Philosophy
The Temperate Man Who Has to Become a Doctor
One person can have two kinds of knowledge. Socrates asks which one the examiner is using.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe words “in addition” do a lot of work in Socrates’s argument. A temperate doctor can assess another doctor, but the ability to do so comes from medicine.
Orientation
At a Glance
- In addition to temperanceSocrates says the temperate person would also need to be a doctor to assess another doctor’s medical claims and actions.
- Which knowledge does the workThe examiner draws on medicine to judge a diagnosis or a treatment, even if she has other kinds of knowledge.
- A wheel that moves nothingWittgenstein’s image prompts a question about what the proposed general knowledge would contribute to the medical judgment.
- A more modest contributionSocrates considers whether temperance might help someone examine others in a subject the examiner has already learned.
Charmides 167a, 170c–e, 171b–c, 171c–d, 172b–c · Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §271
The line is short and it ends a long argument. To examine a doctor, you have to follow what the doctor says and does about health and disease. Could anyone do that without medicine? Critias says no. The temperate man could do it, Socrates concludes, if he were “a doctor in addition to being temperate.” The words “in addition” tell us which knowledge the examiner needs. Critias has been agreeing step by step, and this is where the steps add up.
There’s nothing impossible about one person having two kinds of expertise. A doctor who studies law can learn to handle disputes that draw on both. A physicist might also learn to play the piano. Socrates’s temperate doctor is possible in just this sense. If there could be someone with the temperance Critias describes, there’s no reason that person couldn’t study medicine as well.
Look at which knowledge the examiner draws on. A doctor assessing a colleague can follow the reasoning from symptoms to a diagnosis and ask whether the treatment made sense. Those questions require knowing about health and disease. Take away the examiner’s medical knowledge and the ability to recognize that someone has some expertise won’t be enough to answer them.
There’s a difference between combining two kinds of knowledge and showing that one can do the work of the other. Critias wants the second. Temperance, in his account, can tell whether someone knows what they claim to know. A doctor who plays the piano tells us very little about the contribution piano-playing makes to surgery. In the same way, the temperate doctor’s success examining a colleague gives us no reason to think temperance could have examined the colleague on its own.
Ludwig Wittgenstein has an image that helps here. In the Philosophical Investigations, he asks us to think of a wheel you can turn without anything else in the machine moving. Its turning does no work in the mechanism. In Socrates’s example, medicine lets the examiner decide whether the diagnosis or treatment stands up. If temperance is supposed to provide that judgment by itself, the image gives us a question to ask. What part of the examination could it actually move?
Socrates applies the argument to other fields. An examiner would need to understand building to judge whether a builder knew what she was doing, and music to make the corresponding judgment of a musician. Socrates says this leaves the temperate man able to examine a fellow practitioner in his own craft, just as other practitioners can. A person who mastered many crafts would have many ways to examine others. We’d still have to find out what temperance adds in any of them.
Socrates does consider one possibility a little later. Perhaps temperance helps people learn more easily and examine others more capably in things they’ve learned themselves. He leaves the suggestion open. I can imagine a doctor who pauses over what she’s unsure of and asks a colleague to look again. Her medical knowledge still matters to the examination. The habit of examining herself could make a difference to when and how she uses it.
My verdict is that the phrase “in addition” tells us where the argument leaves Critias. Medicine supplies the knowledge needed to judge a doctor’s medical decisions. Temperance might help an examiner make better use of what she already knows, and Socrates considers that possibility. What Critias has yet to show is that the second kind of knowledge can take over the first one’s work. That’s a much larger claim than the example of a temperate doctor can support.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What does the author take the phrase “a doctor in addition to being temperate” to establish?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If a person can judge only the fields they have learned, what would Critias need to demonstrate to show that temperance is a distinct kind of knowledge rather than merely a way of using expertise?→
- How could we distinguish a genuine contribution from temperance during an examination from a judgment produced entirely by the examiner’s specialized knowledge?→
- Does the possibility that temperance improves learning or self-correction preserve any important part of Critias’s claim, or does it amount to a fundamentally different account of temperance?→