Philosophy
What Makes Medicine Medicine?
Socrates asks what makes a kind of knowledge the particular knowledge it is.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA librarian can put a book about heart disease on the right shelf. Judging the book takes a different kind of knowledge, and Critias’s definition has to account for that difference.
Orientation
At a Glance
- What defines an expertiseSocrates distinguishes kinds of knowledge by what they’re about, such as the healthy and the diseased in medicine.
- A catalogue has a limited jobA librarian can identify a book’s subject from reliable descriptions without having the expertise to assess its medical claims.
- How to examine a doctorSocrates says the examiner must be able to judge what the doctor says and does about health and disease.
- What other skills can checkStatistics can test how a study drew its sample, while other questions require expertise in the subject the study investigates.
Charmides 170a–b, 170b–e, 171a–c · Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.28, 87a38–87b4
The principle comes as a question that sounds almost too obvious to need asking. What defines a particular kind of knowledge, Socrates asks, except the particular things it’s about? Critias agrees, and Socrates reminds him that medicine is “knowledge of the healthy and the diseased.” The fact that it’s knowledge tells you what it has in common with the other kinds. To tell which kind it is, you ask what it knows.
That’s how we still organize knowledge, more or less, in schools and libraries. Biology deals with living things and linguistics with language. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle says a single science has a single kind of subject, and also considers how sciences differ in their basic principles. We have something simpler in mind when we ask what somebody is an expert in. Heart surgery and Byzantine coins give us two very different answers. Just hearing them tells us what to expect the expert to know about.
Now imagine being able to recognize that someone has knowledge without knowing what they know. You might be able to tell that you were in the presence of expertise, as you can tell that a language is being spoken without recognizing which language it is. Socrates distinguishes knowledge about health from knowledge about justice. If all you can recognize is that somebody has knowledge, the difference between those two kinds lies outside what you can see.
A librarian gives a nice picture of the problem. She can shelve a book on heart disease in the right section without knowing cardiology. The title, the subject headings, and the catalogue give her evidence about what the book is about. They don’t necessarily tell her whether the book gives a sound account of heart disease. Shelving it correctly and reviewing what it says are two different jobs.
The same distinction matters to Critias’s idea of temperance. A person who can recognize knowledge in general might learn from someone else that the expertise they’re seeing is medicine. Sometimes taking somebody’s word for a thing is quite sensible. It still leaves you relying on that person for the identification. If the person claiming the expertise is the one supplying the label, you have a good reason to want to check it.
Socrates shows what a direct check would take. To examine a doctor as a doctor, he says, you look at what the person says and does about health and disease. If the temperate man can follow the medical reasoning and assess the treatment on its own terms, he’s drawing on the doctor’s knowledge as well as any general ability to recognize knowledge. Socrates calls that being a doctor in addition to being temperate.
Some skills cut across subjects, and that’s worth allowing for. A statistician can find a flaw in how a medical study drew its sample without knowing much about the disease it studies. Statistics gives her a way to answer a question about sampling. Whether the study measured a symptom that matters to patients is a question of another kind. Logic, too, can show that two claims contradict each other while leaving us to ask which claim we have reason to believe.
My verdict is that a person can learn what field she’s looking at without mastering it. A catalogue shows us how. To check what a doctor knows about health and disease, though, somebody has to bring knowledge of those things to the examination. Temperance alone, as Critias has defined it, would tell us that we’ve found some knowledge. The next question, what this person knows and how well, is the one that takes us into medicine.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What is the main point of the librarian example?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If identifying a field does not require mastering it, what kinds of evidence would justify saying that an unfamiliar expert is practicing medicine rather than merely appearing to do so?→
- Can a person assess how trustworthy an expert is without sharing the expert’s subject knowledge? If so, what can such an assessment establish, and what must it leave open?→
- Where should we draw the boundary between useful cross-subject criticism and judgments that require knowledge of the subject itself?→