Renaissance

What a Cabinet of Statues Can Teach a Critic

Goethe compares handling antiquities to the discipline he learned from Kant. Pater tests the analogy against the marbles Winckelmann saw in Dresden.

Ancient sculpture can interrupt a bad theory, but a Roman copy or a restored figure can also conceal what a critic needs to know. Dresden shows both sides of Goethe’s comparison.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A common disciplinePater sees a parallel between Kant’s limits on speculation and Winckelmann’s habit of consulting actual things.
  • A first encounter in DresdenEven a crowded display gave Winckelmann the chance to attend to ancient carving and drapery directly.
  • The surviving object has a historyA Roman replica can preserve a Greek design while leaving the critic with evidence from a later period.
  • The two methods still differThe comparison is strongest when it describes how each practice checks a claim against the evidence available to it.

Pater reports Goethe’s equivalence in a compact and slightly puzzling passage. Winckelmann, he says, “protests against Christian Wolff and the philosophers,” and Goethe, discussing that protest, “alludes to his own obligations to Emmanuel Kant.” Kant’s influence on Goethe “consisted in a severe limitation to the concrete,” but Goethe adds “that in born antiquaries, like Winckelmann, a constant handling of the antique, with its eternal outline, maintains that limitation as effectually as a critical philosophy.” It’s an odd pairing at first glance, since Kant spent his life in Königsberg building one of the most abstract systems in philosophy, and Winckelmann spent his on his knees in front of marble.

The two sides of the comparison need some unpacking before it makes sense. Christian Wolff was the reigning philosopher of the German universities in Winckelmann’s youth, a builder of vast deductive systems that claimed to derive everything from first principles, and Winckelmann later recalled how imposing Wolff’s lectures had once seemed to him. Wolff was away from Halle during Winckelmann’s studies there. The lectures had seemed “wie im Mondschein von Weitem ein Ungeheuer,” like a monster seen far off by moonlight, but they were “ein Klotz, da ich nahe kam,” a block of wood when I came close. That’s an antiquary’s joke, since it treats a philosophical system like an object and finds that close inspection turns the monster into a log.

Kant’s critical philosophy, which appeared in 1781, thirteen years after Winckelmann’s death, challenged the sort of confident metaphysical system associated with Wolff. Kant argued that reason overreaches when it tries to know things beyond any possible experience, and he put the point in a famous formula, that “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind,” thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. Goethe’s claim is that Winckelmann reached the same discipline by another road. Where Kant limited speculation by examining the conditions of knowledge, the antiquary limited it by keeping his hands on things that resisted his theories.

The Dresden collection is where Pater’s Winckelmann first meets those things. From Count Bünau’s library at Nöthnitz, a few miles outside the city, Pater says “he made many visits to the collection of antiquities at Dresden,” although the Winckelmann Museum dates his first access to 1754. In Pater’s account Winckelmann had known Greek art first through books, but now he’s “in contact with that life, still fervent in the relics of plastic art.” The Saxon electors had bought whole Roman collections earlier in the century, and while Winckelmann was there the antiquities were temporarily housed in pavilions of the Great Garden. Winckelmann later complained that many statues were crowded so closely that he could see them without being able to examine them. Among them stood the three draped women found at Herculaneum, whose contour and drapery he praised in his first book.

So Dresden really does test Pater’s account of how objects train attention. A statue can’t be argued into a different shape, and a critic who keeps returning to the same marble finds that his first impressions get corrected by the thing itself, the line of a hip, the weight of a fold, the turn of a head, in a way that no amount of reading can manage. Pater calls it Winckelmann’s “native tendency” to “escape from abstract theory to intuition,” and the Herculaneum women are a fine example, since the line and fall of their drapery are visible even where the identities of the figures remain uncertain.

The test also exposes the limits of the discipline. Some ancient sculptures were Roman versions of Greek designs. The Large Herculaneum Woman, for example, is catalogued as a Roman replica of a model from the late fourth century BCE. Restoration adds another layer whenever a later sculptor has supplied a missing piece. The eye and hand can learn from the surface in front of them, and they still need a history of how that surface came to be. Pater admits later that Winckelmann’s results suffered from this “turbid medium,” and the objects that limited his speculation also limited his evidence.

Goethe’s comparison holds up best at the level of temperament. Kant’s discipline is the habit of asking what can actually be known before building on it, and the antiquary’s discipline is the habit of checking every idea against something you can touch, which works the same way on the mind even though the procedures differ completely. Pater’s word for Winckelmann’s method elsewhere is “dexterity,” a word of the hands, and it suggests that the limitation Goethe admired is less a doctrine than a skill, practiced daily in the presence of objects that won’t flatter you. It’s the same discipline a good doctor learns at the bedside, where the textbook diagnosis has to survive the actual patient in front of you.

My verdict is that Goethe’s equivalence is true in function and false in method, since both disciplines keep speculation tied to what can be given, but Kant does it by reflection and the antiquary by friction with things. Dresden shows the discipline working, a scholar learning to see by returning again and again to a few crowded statues, and it shows the discipline’s dependence on the quality of the objects, which is why Winckelmann still needed Rome. Objects can keep a critic honest, but only as honest as the objects themselves, and a wise antiquary, like a wise philosopher, keeps asking what his evidence can actually bear.

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