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Book II Chapter 7

Zeno on Virtues and Other Goods

Of goods, some are virtues and some are not. Practical wisdom, temperance, ⟨and justice⟩, courage, ⟨and greatness of soul, vigor, and strength of soul⟩ are virtues. Joy, gladness, confidence, wish, and similar things, however, are not virtues.²⁰²

Zeno on Knowledge and Arts

Of virtues, some are forms of knowledge of certain things and arts, and some are not. Practical wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage are forms of knowledge of certain things and arts. Greatness of soul, vigor, and strength of soul, however, are neither forms of knowledge of certain things nor arts.²⁰³

Zeno on Vices and Other Evils

Correspondingly, of evils some are vices and some are not. Folly, injustice, cowardice, smallness of soul, and incapacity are vices; distress, fear, and similar things are not vices.²⁰⁴ Of vices, some are forms of ignorance of certain things and lack of art, and some are not. Folly, intemperance, injustice, and cowardice are forms of ignorance of certain things and lack of art. Smallness of soul, incapacity, ⟨and weakness⟩, however, are neither forms of ignorance of certain things nor lack of art.²⁰⁵

Definitions of the Virtues

Practical wisdom is knowledge of what should be done, what should not be done, and what is neither; or knowledge of things good, evil, and neither for a creature that is by nature social and ⟨rational⟩. They direct us to understand the other virtues in this way as well.²⁰⁶ Temperance is knowledge of what is choiceworthy, what is to be avoided, and what is neither. Justice is knowledge that assigns each their due worth. Courage is knowledge of things terrible, things not terrible, and things neither.²⁰⁷

Definitions of the Vices and of Virtue

Folly is ⟨ignorance⟩ of things good, evil, and neither; or ignorance of what should be done, what should not be done, and what is neither. Intemperance is ignorance of what is choiceworthy, what is to be avoided, and what is neither. ⟨Injustice is ignorance that fails to assign each their due worth.⟩ Cowardice is ignorance of things terrible, things not terrible, and things neither.²⁰⁸ They define the other virtues and vices similarly, following what has been said. More generally, they say that virtue is a disposition of the soul in agreement with itself throughout the whole of life.²⁰⁹

Primary and Subordinate Virtues

Of virtues, some are primary and others subordinate to the primary virtues. The primary virtues are four: practical wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. Practical wisdom concerns appropriate actions; temperance, human impulses; courage, acts of endurance; and justice, assignments of what is due. Of the virtues subordinate to these, some fall under practical wisdom, some under temperance, some under courage, and some under justice.²¹⁰

The Subordinate Virtues

Under practical wisdom fall good deliberation, sound calculation, quickness of mind, discernment, ⟨sound aim,⟩ and resourcefulness. Under temperance fall orderliness, propriety, modesty, and self-control. Under courage fall endurance, confidence, greatness of soul, stoutheartedness, and love of effort. Under justice fall piety, kindness, good fellowship, and fair dealing.²¹¹

The Virtues under Practical Wisdom

They say that good deliberation is knowledge of what to do, and how to do it, so that we shall act advantageously. Sound calculation is knowledge that weighs against one another and sums up what is happening and being accomplished.²¹² Quickness of mind is knowledge that finds the appropriate action at once. Discernment is knowledge ⟨of what is worse and better; sound aim is knowledge⟩ that attains the target in each case. Resourcefulness is knowledge that finds a way through difficulties.²¹³

The Virtues under Temperance

Orderliness is knowledge of when to act, what should follow what, and, in general, the ordering of actions. Propriety is ⟨knowledge⟩ of fitting and unfitting movements. Modesty is knowledge that guards against justified reproach. Self-control is knowledge that admits no transgression of what has appeared in accordance with right reason.²¹⁴

The Virtues under Courage

Endurance is knowledge that abides by what has been correctly judged. Confidence is knowledge through which we know that we shall encounter nothing terrible.²¹⁵ Greatness of soul is knowledge that raises one above the things that naturally occur among both the virtuous and the base. Stoutheartedness is knowledge belonging to a soul that renders itself unconquerable. Love of effort is knowledge that carries out the task at hand and is not hindered by toil.²¹⁶

202.The subject remains goods: the second list contains goods that are not themselves virtues, rather than things rejected as evils. “Wish” renders βούλησις in this positive classification; the text does not call every ordinary desire good. Angle brackets retain Wachsmuth’s supplements of justice and the three further virtues, supplied from the parallel structure of the following sentences. Vigor and strength of soul preserve the two terms ῥώμη and ἰσχύς.

