Philosophy
Knowing That You Know, and What You Know
A name on the tip of your tongue feels close enough to know, even when you can’t say it. Socrates asks whether Critias’ definition of temperance could get us any closer to an answer.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates separates recognizing that someone knows something from identifying what they know. The distinction puts Critias’ promise of self-knowledge to the test.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Two kinds of knowingSocrates distinguishes knowing that you have some knowledge from knowing what it is about. On the terms of the argument, Critias’ proposed power can supply only the first.
- When recall stallsA word may feel familiar, and you may even recall part of it, while the word itself stays out of reach. The feeling that you know can run ahead of what you can produce.
- Performance without a report of seeingIn the early blindsight study, a patient who reported no sight in part of his visual field could still locate some targets there. His responses and his report tell us different things.
- Where the limit liesThe self-knowledge Socrates puts to work in the Apology concerns particular claims. It helps him distinguish expertise in a craft from the broader authority someone thinks it confers.
Charmides 167a, 169e–170b, 170b–e, 171d–172a · Apology 21b–d, 22a–c, 22d–e · Brown and McNeill The Tip of the Tongue Phenomenon · Sanders and colleagues Blindsight: Vision in a Field Defect
The key distinction arrives almost quietly, in the middle of a run of short answers. Socrates points out that a person knows the healthy by medicine, the harmonious by music and what belongs to building by house-building. If temperance is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, it can’t tell him any of those things. “Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows,” he concludes. On those terms, temperance would tell us “only that one knows and that one does not know.”
Those two achievements are easy to run together because we often have them at once. When someone asks for the capital of France and you can confidently answer Paris, knowing the answer and knowing that you know it feel like one piece of self-awareness. Ordinarily the that rides on the what. Your confidence has something to rest on because you can produce the answer. Critias agrees that the temperate person would be able to “examine what he in fact knows and what he does not.” Socrates is asking how much of that promise the proposed power could deliver.
Psychology offers an everyday case where the two can come apart. A word is on the tip of your tongue, the name of an actor or a street, and you feel you know it. You can almost hear it, and maybe you can guess its first letter, yet the name still won’t come. In 1966 Roger Brown and David McNeill found that people in this state sometimes recovered details such as the number of syllables before retrieving the word. A feeling of knowing can give you a clue, and it can also mislead you. Either way, until the name comes, there’s a gap between what you feel you can answer and what you can say.
A case in the other direction is more surprising. In a 1974 report on blindsight, a patient who reported seeing nothing in part of his visual field could still reach toward some targets presented there with considerable accuracy. Here there’s something the person can do with the information, even though he doesn’t report seeing the target. Whether that ability counts as knowledge in Socrates’ sense is a further question. What the example gives us is a way of seeing how access to information and awareness of having it might come apart.
Applied to expertise, the difference is just as sharp. The confident way someone talks, the jargon he uses and the deference of his colleagues may suggest he knows something. They needn’t tell you what he knows in any detail, or where his knowledge runs out. A confident novice and a confident master can sound alike to someone outside the field. Job interviews can run up against this when a candidate sounds like an expert for an hour and turns out to be lost on the first day.
That’s why the distinction is so damaging to Critias. In the picture of life Socrates draws out of his proposal, we’d avoid acting where we don’t know, hand tasks to people who do and keep others from doing what they can’t do well. Every one of those decisions needs knowledge of the relevant subject. A temperance that could tell you there was knowledge somewhere in the room would be like a smoke detector that tells you there’s a fire somewhere in the city. You would still have to find out where.
In the Apology, Socrates puts his own limits to work by questioning particular people about particular subjects. The craftsmen really know things he doesn’t. His objection is that doing their own work well makes them think they’re wise about other important matters. He learns where a claim runs out by asking what the person can answer for. In that inquiry the that has something to go on, because he’s paying attention to the what.
My verdict is that knowing that you know and knowing what you know deserve to be treated as two achievements, however often we bundle them together under self-knowledge. If Critias’ proposed power can give only the first, it leaves us in something like the frustrating moment before a name comes to mind. The feeling can be a reason to keep looking. The work of finding the answer still belongs to whoever can tell us about the thing itself.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article argue that Critias’ account of temperance cannot reliably guide the division of tasks?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If a person can reliably perform a task but cannot explain what information guides the performance, in what sense—if any—should that person be said to know?→
- What kinds of evidence should outweigh confidence, jargon, or reputation when we try to determine the boundaries of someone’s expertise?→
- If recognizing that you may know something only gives you a reason to keep searching, what additional steps are needed to turn that self-awareness into knowledge of the subject itself?→