. The reader gets a chance Critias barely takes, to linger over an easy yes and see how much is riding on it.

Test your understanding

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Question 1 of 3

What limitation on “knowledge of knowledge” is most crucial to Socrates’ conclusion about identifying a real doctor?

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