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Book II Chapter 7

Chapter 7

On the Ethical Branch of Philosophy.¹³⁴

⟨From the Epitome of Didymus⟩ · 1

Ethics is a capacity of the soul through whose proper exercise virtue in action is formed; or an account according to which we shall employ virtue acquired by habituation.¹³⁵

Character is a quality of the nonrational part of the soul as it is habituated to be subject to reason.

Alternatively: a nonrational part of the soul habituated to obey reason; or an affection, or the affective part of the soul, habituated to obey the rational part.

Alternatively: an affection, or the desiring part of the soul, habituated to obey the rational part.¹³⁶

⟨From the Epitome of Didymus⟩ · 2

It may also be defined in this way: an impulse of the soul toward action; or a movement of the soul in accordance with impulse; or a quality of a nonrational portion of the soul; or a quality of the soul’s nonrational part capable, through a subordinate relation, of following the rational part.

This, then, is how those who follow Plato define it. Those who follow Zeno the Stoic define it figuratively: character is a spring of life, from which particular actions flow.¹³⁷

⟨From the Epitome of Didymus⟩ · 3

An affection, according to Aristotle, is a nonrational movement of the soul capable of excess. He applies “nonrational” to what does not possess reason in a ruling role; for it possesses a subordinate relation through which it is naturally able to obey the rational part. He applies “capable of excess” to what is naturally able to admit excess, rather than to what is already excessive; for sometimes it exceeds, and sometimes it falls short.

It is also defined in this way: an affection is a movement of the soul’s nonrational part, capable of excess, in response to an impression of something pleasant or painful.¹³⁸

⟨From the Epitome of Didymus⟩ · 4

So much for the Peripatetic definition. As Zeno the Stoic defined it, however, passion is an excessive impulse. He does not say “naturally capable of excess,” but already in a state of excess: not potentially, but rather actually. He also defined it in this way: passion is a fluttering of the soul, comparing the affective part’s readiness to move with the movement of winged creatures.¹³⁹

The formation of character is the implanting of character.¹⁴⁰

⟨From the Epitome of Didymus⟩ · 5

Ethical virtue is a mean among affections; or a disposition that sets the limits of an affection’s excess and deficiency by the account supplied by practical wisdom; or a disposition to choose what is noble in matters of pleasure and pain.¹⁴¹

These definitions will suffice, since discussions of them will often arise along the way. We must move on to the division of the ethical field, showing its distinctions from the field itself at the outset.

Division of the Ethical Field · 1

Philo was a native of Larissa, an Academic philosopher and a pupil of Clitomachus, one of those who made considerable progress in other matters. This Philo treated other subjects skillfully and also a division of philosophical discourse, which I shall take up as the subject under discussion.¹⁴² He says that the philosopher resembles a physician. Just as a physician’s task is first to persuade the sick person to accept treatment, and second to remove the arguments of those advising against it, so too is the philosopher’s. Both tasks belong to what is called exhortatory discourse, since exhortation urges one toward virtue. One part shows its great benefit; the other refutes those who reject philosophy, accuse it, or otherwise behave maliciously ⟨toward⟩ it.¹⁴³

Division of the Ethical Field · 2

After this comes a second division, occupying second place in the analogy with medicine. Once the physician has persuaded the patient to accept treatment, his task is to administer it: partly by first eliminating the causes of disease, partly by introducing what produces health. So too with philosophical knowledge: after exhortation, it attempts to apply the treatment for which it also employed encouragement, in two parts. It applies one discourse to remove falsely formed opinions, through which the soul’s standards of judgment become diseased, and another to implant sound opinions. Thus the second topic concerns good and evil, toward which and for the sake of which the exhortation is directed.¹⁴⁴

Division of the Ethical Field · 3

The third division will in turn correspond to the third stage of medicine. For medicine’s whole concern is with its end, which is health, and philosophy’s with happiness. To discourse about ends is joined discourse about ways of life. In medicine it is not enough to produce health: instructions about health must also be supplied, by attending to which people will preserve the body’s good condition. Likewise, in life certain principles are needed through which the end will be preserved.¹⁴⁵

Division of the Ethical Field · 4

Discourse about ways of life is also twofold: one part is individual, the other communal. The individual part must examine questions concerning each person, such as whether a person of understanding should take part in politics or associate with rulers, or whether the wise person should marry. The communal part examines ⟨questions⟩ concerning everyone, such as: what is the best constitution? Should public offices be open to all, or subject to a property qualification? This communal part should be called political, and should be arranged separately, although it is part of discourse about ways of life, because of its extent and common concern. If everyone could be wise, no further topics would be needed; for the finer subdivisions are offshoots of those already set out.¹⁴⁶

Division of the Ethical Field · 5

But care must also be taken for people of middling condition, who may benefit from advisory discourses but cannot devote time to the full expositions, either because time is short or because of necessary occupations. Discourse giving precepts must therefore be introduced, through which they will have concise instructions for the security and correctness of their use of each thing.

