Renaissance

Can Criticism Give Us a New Sense?

Hegel says Winckelmann opened a new way of seeing art. Pater asks what a critic must be able to notice to do that.

Winckelmann’s dates could be corrected. Pater’s account of his attention to a hand, a line or a calm figure explains what might outlast a correction.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • What Hegel’s organ meansAn organ is a capacity to perceive something in art that the viewer once passed by.
  • Facts change the available questionsWinckelmann organized ancient art by style and period even though later discoveries required revisions.
  • An eye for differencesPater values the way Winckelmann could make an apparently small detail reveal a larger pattern.
  • Criticism can change the viewerGoethe’s remark about becoming something describes a change in attention that can outlast individual facts.

Pater opens the chapter by borrowing Hegel’s verdict on Winckelmann. “Winckelmann, by contemplation of the ideal works of the ancients, received a sort of inspiration, through which he opened a new sense for the study of art,” Hegel says in his lectures on aesthetics, and “He is to be regarded as one of those who, in the sphere of art, have known how to initiate a new organ for the human spirit.” Pater raises the stakes at once with a sweeping claim. “That it has given a new sense, that it has laid open a new organ, is the highest that can be said of any critical effort,” he says, and then he asks “what kind of man it was who thus laid open a new organ.”

An organ, in this old sense, is a capacity for taking something in, the way the eye is the organ of sight, so Hegel is claiming that after Winckelmann people could perceive something in ancient art they couldn’t perceive before. There are at least three things that could mean. A new sense might be new information, facts about dates, schools and myths that let you understand what you’re looking at. It might be new discrimination, the trained ability to tell apart details that used to blur together. Or it might be a new aptitude, a disposition that redirects your attention so that you look at different things in the first place.

The information view has a real case, and it deserves hearing. Winckelmann’s History of Ancient Art of 1764 made an influential attempt to arrange ancient art into a sequence of styles tied to times and societies, and that framework changed what scholars could say about any statue. Without information there’s nothing for perception to work on, and Pater admits as much when he notes that “Pompeii had just opened its treasures” and that Winckelmann “gathered its first-fruits.” The trouble is that much of the information was wrong, as Pater himself concedes. Winckelmann “had seen little or nothing of what we ascribe to the age of Pheidias,” knew Greek art mostly through Roman copies, and left results that “a more privileged criticism can correct.”

The discrimination view fits Pater’s own definition of criticism. In his Preface he says “the function of the æsthetic critic is to distinguish, to analyse, and separate from its adjuncts” the special virtue of a work, and Winckelmann was a master of that. Pater says he “catches the thread of a whole sequence of laws in some hollowing of the hand, or dividing of the hair,” noticing in a detail of carving the whole logic of a style. That’s what expertise looks like in any field, the way a birder learns to tell two nearly identical warblers apart, or a radiologist sees a shadow on a scan that the rest of us would miss.

Pater’s emphasis, though, falls on something underneath the discriminations. In Dresden, he says, Winckelmann shows “the native tendency” to “escape from abstract theory to intuition, to the exercise of sight and touch,” and “By a happy, unperplexed dexterity, Winckelmann solves the question in the concrete.” Later he says Winckelmann “apprehended the subtlest principles of the Hellenic manner, not through the understanding, but by instinct or touch,” and that the ancient world “seems to call out in Winckelmann new senses fitted to deal with it.” This is the aptitude view, a capacity rooted in temperament that changes where attention goes before any particular judgment is made. Winckelmann’s own most famous formula, from his first book of 1755, that the mark of Greek masterpieces is “edle Einfalt und stille Größe,” a noble simplicity and a quiet grandeur, works the same way, since it’s less a fact than an instruction about where to look, toward stillness rather than drama.

The best evidence for the aptitude view comes from Goethe, who said of Winckelmann, as Pater quotes him, “One learns nothing from him,” and then, “but one becomes something.” That’s an almost exact statement of the distinction, since nothing learned means no new information, and becoming something means a change in the person who looks. It’s the difference between memorizing a field guide and becoming the kind of walker who notices movement in a hedge and stops, which is an aptitude that keeps producing new discriminations long after the guide is out of date.

The decisive test is what survives when the information is corrected. Winckelmann’s dates have been revised, his favorite statues have been reattributed, and the wider access to fifth-century sculpture gave later scholars a basis for revising his account. Readers can still try the attention he taught, following the contour of a body and asking what makes it seem at rest within itself. If his new sense had been information it would have expired with his errors, and if it had been only a set of discriminations it would have stayed with the specialists, but Pater’s account of the critic suggests how a specialist’s way of attending can be shared by an ordinary reader.

My verdict is that a new sense, in Hegel’s and Pater’s meaning, is an aptitude that redirects attention, which shows itself in new discriminations and feeds on information without being reducible to either. Pater is right to rank it above everything else criticism can do, even above the analysis his own Preface describes, because an aptitude can be handed on and keeps working after its first owner’s facts have been corrected. Goethe’s line says it best, since you learn nothing from such a critic and become something, and becoming something is the only kind of gain that survives the critic’s mistakes.

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Why does the article treat the correction of Winckelmann’s factual errors as a decisive test of what his “new sense” was?

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