Philosophy
The Word Nobody Refuted
A word in brackets on the Greek page opens a question about what makes a life well ordered.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCharmides says temperance is acting in an orderly way and quietly. Socrates tests the quiet part. Could orderliness explain why fast and slow actions can show the same virtue?
Orientation
At a Glance
- A word in bracketsThe Diotimos Greek text brackets the word for “orderly” in Socrates’ conclusion, and the translation leaves it out.
- Half the answerSocrates argues that temperance does not require a quiet pace, leaving orderliness untested on its own.
- Order at different speedsA line of handwriting or a passage of music can be orderly whether the task calls for speed or patience.
- A question about good orderCharmides’ promise to obey Critias at the end leaves us asking which kinds of order can make someone temperate.
Charmides 159b–d, 160c–d, 164d–165b, 174b–d, 176b–c · Thucydides, History 1.84.1–3 · Timaeus 47b–c · Xenophon, Hellenica 2.4.19
There’s a small detail in this passage that most readers never see, because you have to look at the Greek page. When Socrates sums up his case, he says the quiet life would be no more temperate than the unquiet one. The Greek text preserves one more word, kosmios (κόσμιος), so that with it the phrase reads roughly “the quiet, orderly life.” The Diotimos edition brackets the word, following Heindorf’s suggestion to leave it out, and omits it in the translation. Whoever put it there in the first place, Plato or a scribe, had noticed something real, which is that the boy’s answer had two key words in it and Socrates’ examples had tested just one of them.
So does orderliness survive the refutation of quietness, and on strict logic the honest answer is that the compound proposal, at least, is finished. Charmides said temperance was doing things “in an orderly way and quietly,” and if quietness isn’t required for temperance, then a definition demanding both is wrong as it stands, the way a recipe calling for flour and sugar is wrong if the cake comes out fine without the sugar. Socrates is entitled to say the definition failed, and the failure of that definition leaves open what orderliness could contribute on its own.
Orderliness also holds up remarkably well against his examples. Look at the fine quick actions he lists, copying letters, playing the lyre, wrestling and boxing, and it’s easy to see how they can be quick and orderly at once, with the letters formed accurately, the music kept in rhythm and the wrestling done with technique instead of flailing. A fast scribble isn’t fine handwriting, and a fast, sloppy lyre player isn’t playing well, so the very cases Socrates uses against quietness are full of the other ingredient. Orderliness might explain exactly why a quick action and an unhurried one can display the same virtue, since order is what they have in common, while the tempo is just whatever the task in front of you demands.
Greeks of Socrates’ own time made that connection out loud. In Thucydides, the Spartan king Archidamus, speaking as Sparta considers going to war, defends Sparta’s famous slowness as a sensible kind of sōphrosynē, the very virtue the Charmides is chasing, and then he says it’s the Spartans’ good order that makes them both warlike and wise in counsel. His word for their good order, eukosmon, shares a root with the boy’s “orderly.” If orderliness can account for both the charge and the long deliberation, it’s a much better candidate for temperance than quietness ever was.
The Timaeus gives orderliness a cosmic upgrade. Timaeus says we were given eyes so that we could watch the orderly turning of the heavens and learn to steady the wandering turnings of thought inside us. The heavens are a telling model to pick. They keep moving, and what makes their motion worth copying is its regularity. That gives us another way to imagine the order in the boy’s answer, as a steadiness that can belong to a life in motion.
The case against orderliness is a serious one, though, and it starts from the fact that order without a standard is just as empty as quiet. There are orderly gangs and orderly armies that march in step to commit atrocities, and a perfectly drilled bureaucracy can process injustice with spotless efficiency, so “orderly” on its own says nothing about whether the order is any good. Charmides’ examples of walking and talking quietly make his answer sound like good manners, the drilled behavior of a well-raised boy who does what he’s told. The dialogue ends with the boy promising to obey his guardian’s order to keep company with Socrates, a model of orderly compliance in a scene that feels anything but reassuring, given the kind of order Critias would later impose on Athens.
So the real question is whose order counts, and the boy’s first answer leaves that open. An orderly life is only temperate if the order is the right one, set by some understanding of what’s actually good for the person living it, and the rest of the dialogue tests how far self-knowledge and knowledge of good and bad can help us with that. Orderliness survives the refutation, but it survives as a question rather than an answer, because the moment you ask what kind of order makes a person good, you’ve stopped talking about manners and started talking about wisdom.
My verdict is that the compound proposal is refuted as Charmides stated it, and the drilled good conduct of a well-behaved boy is too thin an account of temperance. But orderliness as an idea survives, and it’s the most promising thing in his first answer, because it explains why fast and slow actions can show the same virtue, which quietness never could. The bracketed “orderly” in Socrates’ conclusion brings us back to the word nobody refuted. It’s still on the table, waiting for someone to say what kind of order it should mean.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author judge Charmides’ original definition of temperance to be refuted even though orderliness itself remains a possible candidate?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If orderliness can belong to both virtuous and unjust conduct, what kind of standard would distinguish temperate order from mere efficiency or obedience?→
- Does the failure of Charmides’ compound definition give us good reason to preserve one part of it, or should the whole proposal be reconsidered from the beginning? Why?→
- How does viewing order as steadiness within motion, rather than as quietness, change the way we might understand a temperate life?→