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Book II Chapter 7

On the End · Aristotle 1

Aristotle takes the end as the exercise of complete virtue, furnished with resources in ⟨a complete life⟩. Exercise is more than possession: for he holds that happiness is an activity, and the end an ⟨action⟩ of ours.¹⁷³ Virtue is the soul’s best disposition. It is “complete” in three ways: as a composite of theoretical, practical, and ethical virtues (for he posits three kinds), which one might call virtue complete by composition; as made complete from its proper powers, nature, reason, and habit (one might call this completeness by number); and as the harmony of the rational part of the soul with the nonrational part. I shall explain these matters further as I proceed.¹⁷⁴

On the End · Aristotle 2

Happiness can be defined in several ways according to him: “An activity in accordance with complete virtue, furnished with resources in a complete life”; “a noble and complete life furnished with resources”; and, clearest of all, “the exercise of complete virtue, furnished with resources in a complete life.” He says “⟨in⟩ a complete life” with reference to the duration of the exercise of goods, and “furnished with resources” so that the exercise takes place amid good things, not bad.¹⁷⁵ This, then, is the end; the same thing is also called happiness, a synonymous term taken over from Plato.¹⁷⁶

On the End · Three Targets

He posits three targets for the striving of human desires: the noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant. Noble are virtue and what participates in virtue, such as the worthy person himself, and the deed that proceeds from virtue. The good is noble insofar as it is praiseworthy or produces praiseworthy people. The advantageous is ⟨what is⟩ useful for living; the conception might also extend to living well. These are the primary things in accordance with nature for soul and body, discussed earlier. The pleasant is a congenial affection of soul and body, leading from a condition contrary to nature to one in accordance with nature, as Plato defined it in the Timaeus.¹⁷⁷

On the End · Eudoxus

Aristotle, in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, thinks that Eudoxus, the student of the stars, maintained that pleasure is the end.¹⁷⁸

On the End · Democritus and Plato 1

Democritus and Plato both place happiness in the soul. The former wrote as follows: “Happiness is of the soul, and so is unhappiness.” “Happiness dwells neither in herds nor in gold; the soul is the dwelling of a divine spirit.”¹⁷⁹ He also calls it ⟨happiness and⟩ cheerfulness, well-being, harmony, proportion, and freedom from disturbance. He says that it is constituted by setting limits to and distinguishing among pleasures, and that this is what is noblest and most advantageous for human beings.¹⁸⁰

On the End · Democritus and Plato 2

Plato, agreeing with Democritus on this point, writes that we must suppose of the most authoritative thing within us “that god has given it to us as a divine spirit,” and places happiness in it. He describes this as a disposition and state of a certain kind in the soul’s ruling part: the affections provide the beginning of this good, while reasoning is its limit and boundary.¹⁸¹ We can hear him say: “For these two springs are naturally allowed to flow (pleasure and pain); whoever draws from them ⟨from the source he should, in the direction and manner he should⟩ is happy, while whoever does not is the opposite.”¹⁸²

On the End · Democritus and Plato 3

By naming pleasure and pain, then, he establishes the beginning of happiness in the affections. By saying that the person who draws from the proper source, in the proper direction and manner, is happy, he has stated that the rational part sets happiness’s limits.¹⁸³ On this point, therefore, they agree with each other. But insofar as Plato places the primary good, desirable for its own sake, in sound reasoning, and the derivative good in pleasure, which he too considers synonymous with joy and freedom from disturbance, ⟨they differ from each other⟩ as a consequence.¹⁸⁴

On Goods and Evils · 1

A good is that from which being benefited results; that which all rational beings primarily desire; that which either accords with nature or produces what accords with nature; what naturally arouses desire; what moves desire when desire is in accordance with nature; that through whose presence each thing is in a good condition, insofar as that presence is concerned, or what produces such a condition; that which is either choiceworthy for its own sake or productive of what is choiceworthy; and that which either is happiness or contributes to happiness.¹⁸⁵

Also, as Strato puts it, that which completes the capacity through which we attain activity; and that which constitutes each thing’s essence, by which the particular things sharing in such a capacity will be judged. It is also defined in many other ways.¹⁸⁶

173.Wachsmuth supplies ⟨βίῳ τελείῳ⟩, “a complete life,” and ⟨πρᾶξιν⟩, “action.” Χορηγουμένην, “furnished with resources,” is a consequential editorial correction repeated throughout this account; the next unit explains that the resources must be good. The formulation is the source’s summary of Aristotle, not presented as a verbatim sentence from the Nicomachean Ethics.

