Philosophy
Making Gold, Using Gold
Suppose you could turn stones into gold, or even make yourself immortal. In the Euthydemus, Socrates asks what good either power would do without knowing how to use it.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe Euthydemus makes the Charmides’ question about benefit vivid. Having a thing and knowing what to do with it can take two very different kinds of skill.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Gold still needs a useSocrates asks Clinias whether turning rocks into gold would make anyone better off. The answer depends on whether the person knows what to do with the gold.
- Even immortality can fall shortThe dialogue applies the same test to endless life. Knowing how to make it possible still leaves the question of how to live it.
- The speeches change handsClinias observes that somebody may be able to write a speech without knowing how to use it. Socrates compares the spell a speaker casts on an audience to other kinds of enchantment.
- A higher skill needs an accountThe Euthydemus asks what the kingly art produces, and the Charmides asks what work knowledge of good and bad performs. Both conversations have further questions once they name their leading candidate.
Charmides 156d–157b, 174b–d, 174d–175a · Euthydemus 288d–289a, 289a–c, 289c–e, 289d–290a, 290b–d, 290c–d, 291c–d, 292a–e
The Euthydemus is mostly a farce, a battle of wits between Socrates and two sophist brothers who can prove anything, but at its center is a serious conversation between Socrates and a young man named Clinias. They agree that the knowledge they need is one that would benefit them, and they test candidates. Clinias, like Charmides, is a young man talking with Socrates. Here he helps rule out candidates for a knowledge they both want to find. Would it help to know how to find buried gold, or how to turn stones into gold? No, since without knowing how to use the gold, they would be no better off. Then Socrates pushes the point as far as it will go, saying that even if we knew how to make ourselves immortal, the knowledge would be useless without knowing how to use immortality.
That example is worth pausing over, because it’s the most extreme version of the distinction the Charmides also draws. In the Charmides, medicine still heals and cobbling still shoes us without the knowledge of good and bad, but the speakers still have to ask what makes those results good for the people who use them. The Euthydemus says the same thing about the greatest product imaginable, endless life, which would be no benefit to a person who didn’t know how to live it. Production and use come apart even at the very top, and the most a making-knowledge can do is hand its product to someone who knows what it is for.
The Euthydemus then considers a candidate with a special connection to the Charmides. Perhaps, Clinias and Socrates wonder, the knowledge they want is the art of the speechwriter, and Socrates says that this art seems to him a branch of the art of enchantment, a little below it, since enchanters charm snakes, spiders and scorpions and diseases, while speechwriters charm juries, assemblies and crowds. The Charmides had begun with exactly such an art, the Thracian charm for the soul, which turned out to be “beautiful words,” so the Euthydemus considers, and then sets aside, an art that makes a useful comparison with the charm in the Charmides. Socrates admits the speechwriters seem to him wise and their art lofty, a hint that he is tempted by it before setting it aside.
The reason the charm can’t be the final answer in either dialogue is the same. A charm, or a persuasive speech, produces something, a change in a listener, but it doesn’t know what that change is good for, so it too needs a further knowledge to use it well. The Charmides hints at this when its charm turns out to be conversation aimed at temperance, which puts the charm in the service of a virtue it doesn’t itself define. Every art in the chain, from the gold-maker to the enchanter, makes something that someone else must know how to use.
So both dialogues climb a ladder of using, on which hunters hand their catch to cooks, generals hand captured cities to statesmen, and each user turns out to be a maker for someone further up. The Euthydemus reaches the top and calls it the kingly art, and the Charmides reaches the top and calls it the knowledge of good and bad. In both cases the top is defined by its position, the knowledge that uses everything else for the sake of a person’s good, rather than by any content we can state. The Euthydemus ladder even includes geometers and astronomers, who discover truths and hand them to the dialecticians to use, so that even pure knowledge waits on someone who knows what it is for.
That’s why appointing the higher expertise doesn’t end either inquiry. In the Euthydemus, once the kingly art is named, Socrates recalls the search and asks Crito what the kingly art would produce. The conversation goes round in a circle, unable to say. In the Charmides, once the knowledge of good and bad is named, Socrates immediately points out that it isn’t temperance as Critias defined it, and the conversation ends without saying what that knowledge contains. Naming the top of the ladder tells you where to look, but it doesn’t tell you what you’ll find when you get there.
What the two dialogues share, then, is a structure of thought more than a doctrine. Every making-knowledge is incomplete until a using-knowledge directs it, and the chain of using ends in a knowledge whose use is life itself, the knowledge of how to live well with everything the other arts provide. Neither dialogue can describe that final knowledge, and both are candid about it. Both texts give the question of use a place of its own. The immortality example makes the stakes plain, since even unlimited life is only as good as the knowledge of how to use it.
My verdict is that the Euthydemus and the Charmides draw the same distinction between producing something and knowing how to use it, and that the Euthydemus, with its gold and its immortality and its enchanters, draws it more vividly. Both dialogues climb to a highest knowledge that uses all the others, and both find that naming it leaves the real question open, since a knowledge defined by its position at the top of the ladder still has to be discovered. The inquiries end where the hard work begins, with a question that even unlimited life would leave open.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article say that speechwriting and enchantment cannot be the highest knowledge sought in the dialogues?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If even immortality is not beneficial without knowing how to use it, what does that suggest about the relationship between possessing a good and benefiting from it?→
- Can a chain in which every maker depends on a higher user ever reach a satisfactory endpoint, or does the article’s unresolved highest knowledge reveal a problem with the ladder itself?→
- Why might naming the highest knowledge still count as progress if the dialogues cannot explain its content or product?→