Philosophy
Socrates’ Broken Ruler
Socrates questions his own eye for beauty, then asks what it takes to tell a real expert from a pretender.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates admits his eye for beauty is useless, like a white chalk line on white marble. Then he does something smart with his broken instrument, and it’s a better lesson in knowing what you know than anything Critias comes up with later.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A white line on white stoneSocrates says almost every boy looks beautiful to him. He likens his eye for beauty to a white measuring-line that leaves no visible mark.
- Even the youngest boys stareThe grown men’s reaction surprises Socrates less than the boys’. He notices that even the youngest is watching Charmides.
- The doctor testCritias’s proposed knowledge of knowledge cannot tell a doctor from a pretender. Judging a medical claim requires knowledge of medicine.
- Self-knowledge in practiceThe scene suggests a modest kind of self-knowledge. Socrates names a bias and looks beyond his first impression.
Right as Charmides walks in, Socrates pauses the story to issue a disclaimer about himself. “Now I, my friend, am no measure of anything,” he says, because where the beautiful are concerned he is “simply a white measuring-line on white stone,” since “nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me.” The image comes from the building site, where a mason would rub his line with red ochre or black so that, snapped against a block of stone, it left a mark to cut by, and a white line on white marble leaves nothing at all. There’s a pun in the Greek as well, because the word for “measure” and the word for “measuring-line” come from the same root, so Socrates calls himself a measuring tool in the same breath as saying he can’t measure anything. He’s telling his friend that as a judge of good looks he’s a tool that can’t make a mark, the equivalent of a carpenter’s chalk line on a freshly painted white wall.
The joke lands because everyone has met an instrument like that. Think of the reviewer who gives every movie five stars, or the friend who swears every new restaurant is the best thing he’s ever eaten, or the smoke alarm that goes off every time somebody makes toast, so that when it shrieks you have no idea whether the house is on fire. An instrument that registers everything tells you nothing, and Socrates admits his eye for beauty is exactly that kind of instrument, which means his friend should discount anything he says about how gorgeous the new arrival is.
Then comes the twist, because the broken ruler goes off anyway. “All the same,” Socrates says, “at that moment he struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty,” and now we have a problem of testimony. If his reaction to every boy is to find him beautiful, how much is this reaction worth, and why should we believe Charmides is anything special and not just the latest kid to set off a faulty alarm? Socrates seems to know that his own word can’t settle the question, and what he does next is quietly brilliant.
He checks his instrument against other instruments, starting with the grown men, and they’re all in love with the boy, “so astounded and flustered were they when he came in,” but Socrates immediately discounts them too, because “with us grown men that was less surprising,” and of course it was, since the men are the same kind of biased judge he is. Then he notices a reaction that surprises him more. “But I watched the boys too,” he says, “and not one of them was looking anywhere else, not even the littlest,” and the boys’ attention gives him another observation to set beside his own.
That’s a small masterpiece of honest judgment, and it comes before anybody in the dialogue has said a word about knowing yourself. Socrates knows his own bias, he tells you about it up front, he discounts his own reaction, and then he looks at how a different group reacts. Their motives remain open, and their attention gives him a second observation to consider. The joke qualifies his testimony, and by qualifying it, it makes the testimony more trustworthy than a confident report would have been.
Now compare that with where the dialogue’s big theory ends up. Critias eventually defines temperance as a knowledge of knowledge, which would let a person examine “what he in fact knows and what he does not,” but when Socrates presses the idea, it turns out such a knowledge could tell you only that someone knows something, never what. The temperate person, on this theory, would know “only that one knows and that one does not know,” without being able to tell a real expert from a fake, and that’s the white line all over again, an instrument that goes off without making a mark that tells one thing from another.
The difference between the joke and the theory is what each one does about the problem. Socrates knows his line is white and works around it by checking it against the world, against the reactions of the other observers, while Critias’ theory tries to fix the instrument by having it measure itself, which is like trying to calibrate a chalk line by snapping it against its own length. A knowledge that knows only knowledge has nothing outside itself to check against, and that’s exactly why it can’t discriminate. Critias, remember, is the man who at the door was perfectly happy to have Socrates claim a knowledge he didn’t have, so it’s fitting that his theory of self-knowledge ends up with no way of checking itself against anything real.
So the white measuring-line is more than a throwaway joke about Socrates’ weakness for pretty boys. It introduces the dialogue’s problem of discernment before the dialogue knows it has one, and it offers a practical response, at least for one afternoon. Real self-knowledge, Plato seems to suggest, looks less like a knowledge that knows itself and more like a man who knows exactly how his own eyes mislead him and keeps looking to see what else he can learn.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does Socrates compare himself to a white measuring-line on white stone?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does acknowledging a bias make a person’s testimony more trustworthy, and when might acknowledgment still be insufficient?→
- Why might checking one’s judgment against other observers improve discernment without providing certainty?→
- How does the contrast between Socrates’ practical self-correction and Critias’ self-measuring theory reshape the article’s account of self-knowledge?→