Philosophy

Is Knowing the Good Just Another Craft?

Socrates says that the work of knowing good and bad is to benefit us. A cobbler can show us a shoe. What can this knowledge show for its work?

Treating knowledge of good and bad like a craft gives it a purpose and raises the question of whether benefit is anything like a craft’s product.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Each knowledge gets a jobMedicine makes people healthy, and cobbling makes shoes. Socrates gives knowledge of good and bad the work of benefiting us.
  • A skill we might learnJulia Annas uses practical skill to explain how people can learn to exercise a virtue with increasing understanding and judgment.
  • What does the royal art produce?In the Euthydemus, Socrates can’t say what citizens trained by the royal art will be good at. The question of its product sends the inquiry in a circle.
  • Acting well and making thingsAristotle distinguishes practical wisdom from the skill of making an object. Good action can be an end in itself.

Charmides 156e–157b, 174b–d, 174d–175a · Euthydemus 291b–d, 292a–e · Julia Annas Virtue, Skill and Vice · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 (1140a–b), 6.5 (1140b)

As soon as Critias names the knowledge of good and bad, Socrates treats it the way the dialogue has treated every other expertise, by assigning it a work of its own. “But this, it seems, is not temperance,” he says, “but the knowledge whose work is to benefit us,” and a moment later he speaks of temperance as failing to be “the craftsman of health” or of benefit, since “we just now assigned this work in turn to another craft.” Medicine produces health, cobbling produces shoes, and the knowledge of good and bad produces benefit, so the model is neat. The question for discussion is whether the neatness is real insight or a way of postponing the difficulty. The language of craft has run through the whole dialogue, from the Thracian doctor at the start to the cobblers and pilots near the end, so Socrates is applying the dialogue’s usual tool to its final candidate.

The case for the model is strong, and it shouldn’t be brushed aside. It tells us what kind of knowledge we’re looking for, a knowledge with a target, as definite in its aim as medicine is in aiming at health, and it separates that knowledge sharply from Critias’ knowledge of knowledge, whose target was knowledge itself. It also fits the dialogue’s medical frame, since the Thracian doctor treated the soul with charms the way a doctor treats a body with drugs, and it explains why the other crafts need this one, since each produces its own result and only this one asks whether the result is good for the person.

Julia Annas argues that acquiring a virtue can resemble learning a practical skill. Both take practice and guidance, and a learner has to understand what she’s doing well enough to improve and eventually act for herself. The analogy helps explain why learning a virtue can take time. It also makes room for giving reasons for what we do, something Socrates wants from his companions throughout this conversation.

The case against starts with the product, since health is a condition you can check and shoes are objects you can hold, but benefit isn’t a thing produced alongside them, it’s a relation between those things and a person’s life. The knowledge of good and bad doesn’t make anything new, it judges whether the products of other crafts serve the person who has them, so calling it a craft with its own product risks treating a judgment as if it were a manufacturing process.

Plato himself shows where this leads in the Euthydemus. Socrates tells Crito how he and young Clinias came to consider the kingly art. In retelling the inquiry, he asks Crito what that art produces. If it makes citizens good, the next question is good at what, and the only answer seems to be at making others good, who will then be good at making others good, and Socrates admits they have gone round in a circle, as if hunting larks and having the bird always slip away just as they reached for it. The craft model, pressed for a product, sends the inquiry spinning.

Aristotle distinguishes practical wisdom from craft. Making has an end beyond itself, such as a house or a shoe. In action, doing well can be the end itself. Aristotle makes the distinction vivid with a comparison. A deliberate mistake can display more skill in a craft than an accidental one. In practical wisdom, choosing badly on purpose makes the error worse. The quality of the person’s choice belongs to what the wisdom is for.

So does the craft model clarify ethical understanding or postpone the question of how it works? It does some of both, and the dialogue seems aware of it. The model clarifies where the needed knowledge sits, above and alongside the crafts as the knowledge that judges what they’re for, and it explains why Critias’ knowledge of knowledge can’t be it. But it says nothing about how this unusual expertise reaches its verdicts, what it would study, or how anyone could tell who has it, and the conversation leaves those questions open when it turns back to temperance.

My verdict is that treating the knowledge of good and bad as a craft is a genuine clarification and a genuine postponement at the same time. It correctly identifies the kind of knowledge benefit requires, one with the good of the whole person as its target, and it shows why the crafts can’t supply that knowledge for themselves. But by giving it a product, benefit, on the model of health and shoes, it hides the fact that this knowledge works differently from any craft, and the Euthydemus, with its circle of good men making good men, shows how quickly the model can leave the speakers going in a circle.

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