Philosophy
Granting a Point to Keep Going
Socrates sets aside the question of whether knowledge can know itself. He wants to see what would follow if it could.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCritias’s account gets two generous concessions. Tracking what Socrates grants, and when he grants it, changes what the rest of the argument can show.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The first concessionWhen the inquiry stalls, Socrates provisionally grants that knowledge of knowledge is possible.
- The second concessionSocrates later grants that this knowledge could tell people what they know and what they don’t, so he can test its proposed benefit.
- What expertise can secureSocrates imagines a society where people act with the right expertise and asks what would still be needed for them to live well.
- A question still openIn his final review, Socrates lists both concessions among the claims that the argument had yet to establish.
Critias has run out of clear answers. Socrates says he kept covering up his perplexity, and the inquiry seems about to stop where it is. Then Socrates offers him a way to continue. “Let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge,” he says, with a promise to look into the question again another time. This lets him ask what such knowledge could do. Would someone who had it actually know what they knew and what they didn’t? The second question has somewhere to go while the first is still open.
The words “for now” do more work than they might seem to. Think of a chess player looking ahead. Suppose I move the knight here. What could you do in reply? She can follow the line as far as it’s useful without making that move on the board. When she goes back to the position she started from, she still has the other moves to consider. Socrates is doing something like that with Critias. He makes the temporary assumption explicit, then follows it far enough to see what happens.
The first result is modest. By Socrates’s account, knowledge that deals with knowledge in general can distinguish a case of knowing from a case of ignorance. Medicine deals with health, and statesmanship deals with justice. To tell whether a particular judgment is sound in one of those fields, someone needs to understand what the judgment is about. Granting that knowledge can know itself gets Critias a long way towards the thing he wanted to define, but the conversation has still to show how it could tell someone what they actually know.
Then Socrates grants that second ability too. At 172c–d, he offers to let the proposed kind of knowledge tell a person what they know and what they don’t, and asks whether having it would benefit us. The concession is easy to miss because the conversation has just spent time finding a difficulty with the very thing he’s now willing to allow. But it lets them consider a larger promise of the definition. Would being able to tell who knows what make a household or a city go well?
Socrates imagines temperance on guard, keeping people who lack expertise from doing the work of those who have it. He grants that people would live and act knowledgeably under those conditions. Happiness remains to be accounted for. After asking which expertise would make the difference, he and Critias settle on knowledge of good and bad. The imagined arrangement can put a skilled person in every place where a skill is needed. Socrates still asks what will make the exercise of those skills beneficial. The concessions have helped bring that question into view.
At the end, Socrates remembers how much they gave the proposal. They conceded that knowledge of knowledge exists even though they had yet to establish it. Then they conceded that it could know the works of other kinds of knowledge, a further claim their argument had yet to support. Those two entries in the final review make it possible to read the intervening discussion more carefully. Its conclusions tell us something about the account they tried out under those generous terms. The existence of the proposed knowledge is still an open question in their inquiry.
There’s a practical reason to be as clear as Socrates is about what was granted. In a meeting, someone might suggest proceeding on the assumption that a supplier will deliver by Friday. That lets everyone work out whether they can finish the job on Monday. If the calculation works, they still have to check the delivery date. If it fails, they already know the Monday deadline is in trouble even under the assumption they wanted to make. What matters is being able to hear the word if when the result is read back.
When Socrates says they can look into possibility another time, he never tells us when that will be. The dialogue ends with the question still owing an answer. Yet granting the point has helped them learn something worth keeping. Even with an examiner who can identify who knows what, they still need an account of how knowledge makes a life go well. They might have missed that difficulty if the conversation had ended when Critias ran out of answers. The words “for now” gave them a way to reach it and a way to remember how they got there.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does Socrates provisionally accept the possibility of “knowledge of knowledge” instead of first proving that it exists?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does making a provisional assumption deepen an inquiry, and when might it instead conceal a weakness in the argument?→
- Why might the ability to identify who possesses expertise still be insufficient for judging whether that expertise is being used well?→
- How should conclusions reached under generous assumptions be preserved without being mistaken for conclusions that have been fully established?→