Philosophy

Is the Quietest Pupil the Best?

A pupil blurts out a question and catches the teacher’s mistake. Socrates’ reply to Charmides helps explain why good judgment sometimes breaks the quiet.

Charmides takes quietness for temperance. A classroom mistake, an experiment on wait time, and a passage in the Phaedrus help test that idea.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Charmides’ first definitionCharmides says temperance is doing things quietly and in an orderly way.
  • Socrates’ counterexamplesQuickness can be admirable in writing, playing the lyre, and understanding an argument. Quietness alone can’t explain what makes those actions good.
  • Two classroom silencesA pause can give students time to think. In the imagined classroom, silence also lets the teacher’s mistake stand.
  • Knowing when to speakThe Phaedrus makes timing part of the craft of speech. The pupil who spots an error gives us a reason to value that judgment.

Charmides 159b–c, 159d–160b, 160b–d · Phaedrus 272a · Philip W. Jackson The Daily Grind · Mary Budd Rowe Wait-Time study · Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.7.1

Imagine a classroom where the teacher’s praise goes to the quiet pupils. They sit still, raise their hands, wait to be called on and never interrupt, and the report cards reflect it. One day, in the middle of a lesson, a restless student blurts out a question that breaks the rules, and the question reveals that the teacher has made a serious error on the board, one the quiet pupils had copied down without a murmur. The case for discussion is which of these students was behaving well. The scene isn’t far-fetched, since teachers make mistakes on the board all the time, and the students who catch them are not always the ones the teacher would have picked.

Charmides’ first definition of temperance would side with the quiet ones. Asked what temperance is, he says it is doing everything “in an orderly way and quietly,” walking in the streets and talking and doing everything else in the same manner, and he sums up, “I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness.” The word he uses describes the bearing of a well-brought-up Athenian boy, calm and sedate, and it is very much the virtue a classroom of the time would have praised. Socrates even remarks that “People do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate,” so the boy is offering a common opinion, not an eccentric one.

Socrates refutes the definition with examples drawn from Charmides’ own schooling. At the writing master’s, copying letters quickly is finer than copying them quietly, and the same goes for reading, playing the lyre and wrestling. Then he moves to the mind, and asks whether learning easily isn’t finer than learning with difficulty, and whether teaching, remembering and understanding aren’t finer when done quickly and vigorously. Charmides agrees each time, and Socrates concludes that quietness can’t be temperance, since temperance is always fine and quietness often isn’t. He carries the point into “the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation,” where the quick and sharp are praised over those who find things out with difficulty, so the refutation reaches the very activities a classroom exists for. Readers have long noticed that Socrates slides from quiet to slow, which Charmides never said, and the objection is fair, but the classroom case doesn’t depend on that slide.

The case for the quiet pupils deserves its full weight. A classroom where everyone interrupts can’t function, and learning needs order, attention and a willingness to let others speak. The education researcher Philip Jackson, who studied what he called the hidden curriculum of schools, pointed out that children spend much of their time learning to wait, to take turns and to tolerate delay, and those habits make shared learning possible. Calm and order are real goods, and a student who has them is not to be dismissed. Jackson also noticed that the students who thrive in this hidden curriculum are often those who learn to look attentive, which is not quite the same as attending.

But the case also shows what quietness can’t do, since the quiet pupils copied the mistake, and their silence, however well-mannered, was a failure of judgment, since they either didn’t notice the error or noticed it and said nothing. The disruptive student did what the lesson actually needed, and if the classroom’s system of praise punishes him for it, the system is rewarding compliance rather than understanding. Jackson’s point cuts both ways, since a hidden curriculum of waiting and complying can teach children that keeping quiet matters more than being right. A system that praises only stillness also loses information, since the questions that would have revealed confusion are never asked.

The part of quietness that survives is calm attention, the pause in which thinking happens. In Mary Budd Rowe’s classroom research, teachers typically waited about a second after a question. When the wait increased to three to five seconds, students gave longer answers, among other changes. A few seconds of quiet can make room for a student’s thought. The silence of someone who has stopped thinking, or who has decided that speaking up isn’t his place, has a different effect.

The Phaedrus has a phrase that captures the difference. The true master of speech, Socrates says there, knows when to speak and when to keep silent, which makes the right use of silence a matter of judgment rather than a fixed rule of behavior. On that view temperance can’t be quietness, but it might include knowing when quiet is called for and when it isn’t, which is a much more demanding thing to teach than sitting still. Charmides himself, as Xenophon later describes him, became a capable man too shy to speak in public, which suggests that quiet carried too far has costs outside the classroom too.

My verdict is that the quietest pupil is not necessarily the best behaved, and that Socrates’ refutation of Charmides’ first definition shows why. Quietness survives as calm, orderly attention and as the pause that lets thought happen, both genuine goods in a classroom. It fails as a measure of virtue, because it can just as easily be the silence of compliance, and a teacher who praises quiet for its own sake will sometimes be praising the students who copied the mistake while scolding the one who caught it.

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Why does Socrates conclude that quietness cannot itself be temperance?

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