Renaissance
How Should Criticism Weigh Winckelmann’s Conversion?
Conversion helped open the way to Rome. Pater asks what that opportunity cost Winckelmann and what a critic can say about his motives.
The Renaissance (1893)Pater considers belief, ambition and the appeal of Roman art before offering a qualified pardon. Reading the alternatives separately keeps the work and the decision both in view.
Orientation
At a Glance
- An opportunity becomes availableArchinto encouraged Winckelmann to convert, and ecclesiastical connections later helped make study in Rome possible.
- Goethe sees a pagan temperamentGoethe understands the move as an outward change for a man whose deepest loyalties already lay with antiquity.
- Pater considers a costThe ceremony and art of Rome may have attracted Winckelmann, but Pater also asks what an outward profession could cost his sincerity.
- Achievement leaves a question openThe value of Winckelmann’s work can be judged without deciding how fully any single motive explains his conversion.
The Renaissance · Winckelmann, the conversion and the prospect of Roman patronage · Note 286, the patron as a Maecenas · Note 287, conversion, sincerity and patronage · Winckelmann, Goethe’s reading and Pater’s possible absolution · Winckelmann, the pension and departure for Rome · Goethe, Winckelmann, the account of conversion · Winckelmann Museum, the change of faith and funding for Rome · Vatican Museums, Winckelmann’s chronology · Library of Congress, Saxony under the Catholic dynasty
Pater tells the whole story without softening any of it. The Saxon court had become Catholic, “and the way to favour at Dresden was through Roman ecclesiastics.” Winckelmann had once “thought of begging his way to Rome, from cloister to cloister, under the pretence of a disposition to change his faith.” In 1751 the papal nuncio Archinto visited Nöthnitz, suggested Rome and “held out the hope of a place in the pope’s library,” and Cardinal Passionei was ready “to play the part of Mæcenas, if the indispensable change were made.” Then the blunt sentence, “Winckelmann accepted the bribe,” and he joined the Roman Church “Unquiet still at the word ’profession,’ not without a struggle,” in the summer of 1754.
The political advantages of conversion had a visible precedent in Saxony. The Saxon ruling house had turned Catholic in 1697 when Augustus the Strong converted to win the crown of Poland, and under the dynasty that followed, the court’s religion could affect access to patronage. What made Winckelmann’s case uncomfortable was the scale, since this wasn’t a king buying a throne but a poor scholar buying access to libraries and statues, and a conversion for books looks both more innocent and more cynical than a conversion for power. The church was getting something too, since a learned convert from Protestant country was a small prize for the nuncio, and the bargain looked good from both sides of the table.
Pater then offers three readings, and they need to be kept apart. The first is Goethe’s, that Winckelmann “was a pagan, that the landmarks of Christendom meant nothing to him,” so the change of church was a change of costume, and Pater gives several reasons Goethe’s reading might seem plausible. Winckelmann “intended to deceive no one by his disguise,” he “entered Rome notoriously with the works of Voltaire in his possession,” and “the thought of what Count Bünau might be thinking of him seems to have been his greatest difficulty,” which gives Pater one reason to consider the weight of his obligations to Bünau. Goethe’s argument amounts to saying that a man so wholly pagan in temperament could change his outward church as lightly as a traveler changes his coat.
The second reading Pater offers is noticeably more generous. Winckelmann “may have had a sense of a certain antique and as it were pagan grandeur in the Roman Catholic religion,” and turning “from the crabbed Protestantism, which had been the ennui of his youth, he might reflect that while Rome had reconciled itself to the Renaissance, the Protestant principle in art had cut off Germany from the supreme tradition of beauty.” On this reading an aesthetic attraction could have played a part, a move toward a church that still housed ancient statues in its palaces and spoke the language of ceremony.
The third reading treats the conversion as a cost to Winckelmann himself. “And yet to that transparent nature, with its simplicity as of the earlier world, the loss of absolute sincerity must have been a real loss.” Pater notes that “Goethe understands that Winckelmann had made this sacrifice,” and that phrase matters, because it treats the conversion neither as nothing nor as a crime but as a price paid out of the person’s own integrity. Notice the grammar in all three readings, “may have had,” “might reflect,” “must have been,” which is the language of a critic who knows he can’t see inside another man’s motives.
Then Pater reaches his verdict, and here the alternatives blur. “Yet at the bar of the highest criticism, perhaps, Winckelmann may be absolved,” because “The insincerity of his religious profession was only one incident of a culture in which the moral instinct, like the religious or political, was merged in the artistic.” He adds that the higher life often requires “the renunciation of a crown reserved for others,” and he closes with “Savonarola is one type of success; Winckelmann is another; criticism can reject neither, because each is true to itself.” That’s an absolution in the name of art, and it’s the most debatable move in the passage. The word “merged” does a great deal of work, since it implies that in Winckelmann there was no separate moral self left over to be insincere.
The trouble is that Pater mixes three separate questions. The conversion and the patronage are documented, and there is evidence that Archinto connected the two. The motives are harder to settle. Goethe’s pagan and Pater’s admirer of Roman grandeur are readings of a decision that could have had several causes. The achievement, the History of Ancient Art and the new way of seeing it opened, stands on its own merits. Absolving the insincerity because of the achievement lets the third question answer the first, which turns art into an alibi, and a reader who admires Winckelmann’s work can still decline to call his conversion clean. It’s the same confusion we fall into when a great artist behaves badly and we’re tempted to excuse the behavior because of the songs or the films, as if the work could settle a question about the life.
My verdict is that criticism should weigh the conversion by keeping its alternatives distinct, taking account of the opportunity it opened, holding the motive open as Pater’s own cautious grammar does, and valuing the achievement without using it to settle the moral question. Pater’s absolution is generous and characteristic, and his comparison with Savonarola rightly insists that very different lives can each be true to themselves. But the honest critic, like Goethe in Pater’s account, can recognize that Winckelmann faced a choice about sincerity, value the work that followed and still leave his convictions open, since that’s the one ledger no biographer can read.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What central mistake does the article identify in Pater’s absolution of Winckelmann?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When motives cannot be known with certainty, what standards should a critic use to judge a historically documented but morally ambiguous choice?→
- Does Pater’s claim that Winckelmann’s moral instinct was “merged in the artistic” explain his insincerity, excuse it, or merely rename the problem? Why?→
- How can readers value the work that followed Winckelmann’s conversion without allowing that achievement to determine their judgment of the conversion itself?→