Philosophy
The City Where Nobody Gets It Wrong
Socrates imagines a city where every job goes to someone who knows how to do it. The first question is who would be qualified to do the hiring.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe city that never makes a mistake needs two things its organizers have yet to find. They must recognize real expertise and know which ends it should serve.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The city delegates every jobSocrates imagines rulers who put each task in the hands of someone who knows how to do it. A household and city run this way seem likely to avoid many errors.
- Someone must recognize the expertThe people making the appointments must tell genuine doctors or pilots from convincing pretenders. That judgment requires more than knowing that expertise exists.
- Perfect appointments still leave a choiceSocrates then grants that every expert is genuine. He still asks whether the city’s people would do well and be happy.
- The city needs a purposeCompetent people can carry out a decision. The city still needs a way to decide which purposes are worth pursuing.
Charmides 170e–171c, 171c–172a, 172a–d, 173a–c, 173c–d, 174a–d · Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 43.1
Socrates paints the picture on Critias’ behalf, and he paints it well. If temperance meant knowing what one knows and doesn’t, he says, “it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate. For we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us.” We wouldn’t try to do what we didn’t know, “we would find those who did know and hand things over to them,” and we wouldn’t allow anyone we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly. “And so a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well,” he concludes, “and a city governed by it too.”
It’s worth taking the picture seriously. The danger of handing a job to someone who can’t do it is easy to imagine, whether the job is treating a patient or navigating a ship. Many Athenian administrative offices went by lot, while some specialized posts and military commands were filled by election, as the Constitution of the Athenians records. Socrates’ picture goes further. It asks what would happen if finding the right competence were the basis for handing out every job.
Notice what the whole picture depends on, because everything rests on one capacity, the ability to tell who knows and who doesn’t, since the temperate rulers would “find those who did know” and stop everyone else from acting outside their competence. That is a personnel office of superhuman accuracy, able to look at any doctor, pilot or builder and see at once whether his knowledge is real. Without it, the city of no mistakes becomes a city where the people in charge make the most important mistake of all, about who should be doing what.
And the dialogue has just shown that Critias’ account has yet to establish the capacity. The doctor argument asks whether the temperate man can distinguish a real doctor from one who “pretends or thinks he does,” except in a field where he was an expert himself. The city of no mistakes was built on exactly the faculty that earlier exchange put in doubt, and Socrates makes the point gently, observing that “no knowledge of this kind has turned up anywhere.”
A modern hiring committee has a version of the same problem. A diploma shows that someone finished a course. A demonstration can show how well a candidate handled the particular case the committee gave her. Either can tell you something without telling you what will happen when a different case comes through the door. Socrates’ imagined rulers would need an ability to judge genuine competence much stronger than any of these familiar checks.
Suppose, though, that the hiring office worked perfectly, and Socrates’ next move is to ask exactly that, whether even then the city would do well, and in the dream that follows he grants healthier bodies, safety at sea and in war, well-made goods and honest prophets while still refusing to grant happiness. A city of perfect administration would carry out its purposes without error, but administration doesn’t choose purposes, and the dream never says who would. Socrates even admits that they “too easily agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew, and handed over what we did not know to others who did know it.”
The city faces two different questions. The first is whether the people in charge can tell who has the skills they need. The examination of the doctor gives Socrates reason to doubt that Critias’ definition of temperance supplies that ability. The second is what the city would do with the skills once it had found them. Even a perfect hiring office would still leave that decision to someone.
My verdict is that the city of no mistakes is an attractive political experiment that depends on an extraordinary ability to identify knowledge, an ability the dialogue has just shown to be out of reach for Critias’ temperance. Even granting that ability, the experiment would still need an account of beneficial ends, which administration can’t supply. The picture deserves its moment in the sun, since the wish to have things done by those who know how is a sound one, but it can’t survive the two questions every such picture has to face, who decides who knows, and who decides what for.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What is the most important vulnerability in Socrates’ imagined city of competent specialists?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If judging expertise generally requires expertise in the same field, how might a city choose specialists without assuming the very capacity Socrates doubts?→
- What is the difference between carrying out a purpose correctly and choosing a good purpose, and which kind of knowledge would each require?→
- Should the inability to guarantee perfect judgments about competence lead a city to reject competence-based assignments, or only to adopt more modest ways of evaluating candidates?→