Philosophy
Examining What You Can’t Define
Socrates tells Critias he doesn’t know what temperance is. His own test for doctors makes it worth asking what, exactly, he can judge.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA doctor needs medicine to test a diagnosis. Socrates can still ask whether an account of temperance holds together on the terms Critias has agreed to.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Socrates admits what he lacksAt 165b–c, Socrates says he investigates each proposal because he doesn’t know the answer. The admission makes his later demand for a medical examiner’s expertise sound awkward.
- What the doctor’s test requiresJudging whether a diagnosis is true or a treatment is right takes knowledge of health and disease. That test asks about the doctor’s actual work.
- What Critias has agreed toCritias agrees that temperance would tell us who knows what. He also agrees that recognizing a genuine doctor requires medicine. Socrates can follow the tension between those commitments.
- What a refutation leaves openWhen the commitments clash, the speakers have a reason to revise the proposal. The clash leaves open which premise to give up and what temperance really is.
Charmides 165b, 165c, 166c–d, 166d–167a, 170d–e, 170e–171c, 171c, 175b–e · Meno 80d–e, 81d · Gregory Vlastos The Socratic Elenchus
There’s an apparent problem at the center of the dialogue’s method. Socrates tells Critias that he inquires “because I myself do not know,” and he never offers his own definition of temperance, yet he tests and rejects one definition after another. Meanwhile, his own argument about the doctor concludes that only someone with medical knowledge can examine a doctor, so by parity of reasoning it seems only someone who knows what temperance is could examine accounts of it, and Socrates says he doesn’t. It looks as though he has argued himself out of a job.
Plato states a related puzzle in the Meno. Meno asks how you can search for something when you don’t know what it is, since you won’t know what to look for and won’t recognize it if you find it. Socrates answers there by appealing to recollection. The Charmides poses a more immediate problem about the examiner. Can you test an answer before you have an answer of your own?
The doctor argument asks an examiner to judge whether a diagnosis is true or a treatment is right. That takes medicine. In his exchange with Critias, Socrates can ask a more limited question. Can this definition do what Critias says it does, given his other agreements? Even someone who lacks a definition of temperance can follow that line of reasoning. He needs to understand the claims under discussion and see what follows when he puts them together.
Gregory Vlastos made this gap between exposing an inconsistency and establishing a truth a central problem in his study of Socrates’ method. It’s the gap you meet when a company’s books fail to balance. An auditor can establish that the entries can’t all be right. Finding which entry to change takes more evidence. Vlastos asks how Socrates can sometimes claim a stronger result from his questioning. Here the narrower result already gives Critias a reason to look again at his definition.
You can trace the clash in the Charmides. Critias agrees that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and that it would let a person tell what others know. He also agrees that telling a real doctor from a fake requires knowledge of medicine, and that temperance by itself is concerned only with knowledge and ignorance. All three agreements can’t stand together. Socrates needs no definition of temperance to ask Critias which commitment he is prepared to give up.
So the doctor argument limits what Socrates can claim. If he were going to certify someone as an expert on temperance, he would need to know the subject well enough to judge that person’s answers on their merits. Critias’ proposal can be tested before anyone has settled that question. The distinction matters for Critias himself. We’ve learned where his account runs into trouble, and the conversation leaves his own possession of temperance an open question.
That limit helps explain the shape of the ending. Socrates says they granted several claims the argument hadn’t earned, including that a knowledge of knowledge exists and that it knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge. Even with those concessions, they can’t make their proposed account come out beneficial. The inquiry is like weeding a garden. There’s real work in clearing away what can’t stand, and more work to do before anything takes root.
My verdict is that Socrates can examine a virtue he can’t define because one thing worth examining is whether an account holds together. The medical test shows what it takes to pass judgment on a doctor’s work. Critias’ test shows what can happen earlier, when two people work through what they’ve agreed to and find a reason to think again. The Charmides ends with its readers better placed to look for an answer and with the question still open.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What distinction allows Socrates to examine Critias’ definition without already possessing his own definition of temperance?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If exposing an inconsistency does not show which belief should be abandoned, what intellectual value does Socratic examination still provide?→
- How does the distinction between testing an account for coherence and judging it on its merits change your view of Socrates’ claim that he does not know?→
- When Critias’ three commitments conflict, what considerations should guide the choice of which commitment to revise or reject?→