Philosophy
Who Knows What Is Just?
Socrates pairs justice with statesmanship the way he pairs health with medicine. What would a ruler need to know if that comparison held?
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates gives justice a place among the things a statesman must know. The comparison with medicine tests Critias’ promise that temperance could govern a whole city.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A particular kind of judgmentSocrates pairs statesmanship with knowing what is just and medicine with knowing what is healthy. Each expertise is distinguished by what its practitioner can judge.
- Who speaks in the assemblyIn the Protagoras, Socrates says the Athenians hear specialists on building and citizens from many trades on public affairs. Protagoras explains the practice by giving everyone a share in civic virtue.
- What temperance cannot settleThe proposed knowledge of knowledge might tell a ruler that someone knows something. It gives the ruler no way to judge what is just without knowledge of justice itself.
- Critias in powerXenophon reports that the Thirty went from prosecuting notorious informers to killing people for their property. Critias’ later career gives the dialogue’s question about governing well a sharper edge.
Charmides 170a–b, 170b–c, 171d–172a, 172a–d · Protagoras 319b–d, 322c–d, 323a · Gorgias 464b–c · Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.2, 2.3.12, 2.3.21 · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 (1140b)
The parallel comes in passing, as an example meant to make a point clear. A knowledge of knowledge, Socrates says, could distinguish only that something is knowledge and something isn’t, and that isn’t the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy, or of the just, because “the one, I think, is medicine, the other statesmanship, and this one nothing but knowledge.” Critias agrees at once, and the argument moves on, but the pairing carries a whole theory of political life inside it.
The assumption is that justice is to statesmanship what health is to medicine, the object that makes it the particular knowledge it is. On that picture, judging what is just in a city takes an understanding of justice, the way a doctor’s skill takes an understanding of bodies. Counting votes can tell you what an assembly has decided. Whether the decision is just is a further question, and on Socrates’ analogy some people are better equipped to judge that than others. He draws a similar parallel in the Gorgias, where he makes justice the counterpart to medicine in the care of the soul.
That was a pointed thing to say in Athens. In the Protagoras, Socrates describes how the Athenian assembly behaves. When a question about building or laying down a ship comes up, they call in the specialists and shout down other speakers. When they deliberate about the city, they’ll hear a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a rich man or a poor one. Protagoras explains the practice by saying that everyone is expected to share in civic virtue. Even if we grant that some people judge more wisely than others, the assembly leaves room for many citizens to exercise their judgment in public.
Whatever we think of that view, its role in the Charmides argument is precise. Critias wants temperance, his knowledge of knowledge, to tell him who knows what. Later Socrates sketches the attractive picture of a household and a city run by temperance, in which people hand each task to those who know how to do it. The earlier parallel gives us reason to doubt that picture. If knowing what is just belongs to statesmanship as knowing what is healthy belongs to medicine, knowing that someone has knowledge would leave a ruler unable to judge a decision about justice. When Socrates revisits the picture, he says they were too quick to agree to it.
So statesmanship appears here as one particular expertise among others, with its own object. That has consequences. A ruler who had only Critias’ temperance would be like a hospital director who could tell that someone on staff had knowledge of some kind but couldn’t tell what it was or whether the patients were getting good treatment. To judge how the city is ruled, somebody still has to know what justice requires.
The irony would have been sharp for readers who knew what became of Critias. In 404 BCE he was among the Thirty, the oligarchs appointed after Athens’ defeat. Xenophon reports that the regime initially prosecuted notorious informers and that its later victims included people killed for their property. These events give the parallel a harder edge. A regime may claim the authority to decide who deserves to die. Its exercise of that authority still leaves open the question of whether any of its decisions are just.
The parallel also raises a question it doesn’t answer. Is practical judgment about justice really a craft like medicine? Aristotle later distinguishes practical wisdom from craft knowledge because it concerns acting well, while a craft aims at making or producing something. Political judgment also involves values and trade-offs that people can disagree about even when they have the same facts. The Charmides sets those questions aside here. Its narrower point is that knowing what is just would take a particular understanding with an object of its own.
My verdict is that Socrates’ pairing assumes judgment about justice takes an understanding of its own, a view that sits uneasily beside the assembly described in the Protagoras. Its immediate job is to limit what Critias can expect from temperance. Knowing that experts exist might help a ruler in some ways. When the city needs to decide whether an act is just, the ruler still has to answer to the thing statesmanship is supposed to know.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What central limitation does the article find in Critias’ idea of temperance as “knowledge of knowledge”?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If recognizing that someone is an expert does not reveal whether the expert’s judgment is just, what additional understanding must a ruler possess?→
- Can judgment about justice genuinely be an expertise like medicine while still allowing ordinary citizens a meaningful role in public deliberation? Why or why not?→
- How should a city distinguish between having authority to make a decision and having adequate grounds to call that decision just?→