Philosophy
Doing Well, Two Ways
In the Charmides, a phrase can describe how we act or how life goes for us.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates pictures a city where everyone knows their job and gets it right. The dream leads him to ask whether that’s enough for a good life.
Orientation
At a Glance
- From expertise to happinessSocrates imagines temperance keeping error out of the city and says that those who do well must be happy.
- Two senses of doing wellThe phrase can describe how someone acts or how that person fares, a distinction English can preserve.
- A parallel in the GorgiasSocrates connects temperance, good action, and happiness in his argument with Callicles.
- The dream puts the claim to a testWhen Socrates asks what makes knowledgeable action beneficial, Critias singles out knowledge of good and bad.
Charmides 171d–172a, 172a–d, 172e–173c, 173d–174a, 174b–d · Gorgias 507c, first page, 507c, continued · Crito 48b · Apology 41d · Phaedo 117e–118a · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.4, 1095a17–22 · Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy I, prose 4
The argument comes in a single breathless sentence near the end of the long discussion of knowledge of knowledge. If temperance really let us know what we know and what we don’t, Socrates says, we would live without error. In a household or a city run that way, people would do finely and well in every action, “and those who do well must be happy.” The key phrase is eu prattein, to do well, and the whole inference passes through it, from error-free action to doing well and from doing well to happiness.
The Greek phrase can mean to act well, the way a craftsman does his job well, or to fare well, the way an old friend might say she’s doing. In the first half of Socrates’ sentence, the people without error act well. In the second half, doing well is enough for happiness. If it now means faring well, the same two words carry the argument across a gap. If doing the right thing is itself what makes a life go well, the phrase can keep its sense. It’s the kind of step that sails past in conversation and only looks odd when you write it down and stare at it.
English happens to have the same ambiguity, which is lucky for translators. “She did well on the exam” means she performed well, while “she’s doing well these days” means she’s thriving. A translation that keeps “do well” lets readers hear both possibilities. Splitting it into “act rightly” and “prosper” would settle the question for them before they had a chance to notice it.
Plato makes a similar move elsewhere. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that the temperate person is good, that the good person does well and beautifully in whatever he does, and that the person who does well is blessed and happy. In the Crito, he uses a different verb and asks whether living well amounts to living rightly. Aristotle says there’s wide agreement that living well and doing well are the same as being happy. He immediately adds that people disagree about what happiness consists in. The words were familiar enough. The question was what to make of them.
On one reading of Socrates, the two senses really do support each other. If virtue is the most important good, and a good person can’t be harmed in the ways that matter most, then acting well can be what it means for a life to go well. Socrates says in the Apology that no evil can come to a good man in life or after death. Heard that way, the double sense of eu prattein gives voice to a serious claim about what counts as a good life.
The obvious objection is that people who act well often fare badly. In prison, Boethius has to ask Lady Philosophy how his efforts to act justly could have led to his ruin. Socrates’ own death in Plato’s Phaedo puts the difficulty close to home. There’s room to say that neither man lost the good he cared most about, but that takes an argument about what matters. The phrase on its own can’t give us one.
What’s striking is that Socrates comes back to the inference himself. In what he calls his dream, he grants that a temperance which kept out ignorance would let the human race “act and live knowledgeably.” Whether that lets us “do well and be happy,” he tells Critias, is something they haven’t established. Critias proposes a particular kind of knowledge, the knowledge of good and bad. The question has changed from whether people can do their jobs correctly to whether they know which results are worth having.
My verdict is that the step from acting well to faring well needs an account of what makes a life good. The dialogue lets the sentence carry us along and then gives us a chance to ask where it has taken us. English is lucky to have “do well” with the same double edge. Keeping it lets readers hear both the attraction of the step and the place where Socrates himself stops to question it.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What is the central ambiguity in eu prattein on which the article focuses?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If acting well does not always lead someone to fare well, what further account of a good life would be needed to connect the two?→
- Does preserving the ambiguity of “do well” clarify Socrates’ argument by exposing its attraction, or risk making an unsupported inference sound more convincing? Why?→
- How should examples such as Boethius’ ruin and Socrates’ death affect the claim that virtue prevents a good person from being harmed in the ways that matter most?→