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Book II Chapter 7

On the End · Definitions 1

The Stoics give this definition: “The end is that for the sake of which everything is appropriately done, while it itself is done for the sake of nothing else.” Also: “That for whose sake the other things are, while it itself is for the sake of nothing else.” And again: “That to which everything appropriately done in life is referred, while it itself is referred to nothing else.”

The later Peripatetics, those following Critolaus, define it as “that which is made complete out of all goods” (that is, “out of the three kinds”), incorrectly. For not all goods become parts of the end: neither bodily goods nor goods from external things do so, but only the activities of the soul’s virtue.¹⁵⁹

On the End · Definitions 2

It would therefore have been better to say “actualized” instead of “made complete,” so that virtue’s exercise might be made apparent.¹⁶⁰ Those who follow Epicurus do not accept the expression “actualized,” because they posit the end as something experienced, rather than something enacted (for it is pleasure). Hence they also give this account of the end: “To bring about of itself a congenial disposition toward itself, without any application toward something else.”¹⁶¹

On the End · Target and End

The word “end” is found also in Homer:

For I say there is no more delightful end.

But he introduced the end as something shared by the people, whereas Plato first distinguished the end particular to an individual and a life, both in the Timaeus and in the Protagoras.¹⁶²

We must also ⟨note⟩ the difference between the target and the end. The target is what is set before one to be hit, as a shield is for archers; the end is ⟨the⟩ attainment of what is set before one. For they require an activity of ours in relation to the end.¹⁶³

On the End · Preliminary End 1

A preliminary end is the living creature’s first congenial affection, from which it began to be aware of its own constitution, ⟨being⟩ not yet rational but nonrational, in accordance with natural and seminal principles, as are the nutritive and perceptive faculties. Each of these occupies the place of a root, not yet of a plant. For on coming into being the creature was necessarily attached to something immediately from the beginning; this is the preliminary end. It lies in one of three things: pleasure, freedom from disturbance, or the primary things in accordance with nature.¹⁶⁴

On the End · Preliminary End 2

The primary things in accordance with nature are, for the body, condition, movement, posture, activity, capacity, desire, health, strength, good bodily state, acuity of sense, beauty, speed, soundness, and the qualities of vital harmony; for the soul, quickness of understanding, natural aptitude, love of effort, perseverance, memory, and similar things. None of these yet has the character of an art; they are rather innate. None of the ancients named the preliminary end, although they knew the thing itself.¹⁶⁵

On the End · Happiness

They say that happiness is synonymous with the end. Happiness is the best thing in life, or the greatest of goods, or the most excellent. These are among the simpler conceptions of it. Even if someone speaks of blessedness or living blessedly, he will arrive at the same point as those who discuss ends. We must therefore make a further division.¹⁶⁶

Of those who have discussed the end, some conceived it as belonging to the soul, others to the body, and others as a mixture of both. I shall give examples. Whoever says virtue, that is, an end lying in virtue, has taken it to belong to the soul; whoever says pleasure, to the body; whoever says living nobly and pleasantly, to both. One might also put it this way: some say rational, others nonrational; some intellectual, others a matter of feeling. All the distinctions expressed in these terms converge on the same point. For since the human being is constituted of body and soul, a good life must also be constituted in relation to these and through them.

On the End · Homer

Let us speak at once of the first group, those whose starting point was the goods of the soul. Homer, for let antiquity be given precedence, declared the end of happiness to belong to the soul, and did so through the character he presents as the wisest: for Odysseus is made to exclaim:

For I say there is no more delightful end than when gladness possesses the whole people.

Gladness is a certain disposition of the soul, which one might explain as noble understanding, taking this to mean understanding directed toward noble things. Let the honor already allotted to Homer for his antiquity suffice; we must proceed to the philosophers.¹⁶⁷

On the End · Socrates and Plato 1

Socrates and Plato, agreeing with Pythagoras, take assimilation to god as the end. Plato articulated this more clearly by adding “as far as possible.” It is possible only through practical wisdom, and this means ⟨living⟩ according to virtue. For in god there is the making and governing of the cosmos; in the wise person, the ordering of life and the conduct of living.¹⁶⁸ Homer is said to have hinted at this when he said:

Walk in the god’s footsteps.

Pythagoras is said to have stated it alongside him: “Follow god,” clearly meaning a god who is not visible and leading the way, but intelligible and the harmonizer of cosmic order.¹⁶⁹

On the End · Plato 2

Plato has expressed it according to the threefold division of philosophy: in the Timaeus in terms of nature (and I shall add, in Pythagorean terms), amply indicating Pythagoras’s prior conception; in the Republic in ethical terms; and in the Theaetetus in logical terms. It is also set out, clearly and fully, in the fourth book of the Laws, in the discussion of following god.¹⁷⁰

On the End · Plato 3

Plato’s many voices ⟨do not amount to many doctrines⟩. He has also spoken about the end in many ways. His variety of expression arises from his eloquence and grandeur of speech, but converges on one consistent doctrine. This is living according to virtue; and this, in turn, is both the possession and the exercise of complete virtue.¹⁷¹ That he regards it as the end is shown by his use of the very word in the Timaeus, ⟨saying⟩ it expressly. I shall give the conclusion of the passage as well; it runs as follows: “Having made oneself like it, to attain the end of the best life set before human beings by the gods, both for the present and for the future.”¹⁷²

159.Καθηκόντως means appropriately, corresponding to καθήκοντα, the “appropriate actions” of II.7.2. The three kinds of goods are those of the soul, the body, and external circumstances. The objection to Critolaus’s followers belongs to the source’s argument; it is not an editorial verdict added by this translation. The sequence distinguishes goods that enter into the end from other goods.

