Renaissance
Reconciled by Being Explained
Pater’s historian gives each religion a place in humanity’s education. What happens to the truths those religions claim for themselves?
The Renaissance (1893)Pater’s historical method can help readers understand beliefs on their own ground. His image of successive stages raises a different question about whose beliefs count as mature.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A place for every religionPater imagines a scholar who sees religions as products of the human mind and gives each a place in its development.
- What the historic sense doesThe historian asks what a belief meant to the people who held it in their own time.
- What the ladder impliesPater’s comparison with childhood and old age gives some beliefs an earlier place than others and can make them seem less mature.
- Understanding leaves a question openA historian can explain how a faith developed while leaving its claims about revelation or divine truth for believers and others to consider.
The Renaissance · Pico della Mirandola, the modern scholar’s reconciliation · Pico della Mirandola, the historic sense and its alternative · Note 57, the Enlightenment as clarification · Note 58, the historical standpoint in Pater’s account · Friedrich Max Müller, Introduction to the Science of Religion, lectures given in 1870 · Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture, volume I
Pater’s modern scholar is the hero of a short thought experiment, and he talks like a man who has finally found a way to stop the fighting. Religions, he says, “have common laws, and are not to be isolated from the other movements of the human mind in the periods in which they respectively prevailed,” and they spring up as “expressions of the varying phases of its sentiment concerning the unseen world.” Each has added something to the religious sense, so by “ranging them as so many stages in the gradual education of the human mind,” the scholar can “justify the existence of each.” The peace treaty rests on “the inexhaustible activity and creativeness of the human mind itself, in which all religions alike have their root, and in which all alike are reconciled,” which sounds like the end of every holy war at once.
In 1871, the year Pater dated this chapter, there were real scholars asking similar questions. Friedrich Max Müller, the Oxford philologist, had lectured at London’s Royal Institution in 1870 on what he called the science of religion, and Edward Burnett Tylor’s Primitive Culture, published that same year, traced religion from belief in spiritual beings, which Tylor called animism, up through a ladder of later forms. The edition’s note calls Pater’s contrast “a Victorian judgment about the past,” and that’s exactly right, since the imagined scholar speaks in a voice that would have sounded familiar in a Victorian lecture hall. So the question isn’t only whether Pico could have used this method, but whether the method itself does what it promises for the religions it describes.
The case for it is strong, and it deserves to be made first. What Pater calls the historic sense is the faculty “which, by an imaginative act, throws itself back into a world unlike one’s own, and estimates every intellectual creation in its connexion with the age from which it proceeded.” That’s a real form of respect, because it refuses the move Pater pins on the allegorists, where “the first necessity was to misrepresent the language, the conceptions, the sentiments” of the texts being compared. A historian lets Homer’s gods be what they were to Homer’s audience and lets Moses speak to the people of Israel, with nobody forced to secretly mean something else. At the level of meaning, history honors each tradition far better than Pico’s method ever could.
The trouble starts with two small words in the scholar’s first claim, which is that all religions are “natural products.” Many religious traditions say something about the source of their authority, whether that is a revelation at Sinai, an oracle at Delphi or a voice from heaven. A historian who says those experiences are wholly products of the human mind has already taken a position on what they mean. A believer who hears that her faith is an expression of a phase of human sentiment has just been told, very kindly, that she’s mistaken about it. The scholar honors her religion as an achievement while quietly denying that it’s a revelation, and that isn’t honoring it in its own terms, because its own terms include the claim he’s set aside.
The second problem is the ladder, because stages in an education come in an order, and in any schooling the later grades know more than the earlier ones, so the moment you arrange religions as steps in the education of the human mind, somebody has to be the kindergarten. In Tylor’s scheme the bottom rungs belonged to the peoples the Victorians called primitive, and the top looked a lot like the rational, educated religion of a Victorian gentleman. It’s an old habit of anyone who builds a staircase through history to find himself standing on the landing at the top, and the developmental story of religion flattered the people who told it in the same way the Whig story of politics flattered Parliament.
Pater’s closing analogy gives the game away, and it’s worth reading slowly. The religions are reconciled, he says, “just as the fancies of childhood and the thoughts of old age meet and are laid to rest, in the experience of the individual.” Look first at the nouns, since the early religions get fancies and the later ones get thoughts, which tells you who’s the child. Then look at the verb phrase, laid to rest, which is the language of a funeral. The religions don’t meet one another in this picture at all, they meet inside the mind of an old man who has outgrown both, the way a person’s childhood and old age are reconciled only in a life that’s nearly over.
The other side deserves a fair hearing here too. Historical understanding can help people see their neighbors’ beliefs on their own terms, and a museum where every faith has a room is a lot better than a battlefield. Many later scholars kept the historical method while setting aside Tylor’s ladder, so you can have the imaginative act without the ranking. A defender of Pater’s scholar could fairly say that the respect he offers is the most anyone can offer who doesn’t share a given faith, and that asking for more would mean asking the historian to convert to everything at once.
My verdict is that the scholar’s method has two halves and only one of them keeps its promise. The imaginative act that throws itself back into another world honors every religion as a human achievement and makes them intelligible to one another, which is a genuine good. The developmental story and the label of natural products do something else, since they rank the religions and overrule what each says about itself, and so they reconcile religions the way a eulogy reconciles a life, by speaking for someone who can’t answer back. History can help believers live together, but it can’t reconcile their religions on their own terms, because those terms include a claim to truth that history has to leave at the door.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
According to the article, why does calling religions “natural products” undermine the scholar’s claim to honor them on their own terms?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- Can a historian understand a religion on its own terms without taking a position on whether its claims to revelation are true? Why or why not?→
- If developmental ranking is removed, what can historical comparison still accomplish—and what limits would remain?→
- What does the contrast between “fancies of childhood” and “thoughts of old age” reveal about the kind of reconciliation Pater’s analogy offers?→