Philosophy

The Shoes Still Fit

Socrates asks what happens to medicine and shoemaking if we take away knowledge of good and bad. Critias says the patients still recover and the shoes still fit.

A craft can deliver exactly what it promises. The harder question is what makes its achievement beneficial to the people who use it.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The crafts keep doing their workCritias agrees that medicine still restores health and cobbling still makes people well shod when knowledge of good and bad is set aside.
  • A successful product can serve a bad aimA translation can be fluent and accurate while making a fraud more effective. Judging the work calls for attention to its purpose.
  • Making and using call for judgmentThe Republic’s flute-player can tell a maker which instruments work well. The Euthydemus asks who can make good use of what a craft obtains.
  • Health tests the distinctionA patient’s recovery already seems beneficial. The passage invites a closer look at what medicine delivers and what Socrates assigns to knowledge of good and bad.

Charmides 174b–d, 174d–175a · Republic 601d, 601e · Euthydemus 289b–c, 290b, 290d

Take away the knowledge of good and bad, Socrates says, and will cobbling leave us any less well shod? He asks the same about a patient’s health, the clothes a weaver makes, and the pilot’s ability to keep people from dying at sea. Critias answers, “No less.” Each craft can still do what people rely on it to do. Then Socrates says that each of these things “being done well and beneficially” will be lost if the other knowledge is missing. After a long discussion about what knowledge can know, he’s brought the question down to the shoes on someone’s feet.

Start with the cobbler’s side of the question. A good shoe fits the person who wears it and holds together when they walk. Those are things you can ask a cobbler to accomplish, and you can often tell whether they’ve been accomplished. There’s a further question about what the person is going to do with the shoe. Socrates’s list makes both questions visible. A safe voyage is an achievement of the pilot, and the people who got there safely still have to decide what it was worth going there to do.

Picture a translator asked to turn a swindler’s letter into fluent French. She can choose exactly the right words, reproduce the tone, and convey every detail. Those decisions make the translation good as a translation and can make the fraud easier to carry out. She might recognize what she’s helping to do and turn the work down. That would be an important judgment about whether to take the job. It calls for attention to the purpose of the letter as well as to the words she would use to write it.

In the Republic, Socrates distinguishes the arts of using, making, and imitating a thing. He takes a flute as an example. The person who plays it can tell the maker which flutes respond as they should and what changes would help. That’s a kind of judgment that comes from use, and it can make the maker’s work better. It also helps us see a limit to the comparison. Knowing which flute serves the player best can settle a question about the instrument. The Charmides asks what would make the work of playing it worth doing.

The Euthydemus gives the difference a practical shape. The discussion asks for a kind of knowledge that knows how to use what it produces or obtains. Hunters can catch their prey and hand it over to people who know how to prepare it. A general can capture a city or an army, while the politicians have to decide what should be done with it. The achievement creates possibilities for the next person to handle. You can give the hunter or the general full credit for the achievement and still ask what would count as using it well.

Health puts more pressure on the distinction than the shoes do. If a patient recovers, we ordinarily think the doctor has already done the patient some good. Socrates still treats the effect on health as medicine’s own work, even when he gives knowledge of good and bad the job of making things beneficial. His wording leaves a question about how those claims fit. It’s easy to see how someone could use a safe voyage to do something foolish. The recovery of a sick person can seem worth having before anyone has settled what the person will do next.

Critias tries to save his account by suggesting that temperance could govern the other kinds of knowledge, including the knowledge of good. Socrates asks whether governing medicine would make temperance the source of health. They give that work back to medicine, just as they give the work of securing benefit to knowledge of good and bad. The move puts pressure on the idea that a general supervisor can take credit for everything done under its direction. The specialist still has a job that needs to be done, and the person choosing how to use its result has a question of their own.

Critias’s little answer matters because he gives away so little in saying it. The shoes fit, the doctor can restore health, and the pilot still knows how to bring people through a storm. Every one of those skills is worth having when its work is called for. What Socrates wants Critias to account for is the judgment that calls for it, and the good that makes it worth putting to work. By the time they get to the shoes, they’ve found a way to ask that question without taking anything away from the cobbler.

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What central distinction does the example of the cobbler establish?

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