Renaissance

What a Failed Definition of Beauty Can Teach Us

Pater praises what theorists notice along the way. The Hippias Major shows what happens when Socrates keeps asking what beauty is.

The dialogue never settles on a definition of beauty. Testing its answers still exposes how comparisons change what counts as beautiful and why some pleasures strike us differently from others.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • What Pater keeps from theoryPater finds little practical help in universal definitions of beauty. He values the sharper observations that philosophers make on their way to those definitions.
  • Beauty changes with the comparisonSocrates compares a beautiful ape with a human being and a beautiful woman with the gods. The examples show how a different standard changes the judgment.
  • A test of different pleasuresThe dialogue asks whether beauty is the pleasure of seeing and hearing. Pressing that answer exposes a difference between what each sense does on its own and what both do together.
  • The search does real workSocrates ends without a definition and says the conversation has benefited him. The failed answers produce distinctions that a critic can still use.

The first sentence of the Preface clears the room. “Many attempts have been made by writers on art and poetry to define beauty in the abstract, to express it in the most general terms, to find some universal formula for it.” Then comes the backhanded compliment, the line this whole piece hangs on, “The value of these attempts has most often been in the suggestive and penetrating things said by the way.” It’s a cheeky thing to say about centuries of philosophy, a bit like telling a band their albums don’t work but the B-sides are great, and it raises a real question about what counts as success when you set out to answer a question and end up saying something else worth hearing.

Pater is clear that the stated aim fails, since such discussions, he says, “help us very little to enjoy what has been well done in art or poetry,” or to tell the more excellent from the less, or to use words like beauty and art with any extra precision. For someone who stands in front of actual paintings and has to judge them, the definition delivers nothing. But the remarks made along the way do deliver, so Pater is separating two kinds of achievement, hitting your target and finding something on the road to it, and saying that for the working critic only the second one pays. The reason is easy to see, because a definition of beauty in general has to float above every particular picture, while a sharp remark made along the way is usually made about something, a case or an example, and that’s exactly the kind of thing a critic can carry into a gallery.

You can test that on an ancient attempt in the dialogue called Hippias Major, which scholars still argue about assigning to Plato but which reads like Socrates at his most mischievous. Socrates corners Hippias, a celebrity lecturer, and asks him what the beautiful is, to kalon, the fine or beautiful. Hippias says a beautiful girl, then gold, then a rich and healthy old age with an honorable funeral, and Socrates himself tries the appropriate, the useful, the beneficial and the pleasure that comes through sight and hearing. Every candidate collapses, and the dialogue ends on a proverb, chalepa ta kala, “beautiful things are hard,” which Socrates says he understands better for having struggled to answer the question.

But look at what gets said by the way. When Hippias offers the beautiful girl, Socrates brings in a line of Heraclitus, that the most beautiful ape is ugly compared with the human race, and he adds that the most beautiful girl will look ugly next to the gods. It’s a throwaway, a move to knock out one bad answer, and it happens to be Pater’s own first principle. Pater never names the dialogue, and he may not have had it in mind at all, but the match is close enough to make the point for him. “Beauty, like all other qualities presented to human experience, is relative,” the Preface says, and there it is, worked out with apes and goddesses in a dialogue that failed at the very thing it set out to do.

The same thing happens near the end, with the candidate Pater would have loved. The suggestion that the beautiful is the pleasure that reaches us through sight and hearing runs into trouble when Socrates asks what makes each pleasure beautiful on its own. Sight and hearing together describe the pair, but each pleasure uses only one sense. As a definition it’s dead, but as a starting point it’s practically the Preface, which begins every inquiry by asking what pleasure a song or a picture gives and what sort it is. The dialogue drops, on its way out the door, the very premise that Pater would build a whole criticism on two thousand years later.

So Pater is right that the abstract attempts produce their best stuff by the way. The further question is how those remarks happen. It would be easy to hear “by the way” as “by luck,” but in this dialogue the discoveries happen because somebody insisted on the universal question. Socrates only reaches for Heraclitus’s ape because he refuses to accept “a beautiful girl” as an answer to “what is beauty,” and the pressure of the big question is what forces every candidate to be tested against hard cases. The definition fails, but the testing is the work, and you don’t get the by-the-way discoveries without somebody walking the way.

That changes what the two achievements mean to a critic trying to judge actual works. Pater is right that you can’t enjoy or rank a picture with a definition in your pocket, but you can do both with the distinctions the hunt for definitions throws up, that beauty is relative, that it involves a particular sort of pleasure, that the fitting and the useful are not the same as the beautiful. Pater himself seems to have come round to respecting the hunt. In 1873 he called metaphysical questions “as unprofitable as metaphysical questions elsewhere,” and twenty years later, in the same year as this fourth edition, he published Plato and Platonism, a book of lectures that takes the philosopher of the abstract beautiful very seriously indeed.

Pater’s distinction holds, and the dialogue suggests how much philosophy contributes to the discoveries that matter to criticism. Reaching the stated aim and generating useful discoveries really are different achievements, and for anyone judging real paintings and poems the discoveries are what count. But they aren’t accidents you could collect without the failed aim, since you can’t get Heraclitus’s ape without Socrates insisting on the question, and the right way to read the old theorists is the way Pater suggests, for what they say along the road, while respecting the road, because it’s the impossible destination that makes them walk it, and a critic who skips the old arguments to save time will miss the remarks that only turn up when somebody is trying, and failing, to answer the hardest question in the room.

Test your understanding

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Question 1 of 3

What distinction does the article identify as central to Pater’s assessment of attempts to define beauty?

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