Philosophy
What Does Geometry Make?
Critias uses mathematics to challenge the idea that every kind of knowledge makes something.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA builder can point to a house. A geometer has a different answer, and it makes Socrates ask what temperance is about.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A craft and its workSocrates asks what good work temperance produces, the way medicine produces health and building produces houses.
- Critias’ counterexampleCalculation and geometry can do their work without making anything like a house or a cloak.
- A change of questionSocrates grants the point and asks what temperance studies, just as calculation studies relations among numbers.
- Knowledge that studies itselfCritias says temperance takes other kinds of knowledge and itself as its subject. The dialogue has to test whether that is possible.
Charmides 165c–166a, 166a–d · Gorgias 450d–e, 451a–c · Aristotle, Metaphysics E.1 · G. H. Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology §29 · Rivest, Shamir and Adleman RSA paper
Socrates’ challenge rests on the crafts, the same examples he has been using since the start of the dialogue. Medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health. House-building produces houses. If temperance is knowledge of oneself, Socrates asks, “what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?” Critias pushes back. “You are not inquiring correctly,” he says. This knowledge differs from the others, and they aren’t all like each other either. What work does calculation or geometry have “in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving”? He answers his own question. “No, you can’t.”
It’s a genuinely good objection, and Socrates concedes it at once with “That’s true.” A geometer can write down a proof, but the work that matters is showing that the theorem holds. There’s no house to hand over when it’s done. In the Gorgias, Socrates puts arithmetic, calculation, and geometry among the arts that work mostly through speech, unlike painting or making statues. He draws on the same difference Critias is pointing out here. Some kinds of work consist in showing or explaining something, and the builder’s house is a poor measure of them.
Aristotle later distinguishes three kinds of thinking. Some is productive, aimed at making things, like building or shoemaking. Some is practical, aimed at deciding how to act. And some is theoretical, like mathematics and the study of nature. Each has a different job. For a mathematician, getting something right can be the point of the work, even when there’s no separate thing to show for it.
The mathematician G. H. Hardy took a certain pride in calling his own discoveries useless in the ordinary sense. In A Mathematician’s Apology he says they had made no difference to the comforts of life. The joke history played on him is that his beloved number theory helped make possible systems like RSA, which uses large primes to protect messages and verify signatures. What a mathematician sets out to understand and what somebody else eventually does with that knowledge are separate questions. Critias may still have an answer about what good self-knowledge can do.
Socrates’ reply shows what the objection leaves open. “I can point out to you what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of,” he says, “which is something distinct from the knowledge itself.” Calculation studies how odd and even numbers stand in quantity to themselves and to one another. Weighing deals with the heavier and the lighter. In the Gorgias too, once everyone agrees that several arts work through speech, Socrates asks what each art’s speech is about. We may have given up looking for a house, but we can still ask what the geometer studies.
That changes the question Critias has to answer. Socrates asks “what is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?” Knowing oneself could mean knowing a person. Critias is about to make a stronger claim, that temperance is a kind of knowledge that can take itself as its object. Asking how it does that is a bit like facing one mirror toward another and trying to work out what, apart from more mirrors, you can see.
Critias sees the point and leans into it. He says Socrates has found “the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge.” All the other kinds study something distinct, he says, while temperance “alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself.” That makes the exception its defining feature. Critias also accuses Socrates of caring more about refuting him than about the argument. Socrates says he examines an argument for the same reason he examines himself, to keep from thinking he knows something when he doesn’t.
My verdict is that Critias is right to insist that you can know something without making anything like a house. Socrates grants him that much. But mathematics, the example that saved Critias from the first question, gives him little help with the next. The geometer can say what she studies. Critias now has to explain how a kind of knowledge could study itself, and that’s where the argument gets harder.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What assumption in Socrates’ initial challenge does Critias’ example of geometry undermine?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If knowledge need not produce a tangible object, what standards should we use to judge whether it has successfully done its work?→
- Does the later practical use of a discovery change the kind of achievement it originally was? Why or why not?→
- What would Critias need to demonstrate for the claim that temperance is knowledge of itself to be more than a verbal exception to the pattern of other kinds of knowledge?→