Philosophy

Can a Manager Help Without Making Anything?

Critias says temperance can help by directing the knowledge of good and bad. Think of a conductor who improves the music without playing an instrument.

Critias argues that the knowledge overseeing an activity can share in its benefit. Socrates’ reply depends on what the proposed supervisor is allowed to know.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Critias makes a case for supervisionTemperance might benefit us by overseeing the knowledge of good and bad, even if it does none of that knowledge’s work directly.
  • A conductor can make a differenceA conductor can help musicians play together without taking over their instruments. The Statesman likewise describes an expertise that directs other arts.
  • The restriction makes a differenceCritias has defined temperance as knowledge of knowledge and its lack alone. Socrates asks what such a supervisor can judge about health or benefit.
  • A more modest contribution survivesEarlier, Socrates suggests that awareness of knowledge might help someone learn and examine others. That possibility gives the dialogue room for indirect benefits.

Charmides 167b–c, 171c–d, 172b–c, 174d–175a · Statesman 305c–d

Socrates has just argued that the knowledge which benefits us is the knowledge of good and bad, not temperance, and Critias fights back with his last idea. “Why couldn’t it benefit us?” he asks. “For if temperance really is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of kinds of knowledge, and presides over the other kinds of knowledge too, then surely, since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us.” In other words, temperance doesn’t have to produce benefit itself, it only has to direct the knowledge that does, and the supervisor gets credit for the result.

That defense deserves its strongest hearing, because people can help bring about results they don’t produce themselves. A conductor can improve the way an orchestra plays without playing the oboe. A hospital administrator can arrange for an operating team to have everything it needs. Both contributions can be decisive. It seems worth asking why a knowledge presiding over the knowledge of good couldn’t help in a similar way.

The Statesman offers a version of Critias’ picture. Its Visitor says that the kingly art directs the arts that act and decides when important measures should be taken. The other arts carry them out. That kind of statecraft can contribute to a city’s success without taking the place of its generals, judges, or speakers. It gives us a way to imagine a supervisor whose judgment makes a difference.

So it pays to look carefully at what Socrates actually replies, which comes in three questions. “Would it also make us healthy,” he asks, “and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work?” Those first two questions deny that supervision replaces the underlying craft, that the supervisor could heal in place of the doctor, but Critias never claimed that, and a conductor doesn’t claim to play the oboe. If the reply stopped there, it would miss Critias’ point entirely, and his defense would stand.

The real blow comes in the third question, when Socrates asks, “Or didn’t we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?” That restriction, “and of nothing else,” is one Critias signed up for at 167b–c, and it changes everything, since the earlier doctor argument showed that that knowing knowledge by itself won’t distinguish a real doctor from a convincing pretender. A supervisor who knows nothing about the good can’t direct the knowledge of the good, because he can’t tell when it’s being used well or badly, and that’s like a conductor who can’t read music and knows only that the oboist has a diploma. That restriction was the price Critias paid for making temperance unique, since a knowledge of knowledge with no subject of its own was how Critias kept it distinct from medicine and the other crafts.

Socrates’ own earlier concession confirms that he isn’t ruling out indirect contribution in general. A page or two before, he had suggested that a knowledge of knowledge might make whoever has it “learn more easily whatever else he learns,” so that everything would “appear more clearly to him,” and that he would examine others better about the things he himself has learned. Those are indirect benefits, gains that come from a supervising awareness rather than from producing anything, and Socrates offers them himself. What he denies is that a supervisor with no knowledge of the good can be the source of the benefit the good provides.

So the argument doesn’t exclude every indirect contribution, only one particular kind, the claim that an empty supervisor, knowing nothing of any subject, can deliver the benefit that only knowledge of the good supplies. Real supervisors benefit us because they know a great deal about what they supervise, since a good conductor knows the music and a good editor knows what makes a book work, and Critias’ temperance, by his own definition, knows nothing but the fact of knowing. His defense would work for a richer temperance, and he had defined that richer temperance out of existence.

My verdict is that Critias’ final defense is a good idea attached to the wrong definition, and that Socrates’ reply is decisive only because of that definition. Supervision can certainly benefit us without producing the final result, as the Statesman and every good conductor show. Socrates’ objection turns on the particular limits Critias has set on what temperance knows, and since Critias had restricted temperance to knowledge of knowledge “and of nothing else,” his temperance is that empty supervisor, and the conclusion that it is “the craftsman of no benefit” follows from his own terms.

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