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Book II Chapter 31

Musonius continued

For perhaps all human tasks lie open in common, and none need necessarily be ruled out for either sex.¹³⁴⁹ Some, however, are more suitable to one nature and some to the other, which is why some are called men’s tasks and others women’s. Yet whatever relates to virtue one could rightly say is equally fitting for each nature, if indeed we say that the virtues themselves belong no more to one than to the other. Therefore I think it reasonable that both female and male should be educated alike in whatever concerns virtue. Beginning from earliest childhood, they should immediately be taught that this is good and that bad, that this is beneficial and that harmful, and that this should be done and that should not.¹³⁵⁰ From these lessons practical wisdom comes to those who learn them, girls and boys alike, and no more to one than to the other. Then a sense of shame at everything disgraceful must be instilled in them. Once these qualities are present, both man and woman must be temperate.¹³⁵¹

Musonius continued

Anyone receiving a proper education, whoever it may be, male or female, must be trained to endure hardship, not fear death, and not be crushed by any misfortune: through all these things a person could be courageous. A little earlier it was shown that women too must share in courage.¹³⁵² Further, to shun greed, honor equality, and, as a human being, wish to benefit other humans and not to harm them is a most noble lesson and makes learners just. Why should a man have learned these things any more than a woman? For, by Zeus, if women ought to be just, then both must have learned the same things, at least the most decisive and important matters.¹³⁵³ If, in some small matter within an artisan’s province, he will know something and she will not, or conversely she will know and he will not, that does not yet show their education to be different. Only let neither have learned different things from the other about any of the most important matters, but the same.¹³⁵⁴

Musonius continued

If someone asks me what branch of knowledge oversees this education, I will reply that without philosophy no woman could be properly educated, any more than any man could.¹³⁵⁵ By this I do not mean that women must possess clarity in argument and some extraordinary cleverness as their way of practicing philosophy—for I do not particularly commend this even in men.¹³⁵⁶ I mean that women must acquire goodness of character and moral excellence in conduct, since philosophy is itself the practice of moral excellence and nothing else.¹³⁵⁷

Theophrastus

For education seems—and everyone agrees on this—to tame souls, removing what is beastlike and unreasoning; hence characters become more sociable and pliant.¹³⁵⁸ As for the many, one might perhaps not blame them, because they lack the freedom . . .¹³⁵⁹ But those with a liberal upbringing and adequate resources to enter any way of life, who nonetheless give no thought to the best one, may then justly be called to account.¹³⁶⁰

Theophrastus continued

For it is truly absurd if, given a choice, they would choose the most renowned city and the best friends and intimates, yet, when free to choose the best life, would disregard it and hand their affairs over to whatever happens, without even beginning to judge and examine.¹³⁶¹ Yet if they had to travel a road, they would often ask others and seek a guide with whom they might make the journey safely.¹³⁶² But when gambling—as the saying goes—with their whole life, they consult no one and fall into the worst life, if it happens so.¹³⁶³

Theophrastus continued

For someone not taking the right road, turning aside is also far more perilous than “the division.”¹³⁶⁴ For the harms are great and the return difficult—rather, almost impossible. Time does not allow a change, nor can nature learn the better anew once it has been reared in worse ways. It chooses ⟨indeed⟩ and judges other things better, yet still lives out its life in accustomed habits.¹³⁶⁵ But what is often said seems true: all people deliberate least about themselves.¹³⁶⁶

Musonius, That One Should Not Use Many Proofs for a Single Matter

Once, when discussion arose about the proofs young people must hear from philosophers in order to grasp what they learn, Musonius said that one should seek effective and clear proofs for each matter, rather than many.¹³⁶⁷ For the praiseworthy doctor, he said, is not the one who gives the sick many medicines, but the one who benefits them appreciably through the few he gives; nor is the praiseworthy philosopher the one who teaches his listeners through many proofs, but the one who brings them through a few to the very point he intends.¹³⁶⁸ And the more intelligent the listener, the fewer proofs he will need, and the sooner he will assent to the argument’s main point, since it is sound, at any rate.¹³⁶⁹

Musonius continued

Whoever needs proof at every point, even where the facts are clear, or wants many proofs for what can be demonstrated to him by a few, is altogether absurd and slow to learn.¹³⁷⁰ It is reasonable, then, that the gods need no proof for anything, since nothing is obscure or unclear to them, and proofs are needed only for ⟨such things⟩.¹³⁷¹ But human beings must seek to discover what is not evident or known of itself through what is evident and obvious; that is the work of proof.¹³⁷²

Musonius continued

For example, that pleasure is not a good does not seem known of itself, since in fact pleasure invites us as though it were a good.¹³⁷³ But if someone takes a known premise—that every good is to be chosen—and adds another known fact to it, that some pleasures are not to be chosen, we demonstrate that pleasure is not a good: the unknown through the known.¹³⁷⁴ Again, that hardship is not an evil does not appear convincing of itself. Its contrary seems more convincing: that hardship is an evil. But once an evident premise is laid down, that every evil is to be avoided, and a more evident one is added, that many hardships are not to be avoided, it follows that hardship is not an evil.¹³⁷⁵

1349.The qualifying ἴσως, perhaps, is retained. Wachsmuth rejects [καὶ ἐστι κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν], and they are common to men and women; the Greek retains it in brackets and the English omits it.