174.The three explanations of “complete” are retained separately, including the source’s threefold classification into theoretical, practical, and ethical virtues. The second concerns the three contributing powers, nature, reason, and habit; the third concerns the relation between the soul’s rational and nonrational parts. Neither the classification nor the forward-looking first person is an addition by the translator.

175.Διάστασις here concerns duration, as Wachsmuth explains in his apparatus. The complete life provides the temporal extent for exercising goods; “furnished with resources” adds the surrounding good conditions. The supplied ⟨ἐν⟩ is retained as ⟨in⟩. The shift between activity, life, and exercise belongs to the source’s three alternative formulations.

176.Wachsmuth refers to Plato, Gorgias 470E. The claim that the term was taken over from Plato belongs to this account; the translation does not assert that Plato invented the word εὐδαιμονία.

177.Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric I.6, 9, and 10, for the subjects of the advantageous, noble, and pleasant; the last reference is Plato, Timaeus 64D. Wachsmuth notes that the formulation about virtue and what participates in it has Stoic parallels, so this report need not reproduce Aristotle’s own terminology throughout. The rejected article [τὸ] is retained in Greek and omitted in English; the supplied ⟨τὸ⟩ before “useful” is expressed as ⟨what is⟩. “Leading” preserves the movement from an unnatural to a natural condition in the account of pleasure.

178.Nicomachean Ethics X.2, opening. The person is Eudoxus, not Eudorus of the earlier division of ethics. Ἀστρολόγος is rendered broadly as “student of the stars,” as in II.1.23. The report preserves οἴεται, “thinks,” rather than removing the qualification or presenting a direct quotation from Eudoxus.

179.The first two sayings are attributed here to Democritus. Βοσκήματα means livestock or herds. Δαίμων is rendered “divine spirit,” retaining the connection with εὐδαιμονίη and κακοδαιμονίη; the words do not imply the later Christian sense of “demon.” The following comparison turns to the ruling part of the soul in Plato.

180.Wachsmuth retains the supplement ⟨εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ⟩. Εὐθυμία is cheerfulness or a settled good state of mind; εὐεστώ is well-being; ἀταραξία freedom from disturbance. The several names are preserved. The definition concerns limits and discrimination among pleasures, rather than an indiscriminate pursuit of every pleasure.

181.The reference is Timaeus 90A. The English follows Stobaeus’s wording of the quotation. The subsequent explanatory phrase reads κατάρχειν, “provide the beginning,” not κατάγειν, “bring down” or “derive.” Its counterpart is reasoning as ὅρος and πέρας, limit and boundary. The two roles are explained again in the next unit.

182.Laws I, 636D. Wachsmuth restores the words ⟨ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπῇ καὶ ὅπως⟩ from the following explanation and the Platonic parallel; their supplied status remains visible in English. The parenthetical identification of the two springs as pleasure and pain is already in the printed text. The translation does not expand the quotation to the longer wording of another edition of Plato.

183.The explanation assigns complementary roles to affections and reasoning: the former supply a beginning, while the latter determine the fitting source and manner of enjoyment. The agreement under discussion is between Plato and Democritus. Λογιστικόν is the rational part, not a separate mathematical faculty.

184.The concluding ⟨ἀλλήλοις διαφέρονται⟩ is supplied by Meineke following Canter’s interpretation, as Wachsmuth records. It makes the contrast with the preceding agreement explicit. Προηγούμενον is “primary”; ἐπιγεννηματικόν marks what arises subsequently. The passage reports a distinction between the roles assigned to sound reasoning and pleasure, rather than denying every place to pleasure in Plato’s account.

185.The heading concerns goods and evils, but the present sequence begins with definitions and classifications of the good. These are alternative formulations; they should not be combined into a single definition belonging to one school. “Choiceworthy” renders αἱρετόν, distinguishing being worthy of choice from actually being chosen. Προηγουμένως means primarily or in the first instance. “What naturally arouses desire” renders the printed ὀρεκτικόν; the Greek has not been changed to ὀρεκτόν, “desired.”

186.The attribution to Strato explicitly introduces the definition in terms of completing a capacity. The subsequent definition concerning essence and the judgment of particulars remains in the sequence without a new attribution. Wachsmuth connects that formulation with Plato’s Form of the Good in his apparatus. The English retains the printed κριθήσεται, “will be judged,” rather than substituting another proposed wording.