Philosophy

The Self-Cleaning Oven Problem

Critias thinks self-knowing knowledge makes its bearer self-knowing. Which self does he mean?

Speed makes a person fast, but a self-cleaning oven doesn’t make its owner self-cleaning. Critias’s examples help us hear the difference between knowing one’s knowledge and knowing oneself.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Speed makes you fastCritias uses speed, beauty, and knowledge to argue that the person who has a quality takes on its character.
  • The self changesA kind of knowledge can be said to know itself, while a person who knows herself has a different object of knowledge.
  • What the oven makes clearAn oven can clean itself without giving its owner the ability to do the same.
  • The question Socrates pursuesSocrates lets the first step pass and asks how it would help a person tell what they know from what they don’t.

Critias’s argument is short and has the ring of common sense. “When someone has speed he is fast,” he says. Beauty makes a person beautiful, and knowledge makes a person knowing. So if you have knowledge that knows itself, surely you’ll know yourself. Socrates says, “That isn’t what I’m disputing,” and moves on to the next question. The step he lets pass is the one that connects Critias’s technical idea to the Delphic command to know yourself.

The first three examples have a rhythm in Greek that comes through in English. Speed is tachos, and the person who has it is tachys, fast. Beauty is kallos, and the person who has it is kalos, beautiful. Then Critias says that someone with gnōsis, knowledge, is gignōskōn, knowing. The last word describes what the person does, but it still sounds like an echo of the thing they have. Having strength makes you strong. Having wisdom makes you wise. You feel you know how the next line is going to go.

The fourth example introduces a new question. Calling somebody fast tells you how quickly they can move. Calling a kind of knowledge self-knowing tells you what it knows. The self in that description is the knowledge. When Critias says its bearer will know himself, the self is now the person. The language makes the fourth example sound like more of the same, even though it has changed what the knowing is about.

A self-cleaning oven cleans itself. Owning one doesn’t give you the same ability. A collector who buys a painter’s self-portrait now owns a portrait of the painter. The self belongs to the person whose portrait it is, regardless of who takes it home. The mismatch is easy to hear when the things we own are so clearly separate from us. Knowledge is different, since we can put a capacity we have to work ourselves. That’s what makes Critias’s example worth arguing about.

Imagine that I can use this kind of knowledge myself. If I direct it at what it knows, I might learn something about my own knowledge. Since it’s mine, I could call that a piece of self-knowledge. There’s still a step from knowing that part of myself to knowing who I am or what I’m like. There’s even a step to the more specific claim Critias wants, that the temperate person knows what they know and what they don’t. At this point he treats the two as the same and leaves Socrates to ask how.

Socrates could have stopped at the change of self. Instead he allows the step for the sake of the inquiry and asks what follows. Why would knowing yourself in the sense Critias has just described tell you what you know and what you don’t? That question puts pressure on the definition even if Critias can defend the grammar. You can hear Socrates accepting enough of the proposal to see what work it can do.

It’s worth going back to the inscription with that question in mind. Critias has already said that “Know thyself” and the command to be temperate amount to the same thing. He still has to explain how having a knowledge that knows itself could put that advice into practice. The pattern of speed and beauty makes the connection feel automatic. There’s a reason to want it to work, but hearing the pattern repeat doesn’t explain how the self in the first claim becomes the self in the second.

My verdict is that Critias’s analogy can get us as far as a person who knows something about their own knowledge. That may be part of knowing oneself, and the part still needs an account of how it works. A self-cleaning oven can leave you with a clean oven. What you want from the Delphic advice is a person who can look at their own life more clearly, and there’s a little more to be said before we get there.

Test your understanding

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What is the central weakness in Critias’s move from “self-knowing knowledge” to a person knowing himself?

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