1350.The shared lessons concern good and bad, benefit and harm, and action and restraint. The rejected repetition [κακὸν ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν], bad, the same for both, is retained only in Greek.

1351.Φρόνησις is practical wisdom. The same lessons are said to produce it alike in girls and boys. Αἰδώς is the sense of shame before disgraceful conduct; σώφρονας describes the resulting temperance.

1352.The repeated ἐθιστέον calls for habituation in endurance, fearlessness before death and resistance to misfortune. The reference to the earlier argument on women’s courage stays within this excerpt.

1353.Πλεονεξία is the desire to take more, opposed here to equality. The phrase ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἀνθρώπους places both the acting person and those helped or harmed on the common footing of being human.

1354.The printed τεχνίτου means of an artisan. A minor difference in knowledge within that province does not yet establish a difference in education. The same learning is required of both sexes in the principal matters.

1355.The question asks which ἐπιστήμη, branch of knowledge, directs the education just described. The reply makes philosophy necessary for both sexes, rather than naming a separate discipline for women.

1356.Τρανότης concerns clarity in discourse, while δεινότης περιττή adds exceptional cleverness. The printed ᾗπερ connects these capacities with the proposed way of philosophizing; the parenthesis expressly withholds special praise from such accomplishments in men too.

1357.Καλοκαγαθία combines being fine and good; here it describes conduct and the aim of philosophical practice. The closing sentence defines philosophy through this moral excellence.

1358.The heading names Theophrastus without giving a work title. The opening for connects with an earlier argument. More sociable and pliant renders κοινότερα καὶ ὑγρότερα, qualities of character shaped by education. The three subdivisions serve layout only.

1359.Three printed dots mark a gap after ἐξουσίαν, freedom or opportunity. The missing words are not restored; the precise limit on the many’s opportunity therefore remains unstated.

1360.Ἐλευθερίως describes a liberal upbringing, and χορηγία sufficient resources. The criticism distinguishes those lacking opportunity from those equipped to consider and choose a way of life.

1361.The contrast concerns care in choosing one’s surroundings and associates versus neglect in choosing a life. Οἰκεῖοι are those close to someone, rendered intimates; no particular city or circle is named.

1362.The ordinary journey supplies an analogy for the more consequential direction of a whole life. The guide is not identified with a named person or philosophical school.

1363.Κυβεύοντες evokes throwing dice. The worst life supplies the noun understood with τὸν χείριστον; the qualifying ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, if it happens so, leaves the outcome to chance.

1364.Wachsmuth prints τῆς διαιρέσεως, than the division or distinction. Its relation to the comparative and the road image is uncertain. A branching point or choice may be intended, but the English preserves the difficult comparison rather than silently replacing the Greek.

1365.Nature remains the subject through the contrast between choosing better things and living in established habits. The passage concerns relearning the better after formation in worse ways. Wachsmuth supplies ⟨μὲν⟩, reflected by ⟨indeed⟩; almost qualifies the preceding claim of impossibility.

1366.The main text has ἥκιστα, least. The apparatus proposes κάκιστα, worst, as a different reading; that conjecture is not adopted here. The conclusion thus concerns how little people deliberate about themselves.

1367.The heading states the question, and the opening reports Musonius’s response. Ἀπόδειξις means a proof or demonstration by argument; the emphasis is on effectiveness and clarity. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1368.The medical comparison distinguishes the benefit achieved from the number of remedies used. Likewise, the philosopher’s success is measured by bringing the listener to the intended conclusion, not by accumulating arguments.

1369.Wachsmuth prints ὅτι γε ὑγιεῖ, since it is sound, at any rate. The English retains the causal wording; the claim concerns a sound argument’s main point, not quick assent regardless of its truth.

1370.The criticism concerns demanding redundant demonstrations, including proofs where the facts are already clear. It does not reject the need to establish what is genuinely unknown.

1371.The gods’ complete knowledge supplies the limiting contrast with human understanding. Wachsmuth prints Usener’s supplied ⟨οἷα⟩, referring back to obscure or unclear things; the English reflects the connection with ⟨such things⟩.

1372.Αὐτόθεν γνώριμα are things known directly, without the argument now sought. Proof proceeds from what is evident to what is not evident; this distinction prepares the examples that follow.

1373.Good is considered here as something to be chosen, rather than merely something attractive or pleasant. Pleasure’s immediate appeal is what makes the conclusion require an argument.

1374.The proof combines a universal premise about good with counterexamples among pleasures. It denies pleasure an unqualified status as good; it does not conclude that every pleasure must be avoided.

1375.Πόνος is hardship, including painful effort. The main text calls the added premise φανερωτέρου, more evident; the apparatus questions this wording, but it is retained. The parallel argument concerns what is to be avoided.