Diotimos Reading Desk

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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

Reading language

Book II Chapter 4

Plato from the Sophist · 2

“Explain each.”

“The indication applied to actions is, I take it, called a verb.”

“Yes.”

“And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions is a name.”

“Quite so.”

“Then names alone, spoken in sequence, never make a statement; nor do verbs spoken without names.”

“I did not understand that.”

“Clearly you were looking at something else when you agreed just now. For this was precisely what I meant: these things spoken in sequence in this way are not a statement.”

“How?”

“For example, ‘walks,’ ‘runs,’ ‘sleeps,’ and all the other verbs that signify actions—even if someone says them all in succession, he still produces no statement.”

“How could he?”¹¹⁶

Plato from the Sophist · 3

“Likewise, when someone says ‘lion,’ ‘deer,’ ‘horse,’ and the other names given to those who perform actions, this sequence too has not yet formed a statement. For neither way of speaking makes clear any action or inaction, or the being of what is or is not, until someone mixes verbs with names. Then they fit, and such a combination at once becomes a statement—virtually the first and smallest of statements.”

“What do you mean by that?”

“When someone says ‘a human being learns,’ do you call this the smallest and first statement?”

“I do.”¹¹⁷

Plato from the Sophist · 4

“For it now makes something clear about things that are, are coming to be, have come to be, or will be. It does not merely name, but accomplishes something by combining verbs with names. That is why we said that the person speaks, rather than merely names; and we gave this weaving the name ‘statement.’”

“Rightly.”

“Thus, just as some things fitted together with one another and others did not, so with vocal signs: some do not fit, while those among them that do fit produce a statement.”

“Entirely so.”¹¹⁸

The same author from the Phaedrus · 1

“Let that suffice, then, for the question of art and the lack of art in discourse.”

“Certainly.”

“There remains the question of propriety ⟨in writing, and of impropriety⟩: in what circumstances it would be well done, and in what circumstances improperly. Is that so?”¹¹⁹

“Yes.”

“Do you know how, in acting or speaking about discourse, you will most please a god?”

“Not at all. Do you?”

“I can tell a story heard from earlier people; they themselves know its truth. But if we discovered this ourselves, would we still care at all about human opinions?”

“An absurd question! But tell me what you say you have heard.”

“I heard, then, that near Naucratis in Egypt there lived one of that country’s ancient gods, to whom the bird they call the ibis was sacred. The name of the divine being himself was Theuth.”

The same author from the Phaedrus · 2

“He was the first to discover number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, board games and dice, and also writing. At that time Thamus was king of all Egypt, living near the great city of the upper region which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; they call its god Ammon. Theuth came to him, displayed his arts, and said that they ought to be distributed to the other Egyptians. The king asked what benefit each possessed. As Theuth explained, the king criticized some things and praised others, according to whether he thought the account good or bad. Thamus is said to have made many comments to Theuth for and against each art, which would take a long discourse to recount. When they came to writing, Theuth said: ‘This subject of learning, King, will make the Egyptians wiser and better at remembering; for a remedy for memory and wisdom has been discovered.’”¹²⁰

The same author from the Phaedrus · 3

“But he replied: ‘Theuth, master of invention, one person can give birth to the products of an art, another can judge the share of harm and benefit they bring to those who will use them. And now, because you are the father of writing, your affection has made you say the opposite of what it can do. It will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who learn it, through neglect of the exercise of memory: trusting in writing, they will recall things from outside, through marks belonging to others, rather than from within, by themselves. You have therefore discovered a remedy for reminding, rather than for memory. And you provide your pupils with the appearance of wisdom, rather than its truth. Having heard much without instruction, they will seem to know much, while for the most part being ignorant; they will be difficult to live with, having become seemingly wise instead of wise.’”¹²¹

The same author from the Phaedrus · 4

“Socrates, how easily you make up Egyptian stories—or stories from any country you please!”

“But people have said, my friend, that the first prophetic discourses were those of an oak in the sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona. The people of that time, who were not wise as you young people are, were simple enough to be content to listen to an oak or a stone, provided only that it spoke the truth. Perhaps it matters to you who the speaker is and where he comes from. For you do not consider only whether the matter is as he says or otherwise.”¹²²

The same author from the Phaedrus · 5

“You were right to rebuke me. And I think the matter of writing is as the Theban says.”

“Then anyone who thinks he leaves an art behind in writing, and anyone who receives it believing that something clear and secure will come from writing, would be full of simplicity and would truly fail to understand Ammon’s prophecy, if he thought written discourses were anything more than a means of reminding someone who already knows about the subjects of the writing.”

“Entirely right.”¹²³

The same author from the Phaedrus

“For writing has this strange feature, Phaedrus, and in this it is truly like painting. The offspring of painting stand there as though alive; but if you ask them anything, they remain most solemnly silent. The same is true of discourses: you might think they speak with some understanding, but if you ask about anything they say because you want to learn, they signify just one thing, always the same. Once it is written, every discourse rolls about everywhere, alike among those who understand.”¹²⁴

116.Λόγος is rendered “statement” in this analysis of the smallest meaningful combination. A verb indicates an action; a name identifies the agent. A mere list of verbs lacks the combination required here, even though each item has a meaning.

117.The example combines an agent with an action, rather than merely placing names or verbs beside one another. “A human being learns” preserves the general ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει. The preceding distinction between being and not being prepares the dialogue’s wider inquiry into meaningful and false statements.

118.Συμπλέκειν and πλέγμα develop the image of weaving or interlacing. The result does more than name its separate constituents: it says something about them. The sequence closes by returning to the capacity of things, and then of their signs, to fit together.

119.Phaedrus 274B–275D spans parts 1–5; Socrates speaks with Phaedrus. Wachsmuth supplies ⟨δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας⟩ from Plato. The English brackets its substantive content, with the particle conveyed through the sentence’s transition. Socrates introduces the Egyptian story as something heard, preserving the distinction between a received tale and knowledge of its truth.

120.The story gives invention and the judgment of an invention’s benefit to different figures. Theuth claims writing as a φάρμακον, “remedy,” for memory and wisdom; Thamus’s reply will contest that claim. Compare the favorable accounts of writing and memory at II.4.2 and II.4.8, and the same inventor’s analysis of letters in II.4.15.

121.The contrast is between μνήμη, an exercised power of memory, and ὑπόμνησις, a reminder or external prompt. Δόξα is appearance or reputation in this context; δοξόσοφοι closes the reply with people who seem wise. These are Thamus’s claims within Socrates’ story. The English follows the printed ἀγνώμονες, here “ignorant,” without turning the passage into a claim that all readers lack knowledge.

122.Phaedrus questions the provenance of the story, and Socrates replies with the oak of Dodona. The compliment to the wisdom of the young is ironic. The issue is whether a speaker’s identity and origin should displace attention to the truth of what is said.

123.The Theban is Thamus, whose judgment the dialogue now calls Ammon’s prophecy. The limitation concerns writing’s capacity to impart an art as clear and secure knowledge; the final clause still allows it to remind someone who knows. The English retains that qualification rather than making the passage an absolute rejection of writing.

124.Phaedrus 275D–E. Socrates compares the apparent life of a picture with a written discourse’s inability to answer a new question. This anthology excerpt stops after “among those who understand”; Plato’s dialogue continues the comparison with readers to whom the discourse is not suited. That further wording is not added to Stobaeus’s Greek or to the English.