203.Ἐπιστήμη denotes knowledge, while τέχνη denotes an organized art or expertise, rather than fine art alone. The distinction follows the account introduced under Zeno. Wachsmuth observes that greatness of soul is subsequently defined as knowledge at II.7.5b2, printed p. 61; he retains the discrepancy and relates it to differing accounts associated with Zeno and Chrysippus. The present translation likewise preserves both formulations.

204.Distress and fear remain in the evil class even though they are distinguished from vices. Λύπη, “distress,” is distinguished here from the πόνος, “pain” or “hardship,” listed among indifferents in II.7.5a. The first list of vices does not include intemperance, whereas the next does; the printed lists have not been silently made identical.

205.Μικροψυχία is literally smallness of soul, the counterpart to greatness of soul. Incapacity and weakness translate the distinct terms ἀδυναμία and ἀσθένεια; the latter is supplied by the editor. Ἀτεχνία is lack of the art or expertise, corresponding to τέχνη in the preceding classification.

206.Wachsmuth relocates the following extended exposition of virtues to this position, identifying it with a Chrysippean account. He explains that it stood later in the manuscript sequence between divisions of goods and evils, and argues for the displacement of a leaf. The source’s raised locator 5b¹ is written 5b1 here; added final numbers divide it only for layout. “Social” renders πολιτικοῦ, and “rational” is his supplement, not a replacement of the printed social qualification.

207.Each definition makes a virtue a kind of knowledge, in contrast with the preceding account’s exceptions. “Neither” retains the repeated third class in the practical wisdom, temperance, and courage definitions. Justice concerns assignment according to worth; the wording does not simply define it as giving everybody an identical share. “Terrible” retains δεινόν without replacing it by a list of external dangers.

208.The supplied “ignorance” completes the definition of folly. Wachsmuth also brackets the whole definition of injustice, with the negative μή supplied within the restoration to oppose justice’s assignment of worth. The English retains the scope of those brackets. The definitions of vices mirror those of virtues without turning ignorance into morally neutral lack of information.

209.“Disposition” renders διάθεσις. The agreement is with itself, αὑτῇ, and extends throughout life. This general definition should not be reduced to feeling calm at a particular moment. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.89 for a parallel statement about virtue and consistency.

210.Καθήκοντα are appropriate actions, the term used earlier in the divisions of ethics. Ὁρμαί are impulses toward action; ὑπομοναί concern enduring or standing firm; ἀπονεμήσεις concern assigning or distributing. The four fields anticipate the natural starting points at II.7.5b3. The order courage then justice follows the source here, even though some earlier lists place justice before courage.

211.The following definitions determine the senses of these compact names. “Sound aim,” εὐστοχία, is supplied in the list by Wachsmuth in view of the definition he restores below. The list preserves several distinct virtues that ordinary English might group together as courage or good sense. In particular, confidence and stoutheartedness render θαρραλεότης and εὐψυχία, while greatness of soul renders μεγαλοψυχία.

212.“Weighs against one another” renders the difficult printed ἀνταναιρετικήν, paired with συγκεφαλαιωτικήν, “summing up.” Wachsmuth’s apparatus records competing readings and conjectures; the English follows his printed pair as a process of comparative reckoning and summation. “Act advantageously” renders συμφερόντως; it does not by itself restrict the advantage to private financial gain.

213.The angle brackets contain both the missing object of discernment and the beginning of the definition of sound aim, restored from a parallel cited in the apparatus. They do not enclose the whole final definition. “At once” renders ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα, and “target” renders σκοπός; the latter remains distinct from τέλος, “end.” Resourcefulness concerns finding a way through a difficult situation.

214.Orderliness concerns the timing and sequence of actions. Propriety’s “knowledge” is supplied in the Greek. The definition of modesty concerns justified reproach, ὀρθὸς ψόγος, rather than every adverse opinion. Self-control retains the force of ἀνυπέρβατον, “not to be overstepped”: the knowledge holds firm concerning what right reason has shown. Compare the related, but differently worded, account in Diogenes Laertius VII.93.

215.The emphatic negative οὐδενὶ ... μή is retained as the assurance that nothing terrible will be encountered. In this ethical classification, the statement should not be expanded into a promise that no bodily danger or hardship can occur. Endurance concerns remaining with correct judgments; it does not commend holding to every previous decision regardless of its truth.

216.Here greatness of soul is expressly knowledge, whereas the Zeno sequence at II.7.5b denies that classification; the difference is retained. “Virtuous” and “base” render σπουδαῖοι and φαῦλοι as ethical types. Love of effort is not a wish for suffering: its definition concerns completing the task despite toil. The printed διὰ πόνον is followed; Wachsmuth’s apparatus records a correction and another suggestion for its wording.