Philosophy

The Test the Guardian Wrote and Graded

Critias tells Charmides that going to Socrates every day will prove he is temperate. Then he gives his ward an order to go.

Critias sets the test, orders the behavior, and promises to accept it as proof. The ending asks what following an order can show about character.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Critias sets the conditionCharmides asks to keep receiving Socrates’ charm. Critias tells him that keeping company with Socrates will count as proof of temperance.
  • A guardian has a caseThe Republic treats obedience to rulers and restraint of appetite as elements of self-control. Following sound advice can be a good choice.
  • An order changes the evidenceWhen Critias commands the same behavior he proposes to measure, Charmides can comply for the simple reason that his guardian told him to.
  • The question is still openKeeping company with Socrates could help Charmides develop good judgment. Whether he already has the virtue they were looking for remains a separate question.

Charmides 159b–d, 159d–160b, 176a–c · Republic 389d–e · Marilyn Strathern Improving Ratings

Charmides has just said that he doesn’t know whether he has temperance and wants to be charmed by Socrates every day. Critias steps in at once, telling him that “it will be proof to me that you are temperate” if he lets Socrates charm him and doesn’t “desert him, great or small.” Charmides promises, “I’ll follow him and not desert him,” adding that he would be doing something terrible “if I didn’t obey you, my guardian, and didn’t do what you order,” and Critias replies, “Well, I do order it.” In three lines the guardian sets a test, the boy agrees to pass it, and the guardian orders him to. It happens so fast that a reader could miss how much has been decided, since the question Charmides had just raised about himself has been answered by someone else in less time than it took to ask.

There is a case for Critias that deserves to be heard. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates counts obeying rulers and governing one’s own appetites among the main elements of self-control for most people. On that view a young man who does what his guardian asks, especially when the request is to spend time with a wise teacher, might be showing something worth calling temperance. Critias has a recognizable standard in mind.

But look at what the test actually measures, since Charmides’ first definition of temperance, offered near the start of the dialogue, was “doing everything in an orderly way and quietly,” or in short, “a kind of quietness,” and Socrates refuted it by showing that quiet, orderly behavior isn’t always fine. Critias’ test certifies exactly that kind of outward compliance, showing up when told to and not deserting, so the guardian has brought back, as his standard of proof, a version of the definition the dialogue disposed of a long time ago.

The circularity is the deeper problem, since a good test is independent of what it tests, so that passing it tells you something you didn’t already know. Critias defines the test, then orders the behavior the test checks for, and then stands ready to certify the result, which means the outcome is fixed before the test begins. It’s like a teacher who writes the answer on the board, tells the class to copy it, and then praises them for getting it right, since whatever the exercise shows, it can’t show whether anyone understands the material.

There’s a modern cousin of this problem. Writing about university audits, Marilyn Strathern describes the way a measure can lose its value once it becomes a target, an application of what’s known as Goodhart’s law. Going to Socrates might give a guardian some reason to think his ward is serious about the conversation. Once the guardian orders the visits, the same behavior has another ready explanation.

The test also changes the meaning of what Charmides had just done. He had asked for the charm because he didn’t know whether he had temperance, which was a candid admission of uncertainty and a request for further examination. Critias converts that request into a proof of the very thing Charmides said he couldn’t judge, turning a question back into a certificate. The dialogue has spent its whole length showing that temperance can’t be confirmed by outward signs or by someone else’s say-so, and the guardian’s last move confirms it by both. Charmides goes along cheerfully, which suggests he didn’t notice the switch, and that is itself a small sign of how much examining he still has ahead of him.

Going to Socrates every day might well have done Charmides good, and a young man who listens to his elders can be wiser for it. The difference is between wanting your ward to keep good company and claiming you can judge his character from the fact that he does. The first makes sense even if the second needs a lot more evidence.

My verdict is that Critias’ command can’t prove that Charmides is temperate, and that the ending exposes a circular test controlled entirely by the guardian. Obedience can be evidence of something, a conventional respect for authority that even the Republic counts as a kind of temperance, but here the test is designed, imposed and certified by the same man, and it measures a behavior the dialogue had already shown to be no definition of the virtue. The evidence a definition failed to provide can’t be manufactured by giving an order and then admiring the result.

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Why does the author regard Critias’ test as circular?

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