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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

Reading language

Book II Chapter 15

In the same work, on Demosthenes

. . adorning himself with words,¹⁰²⁹ but surpassing his words by his deeds—if indeed one must regard it as a test of truth when action also follows speech.¹⁰³⁰

Lucius, from the accounts of Musonius: Whether Habit or Reason Is Stronger

Again the question arose among us whether habit or reasoned teaching ⟨would be⟩ more effective for acquiring virtue, if teaching correctly showed what ought to be done, while habit arose in those becoming accustomed to act according to such teaching.¹⁰³¹ Musonius thought habit more effective, and in support of his view asked one of those present: “Of two physicians, one can speak most knowledgeably about medicine but has no practice in treating the sick; the other cannot expound it but is accustomed to treating according to medical teaching. Which would you prefer to have with you when ill?” He answered, “The one accustomed to treating.”¹⁰³²

Lucius on Musonius continued

And Musonius said: “What, then, of two men, one who has often sailed and already steered a fair number of ships, and another who has sailed only a few times and never steered? If the man who has never steered explains very ably how one should steer, while the other does so inadequately and quite feebly, which would you employ as helmsman when sailing?” He replied that he would employ the one who had often steered.¹⁰³³

Lucius on Musonius continued

Again Musonius said: “And what of two musicians, one who knows musical theory and expounds it most persuasively but cannot sing or play the kithara or the lyre, and another who is weaker in theory but plays the kithara and lyre well and also sings? To which would you entrust a musical task, or which would you wish to become the music teacher of a child who knows no music?”¹⁰³⁴ He answered that he would choose the one competent in ⟨practice⟩.¹⁰³⁵

Lucius on Musonius continued

“What, then?” said Musonius. “That is how matters stand in those cases. But in matters of temperance or self-control, is becoming self-controlled and temperate in everything one does not far better than being able to say the proper things about them?” The young man conceded this as well: speaking competently about temperance is weaker and of less value than being temperate in action.¹⁰³⁶

Lucius on Musonius continued

Musonius then connected this with what had been said: “Given this, how could knowing the reasoned account of each matter be better than becoming accustomed to act and acting in accordance with that account’s guidance? Habit leads to the ability to act, whereas knowing the account of a matter leads to the ability to speak.¹⁰³⁷ The account does, indeed, also assist action by teaching how one should act, and comes before habit in order: one cannot become accustomed to anything noble unless one is habituated in accordance with an account. Yet in effectiveness habit comes before the account, because it has greater power to lead a person to action than the account does.”¹⁰³⁸

From Theodorus’s epitome of Teles: On Seeming and Being

They say that seeming just is better than being just. Is seeming good perhaps also better than being good? — Certainly. — Then is it because they seem to be good actors that people act ⟨well⟩, or because they are? — ⟨Because they are. —⟩ And do they play the kithara ⟨well⟩ because they seem ⟨to be⟩ good kithara players or because they are? — Because they are.¹⁰³⁹ — And in all other matters, generally, is it because they seem ⟨to be⟩ good that they do well, or because they are? — Because they are. — What enables them to live well is better than what does not. Thus being good would appear better than seeming so; for it is the just person who is good, not the person who seems to be just.¹⁰⁴⁰

Teles continued

And what about the other goods—all that people regard as good? Would you rather really be in that condition ⟨than seem to be⟩, and have those goods rather than seem to have them? To take an immediate example, would you wish to see or to seem to see? To be healthy rather than seem so? To be strong rather than seem so? To be well provided for, to have friends, rather than seem so?¹⁰⁴¹ Again, with the goods of the soul: to have understanding rather than seem to? To be free from distress rather than seem so? To be confident, fearless, courageous rather than seem so? But when it comes to justice, would you no longer prefer to be just rather than seem so? — Yet I would also prefer to seem courageous rather than be so. — Or is it not the courageous person who is both fearless and free from distress, rather than the person who seems so? Why do you wish to seem courageous? — They will honor me. —¹⁰⁴²

Teles continued

Yes—and they will put you in the front rank, order you to fight in single combat, contrive to have you draw the lot, and rejoice when you do, just as with Ajax. What do you think will happen then, when you are a coward but face danger?¹⁰⁴³ And if you are taken captive while reputed courageous, you will have heavy fetters and handcuffs. No one will trust you; instead you will also be kept locked up. If they torture you, you will receive many blows; even when you tell the truth you will not be believed, but will be thought to be mocking them because you seem able to endure. They will order you to be beaten, stretched on the rack, and roasted. See how much you will receive from seeming courageous and able to endure! Yet you put forward that advantage and conceal these consequences, like the orators.¹⁰⁴⁴

Plato, from the Letter to Aristodorus

I hear that you are now, and have always been, one of Dion’s closest companions, displaying the wisest of the dispositions that make for philosophy.¹⁰⁴⁵ For steadfastness, trustworthiness, and soundness—this, I say, is true philosophy. The other kinds of wisdom and cleverness, directed toward other ends, I believe I name rightly when I call them refinements.¹⁰⁴⁶

1029.Two printed dots mark missing text at the beginning. The surviving opening contains no negative; none has been supplied before adorning himself with words. The missing clause may have qualified the contrast, but it is not reconstructed here.

