Philosophy

One Knowledge, Two Failed Definitions

Knowledge of good and bad comes up near the end of both the Laches and the Charmides. In one it makes the definition of courage too broad. In the other it takes away the work temperance was meant to do.

The same kind of knowledge strains two definitions in opposite directions. Nicias’ courage takes in all of virtue, while Critias’ temperance loses its claim to benefit us.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Nicias begins with dangerNicias calls courage the knowledge of what should be feared and dared. Socrates asks whether knowledge can be confined to what lies in the future.
  • Courage grows too broadIf courage takes in every good and evil at every time, Socrates asks what could be left for the rest of virtue. The definition has taken in more than courage.
  • Temperance loses its workCritias’ definition deals with knowledge itself. The dialogue gives the power to benefit us to knowledge of good and bad and asks what work remains for temperance.
  • The same problem runs both waysA virtue seems to need some judgment about good and bad. Giving all of that judgment to any one virtue makes it hard to say what distinguishes it from the others.

The Laches and the Charmides are cousins, two short dialogues in which Socrates and a pair of distinguished Athenians try to define a virtue and fail. In the Laches the virtue is courage and the main definer is Nicias, a celebrated general, and in the Charmides the virtue is temperance and the main definer is Critias. Near the end of each, the same knowledge appears, the knowledge of good and bad, and in each it brings the definition down. Comparing how it does so shows that the same idea can do very different work depending on where it enters an argument. Both dialogues also feature men of public life, generals in one and a future ruler in the other, discovering that they can’t say what a familiar virtue is.

In the Laches, Nicias proposes that courage is the knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared. Socrates gets him to agree that what is to be feared means future evils, and then points out that knowledge doesn’t come in separate pieces for past, present and future, since medicine knows health in every tense and generalship plans for what is coming as well as what has happened. So courage, as Nicias defined it, must be knowledge of all goods and evils at all times, and Socrates asks whether a man with such knowledge would lack any part of virtue, including temperance, justice and piety. Nicias introduces his account by recalling a saying he has often heard from Socrates, that a person is good at what he is wise about. That makes the later difficulty a question for Socrates too.

That’s where the Laches definition collapses, because if courage is knowledge of all goods and evils, it isn’t a part of virtue but the whole of virtue, and Nicias had agreed that courage was one part among several. The knowledge of good and bad entered the definition from inside, as what Nicias’ own words turned into when pressed, and it swelled the definition until it burst the boundaries of the virtue it was meant to define. As Socrates concludes, they have not found what courage is.

In the Charmides, the same knowledge does the opposite job. Critias has proposed that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge. Even if such an ability could tell us someone has knowledge, Socrates has argued, it could tell us little about what the person knows. When knowledge of good and bad appears, Socrates calls it “the knowledge whose work is to benefit us.” Critias asks whether temperance could govern that knowledge as it governs the others. The question of what work this leaves for temperance remains unanswered.

So the same idea causes two different crises, since in the Laches the definition includes too much, and courage swallows the rest of virtue. In the Charmides the definition includes too little, and temperance is left as an empty shell with the valuable knowledge outside it. One dialogue shows a virtue that can’t be defined as the knowledge of good and bad without ceasing to be a particular virtue, and the other shows a virtue that can’t be defined without it without ceasing to be worth having.

There’s even a verbal link between the two endings. In the Laches, Socrates insists that knowledge covers past, present and future alike, and in the Charmides he imagines a man who knows “everything that has happened and everything that is now,” besides the future, and asks which of his knowledges makes him happy. Both dialogues push knowledge to its full temporal reach and then ask what part of that total knowledge actually matters, and both answer with the knowledge of good and bad.

Put together, the dialogues leave a problem about the boundaries of virtue. Courage seems to need some grasp of what dangers matter and what makes them worth facing. Temperance seems to need some grasp of the ends our restraint serves. Give either virtue full knowledge of all good and bad, though, and it becomes hard to see what work the other virtues have left.

My verdict is that the knowledge of good and bad does opposite argumentative work in the two dialogues, overflowing courage in the Laches and hollowing out temperance in the Charmides, and that its very breadth is what makes it both promising and disruptive. It promises a solution because it is the knowledge that makes any virtue beneficial, and it disrupts because a knowledge of all good and bad can’t be the private property of any single virtue. Reading the two dialogues together shows that the failure in each is not a local accident but a symptom of the same deep question about how the virtues relate.

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