Philosophy

Good, Though Undefined

Socrates can’t say what temperance is, and he still thinks it’s a great good. What kind of confidence can survive a failed definition?

The dialogue starts from the idea that temperance is admirable. At the end, Socrates still holds to its value and has to account for what the inquiry failed to establish.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A belief survives the inquirySocrates says temperance is a great good while acknowledging that he and Critias haven’t discovered what it is.
  • The hunch sets a testSocrates asks whether Critias’s proposed knowledge would benefit anyone before accepting it as an account of temperance.
  • Knowing and thinkingMoore says he knows he has two hands. Socrates describes his confidence in temperance’s value as something he thinks and still has reason to examine.
  • Charmides sees the difficultyCharmides asks how he could know whether he has temperance when Socrates and Critias can’t say what it is.

Charmides 159c, 169b–c, 175a–b, 175b–176a, 176a–b · Meno 71b · Republic 505e · Phaedo 85c, 85d · G. E. Moore, Proof of an External World excerpt, p. 1

“For I do think that temperance is a great good,” Socrates says near the end of the dialogue. He has just admitted that he and Critias couldn’t discover what temperance is. Set that beside a question he asks in the Meno. If he doesn’t know what virtue is, how could he know what sort of thing it is, including whether it can be taught? Now the question turns back on him. If Socrates can’t give an account of temperance, what allows him to speak so confidently about its value?

He gives us a clue earlier, when Critias asks him to consider a knowledge that can know itself. Socrates says he has “a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good.” The hunch sets a test for the definition. Even if the proposed knowledge can exist, he wants to see whether it could help us. A similar order appears in the Republic. Socrates says every soul pursues the good and has some intuition of its reality, while struggling to grasp what it is. In both cases the sense that something matters gives a person a reason to look before they have a settled account of it.

The conviction also gives the speakers something to work with. When Charmides proposes quietness as a definition, Socrates gets him to agree that temperance is “one of the fine things.” Then they can ask whether quietness fits, by looking at activities in which quickness is admirable. By the end, Socrates and Critias have a different definition and can’t show what good it does. The earlier agreement makes it easier to see why that result is a problem for this definition. The people who started the inquiry wanted to find an admirable quality whose presence makes a difference.

G. E. Moore’s argument about the external world offers a useful comparison. He holds up his hands and takes himself to know that he has a hand in each place where he points. He uses those ordinary claims as premises in a proof about external objects. That gives us a way to think about which beliefs someone will keep when confronted with a difficult argument. Moore insists that he knows about the hands. Socrates uses the more tentative language of a belief about temperance, and he has specific doubts about the concessions that led the inquiry to its unwelcome result.

That difference is easy to hear in the closing speech. Socrates says he thinks temperance is a great good. He has also said that they haven’t found what the name belongs to, and he’s willing to say aloud which steps they allowed without sufficient support. His belief about temperance can explain why he wants another inquiry. Anyone who wants to rely on the belief has to reckon with the work that remains. In the Meno, the question concerns what he can claim to know about virtue. Here, we hear him state a conviction whose grounds he’s still trying to understand.

Simmias has a picture for the predicament in the Phaedo. When reliable knowledge proves hard to come by, he suggests taking the best human account available as a raft and making the voyage on it at some risk. He also says people should test the accounts they’re offered as thoroughly as they can. Socrates’s confidence about temperance has something of that character. It can guide the next question, and its adequacy remains open to examination. The raft is a way of traveling under those conditions. The danger stays in the picture.

A person can use that sort of reasoning to protect a prejudice, too. Someone could call a conviction a hunch and blame the argument each time it comes out badly. What helps in this case is that Socrates leaves the difficulty in view. He asks Charmides to see whether he has temperance. Charmides asks how he could know when even Socrates and Critias haven’t discovered what it is. He nevertheless says he’s willing to go on being charmed. The boy sees the difficulty for himself, and his question keeps it from disappearing under Socrates’s confidence.

Socrates’s belief that temperance is good has done real work. It gave him a reason to ask what the proposed definition would accomplish, and now it gives Charmides something to investigate. A reader may share the belief and still wonder which kind of conduct would justify it. The dialogue has brought that question closer by showing where a promising answer came apart. At the end, Charmides asks for more time with Socrates. He knows what he wants to examine and has heard why he can’t yet say what he’ll find.

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What role does Socrates’s hunch that temperance is good play in the inquiry?

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