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Book II Chapter 7

On Goods and Evils · Plato 1

Plato uses the following division. I shall set it down word for word from the first book of the Laws, both for the beauty of its expression and for its clarity:¹⁸⁷ “Goods are of two kinds, human and divine, and the former depend upon the divine. If someone receives the greater goods, the lesser are present as well; otherwise he is deprived of both. The lesser goods are these: health leads, beauty is second, and third is strength for running and every other movement of the body. Fourth is wealth, which is not blind but sees keenly, provided that it follows practical wisdom.

On Goods and Evils · Plato 2

The first leader among the divine goods is practical wisdom; second is a temperate disposition of the soul accompanied by intelligence. From these, blended with courage, justice would be third, and courage fourth. All these are naturally ranked before the former goods, and the lawgiver too must rank them in this way.”¹⁸⁸

On Goods and Evils · Divisions 1

I shall also make the distinction in this way. Plato, who speaks with many voices but does not hold many doctrines, as some suppose, has divided the good in many ways. By kind, he divides goods into two: divine and human. He calls the virtues of the soul divine, and the good conditions of the bodily part and the resources derived from what are called external things human. By their fields, he divides them into three: one might describe goods of the soul as virtues, those of the body as good conditions, and those in external things as resources.¹⁸⁹

On Goods and Evils · Divisions 2

By forms, the division is fivefold. First, he declares the good to be the Form itself, which is divine and separate; second, the composite of practical wisdom and pleasure, which some believe to be, according to him, the end of human life; third, practical wisdom itself on its own; fourth, the composite of sciences and arts; fifth, pleasure itself on its own. He uses these distinctions especially in the first book of the Laws and in the Philebus.¹⁹⁰

On Goods and Evils · Another Account

Another account: only the noble is good, since nothing that exists is good unless it shares in virtue, as the firebrand and iron share in fire, without which nothing is hot in an unqualified sense.¹⁹¹ It is likewise with the other goods of the three kinds, to the extent that the two, bodily goods together with external ones, have shared in virtue.¹⁹² For just as the moon’s substance is unlit in itself but is illuminated by sharing in the sun’s radiance, so nothing that does not participate in virtue is good. Human goods derive their capacity to benefit from the divine goods.

On Goods and Evils · Aristotle 1

Aristotle too adopts the threefold division of goods by their fields, similarly to Plato. Further, some goods are choiceworthy for their own sakes, others for the sake of other things. Choiceworthy for their own sakes are those that move or encourage one toward choosing them without some further thing as the reason. Such are happiness, the class of virtues, the bodily ⟨primary⟩ things in accordance with nature, health, good bodily condition, acuity of sense, beauty, speed, soundness, strength, and things like these, together with those bodily pleasures that bring no harm.¹⁹³ For a person of understanding would choose these ⟨for⟩ themselves, even if they procure nothing else distinct from them.¹⁹⁴

On Goods and Evils · Aristotle 2

Choiceworthy for other things are those that invite choice because of something else distinct from themselves: walking, exercise, learning, reading, medical treatments, care, nourishment, and coverings. None of these is to be taken for its own sake, but with reference to the things for which it is provided.¹⁹⁵

Is Everything Noble Choiceworthy for Itself · 1

According to Plato, everything is. This includes every virtue, the worthy disposition corresponding to each, and its activity, which is action accompanied by reason.¹⁹⁶ It is called “noble” because it calls one toward itself.¹⁹⁷

Is Everything Noble Choiceworthy for Itself · 2

Aristotle, however, holds that dispositions are not choiceworthy for their own sakes, since they are chosen for something else, their activity. Every disposition is for this activity as its purpose; ⟨but⟩ the activity is choiceworthy for its own sake, as exercise and the end of life. Accordingly, he speaks of happiness in terms of exercise, whereas Plato does so also in terms of possession. The older philosopher has recorded these things in the Laws, the Timaeus, and some other works; the younger in his ethical works.¹⁹⁸

Doctrines of Zeno and the Other Stoics on the Ethical Part of Philosophy

I shall next set down an account of ethical matters, taking up the main points of the essential doctrines. I shall begin here.¹⁹⁹

Zeno on Goods Evils and Indifferents

Zeno says that the things that exist are those which partake of substance. Of existing things, some are goods, some evils, and some indifferents.²⁰⁰ Goods are such things as practical wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and everything that is virtue or partakes of virtue. Evils are such things as folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, and everything that is vice or partakes of vice. Indifferents are such things as life and death, reputation and disrepute, pleasure and pain, wealth and poverty, health and disease, and things like these.²⁰¹

187.Laws I, 631B–D; the quotation continues in the next unit. The narrator’s “word for word” is retained, but the translation follows the Greek quoted by Stobaeus where it differs from another edition of Plato. Wealth is personified as sighted when guided by practical wisdom. The condition “provided that” is part of the text, not an assurance that wealth is invariably good.

