Renaissance

Who Can Learn to See Beauty in Greek Art?

Winckelmann makes an instinct for male beauty part of his account of taste. He also tells readers how a capacity for beauty can be cultivated.

Greek sculpture gives Winckelmann a reason to ask viewers to widen their attention. His account of training leaves more room than his claim about an inborn instinct.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Whose beauty gets seenWinckelmann argues that Greek sculpture can seem incomplete to viewers whose attention to physical beauty stops at women.
  • Desire and the eyePater reads Winckelmann’s friendships with young men as part of how he learned to attend closely to sculpted form.
  • The place of trainingWinckelmann says a capacity for beauty needs early direction, so the instinct he names still depends on what a viewer does with it.
  • A problem with the standardPater’s later description of ideal sculpture as sexless leaves room to ask how personal attraction relates to the kind of beauty he ultimately praises.

The passage Pater quotes is bold for 1763 and bolder for an English essay of 1867. “As it is confessedly the beauty of man which is to be conceived under one general idea,” Winckelmann writes, “so I have noticed that those who are observant of beauty only in women, and are moved little or not at all by the beauty of men, seldom have an impartial, vital, inborn instinct for beauty in art.” His reason is that “To such persons the beauty of Greek art will ever seem wanting, because its supreme beauty is rather male than female.” Then he turns to training, saying that the beauty of art “must be awakened and repaired by culture,” and that “the instinct of which I am speaking must be exercised and directed to what is beautiful” while one is young.

Pater connects the claim directly to Winckelmann’s own life and friendships. “That his affinity with Hellenism was not merely intellectual, that the subtler threads of temperament were inwoven in it, is proved by his romantic, fervent friendships with young men.” Those friendships, “bringing him into contact with the pride of human form, and staining the thoughts with its bloom, perfected his reconciliation to the spirit of Greek sculpture.” So in Pater’s account desire isn’t a distraction from Winckelmann’s criticism but one of its sources, a way of looking that made him notice what the sculptors had cared about most.

The case for Winckelmann’s claim starts with the art itself. The male nude was an important form in Greek sculpture, from archaic youths to the athletes and gods of the classical period. Praxiteles’ fourth-century Aphrodite of Knidos established a new tradition for the female nude. A viewer who is moved only by female beauty will miss a prominent part of the sculpture Winckelmann wants to discuss, and “impartial” in Winckelmann’s phrase can be read as a demand that the viewer not rule out half the field before looking. Even the Apollo Belvedere, which Winckelmann praised above every other statue, is a young male god, and his famous description of it reads like a lover’s inventory of a body.

The trouble comes when impartiality turns into a requirement. Read strictly, the passage makes a particular disposition, a responsiveness to male beauty that Winckelmann himself had in abundance, the condition for an “inborn instinct” for art, and that looks less like an expansion of perception than a membership test. Pater’s own later remark complicates things further, since he says that “The beauty of the Greek statues was a sexless beauty,” that the gods “had the least traces of sex,” and that their beauty is “a kind of ineffectual wholeness of nature,” which raises the question of how far a viewer’s first attraction determines what they come to see in a figure. It’s the critic’s version of saying that nobody can understand the blues without a broken heart, which holds a truth about experience and also builds a gate that keeps out the wrong sort of listener.

The second half of the passage pulls the other way. The very title of Winckelmann’s essay pairs the “capacity for feeling the beautiful” with “instruction in it,” and his claim that taste must be “awakened and repaired by culture” makes perception something learned rather than something inborn. That part of the argument allows attention to develop through practice. It leaves open how much the starting disposition matters. It’s how people learn to hear complex music or taste wine, by being shown and corrected until their attention sharpens.

The history of Winckelmann’s own circle offers a quiet test. Angelica Kauffmann painted his portrait in Rome in 1764. She became a leading history painter and a founding member of the Royal Academy. Her career shows the place the antique could have in a painter’s work. It also shows how little one can infer about a painter’s private attractions from the way she uses a classical figure.

So taste can draw on desire and on education, and the question is how they relate. Desire supplies energy and attention, the intense looking that makes someone notice the turn of a shoulder or the softness of a contour, and Pater is right that Winckelmann’s friendships sharpened his eye. Education supplies direction and breadth, teaching the eye to see what it wasn’t already drawn to. Desire alone narrows perception to what it wants, and education alone can produce cold connoisseurship, so the best viewer, like Winckelmann at his best, lets attraction open the door and training show him the rest of the house.

My verdict is that Winckelmann’s standard of impartiality expands perception when it’s read as a demand for openness, a refusal to dismiss a prominent subject in Greek sculpture, and narrows it when it’s read as a requirement of one temperament. His other claim, that taste must be cultivated young, is the stronger and more democratic one, and it’s borne out by the painters and scholars of every kind who have learned to see Greek sculpture since. Desire can be a teacher, as Pater shows, but the essay’s own title is wiser than its boldest sentence, since it places instruction beside capacity and lets him speak of how a viewer can learn.

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Question 1 of 3

Why does the author regard Winckelmann’s claim about cultivating taste as more democratic than his claim about an inborn instinct?

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