Philosophy

Knowing the Future Won’t Tell You What to Want

Socrates grants that a real prophet can tell us what’s coming. He still wants to know how we decide which future would be good for us.

The Charmides grants its prophets genuine foresight and asks what further judgment a person needs in order to choose among the futures they reveal.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Assume the prophecy worksThe dream grants genuine prophets who can tell what’s going to happen. Socrates still asks whether life under their guidance would go well.
  • Achilles has two futuresThetis tells Achilles what he can expect if he stays at Troy and what he can expect if he goes home. He still has to decide how much he values glory and a long life.
  • A description leaves work to doHume asks moral writers to explain how they move from descriptions to statements about what ought to happen. A forecast leaves a similar step to the person deciding what to do.
  • Critias names another knowledgeCritias finally identifies knowledge of good and bad as what makes the decisive difference to happiness. The forecast supplies something for that judgment to consider.

Charmides 173b–c, 173c–174a, 174a–c · Homer, Iliad 9.410–416 · David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 3.1.1.25

Socrates didn’t have to include prophets in his dream. He had already granted honest doctors, pilots and generals, which is plenty for an argument about knowledge and happiness. Still he adds, “And if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be,” with temperance turning away the impostors and setting up “the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future.” A doctor knows something about the body. The prophet in this thought experiment can tell you what is coming. Letting Critias have that much makes Socrates’ next question especially hard to avoid.

The test is simple and devastating, since even if the prophets are genuine and tell us exactly what will happen, Socrates still won’t grant that we would therefore do well and be happy. Knowing what will happen tells you the consequences of your choices, which is a great deal, but it doesn’t tell you which consequences to prefer, and a person can know with perfect certainty what each path leads to while having no idea which path is better.

Homer gave the Greeks a hero who faced something like that situation. In the ninth book of the Iliad, Achilles tells the embassy that his mother, the goddess Thetis, has told him of two fates. If he stays and fights at Troy, he loses his homecoming and his glory will never perish. If he goes home, he loses his glory and lives a long life. His mother’s information leaves him with a decision about how much each of those goods matters to him.

The eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume put a related logical point in a form that has stuck. He noticed that writers on morality would move from describing how things are to saying how things ought to be, often without explaining the change. His demand for an explanation gives us a way to put Socrates’ challenge. Even if we know what’s going to happen, there’s still a step from that knowledge to a judgment about which outcome we ought to want.

Suppose a friend could tell you with certainty what life would be like if you took a job in another city. You’d have work you liked better and see less of the people you love. That would be useful to know. It still leaves you to decide how much either change matters and whether you’d take one in exchange for the other.

The same gap shows up in everyday forecasting. Knowing that it will rain on Saturday afternoon helps a couple decide whether to move their wedding indoors. It matters how much they care about the garden, the photographs, and their guests’ comfort. The forecaster has done her job when she tells them it will rain. They have a further decision to make.

That is why the prophets in Socrates’ dream strengthen his case. He can grant the knowledge of events that seems most useful for choosing and still ask a separate question about what benefits us. When Critias finally names knowledge of good and bad, he gives the speakers a way to ask what would make a foreseen outcome worth having.

My verdict is that genuine prophecy is a generous concession that makes Socrates’ point clearer. Achilles needs Thetis’ warning in order to know what is at stake. The warning doesn’t tell him which fate to choose. In the wrestling school, it’s the judgment that would help him choose that Socrates wants Critias to account for.

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Why does the author think granting genuine prophecy strengthens Socrates’ argument?

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