Philosophy
Who Made You Boss?
Knowing who can do a job helps you decide whom to trust. Socrates’ imagined rulers take another step when they tell everyone else what they’re allowed to do.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA change of verbs in the Charmides raises a political question. How does the ability to recognize good advice become the authority to give orders?
Orientation
At a Glance
- Choosing becomes commandingThe speakers first picture handing work to people who know how to do it. They then picture the temperate forbidding people under their rule to act outside their knowledge.
- Expertise leaves an authority questionDavid Estlund calls it a fallacy to assume that knowing better gives an expert the right to command. Being right still leaves room to ask who should decide.
- The navigator gives competence its dueThe Republic’s quarrelling sailors are quick to dismiss the one person who understands navigation. The image shows why it matters to recognize knowledge.
- What would justify rule?Consent, accountability, and the ability to explain a decision all go beyond having expertise. The imagined city leaves that further question open.
Charmides 171d–172a, 172c–d · Republic 488a–489a · David Estlund Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority, p. 16 · John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §95 · Xenophon, Hellenica 2.4.19
Look closely at the verbs in the picture of the temperate city. The temperate rulers would “find those who did know and hand things over to them,” which is a matter of choosing whom to trust, and then, a step further, we would not “allow the others we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly.” The first is a decision about our own affairs. The second is an exercise of power over other people, and the passage moves from one to the other without pausing, as if knowing who is competent automatically gave you the right to forbid everyone else from acting. The change of verbs is small on the page and large in life, since the first describes a customer and the second describes a government.
The philosopher David Estlund calls this the expert/boss fallacy. Someone may know better than you what should be done. A further question is whether that gives him the right to command you. Estlund’s point leaves room for the value of expert advice. It asks for a reason why the person who gives good advice should also have the authority to decide.
Suppose someone who knows boats better than you tells you that a hull needs work. You would have good reason to listen, especially if you planned to take it to sea. That doesn’t make him the owner of the boat or give him the right to order a repair. An expert can show you something you need to know while leaving you responsible for the decision.
The Republic makes a strong case for giving knowledge its due. Socrates describes a ship whose owner is large and strong but a little deaf and shortsighted. The sailors quarrel over who should steer although none has learned navigation. The one person who understands the stars and winds looks like a useless stargazer to them. It’s a sharp picture of how badly people can misjudge who knows what. It also lets us ask what happens when the competence in question is more disputed than navigation.
But the Charmides doesn’t argue for that conclusion, it assumes it, and a careful reader should notice the difference. The picture simply speaks of “we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us,” as if the division into rulers and ruled followed naturally from the possession of temperance. No reason is given for why the temperate should rule rather than advise, or why anyone should accept their rule, and the passage leaves the political question open. Even the Republic, which does argue for rule by philosophers, spends whole books on why they should rule and how they could be trusted, which is a measure of how much the Charmides leaves out by simply assuming it.
What further justification would be needed, even if every claimed intellectual power were granted? Several candidates have been offered over the centuries, and the most famous is consent, the idea defended by John Locke that legitimate rule depends on the agreement of the governed. Another is accountability, the demand that those who command can be questioned, corrected and removed. A third is that the people ruled should be able to recognize, for themselves, that the rulers’ commands serve their good, which requires the rulers to explain and not just decide. Each of these goes beyond expertise, and the temperate city as described provides none of them.
The person hearing Socrates’ picture is Critias, whom Xenophon counts among the Thirty. That later history gives the move from advice to command a particular edge. It gives a reader reason to ask what would let those being governed challenge rulers who were sure of their own superior judgment.
My verdict is that knowing more doesn’t by itself entitle anyone to rule, and that the temperate city’s smooth slide from recognizing competence to commanding others hides a step that needs its own argument. Even if the temperate rulers had every power Critias claimed for them, they would still need something like consent, accountability or the ability to justify their commands to those they govern. The Charmides doesn’t supply that justification, and it doesn’t pretend to, but it leaves a picture that invites the oldest question in politics, which is who made you boss.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What distinction does the article draw from the shift in verbs in the picture of the temperate city?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When, if ever, should superior knowledge give someone authority to command rather than merely a reason to be heard?→
- Of consent, accountability, and rulers’ ability to justify their commands, which best addresses the gap between expertise and legitimate rule, and why?→
- How should citizens evaluate claims of expertise when the relevant competence is disputed rather than readily recognizable?→