Renaissance
How Long Is the Moment Pater Wants Us to Catch?
Pater’s analysis reduces experience to an instant that has already gone. A line of a psalm and a bar of music make room for a present we can actually attend to.
The Renaissance (1893)Aristotle’s boundary, Augustine’s memory and William James’s felt duration give three meanings to the word “now.” Pater’s call to attention makes most sense with a present that has some breadth.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Analysis gives us an instantThe argument divides impressions along with time until the present seems too small for attention to hold.
- Augustine describes the trace of what has passedSomeone reciting a psalm carries the words just said in memory and the words about to be said in expectation.
- James gives the present some breadthThe notes of a musical phrase can be experienced together even though they arrive one after another.
- Pater’s advice needs a moment we can inhabitIf the present has enough duration to notice a phrase, people can learn to notice more within it.
The Renaissance · 1893 Conclusion, the moment already gone and its trace · 1893 Conclusion, being present at the focus · 1873 Conclusion, what analysis “tells us” · Aristotle, Physics IV.11, the now as a boundary · Aristotle, Physics VI.9, Zeno’s flying arrow · Augustine, Confessions XI.28, reciting a psalm · William James, Principles of Psychology, the perception of time
Try it right now and notice this exact moment, and by the time the word “now” has formed in your head it’s already gone, replaced by your noticing. Pater turns that little experience into a formal argument, and it runs like a proof. “Analysis goes a step further still, and assures us that those impressions of the individual mind to which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual flight; that each of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is.” Impressions happen in time, time can be cut forever, so impressions can too, and what’s left is an instant.
If that’s right, the essay has a problem, because its next pages tell you to be “present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy.” You can’t stand at a focus that has already vanished. So it’s worth asking what attention actually meets, and there are three serious candidates. It might meet a limiting point, a knife-edge with no width, or only a trace of what has just passed, or an extended moment with a little breadth of its own, and Pater’s account gives us a way to consider each.
The limiting point is the mathematician’s present, and it’s where the infinite-divisibility argument naturally lands. Aristotle already treated the “now” as a boundary of time rather than a piece of it, the way a point marks the end of a line without being a bit of line, and he reports Zeno’s claim that a flying arrow must be still at every instant. Aristotle rejects the assumption that time is made up of such instants. If the present is a point, then nothing can happen in it and nothing can be perceived in it, so attention gets nothing at all. It’s the present of a stopwatch that could be read to infinite decimal places, useful for physics and useless for living, and that’s exactly why Pater says the moment has more truly “ceased to be” than that it “is.”
The trace comes in the second half of the passage, where what’s real fines itself down “to a single sharp impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by.” The impression carries its own recent past inside it, a relic of what has just slipped away. Augustine had worked this out in the eleventh book of the Confessions, where the present has no length and the past, present and future meet in the mind as memory, attention and expectation, and his example is reciting a psalm, where expectation shrinks and memory grows as he goes through the verses. On this view attention always arrives a little late, and what it holds is a fresh trace.
The extended moment is the psychologist’s present. In 1890 William James took up E. R. Clay’s term “specious present” and described it vividly, saying that “the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time.” Clay’s own example is music, since “All the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the present.” You don’t hear a melody as a row of points, you hear a phrase, and Pater’s “tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream” describes exactly that kind of short, shaped duration.
The choice among these three matters enormously for Pater’s ethic. If the present is a knife-edge, eager observation is impossible, and Pater’s exhortations are commands to balance on a geometrical point. If it’s only a trace, observation is always memory, and the famous call to burn turns into nostalgia, the art of savoring what just left. But if the present has a little breadth, observation is not only possible but trainable, since a musician really does hear more in a single bar than a beginner, holding more notes together in the same felt now, just as a sommelier’s first sip lasts no longer than a tourist’s and holds a great deal more, and Pater’s word “focus” suggests the way a number of things can gather in the same experience.
The infinite-divisibility argument, I think, mixes up two kinds of time, the measured time of the mathematician’s line and the lived time of the listener’s bar. Analysis is right that you can always cut finer, and wrong that experience is built out of the cuts, the way a song can be sliced into microseconds without being made of microseconds, and no listener has ever heard a single microsecond on its own. Pater’s revision gives the claim a more confident ring. In 1873 analysis “tells us” these things, while in 1893 it “assures us” of them.
The present survives the attempt to apprehend it as a short, thick moment that carries its own recent past, the trace and the breadth working together, and the limiting point is a product of analysis rather than of experience. Pater’s own sentence says as much in its second half, where the vanishing instant turns into a “single sharp impression” holding a relic of the moments behind it. On this reading, Pater’s call to eager observation depends on the breadth of a lived moment, a place where attention can settle long enough to see something.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article regard a knife-edge present as a problem for Pater’s ethic of eager observation?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If attention always includes some trace of what has just passed, where—if anywhere—would you draw the boundary between perception and memory?→
- How does the experience of hearing a musical phrase support or challenge the claim that the lived present has breadth?→
- If observation can be trained to hold more within the same felt present, what might it mean in practice to become more fully present?→