Renaissance
Who Gets to Ask for Your Experience?
The first Conclusion questions abstract morality. The last questions abstract theory, where Pater’s test of personal assent has a clearer use.
The Renaissance (1893)Pater asks when an idea, interest or convention can ask a person to give something up. The revision leaves the authority of duty open.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Three claims on experiencePater distinguishes an interest a person can enter, a theory they can make their own, and a demand grounded in convention alone.
- The reach of sympathyThe essay asks readers to notice other people’s passions even as it describes how difficult it is to cross the boundaries of personal experience.
- The problem with moralityA duty may still bind a person who does not feel it as their own, as Kant’s account of beneficence illustrates.
- A narrower targetBy replacing abstract morality with abstract theory, the later version directs its warning toward ideas that ask the reader to discard what they can see.
The Renaissance · 1873 Conclusion, p. 159, abstract morality · 1893 Conclusion, pp. 150–151, the wall of personality · 1893 Conclusion, pp. 151–152, abstract theory · 1893 Conclusion, note 336
Here’s the rule as the first edition gives it. “The theory, or idea, or system, which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract morality we have not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us.” Three kinds of claimant line up at the door, an interest, an abstraction and a convention, and each gets its own test. An interest has a claim if we can enter it, an abstraction if we’ve identified with it, and a convention gets no test at all, since the word “only” dismisses it in advance. The 1893 sentence keeps the structure and changes the key noun, so that the abstraction is now “some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves.”
Take the first test first, because its verb matters. Adam Smith uses the language of entering into another person’s sentiments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, where sympathy involves imagining oneself in another’s situation. So an interest has a claim on your experience when you can imagine your way inside it, and an interest you can’t enter at all, a cause too vast or too alien for any sympathy, is like a bill from a company you never did business with. That’s a reasonable rule, and it holds in both editions, since the clause is identical in 1873 and 1893.
There’s a puzzle hidden in that first test, though, because the same essay says each of us is walled in by “that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced,” and if you took that literally, nobody could ever enter anyone’s interest, so the clause would void every claim another person could make on you. But the essay itself asks us to notice “some passionate attitude in those about us” and to see in our friends “some tragic dividing of forces on their ways,” which means entering other lives is part of the practice. “Cannot enter” may mean an interest that remains too distant for a person to imagine its claim, so that a friend’s grief can claim your evening while a committee’s procedural needs can’t claim your life.
The second test, identification, is where the two editions part company. For a theory it fits perfectly, since the same paragraph calls theories “points of view, instruments of criticism,” and a tool you haven’t made your own is someone else’s tool, with no right to make you throw away what you see, like a map insisting there’s no lake while you’re standing knee-deep in water. For morality the fit is much worse, since Kant gives a different account in the Groundwork. He asks us to consider a person who keeps helping others out of duty even when sorrow has left him unable to feel their distress. Comte, named a few lines earlier, offers another contrast through his emphasis on living for others.
The 1873 version deserves a proper defense, and one line of defense starts with Hegel, also named in the paragraph. The Philosophy of Right distinguishes the standpoint of morality from ethical life, where freedom takes shape through duties and institutions. “Abstract morality we have not identified with ourselves” sounds remarkably like that distinction, so Pater may mean a morality that hasn’t yet become anyone’s way of life, rather than morality as such. Any teacher knows the practical version, since a rule recited without understanding gets dropped the minute nobody’s watching, and read this way the clause is a demand that morality become ours, not a license to ignore it.
The grammar doesn’t help that generous reading much, however, because “has no real claim upon us” puts the whole burden on the morality, while “we have not identified” quietly admits that the failure might be ours. A morality we’ve failed to identify with can still be right, and a stranger drowning in the river doesn’t wait for you to feel at one with the duty of rescue. Whole societies have refused to identify with moral claims that turned out to be just, and the refusal didn’t cancel the claim. The identification test tells you when a moral demand has become part of you, but it can’t tell you whether the demand is valid, and the 1873 sentence asks it to do the second job.
The 1893 revision handles this by aiming the test where it works. With “abstract theory” in place of “abstract morality,” two of the three claimants are things a free mind may rightly turn down, an interest beyond sympathy and a theory it hasn’t adopted, and convention is dismissed as before. Morality simply isn’t mentioned, so its claim is neither granted nor denied, which is an honest silence for an essay that has no space to argue ethics from the ground up. The same paragraph warns against a facile orthodoxy of Comte or Hegel “or of our own,” and the revised rule shares that humility, since it now guards against systems, including the ones we build ourselves, rather than against conscience.
So what kind of authority can demand the sacrifice of an experience? One we can enter or make our own, which is the right test for interests and for theories. For morality, identification describes how a moral claim becomes ours but not whether it binds us, and the first edition asked one test to judge two very different authorities and got one of them wrong. The last edition fixed that by narrowing its target, and I think that’s the better sentence, as long as nobody mistakes its silence about morality for a verdict.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author judge the 1893 revision to be more successful than the 1873 wording?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If sympathy determines whether an interest can claim our experience, how should we examine whether an interest is truly unimaginable rather than merely inconvenient to imagine?→
- Does the strongest defense of the 1873 wording—that morality must become a lived way of life—answer the author’s objection about moral validity? Why or why not?→
- What follows from the 1893 revision’s silence about morality: intellectual humility, an unresolved weakness, or something else? What in the article supports your view?→