Philosophy

Fast Fingers, Good Character?

A wrestler’s quick takedown raises a question about what counts as evidence of temperance.

To knock out “quietness,” Socrates points to handwriting, lyre playing and wrestling, where quick is clearly better than slow. But being good at a task and being a good person may not be measured the same way, and the examples quietly change what’s being judged.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Socrates’ examplesCharmides agrees that quickness can be admirable in activities such as writing, playing the lyre, and wrestling.
  • Skill and characterA good performance can show how well someone can do a task and still leave their self-command an open question.
  • The reason for actingAristotle says a virtuous action depends on what the person knows, what they choose, and the character they act from.
  • What makes skill usefulLater in the Charmides, Socrates and Critias ask how knowing good and bad could help people put their other knowledge to good use.

Charmides 154d–e, 159c–d, 159d–160b, 160b–d, 163a–c, 174b–d, 174d–e · Republic 333e–334b · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 · Xenophon, Hellenica 2.4.19

Socrates’ argument against quietness starts with a premise and a whole pile of examples. Temperance is “one of the fine things,” Charmides grants at once. Then the examples come thick and fast. There’s copying letters at the writing-master’s, reading, playing the lyre, wrestling, boxing, running and jumping, then learning, teaching, remembering and understanding. The boy agrees that quickness can be finer than quietness in these activities. Socrates takes that as a reason to doubt that temperance is quietness. The argument has the snap of a well-run drill, which is part of why it’s worth slowing down and checking what it proves.

Look closely at what the examples are actually measuring, because in the bodily cases “fine” praises the way a task is performed, the way we’d praise neat handwriting, a clean guitar solo or a perfect takedown. Those are excellences of activities. We can judge whether the letters are legible, the music lovely and the takedown clean without knowing much about the person doing it. Nobody watching a wrestling match asks whether the winner was temperate while he did it, because the match is scored on the takedown, and the person doing the takedown could be a model citizen or a total menace without the score changing at all.

Temperance, though, is supposed to be an excellence of character, and character gets judged in a different way. When we call a person temperate, we’re praising how he governs himself, his appetites and his choices. A man can be a superb wrestler and a glutton, or a clumsy writer and a model of self-control. The Greek word for “fine,” kalos, can apply to beautiful performances and admirable characters. The same word is at the heart of Chaerephon’s praise of Charmides’ physique at the start of the dialogue. That range helps the argument slide from one kind of praise to another.

Aristotle later drew this distinction about as sharply as anyone ever has. In a craft, he said, it’s enough that the product turns out well, since a good pot is a good pot whoever made it and in whatever mood, but for an action to count as virtuous, the person has to act knowingly, choose the action for its own sake, and act from a firm and settled character. By that standard Socrates’ bodily examples are measuring the wrong thing entirely, since the speed and polish of a performance can show a lot about skill while leaving the performer’s temperance an open question. You could fill a stadium with fast, graceful athletes and still have that question to ask.

Socrates deserves some credit here, because his examples move in the right direction as they go. After the body he turns to the mind, to learning easily, remembering quickly and being quick-witted, which he calls “a kind of sharpness of the soul,” and then to deliberation, where it’s not the person who “finds things out with difficulty” who gets praised but the one who does it most easily and quickly. Those examples bring us closer to how a person thinks, and they make a fair point. Temperance can’t simply mean doing things slowly, since even admirable activity of the mind, like teaching well, understanding what’s said or thinking clearly in a crisis, often calls for speed.

Even in the mental cases, though, the subject is still quietly changing underneath the argument. Quick learning and a good memory are signs of intelligence rather than temperance, so by this stage the argument is testing temperance against cleverness, which is yet another kind of excellence with its own way of being measured. A quick-witted person can be wildly intemperate. Think of Critias, quick enough to draw fine distinctions about words and later one of the Thirty who ruled Athens. And a slow learner can be a model of self-command. The examples still measure ability, while temperance is about how abilities get used, which is a question none of the quick-versus-slow comparisons ever touches.

Socrates makes a similar distinction with a joke in the Republic. He points out that the person best at guarding against a disease is also the person best at producing it without being noticed, and that the person good at guarding an army is also good at stealing a march on an enemy. If justice made someone an expert at guarding money, the just man would turn out to be a talented thief. The same skill can serve opposite ends. That’s precisely the gap between Socrates’ examples in the Charmides and the virtue they’re being used to test.

My verdict is that the examples change the subject, from excellence at activities to excellence of character, and that weakens the refutation as a strict argument. They still do useful work, though, because they show that temperance can’t be a tempo or a manner, and they push the search toward whatever governs how our skills and smarts get used. That’s exactly where the dialogue heads in its final pages, when Socrates and Critias single out knowledge of good and bad as what lets us use our other kinds of knowledge to our benefit. They still have to ask what that knowledge has to do with temperance. The boy who was asked to admire quick wrestlers turns out to be standing at the start of a much harder question.

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