Philosophy
Not Yet Is an Answer
Critias wants to know whether Socrates agrees. Socrates asks for time to find out what he thinks.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesWhen Socrates says he’ll answer once he has looked into it, Critias lets him begin. Their exchange makes room for a judgment that still has to be formed.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Critias asks for a positionCritias offers to defend his account if Socrates disagrees. Socrates says he needs to examine it before he can give a judgment.
- Belief and choiceBernard Williams asks how an attitude produced at will, regardless of the truth, could count as taking something to be true.
- The work of waitingWith time to ask questions, Socrates compares temperance with medicine and building. Critias tests that comparison by bringing up calculation and geometry.
- Critias makes roomCritias agrees to let Socrates examine the proposal, and Socrates immediately starts asking what temperance is knowledge of.
Charmides 165b, 165c–166a, 175a–b, 175b–d · René Descartes, Discourse on the Method Part II · Bernard Williams, Deciding to Believe p. 148
“Just wait until I have.” Socrates is asking Critias for time to look into the claim that temperance is knowing oneself. Critias has offered to explain his account if Socrates disagrees. The offer sounds as though Socrates already has a position and just has to say which one it is. Socrates tells him that he asks about each proposal because he doesn’t know the answer himself. He’s willing to say whether he agrees after he’s looked into it. Critias says, “Look into it, then.” That brief reply gives them somewhere to go.
It’s easy to hear a pause as resistance. A friend pitches a plan and asks whether you’re in. You say you need to think about it, and your friend starts trying to overcome the objection they think you’re holding back. But you may still be finding out what the plan involves. The time to ask what you think of it will come after you’ve found out enough to have a view. Socrates asks for that time in the middle of a conversation that could easily turn into a contest over who can get the other person to give way.
Critias is treating him, Socrates says, as though he will agree “if only I want to.” You can choose to say yes as a favor to someone. The question is how you could choose to be convinced. Bernard Williams presses that question in Deciding to Believe. Suppose you could bring yourself to believe a claim just by deciding to. You’d know that the same decision would work whether the claim was true or false. Williams asks how you could take that to be a way of finding yourself with something you hold to be true. Socrates makes a smaller request. He wants a chance to find out what there is to agree to.
Descartes makes a rule of avoiding haste and prejudice in the Discourse on the Method. He resolves to accept as true only what he can recognize so clearly and distinctly that he has no ground for doubt. That’s a demanding standard, and it belongs to a much larger project than the one in the wrestling school. The useful likeness is the pause before assent. The work done during that pause is what could give a judgment its grounds. A person who feels obliged to supply the judgment straight away may never get around to that work.
You can see what Socrates does with the time he’s asked for. If temperance is a kind of knowledge, he asks, what does it know? Critias says it knows oneself. Then Socrates turns to medicine, which concerns health and can produce it, and to building, which gives us houses. Critias objects that calculation and geometry have no work to point to in the way a builder can point to a house. The examples have drawn out something they can discuss. The question now concerns what kinds of knowledge have in common, and Critias has helped make it sharper.
There’s a risk in asking for more time. Sometimes the person who asks for it has no intention of taking another look. Socrates gives Critias an immediate way to tell the difference. Critias says he should look, and Socrates answers, “I am looking.” Then he asks the first question. We can watch the pause turn into something they do together. Socrates is still free to change his mind, and Critias has a chance to explain his account and to challenge the examples used to test it.
The inquiry ends with more work to do. Socrates blames himself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose and says they’ve been unable to discover what it is. His admission gives the earlier request a different sound. When he asks to wait, he really is taking the chance that the examination might leave him without the judgment Critias wants. He can tell Critias what he’s found in this account and still be at a loss about temperance itself. Taking more time makes that distinction possible.
The shortest line in the exchange may be the most generous. Critias tells Socrates to look into it, and for a while the conversation has room for the questions that follow. Anyone can ask for a yes or a no. It takes some patience to accept that the person across from you is still working out which answer the evidence will support. Critias gives Socrates that much patience here. We get to hear what they do with it.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
According to the article, what most clearly distinguishes Socrates’ request for more time from merely avoiding commitment?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does asking for more time become a responsible pause for inquiry, and when does it become avoidance?→
- Can a conversation remain cooperative when one person wants a definite answer and the other is not yet ready to form a judgment? What would each person owe the other?→
- What is gained—and what might be lost—by treating “not yet” as a legitimate answer rather than requiring an immediate yes or no?→