Philosophy

The Smaller Benefit Nobody Took Home

Socrates suggests that a clear view of what you know might help you learn. It gets a brief hearing before the dialogue asks whether temperance can make us happy.

A modest suggestion about learning and examining others gets crowded out by a much larger claim about a life without error.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Socrates offers a modest benefitKnowledge about knowledge might help someone learn more readily, see what they know more clearly, and examine others in a field they know.
  • Explanation can uncover a gapIn experiments by Rozenblit and Keil, participants lowered their ratings of their understanding after trying to explain how familiar devices worked.
  • The standard changesThe speakers move from those possible gains to asking whether temperance can make a household or city thrive. Easier learning answers a smaller question.
  • What readers can still useA habit of noticing confusion can help someone learn. The dialogue’s demand for a much greater benefit leaves that possibility open.

Charmides 171c–172a, 172b–d, 173a–c, 173d–174a, 174a–d · Apology 21d · Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science

The suggestion comes right after the doctor argument has questioned whether knowledge of knowledge can distinguish a genuine doctor from a pretender. Socrates wonders aloud whether this might be the good that temperance really has, that “whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns, and everything will appear more clearly to him, since in addition to each thing he learns he has a view of the knowledge as well.” He adds that such a person “will examine others better about the things he himself has learned,” while those who lack it will examine “more feebly and poorly.” It’s the most modest claim anyone makes for temperance in the whole dialogue, and Socrates offers it himself, unprompted, as though trying to salvage something useful from the wreck of the doctor argument.

We have a name for part of this now. Metacognition includes monitoring what we know and how we’re learning. The psychologists Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil asked people how well they understood familiar devices such as a zipper or a flush toilet. The participants rated their understanding lower after trying to explain how the devices worked. Their experiments help make Socrates’ modest suggestion concrete. An attempt to explain can show a learner where there’s still work to do.

Yet the dialogue hurries past these gains almost as soon as they’re named, since Socrates asks whether they have been “looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is,” and Critias answers, “Perhaps that is how it is.” Socrates repeats “Perhaps,” and then adds that perhaps their search has been to no useful purpose, and turns at once to the grand vision of a city run without error. The modest benefits get one exchange, and when the conversation finally fails to find a benefit for temperance, they aren’t brought back as a consolation prize. Critias gives the smaller gains a tentative assent and offers no further defense.

Why do these gains get such a brief hearing? Socrates and Critias had imagined a much greater benefit. A person who could recognize exactly what he and others knew might hand every job to someone who could do it right. They had pictured a household and a city living without error, and then supposed that things would go well for everyone. Easier learning sounds modest beside that promise.

There’s also a structural reason for the neglect, since the question of the last pages is which knowledge makes us happy, and once that question is on the table, any benefit short of happiness looks secondary by comparison. The modest benefits of reflective knowledge don’t make anyone happy on their own, any more than a good study habit makes a student wise, so in a contest framed around happiness they never had a chance. The framing decides the outcome before the candidates are tested.

It’s fair to ask whether the proposed virtue can deliver the great benefit the speakers expect of it. A different question is whether it could do any good at all. A sprinter can run a fine race even if she can’t win a decathlon. In much the same way, a habit that makes it easier to see where we’re confused can be worth cultivating without settling whether our lives will go well.

The smaller benefit also suits Socrates’ practice. In the Apology he compares himself with someone who thinks he knows something he doesn’t. Socrates’ advantage is that he doesn’t make that mistake. Someone who can see where his understanding stops is in a position to ask a better question. The Charmides briefly raises the possibility that this ordinary advantage belongs to the virtue under discussion.

My verdict is that easier learning, clearer understanding, and better examination deserved more than a passing nod. They are smaller than the benefits the speakers first expected. The discussion leaves them on the table, and a reader can still take them home.

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