Philosophy
The Faker and the Fooled
A doctor can claim knowledge he lacks, or believe in his own expertise and be mistaken. Socrates’ test can expose a claim, and the person’s reason for making it is a different question.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesIn the Charmides, one short phrase puts the deliberate impostor beside the person who has fooled himself. The same wrong answer can come from either.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Two ways to claim knowledgeSocrates distinguishes someone who pretends to know from someone who sincerely thinks he knows. Either person can fall short of what a doctor ought to understand.
- What the examination can showTesting a diagnosis takes knowledge of health and disease. An examiner needs different evidence to decide whether the person making the claim meant to deceive anyone.
- The Sophist separates the casesPlato’s Eleatic Stranger distinguishes imitators who take their opinions for knowledge from imitators who suspect their own ignorance and claim knowledge in public anyway.
- Being deceived oneselfThe Republic draws attention to falsehood lodged in the soul. Its distinction helps explain why a person’s sincerity can leave a serious problem for Socrates to examine.
Charmides 167a, 170d–e, 170e–171c, 171c, 173c–d · Sophist 267e–268a · Republic 382a–c · Tobias Lear Washington’s final hours · Harry Frankfurt On Bullshit, p. 132
Socrates is careful about the people temperance is supposed to catch. When he spells out Critias’ promise, he says the temperate person could inspect others and see “what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not.” Later, he asks whether temperance could tell a real doctor from “one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does.” Two different failures appear in the last few words. One person pretends to know. The other thinks he really does.
The pretender is the familiar figure of the con man. Later in the dialogue Socrates imagines temperance turning away “the impostors” from among the prophets. The Greek calls them alazones, braggarts or impostors. A pretender may claim knowledge to get money, to win a position or simply to enjoy being taken seriously. He knows, or has reason to suspect, that his claim runs ahead of what he can do. Whatever he hopes to gain, he has a reason to keep the gap to himself.
The sincere claimant is different. Think of the repeated bleedings Tobias Lear records during George Washington’s last illness. Washington himself asked to be bled before the doctor came, and Doctor Craik later took more blood. Later in the day he was bled again. It’s worth noticing how much that account of a treatment leaves open about what the people in the room knew and believed. A person can be trying to help and still be mistaken about what will help.
Plato draws a similar distinction in the Sophist. The Eleatic Stranger separates the simple imitator, who takes his opinion for knowledge, from the dissembling imitator, who strongly suspects he lacks the knowledge he claims before the public. It’s a distinction within a particular discussion of imitation. What carries over to the Charmides is the difference between what a claimant says to other people and what he takes himself to know. The same public performance can cover very different private judgments.
The examination Socrates describes can expose an incompetent answer without settling why the speaker gave it. If you question a supposed doctor about health and disease and the diagnosis falls apart, you have learned something about his command of the subject. He might already know his own limits, or he might be surprised when you point them out. To tell which, you’d need other evidence, such as what he has previously admitted or whether he kept making the claim after he understood the mistake.
Those differences change what a response can accomplish. Exposing deliberate deception may be enough to show why a claim deserves no trust. Someone sincerely mistaken may still need to see where the reasoning failed. Harry Frankfurt points out a third possibility in On Bullshit. A speaker may choose whatever will make the desired impression and pay no attention to whether it is true. It’s another way a confident claim can come loose from the evidence, even when we can’t say the speaker is deliberately saying something he knows to be false.
In the Republic, Socrates asks us to consider what happens when falsehood is lodged in the soul. He gives the name “veritable lie” to a person’s ignorance about realities when the person has been deceived. A falsehood in words is an image of that condition and, he adds, can sometimes be useful. That distinction brings a danger into focus. The person who knows he’s pretending can already see the gap between his words and what he knows. The person who has fooled himself may need help to see that there’s a gap at all.
My verdict is that we should hear both possibilities when Socrates says “pretends or thinks he does.” Medicine can help an examiner show what went wrong in the diagnosis. Learning whether the person meant to deceive anyone takes a further inquiry. The sincere claimant gives Socrates a particularly interesting case, because questioning can help someone see a mistake he has no idea he’s making. A test of expertise has done real work when it can bring that mistake into the open.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What does the article claim a failed examination of a supposed expert can establish by itself?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If the same public claim can arise from deliberate deception, sincere error, or indifference to truth, how should an examiner decide which possibility matters most?→
- What kinds of further evidence could fairly distinguish a pretender from someone who sincerely mistakes opinion for knowledge?→
- When questioning exposes a person’s lack of expertise but not their motives, what conclusions are justified about whether that person should be trusted?→