Philosophy
One Knowledge Over All the Others
Critias puts temperance in charge of all the other kinds of knowledge. The proposal sounds plausible until Socrates asks what an overseer would have to know about the work.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesDialectic, statesmanship and rhetoric each have a claim to reach across fields. A doctor’s diagnosis helps show what broad authority can and can’t tell you.
Orientation
At a Glance
- One knowledge above the restCritias says temperance knows itself and every other kind of knowledge. He later hopes this position lets it direct even the knowledge of good and bad.
- What oversight can doThe Republic gives dialectic a view of how studies fit together. The Statesman distinguishes deciding whether a city should go to war from knowing how to conduct a campaign.
- Expertise has its own testsSocrates’ example asks how anyone could check a doctor without understanding health. Aristotle likewise ties the precision we should expect to the subject under study.
- Persuasion and good judgmentGorgias can imagine an orator beating a doctor before a crowd. The Charmides’ closing distinction between craft and benefit asks what anyone directing the crafts would need to understand.
Charmides 166a–c, 167b–c, 170b–e, 170e–171c, 174b–d, 174d–175a · Republic 534b–c, 534e, 537c · Statesman 304c–d, 304e–305a, 305c–d · Gorgias 455e–456b, 456b–c, 458e–459c, 462c–463a · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.3, 1094b
Critias puts his claim plainly. “All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves,” he says, “but this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself.” Later, when he wants to show that temperance can benefit us, he says that it “presides over the other kinds of knowledge too.” The picture is of one knowledge at the top of a pyramid, surveying medicine, building and calculation the way a general surveys an army. What could the general see from up there?
The idea has real appeal. In the Republic, Socrates calls dialectic the coping stone of the other studies and asks future dialecticians to see how the studies fit together. In the Statesman, the Stranger distinguishes the art that decides whether to go to war from the general’s art of waging it. He gives statesmanship a similar authority over when to use persuasion. Both cases give a larger view some work to do. The precise kind of work matters.
An accountant can audit a business whose products she couldn’t make. She has something specific to examine, and she brings standards that tell her what to look for in the books. There’s no mystery about how her work can help the business. There would be a mystery if the audit were expected to show whether a new piece of engineering worked, with the books still as its only evidence. What can Critias’ overseer look at, and what standard will it bring?
Socrates gives that question a medical case. A knowledge directed only at knowing might tell you that someone knows something. To assess the doctor’s answer about a case, you’d need some grasp of the healthy and the diseased. A diploma can give a patient a good reason to take a doctor seriously. It won’t tell the patient whether a particular diagnosis is right. That takes a different kind of evidence and the ability to do something with it.
Aristotle makes a related point about precision. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he says an educated person asks for the degree of exactness a subject allows. What counts as a good mathematical demonstration will differ from what we can reasonably expect in an argument about how to live. A house has to stand, a geometric proof has to follow from its premises, and a doctor has to judge what the signs in a particular patient mean. The more you know about each job, the more those differences matter to the person trying to assess it.
There’s a cautionary figure for this in the Gorgias. Gorgias boasts that he has persuaded a patient where a doctor couldn’t, and that an orator could win over an assembly choosing between him and a doctor for a medical post. Socrates asks what that victory would amount to before people who don’t know medicine. Later he calls rhetoric a routine for producing gratification and pleasure. The orator can have real power in the room while leaving the medical question exactly where he found it.
The Republic and the Statesman point to other ways to make oversight meaningful. The dialectician tries to give an account of the good and sees connections among studies. The statesman has to decide what action suits the city and when it’s needed. The Charmides brings the question back to benefit, distinguishing a knowledge of good and bad from the particular work of a craft. Even if someone can say what a city should do, the general still has to know how to lead an army.
My verdict is that a knowledge with a larger view has to have something to look for. It might ask how different studies fit together or what end the city’s actions should serve. Critias gives his overseer knowledge in general as its object, and that makes it hard to see what standard it could bring to any particular task. The patient can still have a reason to ask what treatment is worth having, and somebody still has to know enough medicine to answer.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article contrast an accountant’s legitimate audit with an attempt to judge engineering from the books alone?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When, if ever, can someone responsibly assess a specialist’s conclusion without possessing the specialist’s craft? What would that assessor need to know?→
- How does the distinction between deciding what end should be pursued and knowing how to achieve it clarify the proper relationship between oversight and expertise?→
- If different subjects permit different degrees and kinds of precision, what standards should a general overseer use when comparing or coordinating them?→