Philosophy

The Doctor Who Doesn’t Know Medicine

Critias gives temperance sole authority over knowledge. Follow that rule to the letter and a doctor can treat a patient while knowing nothing about the craft he’s practicing.

Hippocratic writers argue about what medicine can do and how it makes discoveries. Their questions show what’s lost when doctors are assigned health and disease alone.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The doctor’s peculiar ignoranceSocrates draws out the consequence that a doctor doesn’t know about medicine. Critias agrees because the craft itself counts as a kind of knowledge.
  • How the rule produces itCritias gives other fields objects distinct from themselves and assigns knowledge of knowledge to temperance alone. The doctor has health and disease on one side of that division and the study of medicine on the other.
  • An ancient dispute about medicineOn the Art defends medicine against the charge that cures are a matter of luck and considers the limits of treatment. On Ancient Medicine asks how earlier discoveries can guide later inquiry.
  • A craft can examine its own methodsSomeone can practice medicine and also learn to assess the evidence on which a treatment rests. That ordinary form of reflection is hard to place in Critias’ division.

The sentence is so flat that it’s easy to miss the joke. Socrates has just said that the doctor “understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased,” and that “about knowledge the doctor knows nothing; that, we assigned to temperance alone.” Then he draws the consequence. “Then the medical man doesn’t know about medicine either, since medicine is in fact a knowledge,” he says. Critias gives him a single word, “True.” It’s the sort of line a comedian delivers with a straight face, waiting for the audience to catch up.

The result follows neatly from the way the objects have been divided. The doctor gets health and disease. Temperance alone gets kinds of knowledge as such. Medicine itself is a kind of knowledge, so whenever it becomes the object of study, it falls under temperance. The doctor is left with the things he treats and no knowledge of the craft by which he treats them. Each step makes sense on the arrangement Critias accepted. Its tidiness is part of what makes it misleading.

The conclusion sounds about as plausible as saying that a shoemaker doesn’t know anything about shoemaking. You might grant that the shoemaker doesn’t have a general theory of crafts. But surely he can tell you what a good shoe looks like and why a seam that looks sound can give way. That is something he knows about what he does. When the argument lands on the doctor’s ignorance, the reader gets a good reason to look back at the line that separated the craft from any knowledge of itself.

The Hippocratic writings are full of questions about medicine itself. On the Art defends the existence of a medical craft against the claim that cures are a matter of luck. Its author treats the recognition of cases that medicine can’t help as part of understanding the craft’s limits. On Ancient Medicine describes how inquiry can start from discoveries already made and extend them. The authors approach their subject in different ways. Both make it possible to talk about medicine as a body of methods and judgments, as well as about the bodies it treats.

The same kind of reflection comes up whenever a doctor studies the evidence for a treatment. Reading a clinical trial involves asking whether the study answers the question it sets out to answer, and whether its patients resemble the ones the doctor treats. Someone can learn that along with the details of a disease. If a treatment looks promising because the study had an unusually narrow group of patients, knowing how to spot that limit is part of knowing what the medical evidence can support.

So it’s worth asking whose rule produced the absurdity. Critias sets aside temperance as the one knowledge that takes other kinds of knowledge and itself as its objects. Socrates reads the classification to its logical end, the way a lawyer reads a badly drafted contract aloud to show the drafter what it says. Once the doctor wants to ask about medicine itself, the rule says he’s left his own field. A great deal of what people who practice a craft have to think about suddenly belongs to somebody else.

Knowing a field and reflecting on how it works can be distinguished, but the same person can do both. A carpenter who can see that a joint is sound can also learn which methods of joining wood hold up under pressure, and why. That doesn’t give the carpenter a general science of every craft. Later Socrates considers whether temperance might help someone examine others on subjects he himself has learned. That’s a more modest possibility than putting all reflection about a craft in a separate office.

My verdict is that the doctor who doesn’t know medicine exposes the cost of giving one science exclusive jurisdiction over every other kind of knowledge. The Hippocratic writers make that cost plain whenever they ask what medicine can claim for itself or where it has to stop. Critias says “True” and the conversation moves along. The reader is left with a doctor who knows about diseases and a rule that bars him from thinking about how he came to know them.

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Why does Socrates’ conclusion that the doctor does not know medicine follow from Critias’s classification?

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