1030.The heading says in the same work, on Demosthenes. Wachsmuth questions the same-work reference and discusses a possible confusion between persons named Polyaenus; the attribution is therefore not made more definite. The two excerpts remain separate as printed. Βάσανος evokes a touchstone or test: conduct accompanying speech supplies the proposed criterion of truth.

1031.The heading names Lucius as the recorder of Musonius’s discussion. Λόγος here is reasoned teaching or an explanatory account directing practice; ἔθος is habit formed by repeated action. Supplied ⟨εἴη⟩ is marked as ⟨would be⟩.

1032.The phrase περὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν ὡς ὅτι ἐμπειρότατα is awkward, and the apparatus records several proposed repairs. The English keeps the adverb’s reference to speaking knowledgeably about medicine. The contrast is with practical experience treating patients; the printed Greek is retained.

1033.Having sailed is distinguished from having steered: the second man has some sailing experience but has never taken the helm. The comparison gives greater weight to repeated practical responsibility than to the ability to describe how steering should be done.

1034.Κιθαρίζειν and λυρίζειν distinguish playing the kithara and the lyre. The comparison also includes singing and tests competence both in a musical task and in teaching an untaught child. Λόγοι μουσικοί are accounts or principles of music, rendered musical theory.

1035.Supplied ⟨ἔργοις⟩ is rendered ⟨practice⟩. It states the sphere in which the chosen musician is capable: actually performing the tasks under discussion. The supplied word is not expanded into a claim that theoretical instruction has no value.

1036.The passage pairs σωφροσύνη, temperance or sound self-restraint, with ἐγκράτεια, self-control. Musonius now transfers the comparisons with skilled crafts to moral conduct. The young man prefers the actual exercise of the virtue to the ability to speak competently about it.

1037.Λόγος remains an account or reasoned teaching, and ὑφήγησις its direction or guidance. The practice favored by Musonius is itself practice according to such guidance. The distinction concerns what chiefly develops the ability to act and what chiefly develops the ability to speak.

1038.Priority is explicitly qualified: teaching comes first τῇ τάξει, in order, because good habituation requires rational direction; habit takes precedence δυνάμει, in effectiveness or power, because it more effectively leads a person to act. The conclusion preserves both the practical superiority of habit and the necessary contribution of reasoned teaching.

1039.The heading identifies an abridgment by Theodorus of Teles’s writings. The dialogue tests the preference for a good reputation against examples of actual competence: ὑποκριταί are actors, and κιθαρισταί players of the kithara. Being good at a craft supplies the comparison for being morally good.

1040.The printed supplements are retained: two instances of ⟨well⟩, two of ⟨to be⟩, and the entire first answer, ⟨Because they are. —⟩. The argument moves from doing well to living well; the initial claim favoring appearance is the position being challenged.

1041.The list begins with what people commonly regard as goods, including health, resources, and friends; it does not restrict the term to moral virtue. The supplied comparison ⟨ἢ δοκεῖν εἶναι⟩ is marked in English as ⟨than seem to be⟩.

1042.The goods of the soul include understanding and freedom from distress (ἄλυπος). The interlocutor’s answer about courage introduces a new objection: an apparent virtue may bring public honor. The reply that follows tests the costs of that reputation.

1043.Ajax is chosen by lot to face Hector in single combat in Iliad VII.171–192; his comrades rejoice at his appearance in VII.214. Teles uses the heroic comparison to expose the danger of a reputation that assigns a coward duties requiring real courage. Πρωτοστάτης is a man stationed in the front rank.

1044.The first refusal to trust concerns a captive’s custody; the later refusal to believe concerns truthful speech under torture. The active infinitives after κελεύσουσί σε describe orders for the captive to be beaten, stretched, and roasted, expressed causatively in English. The final contrast recalls the promised honor while exposing its concealed costs.

1045.Letter 10, 358C, in the letters transmitted under Plato’s name. Stobaeus’s attribution is preserved without treating the heading as proof of authorship. The excerpt selects the body of the short letter to Aristodorus, omitting its greeting and closing exhortation. Aristodorus is praised for his enduring friendship with Dion.

1046.Βέβαιον, πιστόν, and ὑγιές describe stability, reliability, and soundness of character. Κομψότητες, refinements or niceties, contrasts other intellectual accomplishments with this practical character. The sentence redirects the measure of philosophy toward how someone lives; it does not supply a catalogue of the other accomplishments.