160.The contrast is between being composed of goods and being put into activity. Χρηστικόν points to the exercise or use of virtue. “Something experienced” renders παθητικόν in opposition to πρακτικόν, “something enacted”; it does not mean a pathological condition.

161.The final definition is compressed and its wording is disputed. Wachsmuth prints the active infinitive διατιθέναι and πρὸς αὐτό; his apparatus records alternatives to the latter and to ἁπάσης. The English retains the end as the implicit referent of “itself” and preserves the reference to application toward something else, rather than replacing the sentence with a familiar general statement of Epicurean ethics.

162.Odyssey IX.5; compare the fuller quotation in II.7.3e. Δημοτελές is rendered “shared by the people,” in contrast to the individual end. The references printed here are Timaeus 90D and Protagoras 354D. This is the source’s account of philosophical priority, not an independently established chronology.

163.Σκοπός is the object aimed at; τέλος is its attainment in this distinction. Wachsmuth supplies ⟨σημειωτέον⟩ and separates the paragraph from the preceding reference to Plato. His apparatus attributes the distinction to Stoics and tentatively to Chrysippus. Accordingly the English retains the indefinite “they,” rather than assigning the claim to Plato.

164.Ὑποτελίς names an end at an initial or subordinate stage. “Preliminary end” follows the developmental account here: the creature’s first attachment precedes mature rational life. Οἰκεῖον and ᾠκειώθη express congeniality and attachment; they do not yet assert a deliberate choice. The nutritive and perceptive faculties are compared to roots rather than a developed plant. “Seminal principles” renders σπερματικοὶ λόγοι. The three alternatives report competing accounts of the creature’s first orientation.

165.The list includes rudimentary faculties as well as desirable bodily conditions. “Art” renders τέχνη as a developed skill or organized expertise; the contrast is with what is innate. The source expressly distinguishes possessing the concept from having a name for it. This limits its earlier claims about philosophical priority.

166.Εὐδαιμονία is translated “happiness,” here defined as the best condition or good of a life, not merely a passing feeling. The sentence about “those who discuss ends” follows the unusual printed τελικοῖς; Wachsmuth questions it in his apparatus and considers λόγοις, “accounts.” The ensuing bodily, psychic, and mixed classifications are the source’s way of sorting positions, rather than exhaustive descriptions of every school.

167.Odyssey IX.5–6. The source explicitly interprets εὐφροσύνη, “gladness,” through φρόνησις, understanding or practical wisdom. The translation preserves this interpretive step without making it the ordinary lexical meaning of the Homeric word. It also retains the distinction between Homer and the character Odysseus. The quotation follows the anthology’s μὲν ἔχῃ, not the wording of a different Homeric edition.

168.The Platonic reference is Theaetetus 176B. “Assimilation” renders ὁμοίωσις, becoming like; the qualification “as far as possible” is essential. The following explanation compares divine ordering of the cosmos with the wise person’s ordering of a life. The supplied ⟨ζῆν⟩ is shown as ⟨living⟩.

169.Odyssey V.193. The Homeric line originally describes walking behind a god; the present argument gives it a philosophical interpretation. The injunction attributed to Pythagoras is reported by this source, not independently authenticated here. The contrast between visible guidance and an intelligible model belongs to the source’s explanation.

170.Wachsmuth prints these references: Timaeus 90A–D; Republic IX, 585B onward, and X, 608C onward; Theaetetus 176D–E; Laws IV, 716A onward. “Prior conception” renders the unusual προεπίνοια, which Wachsmuth defends in his apparatus. The division into natural, ethical, and logical treatments is the source’s interpretation of Plato. The first-person “I shall add” belongs to the ancient narrator.

171.The supplied ⟨οὐ πολύδοξον⟩ supplies the explicit denial that Plato’s varied expression entails varied doctrine. The assertion of doctrinal unity is the source’s interpretation. Κτῆσις, possession, is distinguished from χρῆσις, exercise or use, a distinction developed in the following Aristotelian account.

172.Timaeus 90D. The quotation follows Wachsmuth’s text of Stobaeus, including its ending “for the present and for the future.” The supplied ⟨εἰπών⟩ is retained as ⟨saying⟩. The object of “made oneself like it” is not restated in the quotation; the preceding Platonic discussion concerns the assimilation of the understanding to what it contemplates.