188.This completes the Laws quotation. The four divine goods are practical wisdom, temperance with intelligence, justice, and courage. The text makes justice arise from a blend that includes courage, although courage is fourth in the ranking. The “former goods” are the human goods just listed. Νοῦ is the contracted genitive of νοῦς, intelligence; it is not an additional fifth virtue.

189.The narrator distinguishes a twofold division by kind from a threefold division by field or location: soul, body, and external circumstances. Εὐεξία means a good condition, especially bodily condition; εὐπορία means having resources or means available. The claim that Plato’s varied expression is doctrinally consistent repeats the source’s interpretation in II.7.3f; it is not a conclusion added by the translator.

190.The first item is the Form of the Good itself; “forms” in the introductory classification translates εἴδη more generally as the divisions being listed. The qualification ἐνίοις δοκεῖ, “some believe,” is retained for the mixture of practical wisdom and pleasure. The source does not present all five items as equally good or equally final. “Sciences and arts” renders ἐπιστῆμαι and τέχναι as organized knowledge and skills.

191.Καλόν is rendered “noble” in its ethical sense. Wachsmuth warns against changing it to θεῖον, “divine,” and notes the Stoic character of the formula. The fire and moon comparisons explain a dependence: bodily and external things receive their beneficial character through virtue, as heated things or the moon receive heat or light.

192.Wachsmuth marks the words μετὰ δ’ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, “and with other goods,” as corrupt in his apparatus. The English gives a tentative connective sense while preserving the three kinds and the two dependent classes specified in the printed Greek. It follows the surrounding explanation of participation in virtue; no conjectural replacement is inserted into the Greek.

193.The three fields are soul, body, and external circumstances. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.8, 1098B. The supplied ⟨πρώτων⟩ links the bodily list to the primary things in accordance with nature listed in II.7.3c. The qualification “that bring no harm” applies to the bodily pleasures included here; the report does not include every bodily pleasure without distinction.

194.The supplied ⟨δι’⟩ is retained as ⟨for⟩. Being choiceworthy for its own sake need not mean never being chosen for any further purpose: the immediate test is whether a person would still choose the good if nothing distinct from it resulted. The distinction between possessing virtue and exercising it is taken up in II.7.4b.

195.This is the source’s list of things chosen as means to further results. Μάθησις is learning, distinct here from reading; ἰατρεῖαι and θεραπεῖαι distinguish medical treatments from care more broadly. Σκέπαι denotes coverings or protection and can include what clothes or shelters the body. The translation retains the list’s categorical claim rather than adding exceptions not expressed in this passage.

196.The question appears at the foot of printed p. 56 and the answer begins p. 57. Ἕξις is a settled disposition; ἐνέργεια is its activity. Wachsmuth cautions in his apparatus that the terminology of activity here is foreign to Plato’s own wording. The passage is a later report of the position attributed to Plato, not a direct quotation from him.

197.The explanation plays on καλόν, “noble” or “beautiful,” and κλητικόν, “calling” or “summoning.” English cannot reproduce the verbal resemblance with “noble.” Wachsmuth compares Plato, Cratylus 416C. The translation preserves the argument as an ancient account of the name, not as an established modern etymology.

198.The older philosopher is Plato and the younger Aristotle. The contrast develops the distinction between possession and exercise in II.7.3f–g. The supplied ⟨δὲ⟩ is shown as ⟨but⟩. “Ethical works” preserves the general plural Ἠθικοῖς rather than restricting the reference to one named treatise. The statements summarize the positions as this source understands them; they are not newly added claims that every use of the terms in Plato or Aristotle fits this contrast.

199.This heading introduces a sustained report of Stoic ethics within Chapter 7. The narrator’s first person belongs to the ancient account being excerpted; it is not the modern translator’s voice. Zeno is the Stoic founder, Zeno of Citium. The heading includes other Stoics, and the following material should not all be read as a verbatim quotation from a single work of Zeno.

200.“Substance” renders οὐσία in this statement about what exists; it is not the sense “property” or “wealth.” The sentence precedes an ethical division of existing things. Its wording is retained without expanding it into a full account of Stoic ontology. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.101–102 for the division into goods, evils, and indifferents.

201.“Indifferents” means things placed in neither the good nor the evil class, not things about which a person must feel no concern. Life and death, health and disease are classified together in this respect; the sentence does not say that every practical choice between them is equivalent. Δόξα here means reputation, not opinion. Πόνος is pain or hardship, paired here with pleasure.