Philosophy

Is Socrates on Trial Here Too?

Socrates tells the jury that he tested people who thought they were wise. The Charmides asks whether such a test could work without knowledge of the thing a person claims to know.

Critias’ definition sounds like Socrates’ account of his own questioning. The test of the doctor shows where the resemblance breaks down.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The definition sounds familiarCritias agrees that a temperate person can examine what others know and what they only think they know. Socrates describes testing claims to wisdom in the Apology.
  • The doctor tests the claimThe dialogue asks whether a general ability to recognize knowledge can identify a genuine doctor. Judging medicine itself requires knowing what is healthy or diseased.
  • The craftsmen really know thingsSocrates grants that the craftsmen know their trades. His criticism concerns their assumption that this makes them wise about more important matters too.
  • Ignorance still poses a puzzleThe final review asks how someone can know what he does not know at all. The two dialogues leave open how Socrates’ awareness of his limits works.

Read the proposal at 167a and then read the Apology, and the resemblance is hard to ignore. Socrates asks whether the temperate person will be able to “inspect others, to see what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not.” Critias agrees. In the Apology, Socrates describes questioning politicians, poets, and craftsmen to find out who was wise. Could his own practice survive the test he applies to Critias’ definition?

The case that the Charmides undermines Socratic practice is serious. The doctor argument shows that a knowledge of knowledge alone could tell only that someone knows, never what he knows, and so couldn’t distinguish a real expert from a pretender in any field where the examiner wasn’t himself an expert. Socrates in the Apology examined poets about poetry and craftsmen about their crafts without being a poet or a craftsman, and if the Charmides is right, it’s hard to see how he could have judged their wisdom at all. He had no special training in any of those fields, so whatever let him judge them, it wasn’t a matching expertise.

The case that the dialogue distinguishes the two is stronger, though, and it starts with what Socrates actually claimed. He never said he had a science of knowing that let him certify experts. He called his wisdom merely human wisdom, and he concluded from the oracle that it was worth little or nothing. His famous claim isn’t the slogan often attributed to him, that he knew he knew nothing, but something more modest, that he didn’t think he knew what he didn’t know, which is a statement about his own beliefs, not a theory of knowledge. He even says the god used him as an example, as if to declare that the wisest human being is the one who recognizes, as Socrates does, that his wisdom is worth nothing.

The craftsmen give us a way to see the difference. Socrates says they really did know many fine things in their trades. He criticizes them for assuming that the same competence made them wise about the greatest matters too. The Charmides shows how hard it would be for him to certify their technical knowledge himself. Asking what entitles a person to claim wisdom beyond a trade is a different kind of examination.

The Charmides can be read as testing what happens when a practice like Socrates’ becomes a sweeping theory. Critias agrees to a kind of knowledge that could recognize knowledge everywhere, and the conversation imagines how much power such a faculty would confer. When the proposal fails the test of the doctor, there is still room for the more modest practice of asking people to give reasons for what they claim.

Still, the relationship isn’t fully settled, and some unease remains. The closing review says it is impossible to know “in some way or other, what one does not know at all,” and if that’s true, Socrates’ awareness of his own ignorance has to rest on some knowledge, of the questions at least, if not of the answers. The Charmides never says what that knowledge is or how it differs from the knowledge of knowledge it rejects, so a reader who wants a theory of Socratic wisdom won’t find one here. The Apology doesn’t explain how his awareness works either, it only reports its results, so the gap lies in the sources as well as in this dialogue.

That gap may well be deliberate, since a dialogue that refuted Socratic wisdom outright would sit oddly in Plato’s work, while one that offered a complete theory of it would contradict Socrates’ own refusal to claim any theory. By refuting the inflated version and leaving the modest one standing but unexplained, the Charmides does what Socrates does in his conversations, clearing away a bad answer without pretending to supply a good one.

My verdict is that the Charmides distinguishes Socrates’ practice from Critias’ theory more than it undermines it, while leaving their relationship partly unsettled. What it refutes is a master science of knowing that could certify every expert and govern a city, which Socrates never claimed. What it leaves standing is the modest human wisdom of the Apology, a person’s honest awareness of the limits of his own knowledge, tested in conversation, and the dialogue’s refusal to theorize that wisdom is, fittingly, one of the most Socratic things about it.

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According to the article, what is the key limitation exposed by the doctor argument?

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