Philosophy
How Do You Know What You Don’t Know?
Socrates calls it absurd to know, in any way at all, what one doesn’t know at all. The puzzle turns on how much you have to know before you can name a gap.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThere’s a difference between knowing a question is beyond you and having no idea the question exists. Socrates’ closing review puts pressure on a virtue that would reveal every gap at once.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A concession comes backAt 175c, Socrates recalls agreeing that a temperate person could know, of things he doesn’t know, that he doesn’t know them. He now asks how a person could know anything about a subject wholly unknown to him.
- Two kinds of ignoranceA student can recognize an equation and know that he can’t solve it. Someone who has never encountered that sort of equation has a gap he has no way to name.
- That you know and what you knowEarlier, Socrates says knowledge of knowledge would tell you that you know something. To identify what you know or where a particular gap lies, you have to get the subject itself into view.
- How far a craft reachesIn the Apology, Socrates grants that artisans know things he doesn’t. Their mistake, as he describes it, is to take their skill as evidence of wisdom about other important matters.
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates looks back at all the concessions they made along the way, and one strikes him as especially strange. They agreed, he says, that the temperate man “might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it,” and they agreed to this “without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all.” He calls it about the most absurd thing imaginable. It’s a striking thing for Socrates, of all people, to say. So much of his reputation rests on the idea that he knows he doesn’t know.
The puzzle is that knowing you don’t know something seems to require knowing something about it. To know you can’t carry on a conversation in Mandarin, you have to know at least what language someone is asking about and what it would mean to converse in it. Someone who has never heard of a branch of physics might readily admit that there are subjects in physics he doesn’t know. To name that particular gap, though, he has to know that the subject is there. The edge of what you know is the only place from which you can see a gap that has a shape.
That gives us two conditions that both get called ignorance. There’s awareness of a missing answer, where you know the question, perhaps know what an answer would look like, and know that you don’t have it. A student looking at an equation he can’t solve knows which problem he has. Then there’s the case where the subject isn’t even on your horizon. You can be sure the horizon has something beyond it and still have no idea what to look for there.
The closing review suggests that Critias’ temperance blurred these together. Critias had agreed that a temperate person could examine what he knows and what he doesn’t know. Socrates now asks what would be involved in taking that claim all the way. If this knowledge had to identify each thing its owner didn’t know, it would have to bring into view subjects of which he had never heard. That would require the very thing Socrates calls impossible, knowing in some way what one doesn’t know at all. It’s a difficulty for the promise of a complete inventory of one’s ignorance.
Earlier in the argument, Socrates had said that knowledge of knowledge would tell you only that you know or don’t know. The closing review gives us a way to see why that distinction matters. Saying that there are things I don’t know is easy enough. Saying exactly where my ignorance lies puts a particular subject in view, and that already involves some understanding of it. Even the little bit of knowledge it takes to recognize a question has to come from somewhere.
That sheds light on what Socratic ignorance might contain. In the Apology, Socrates describes questioning a public man who takes himself to be wise. He concludes that neither of them knows anything fine and good, and that he has a small advantage because he doesn’t think he knows what he doesn’t. His inquiry has given him enough acquaintance with the questions to notice when a confident answer doesn’t hold up. He can recognize that he still has a question after someone has offered him an answer.
The craftsmen Socrates questions present a slightly different case. In his account, they know their own trades well, and he calls them wiser than himself in that respect. Their mistake is to take that hard-won understanding as evidence that they are wise about other important matters. What separates Socrates from them on his telling is a willingness to ask where an understanding stops. You can know a great deal about your own work and still have an imperfect idea of where your expertise ends.
My verdict is that naming your ignorance already says something about the subject. You can know that you lack an answer only once you can put the question to yourself. Socrates’ closing review puts pressure on the promise of a knowledge that would survey all one’s ignorance at once. The Apology suggests an accomplishment within our reach. You can get to know a question well enough to see how far your answer falls short.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article reject the possibility of a complete inventory of one’s ignorance?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- How does the distinction between recognizing a missing answer and being unaware of an entire subject change what it means to say, “I know that I don’t know”?→
- When does expertise in one area justify confidence in another area, and how might someone responsibly identify the limits of that transfer?→
- If naming a gap in your knowledge already requires some understanding, what practices could help bring previously unseen gaps into view?→