Philosophy
What Medicine Knows and Makes
A doctor studies the healthy in order to bring about health. Plato makes the difference count.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates asks what medicine can recognize and what it can produce. The answers give him two ways to test Critias’ idea of temperance.
Orientation
At a Glance
- What medicine knowsSocrates calls medicine knowledge of the healthy, the things a doctor needs to understand in order to treat a patient.
- What medicine producesThe doctor’s work can produce health, the condition a patient hopes to recover.
- Who can recognize a doctorKnowing that someone has expertise tells you too little to judge how well that person understands health and disease.
- What temperance contributesCritias proposes that temperance oversees other knowledge, and Socrates asks what benefit it produces itself.
Charmides 165c–d, 166a–d, 166d–167b, 169e–170b, 170b–e, 170e–171c, 174a–d, 174e–175a · Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ.2, 1003a33–b4
When Socrates first sets temperance beside the crafts, he chooses his words carefully. “And medicine,” he asks, “is knowledge of the healthy?” Critias agrees. If someone asked what medicine produces, Socrates goes on, he’d answer that “it produces health, a fine work for us.” In Greek, “the healthy” is to hygieinon and “health” is hygieia. The words are related, and the sentence uses one for what medicine knows and the other for what it makes.
Aristotle gives a good account of the difference. Something can be called healthy because it preserves health, produces it, indicates it, or is capable of it. A diet that keeps you well and a complexion that shows you’re well can both be called healthy. A doctor needs to understand what different things have to do with health, from the menu to the pulse. The patient wants to get well.
What a doctor knows includes the healthy and the diseased, which foods help and which harm, which signs mean recovery and which mean danger. When treatment succeeds, what the doctor produces is health in a patient. A cook knows what tastes good and what will nourish people, and makes a meal. A meteorologist can know a great deal about the weather without making it. The examples help us hear two separate questions, even when what a person knows is closely connected to what that person makes.
The dialogue uses the distinction at two crucial points. In the middle of the argument Socrates asks whether knowledge of knowledge could let someone know what he knows. He says that he knows “the healthy by medicine and not by temperance.” Even if knowledge of knowledge could tell you that someone knew something, it wouldn’t tell you whether what they knew was medicine. To test a person claiming to be a doctor, you’d have to judge whether they speak and act correctly about health and disease. In Socrates’ example, that takes a doctor.
Near the end Critias gives temperance a role in overseeing the knowledge of good and bad, which they’ve just identified as the knowledge that benefits us. Socrates asks about the product. Would temperance “make us healthy,” he asks, “and not medicine?” Critias agrees it won’t be “the craftsman of health.” Socrates presses him again. If medicine is responsible for making us healthy, what benefit can knowledge of knowledge claim to make in its own right?
In ordinary English you can say that medicine has knowledge of health and produces health. The repetition makes it easier to miss the distinction that matters here. The Diotimos translation uses “the healthy” when Socrates asks what medicine knows and “health” when he asks what it makes. The unusual phrase earns its keep. Saying that a baker knows bread and makes bread is true enough, but it leaves us to work out the difference between understanding how flour and yeast behave and turning out a loaf.
The distinction also clarifies what Critias owes us. He gives temperance an object when he calls it knowledge of itself and of other kinds of knowledge. Socrates asks whether knowledge like that is possible, then asks what benefit it might bring. Critias’ suggestion that temperance can oversee another kind of knowledge is an answer to the second question. The doctor example lets us see why Socrates asks for something more.
My verdict is that “the healthy” and “health” are worth keeping apart here. The first helps us hear the question about what medicine can recognize. The second names what a patient hopes the doctor will bring about. Once we’ve heard both questions in the doctor’s case, we can hear them in the argument about temperance and see why the answer to one leaves the other open.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article defend translating medicine’s object as “the healthy” while calling its product “health”?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If a kind of knowledge can recognize or supervise other kinds of knowledge without producing their results, in what sense might it still be beneficial?→
- Why might testing whether someone possesses a craft require expertise in that same craft? Could such testing ever avoid this difficulty?→
- Does the distinction between what a craft knows and what it makes apply equally well to medicine, cooking, and meteorology? What do the differences among these examples reveal?→