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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 31

Plato continued

Well, I think I see a large and troublesome kind of ignorance marked off, weighing against all its other parts. — What kind? — Thinking that one knows something when one has not understood it. It seems likely that all the errors we make in thought arise for everyone through this. — True. — And I think this alone among the forms of ignorance has been given the name lack of learning. — Certainly.¹⁴⁵⁴ — What, then, should we call the part of instruction that removes this?¹⁴⁵⁵ — I think, Stranger, that we call the other branch instruction in crafts, but this one, here at least, education. — Indeed, Theaetetus, that is so among almost all Greeks. But we must also examine whether this is now wholly indivisible, or has some division deserving a name. — Then we must examine it.¹⁴⁵⁶

Plato continued

It seems to me, then, that it still divides in some way along this line. — Along what line? — Of instruction through words, one way seems rather rough, while its other part is smoother. — What do we say each of these is? — ⟨One is⟩ a venerable ancestral practice, used especially toward sons, and still used by many today whenever their sons do something wrong: sometimes they scold, sometimes they encourage more gently. Taken as a whole, this would most correctly be called admonition. — That is so.¹⁴⁵⁷ — As for the other, some people would seem, after reasoning it out for themselves, to have concluded that all lack of learning is involuntary; that someone who thinks ⟨he is wise⟩ will never want to learn any of the matters about ⟨which⟩ he supposes himself skilled; and that the admonitory form of education achieves little despite much effort.¹⁴⁵⁸ — And they are right to think so.¹⁴⁵⁹

Plato continued

That is why they set about removing this opinion in another way. — What way? — They question a person about the things on which he thinks he is saying something when he is saying nothing. Then they readily examine the opinions of these people, who are wandering in them, and gather them in discussion and set them side by side in one place.¹⁴⁶⁰ By setting them together, they show that the opinions contradict one another at the same time, about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respects.¹⁴⁶¹ Those who see this become angry with themselves but gentler toward others. In this way they are freed from their grand and rigid opinions about themselves—a release that is the most pleasant of all to hear about, and comes about most securely in the person experiencing it.¹⁴⁶²

Plato continued

For, my dear boy, those who purify them have formed the same judgment about the soul as physicians have about bodies. Physicians believe that a body cannot benefit from the food offered it until someone has expelled what obstructs it within.¹⁴⁶³ So these men think that the soul will gain no benefit from the studies offered it until someone examining the person has brought him to shame, removed the opinions obstructing his learning, and made him appear purified, believing that he knows only the things he actually knows, and no more.¹⁴⁶⁴ — Certainly this is the best and most temperate of dispositions.¹⁴⁶⁵ — For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must say that refutation is the greatest and most authoritative of purifications. And we must hold that someone who has not been refuted, even if he happens to be the Great King, is unclean in the most important respects and has become uneducated and ugly in precisely those respects in which someone who is truly to be happy ought to be most pure and most beautiful.¹⁴⁶⁶

Xenophon, On Hunting

For good education teaches people to make use of laws and to speak and listen about what is just.¹⁴⁶⁷ Those who commit themselves to hard work and instruction gain learning and strenuous practice for themselves, and safety for their own cities.¹⁴⁶⁸ But those who, because it is hard, do not want to be taught, and instead want to pass their time in ill-timed pleasures, are the worst by nature. For they are persuaded neither by laws nor by good arguments. Since they do not work, they do not discover what a good person ought to be like; thus they could be neither reverent toward the gods nor wise.¹⁴⁶⁹ Acting in their uneducated way, they find much fault with the educated.¹⁴⁷⁰ Through such people, then, nothing would go well. But through better people all ⟨the⟩ benefits for humankind have been discovered; and the better people are those willing to work.¹⁴⁷¹

1454.Ἄγνοια is the general term ignorance; ἀμαθία, rendered lack of learning, is here assigned specifically to the presumption of knowing what one does not know. The passage thus distinguishes this state from the other kinds of ignorance.

1455.Wachsmuth supplies ⟨τῷ⟩ from Plato’s text. English expresses the article through the construction the part of instruction; it adds no new kind of instruction.

1456.Δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας denotes instruction in crafts, contrasted here with παιδεία, education. Calling education indivisible or dividing it concerns the dialogue’s classification of kinds; it does not yet settle what method education should use.

1457.Supplied ⟨Τὸ μὲν⟩, from Plato’s text, marks the first branch and is expressed by ⟨One is⟩. Νουθετητική, admonition, includes both angry correction and gentler encouragement; it is not limited to scolding.

1458.The claim that lack of learning is involuntary is made by those introducing the second method. Their reason concerns presumed knowledge: the person who thinks he already knows will not willingly learn those same matters.

1459.Wachsmuth supplies ⟨σοφὸν εἶναι⟩ and ⟨ὧν⟩ from Plato’s text. English marks ⟨he is wise⟩ and ⟨which⟩; the claim to skill remains the learner’s own supposition. The reply endorses the reasoning just stated.

1460.The opinion being removed is the learner’s belief that he knows. The questioning examines what the person himself says and brings those opinions together; it does not begin by supplying him with a new lesson.

1461.The Greek specifies the conditions of opposition: simultaneously, about the same things, in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The translation retains each qualification rather than treating any difference between statements as a contradiction.

1462.The release is from μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν, grand and rigid opinions, about oneself. The accompanying change of attitude is directed both inward, in anger at oneself, and outward, in greater gentleness toward others.

1463.The medical comparison concerns removing an obstruction before nourishment can help. Wachsmuth supplies ⟨ἂν⟩ from Plato’s text after the first πρίν; English expresses its force in the construction until someone has expelled. The translation follows the printed ἐντός, within.

1464.Ἔλεγχος is refutation through examination of the person’s claims. Here shame and the removal of obstructive opinions precede learning; the resulting purified state is a recognition of the limits of one’s knowledge.

1465.Σωφρονεστάτη, most temperate, describes the disposition just defined: believing one knows what one actually knows, without claiming more. The praise concerns this intellectual restraint.

1466.The Great King is admitted as a possible case by even if; exalted status does not exempt anyone from examination. Unclean, uneducated and ugly concern the respects that matter for becoming truly happy, rather than a claim about bodily dirt or physical appearance.

1467.The editorial reference identifies On Hunting 13.14-17; the Greek attribution itself names Xenophon. Education here joins the use of laws with speaking and listening about justice, rather than treating learning as the acquisition of information alone.

1468.The contrast gives learning and demanding practice to the learners themselves, and safety to their own cities. The printed αὐτοὶ, themselves, and the order ἐπιπόνους μελέτας, strenuous practice, are retained rather than replaced from a fuller Xenophon text.

1469.The description φύσει, by nature, stands beside the concluding emphasis on willingness to work; this excerpt does not develop their relation. Δύναιντ’ ἂν, could be, retains the potential form of the stated consequence.

1470.Τῷ τε ἀπαιδεύτῳ χρώμενοι literally speaks of making use of what is uneducated. The English understands the neuter adjective as their uneducated manner of acting; no particular opponent is named.

1471.Wachsmuth supplies ⟨αἱ⟩ from the Xenophon text, reflected by ⟨the⟩. The final comparison identifies the better people by their willingness to undertake effort, returning to the contrast between training and avoidance of hardship.