Such, then, is Philo’s division.¹⁴⁷

134.Wachsmuth restores this heading from Photius and a Florilegium witness, although he prints it without angle brackets. The ethical branch concerns character and conduct. The introductory material compares definitions and divisions from different philosophical schools; it should not be read as a single doctrine shared by all of them.

135.Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Didymus’s Epitome, drawing on a parallel Florilegium attribution and earlier scholarship. The name is commonly associated with Arius Didymus, but the extent and authorship of this ethical compilation are debated. “Introductory definitions” corresponds to Wachsmuth’s Latin section label Prolegomena. Ἠθική can name ethics as a discipline or the capacity cultivated by it; ἐθιστῇ connects the virtue with habituation.

136.Ἦθος is character, while ἐθίζειν means to habituate. “Nonrational” distinguishes a part lacking reason in itself from the rational part it can obey. Πάθος is rendered “affection” in these broad definitions: it need not yet mean the specifically excessive emotion defined below. The repeated alternatives are retained rather than combined into one definition.

137.The subject remains character. The report contrasts a Platonic family of definitions with a Stoic metaphor, rather than attributing every formulation directly to Plato or Zeno. Ὁρμή is an impulse toward action. The spring and flowing actions preserve the water imagery. “Subordinate relation” renders καθ’ ὑποτακτικὸν λόγον, not an additional reasoning faculty in the nonrational part.

138.The report’s explanation of πλεοναστική is decisive: it describes a capacity for excess, not excess already occurring. Accordingly πάθος is “affection” here, while the specifically excessive Stoic state in the next unit is “passion.” Wachsmuth notes Aristotelian parallels but cautions that πλεοναστική is not Aristotle’s own term; the heading reports an interpretation of his position, not a verbatim quotation. Φαντασία is an impression or presentation.

139.The difference from the preceding definition lies in actual excess. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.110 for Zeno’s definition of passion as an excessive impulse. “Fluttering” renders πτοία, the reading Wachsmuth establishes and connects with birds in his apparatus; it preserves the image instead of replacing it with the more general “disturbance.”

140.Ἠθοποιία combines character with making or forming. Wachsmuth prints ἤθους, “of character,” although his apparatus asks whether ἔθους, “of habit,” might have been intended. The translation retains the printed reading, including its apparent repetition.

141.Ἕξις is a settled disposition, προαίρεσις deliberate choice, and φρόνησις practical wisdom. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106B36–1107A2. The excerpt gives several formulations rather than reproducing Aristotle’s complete definition. “Noble” renders καλόν in its ethical sense; “mean” concerns the fitting measure of affections, not mere numerical averaging.

142.Philo is Philo of Larissa, the Academic philosopher named in the Greek, not Philo of Alexandria. The first-person “I” belongs to the source’s narrator, who reports Philo’s division. Wachsmuth retains the difficult phrase περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος and the reading λοιποῖς, “other matters”; the English does not silently replace either with a proposed reading from the apparatus.

143.Προτρεπτικός means exhortatory or encouraging a turn toward a way of life. The physician comparison explains why demonstrating philosophy’s benefit and answering its opponents belong to the same preliminary stage. The supplied ⟨toward⟩ follows ⟨εἰς⟩. In “its great benefit,” the immediate Greek antecedent is virtue; the surrounding argument concerns the benefit of philosophical cultivation.

144.The physician analogy now distinguishes removing causes of disease from introducing health, and removing false opinions from implanting sound ones. Κριτήρια are the soul’s criteria or standards of judgment. The supplied ⟨τῇ⟩ completes the construction “in the analogy” and is conveyed grammatically in English. Wachsmuth deletes [τοῦ μὲν θεραπευτικοῦ], “of the therapeutic part”; it remains in the Greek brackets but is omitted from the English.

145.Τέλος is an end or goal, and εὐδαιμονία is happiness or living well. The medical parallel distinguishes reaching the goal from preserving it. Βίοι are ways or forms of life, not biographies. Wachsmuth’s supplied article ⟨ὁ⟩ identifies the discourse about ways of life and is expressed by the English construction.

146.The contrast is between individual decisions and the shared ordering of a community. Τιμητάς refers to offices subject to an assessment or property qualification, contrasting with offices open in common. The supplied ⟨questions⟩ represents ⟨τὰ⟩ with the understood matters to be examined. The questions about politics and marriage are examples for inquiry, not conclusions that the wise person must pursue or avoid them.

147.Μέσως διακειμένων describes people who have not attained the wisdom just envisaged. Ὑποθετικὸς λόγος gives precepts or practical instructions; it does not mean hypothetical reasoning here. Ὑποθήκαι, the plural noun from the same family, is also one of the three terms in Stobaeus’s title. The concise advice supplements the fuller expositions for readers whose circumstances limit their time.